Jones #701358 v. Nurkala et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
MARTELL JONES #701358, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-00053
Plaintiff, 	Hon. 	Paul L. Maloney
U.S. District Judge
v.
MARSHA NURKALA, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. 	ECF No. 38.
State Prisoner Martell Jones filed a verified complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Defendants Baraga Correctional Facility Resident Manager Nurkala,
Sergeant (Sgt.) Jurva, Sgt. Coronado, and Corrections Officer Christoff harassed him
and retaliated against him in violation of the First Amendment by giving him false
misconduct tickets. 	Plaintiff further asserts that his Fourteenth Amendment equal
protection rights were violated.
Defendants move for summary judgment arguing that no genuine issue of
material fact exists on Plaintiff’s retaliation and equal protection claims. 	In the
opinion of the undersigned, Defendants’ motion should be granted.
II. 	Factual Allegations
Jones says that he is a Buddhist and receives a religious diet in the prison.
ECF No. 1, PageID.4. 	On March 24, 2024, Jones complained that the porter serving
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his meal, also served meals to other prisoners. 	Id. 	Jones says that although each
meal is separately wrapped in plastic and that the porter wears gloves, the porter did
not wash his hands and change his gloves before giving Jones his meal. 	Id. 	Jones
says that he informed the porter that his religious diet must be served separately
from the regular trays and handled by the porter with separate gloves to avoid cross
contamination. 	Id., PageID.5. 	Defendant Christoff allegedly responded to Plaintiff
by stating “F . . . your religion and its dietary laws! Stop complaining and give me the
plastic from your trays!” 	Id.
Plaintiff informed Christoff that he would not tolerate harassment, disrespect,
or interference with his First Amendment right to practice his religious belief. 	Id.
Plaintiff allegedly told Christoff that he would write a grievance due to those
comments. 	Id. 	Christoff 	allegedly 	responded 	that 	Plaintiff 	was 	a 	“fake-ass
Buddhist, hurry-up and give me the f . . . . plastic before I write you a D.D.D.
[Disobeying a Direct Order] and take you off your religious diet!” 	Id. 	As Christoff
walked away he allegedly stated: “keep talking and you’re gonna end up with a ticket
and in the hole!” 	Id., PageID.6. 	Plaintiff says that he later received a misconduct
ticket for insolence from Christoff. 	Id.
On March 25, 2024, Defendant Jurva reviewed the misconduct ticket with
Plaintiff. 	Id. 	Plaintiff complained that the misconduct ticket was fabricated in
retaliation for his verbal complaint. 	Id., PageID.7. 	Plaintiff informed Defendant
Jurva that if she harassed and demeaned him, he would not participate in the review.
When he tried to leave, Defendant Jurva told him that he was either going to
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participate in the review and sign the waiver for the ticket, or she would put him in
the hole. 	Id. 	Plaintiff reiterated that he would not be coerced or threatened and
again tried to walk out of the room. 	Id. 	Plaintiff says that Defendant Jurva told
him that he had no rights and that that she would teach him “not to call officers
bitches and threaten to write grievances!” 	Id. 	Plaintiff says that he turned toward
Jurva and placed his hands behind his back and she placed handcuffs on him. 	Id.
Plaintiff says that Jurva told him that he would do his time in segregation and
that writing grievances will make his time hard. 	Id., PageID.8. 	Plaintiff says that
Defendant Nurkala ordered Defendant Jurva to fabricate a misconduct ticket for
threatening behavior. 	Id. 	Plaintiff asserts that this retaliatory misconduct ticket
issued, in part, because he refused to sign documents against his interest, caused his
continued 	confinement 	in 	segregation. 	Id., 	PageID.9. 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that
Defendants Jurva, Nurkala, and Coronado kept him in segregation in retaliation.
Id., PageID.11. 	Plaintiff further asserts that Defendant Christoff discriminated
against him and denied him equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.
III. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
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party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
IV. 	Retaliation
Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights
violates the Constitution. 	Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999)
(en banc). 	In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff
must show that: (1) he was engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was
taken against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct. 	Id.
To prevail on a retaliation claim, retaliatory motive “must be a ‘but-for’ cause [of the
injury], meaning that the adverse action against the plaintiff would not have been
taken absent the retaliatory motive.” 	Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1721 (2019).
An adverse action is an action sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness
from 	exercising 	his 	constitutional 	rights. 	Thaddeus-X, 	175 	F.3d 	at 	396.
Furthermore, “the threat of adverse action can satisfy this element if the threat is
capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in the protected
conduct.” 	Hill v. Lapin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010).
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After a prisoner establishes the first two elements, the prisoner must be able
to prove that the exercise of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor
in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory conduct. 	Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032,
1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
The Sixth Circuit has employed a burden-shifting approach with respect to the
causation element:
Once the plaintiff has met his burden of establishing that his protected
conduct was a motivating factor behind any harm, the burden of
production shifts to the defendant. If the defendant can show that he
would have taken the same action in the absence of the protected
activity, he is entitled to prevail on summary judgment.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399.
a. Christoff
Although Jones asserts that Defendant Christoff retaliated against him by
giving him a misconduct ticket for insolence, Christoff argues that Jones did not
engage in protected conduct by threatening to write a grievance for verbal abuse.
Jones asserts that he engaged in protected conduct by threatening to write a
grievance for harassment and verbal abuse after Christoff disparaged his religion,
told Jones to stop complaining and to return the plastic from his food tray, and to
take the trays as given or he (Jones) would not eat. 	Thus, Christoff argues that
Jones cannot support the first element of a retaliation claim.
The Sixth Circuit has explained that “protected conduct includes a prisoner’s
‘undisputed First Amendment right to file grievances against prison officials on his
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own behalf.’” 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Herron v.
Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000)). 	Merely threatening to file a grievance
is considered a protected activity as well. 	Pasley v. Conerly, 345 F. App’x 981,
984−85 (6th Cir. 2009) (analogizing Dean v. Conley, No. 98–5906, 1999 WL 1045166,
at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.9, 1999) (the Sixth Circuit found that a prisoner who merely
threatened to file a lawsuit was engaged in protected conduct)). “‘Abusive or
manipulative use of a grievance system [is] not . . . protected conduct,’ and prison
officials may take action in response to the prisoner’s improper use of the grievance
process as long as the response aligns with a legitimate penological goal.” 	Griffin v.
Berghuis, 563 F. App’x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting King
v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 699 (6th Cir. 2012)). 	This includes the filing of frivolous
grievances. 	Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010).
Beyond the general acknowledgment that grievances used to abuse or
manipulate the grievance system are frivolous, limited authority exists as to what
renders a grievance frivolous. 	As acknowledged by the Sixth Circuit in Maben v.
Thelen, “cases in this Circuit appear to suggest that a prisoner’s grievance is frivolous
when the underlying grievance itself is de minimis.” 	887 F.3d 252, 264-65 (6th Cir.
2018) (collecting cases). 	This Court has also found grievances involving “verifiably
untrue” allegations to be frivolous. 	Chrzan v. Mackay, No. 1:19-cv-116, 2020 WL
7774741, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2020) (finding that the plaintiff’s grievance was
frivolous where a video recording of the underlying event contradicted the allegations
in the grievance), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:19-cv-116, 2020 WL
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7773419 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 30, 2020). 	Similarly, the Sixth Circuit held that a
prisoner’s grievance complaining about conduct that had no impact on the prisoner
was frivolous. 	Thaddeus-X v. Love, No. 98-2211, 2000 WL 712354, at *2-3 (6th Cir.
May 22, 2000) (finding that a grievance complaining about a prison employee eating
at his desk was “patently frivolous as the defendant’s conduct had no adverse impact
on [the plaintiff]”).
More relevant to the facts of this case, Courts have found grievances to be de
minimis and therefore frivolous when the grievance complains of verbal abuse or
harassment. 	Sampson v. Davis, No. 2:19-CV-176, 2022 WL 2760061, at *3 (W.D.
Mich. May 12, 2022) (finding that a prisoner’s threat to file a grievance on a CO for
verbal harassment was de minimis and therefore frivolous), R&R adopted, No. 2:19-
CV-176, 2022 WL 2753565 (W.D. Mich. July 14, 2022); Maben v. Thelon, 887 F.3d
252, 264 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Scott v. Kilchermann, No. 99-1711, 2000 WL 1434456,
at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 18, 2000)).1
Plaintiff asserted in his complaint that he would not tolerate harassment and
verbal abuse from Defendant Christoff:
1 	Though the undersigned relies in part on Maben for the proposition that
grievances asserting verbal abuse are de minimis, and Maben cites Kilchermann, the
undersigned notes that “Kilchermann is not persuasive to the extent it suggests that
a grievance must assert a constitutional right in order to constitute protected conduct.
This is not the proper standard for protected conduct.” Rayos v. Leavitt, No. 1:20-CV-
968, 2022 WL 873633, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2022).
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ECF No. 1, PageID.5.
Plaintiff is clearly alleging that Defendant Christoff verbally harassed him and
threatened him with a disobeying a direct order misconduct ticket for not returning
the plastic from his meal tray. 	As Plaintiff alleged, Plaintiff’s meal tray was
delivered by the Porter, and Defendant Christoff was not involved in the delivery of
his meal tray. 	The only allegation in the complaint against Defendant Christoff is
that Christoff harassed Plaintiff when he ordered Plaintiff to return the plastic from
his meal tray. 	Defendant Christoff describes the incident as follows in his affidavit:
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ECF No. 39-2, PageID.269. 	Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff
cannot assert that he engaged in protected conduct by threatening a grievance for the
alleged 	harassing 	comments 	made 	by 	Defendant 	Christoff, 	because 	Plaintiff’s
grievance would be considered frivolous.
b. Jurva, Nurkala, and Coronado
Defendants assert that Plaintiff alleges that they retaliated against him
because they believed that Plaintiff called Defendant Christoff a bitch and because
Plaintiff refused to participate in the misconduct ticket review. 	Defendants argue
that Plaintiff could not have engaged in protected conduct by calling Christoff a bitch.
Plaintiff alleged in his complaint:
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ECF No. 1, PageID.7.
To the extent that Plaintiff alleges that he was retaliated against for calling
Defendant Christoff a bitch, Plaintiff has failed to show that he engaged in protected
conduct. 	See Lockett v. Saurdini, 526 F.3d 866, 874 (6th Cir. 2008) (inmate’s
insolent behavior by calling prison officer a “foul and corrupt bitch” is not protected
conduct).
However, Defendants do not argue that Plaintiff’s refusal to participate in the
review of his misconduct ticket could not be protected conduct. 	Instead, Defendants
argue that they would have given Plaintiff a threatening behavior misconduct report
regardless of his alleged protected conduct. 	Specifically, Defendants argue that
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Jones’s retaliation claim fails on the causation element, because the factual findings
made during the misconduct hearing have preclusive effect.
The Sixth Circuit test for determining whether factual findings made within a
Class I misconduct hearing are entitled to preclusive effect was established in
Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905, 912 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing University of Tennessee
v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 799 (1986) (rejecting the checkmate doctrine but upholding
the preclusive effect of major misconduct hearing findings when appropriate factors
are met). 	“In Roberson [v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 404-405 (6th Cir. 2014)], this court
made clear that Peterson turned on its facts and that the case should not serve as a
‘blanket blessing’ to afford preclusion to every Michigan major misconduct hearing.”
Nash v. Bryce, 	F.4d 	, 2025 WL 2778548, *8 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 2025). 	In Nash,
the Sixth Circuit determined that the failure to provide the prisoner with access to
the video evidence during the misconduct hearing did not provide the prisoner a “full
and fair opportunity” to litigate the issues. 	As a result, the hearing officer’s findings
were not entitled to preclusive effect.
Pursuant to Peterson, facts found during a Michigan prison hearing are given
preclusive effect when (1) the state agency, in this case the Hearing Officer on behalf
of the agency, was acting in a “judicial capacity,” (2) the hearing officer resolved the
disputed issue of fact that was properly before him or her, (3) the prisoner had a
sufficient opportunity to litigate the issue, and (4) the findings of fact would be given
preclusive effect by the Michigan courts. 	Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 259 (6th
Cir. 2018), (citing Peterson, 714 F.3d at 911-13).
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The record before the Court shows that on March 25, 2025, Defendant Jurva
issued a Class I misconduct ticket to Plaintiff for threatening behavior. 	ECF No. 39-
6, PageID.360. 	The top portion of this ticket is shown below.
Id.
A Hearing Officer conducted the misconduct hearing on the alleged violation
on March 28, 2024. 	(Id., PageID.359.) 	The Class I Misconduct Hearing Report on
the misconduct is shown below.
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Id.
Jones says that two non-Defendant officers prevented him from attending the
hearing on this misconduct by refusing to escort him to the hearing and then by
falsely stating that he refused to attend the hearing. 	ECF No. 45, PageID.446.
Defendant Coronado submitted a witness statement that stated:
ECF No. 39-6, PageID.363.
Plaintiff’s statement was included as part of the Hearing Investigation Report:
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ECF No. 39-6, PageID.364. 	Further, a determination was made that Plaintiff was
competent to understand and comply with MDOC rules and regulations.
Id., PageID.362.
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Finally, Plaintiff asserts that despite multiple requests for a rehearing form to
contest the ALJ’s decision, his requests were refused or ignored because he never
received any response, making the appeal procedure unavailable. 	ECF No. 45,
PageID.466. 	First, as to Plaintiff’s claim that he was prevented by two officers from
attending his hearing, Plaintiff has not asserted that his failure to attend the hearing
was relevant to the ALJ’s findings. 	Plaintiff gave his statement and the ALJ
reviewed that statement during the hearing. 	Plaintiff did not provide any other
defense to the misconduct charge other than his assertion that misconduct was false
and retaliatory. 	The ALJ considered Plaintiff’s position and rejected it. 	In the
opinion of the undersigned, the factual findings made during this Class I misconduct
hearing have preclusive effect because the record before the Court shows that all the
requirements in Peterson have been met. 	The hearing officer, a licensed attorney,
acted in a judicial capacity by resolving the misconduct ticket dispute. 	The hearing
officer resolved disputed facts and specifically denied Plaintiff’s claim that he did not
make the threatening statement.
Second, as to Plaintiff’s claim that he was not provided with the form to appeal
the misconduct finding, Plaintiff has not established that he had any basis to appeal
the finding. 	Plaintiff’s defense was merely that he did not make the statement.
The problem with that argument is that there was sufficient evidence for the ALJ to
conclude that he did make the statement. 	Plaintiff’s mere denial was not enough for
the ALJ to find in Plaintiff’s favor and it was not enough to support an appeal of the
ALJ’s decision.
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Accordingly, the record shows that Plaintiff had the opportunity to litigate the
issue regarding the threatening statement or whether the misconduct ticket was
issued in retaliation for the grievance he filed. 	The ALJ found that Defendant
presented 	credible 	evidence 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	guilt. 	Plaintiff 	had 	a 	full 	and 	fair
opportunity to litigate the issue, and it is the opinion of the undersigned that the
hearing officer’s finding of fact would be given preclusive effect by the Michigan
courts. 	Plaintiff is now precluded from asserting otherwise in this case.
Nevertheless, this Court must determine whether a reasonable jury could find
that Defendant issued the misconduct ticket due to Plaintiff’s protected speech.
White v. McKay, 2023 WL 8060847, *3 (6th Cir., Nov. 17, 2023). 	Here, the record
shows that Plaintiff made a threatening statement that justified the issuance of the
misconduct report. 	For these reasons, the undersigned concludes that Defendants
have shown that they would have taken the same action – i.e., written the Class I
misconduct ticket against Plaintiff – in the absence of the protected activity.
Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399. 	Plaintiff has offered nothing to overcome this
conclusion.
Additionally, 	under 	MDOC 	policy, 	Defendants 	were 	required 	to 	write
Plaintiff a Class I misconduct ticket due to his threatening statement. 	The policy
provides that “[a] Misconduct Report shall be written if the behavior constitutes a
non-bondable Class I misconduct, as identified in Attachment A.” ECF No. 39-3,
PageID.274 (Policy Directive 03.03.105(E). 	This includes threatening behavior such
as “[w]ords, actions, or other behavior which expresses an intent to injure or
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physically abuse another person.” 	Id., PageID.289 (Attachment A). 	Plaintiff does
not allege or show that Defendants usually let threatening behavior slide without
consequence. 	See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 442 (6th Cir. 2007) (explaining that
a plaintiff could still establish retaliatory motive where the misconduct charge was
true by, for example, showing that he regularly engaged in the misconduct without
consequence up until the protected conduct).
Thus, it is the opinion of the undersigned that no reasonable jury could
conclude that Defendant issued the misconduct ticket due to Plaintiff’s protected
speech.
V. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the
complaint 	based 	upon 	qualified 	immunity. 	“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified
immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 640 (1987)). 	The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of
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Broadview Heights, 712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must
“determine if the facts alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id.
(citing Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the
right at issue was “‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a
reasonable officer would have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236). 	A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if
either step of the analysis is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted,
810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir. 2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To 	be 	clearly 	established, 	a 	legal 	principle 	must 	have 	a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must
be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 	589 	(1991) 	(per 	curiam), 	which 	means 	it 	is 	dictated 	by
“controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority,’ ” al–Kidd, supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It
is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
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precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.
See Reichle, 566 U.S., at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise, the rule is not
one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct.
2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63-64 (2018).
In the opinion of the undersigned, for the reasons set forth above, Defendants
are entitled to dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims based upon qualified immunity from
liability.
VI. 	Equal Protection
Jones alleges that Defendant Christoff discriminated against him due to his
Buddhist religious beliefs. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.11. 	Plaintiff alleges that Christoff
stated: “F . . . your religion and its dietary laws! 	Stop complaining and give me the
plastic from your trays!” and “Fake-ass Buddhist, hurry-up and give me the f . . . .
plastic before I write you a D.D.D. [Disobeying a Direct Order] and take you off your
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religious diet!” 	Id., PageID.5. 	The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 	U.S. Const.
amend. XIV, § 1. 	To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must adequately
plead that the government treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly
situated persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental
right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” 	Center for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011).
Even accepting the allegations asserted in the complaint against Defendant
Christoff, Jones fails to set forth any evidence that he was treated differently than
any other similarly situated prisoner regarding the delivery of his religious meals.
Moreover, verbal harassment does not violate a prisoner’s equal protection rights.
Austin v. Kutchie, No. 2:18-CV-87, 2018 WL 4870874, *4-5 (W.D. Mich., Oct. 9, 2018).
Therefore, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s equal protection claim should
be dismissed.
VII. 	Recommendation
It is respectfully recommended that the Court grant Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment because no genuine issue of material fact exists.
If the Court accepts this recommendation, this case will be dismissed.
Dated: 	April 7, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES: 	Objections to this Report and Recommendation must be
served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen (14)
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days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638
F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 	See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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