Ashwood #862639 v. Maloney et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
NORTHERN DIVISION
KENNETH ASHWOOD #862639, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-00083
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
GENEVIEVE MALONEY, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. 	ECF No. 32. 	Plaintiff has not filed a response.
On May 20, 2024, Plaintiff – state prisoner Kenneth Ashwood – filed a
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that several Defendants violated his
Eighth Amendment rights by failing to provide him with a low sodium-diet to address
his medical need to lower his high blood pressure. 	ECF No. 1. 	Defendant Dietician
Kristen Jones is the only remaining Defendant in this case. 	Ashwood sues Jones in
her individual capacity for monetary damages and in her official capacity for
injunctive relief. 	ECF No. 4, PageID.25.
Ashwood alleges that he has high blood pressure that cannot be controlled by
medication. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.3. 	Ashwood requested a special diet to allow him
to better control his blood pressure. 	Ashwood says that RN Cook encouraged him to
select 	more 	healthy 	food 	choices. 	Id. 	Thereafter, 	Dietician 	Jones 	allegedly
provided Ashwood with a list of high sodium foods that he should avoid, and told him
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to stay away from processed meats, canned vegetables, gravy, canned tomato
products, and spaghetti sauce. 	Id. 	Ashwood asserts that up to 90 percent of the
food items served in the prison include food that he cannot eat. 	Id. 	Ashwood says
that Defendant Jones acted with deliberate indifference to his medical needs in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. 	Id.
For reasons set forth below, it is respectfully recommended that the Court
grant Defendant Jones’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss this case.
II. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
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When, as here, the non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must “examine the movant’s motion for summary judgment to
ensure that he has discharged his initial burden.” Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch., 138
F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
1991)).
III. 	Eighth Amendment
Ashwood argues that Defendant Jones violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by denying him a low sodium-diet. 	An Eighth Amendment claim for the deprivation
of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective component. 	Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 	To satisfy the objective component, the plaintiff
must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. 	Id. 	In other
words, the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a
substantial risk of serious harm. 	Id. 	The objective component of the adequate
medical care test is satisfied “[w]here the seriousness of a prisoner’s need[] for
medical care is obvious even to a lay person.” Blackmore v. Kalamazoo Cnty., 390 F.3d
890, 899 (6th Cir. 2004); Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2008).
Where a prisoner challenges their treatment as inadequate, a prisoner must show
more than a serious medical need. 	Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir.
2021). 	To establish the objective component in a situation where a prisoner asserts
that the care received was inadequate, a prisoner must prove grossly inadequate care
which generally requires the introduction of medical evidence typically in the form of
expert testimony. 	Id.
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The subjective component of a deliberate indifference claim requires an inmate
to show that prison officials have “a sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying
medical care. 	Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867 (6th Cir. 2000). 	Deliberate
indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can be “satisfied by
something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. 	“[T]he official must both
be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 	Id. at 837. 	To prove a
defendant’s subjective knowledge, “[a] plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence .
. . : A jury is entitled to ‘conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from
the very fact that the risk was obvious.’” 	Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 738 (6th
Cir. 2018) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842)).
The subjective component was summarized in Rhinehart. 	There, the court of
appeals stated the following:
[T]he plaintiff must show that each defendant acted with a mental state
“equivalent to criminal recklessness.” 	This showing requires proof that
each 	defendant 	“subjectively 	perceived 	facts 	from 	which 	to 	infer
substantial risk to the prisoner, that he did in fact draw the inference,
and that he then disregarded that risk” by failing to take reasonable
measures to abate it.
A plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence to prove subjective
recklessness: A jury is entitled to “conclude that a prison official knew
of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.” And
if a risk is well-documented and circumstances suggest that the official
has been exposed to information so that he must have known of the risk,
the 	evidence 	is 	sufficient 	for 	a 	jury 	to 	find 	that 	the 	official 	had
knowledge.
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But the plaintiff also must present enough evidence from which a jury
could conclude that each defendant “so recklessly ignored the risk that
he was deliberately indifferent to it.”
Id. 738–39 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
In the opinion of the undersigned, Ashwood cannot support his Eighth
Amendment claims under either the objective or subjective components. 	First,
Ashwood has failed to show that the seriousness of his asserted medical need for a
low sodium-diet was obvious to a lay person. 	Ashwood alleged in his complaint that
he 	was 	being 	treated 	for 	high 	blood 	pressure 	by 	his 	medical 	providers 	with
medication. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.3. 	He further admitted that his medical provider
“did not recommend that I be provided a low sodium-diet.” 	Id. 	Most importantly,
Ashwood had the ability to self-select a low sodium-diet from the regular prison
menu.
ECF No. 33-4, PageID.273 (MDOC Diet Manual). 	At all times, Ashwood had the
ability to self-select a low sodium-diet from the regular prison menu. 	Moreover,
Ashwood has failed to place expert testimony or any medical evidence into the record
showing his need for a low sodium-diet. 	Phillips, 14 F.4th at 535; Blackmore, 390
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F.3d at 899. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, Ashwood has failed to establish the
objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim.
Similarly, Ashwood has failed to support the subjective component of an
Eighth Amendment claim. 	Defendant Jones submitted an affidavit explaining that
after Ashwood contacted her for a low sodium-diet, she provided him with information
as to how to select a low sodium-diet from the regular menu. 	Jones attests:
ECF No. 33-3, PageID.259 (Dietician Jones affidavit).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to establish factual evidence that could establish that
Defendant Jones disregarded a known medical risk in a manner “equivalent to
criminal 	recklessness.” 	Rhinehart, 	894 	F.3d 	at 	738. 	In 	the 	opinion 	of 	the
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undersigned, Ashwood has failed to establish the subjective component of an Eighth
Amendment claim.
IV. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendant argues that she is entitled to dismissal of the
complaint 	against 	her 	for 	monetary 	damages 	based 	upon 	qualified 	immunity.
“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
of which a reasonable person would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d
531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
Once a defendant raises the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant officer violated a right so clearly
established “that every ‘reasonable official would have understood that what he [was]
doing violate[d] that right.’” 	Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step
inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013).
First, the court must “determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a
constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)).
Second, the court asks if the right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event
occurred such that a reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated
it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these steps in any
order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to
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qualified immunity if either step of the analysis is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in
Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To be clearly established, a legal principle must have a sufficiently clear
foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must be “settled law,”
Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589
(1991) (per curiam), which means it is dictated by “controlling authority”
or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive authority,’ ” al–Kidd,
supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S.
603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It is not enough that
the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The precedent must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it to establish
the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply. See Reichle, 566 U.S., at
666, 	132 	S.Ct. 	2088. 	Otherwise, 	the 	rule 	is 	not 	one 	that 	“every
reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
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clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018).
In the opinion of the undersigned, Defendant Jones is entitled to qualified
immunity from liability because she did not violate Ashwood’s clearly established
Eighth Amendment rights.
V. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment and dismiss this case.
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Dated: 	May 7, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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