Robinson #182351 v. Bush et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JAMES EDWARD ROBINSON, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-34
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Chief U.S. District Judge
v.
JEREMY BUSH, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	Introduction
This Report and Recommendation addresses Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 48), Plaintiff’s response in opposition (ECF No. 56), Defendants’
reply (ECF No.59), and Plaintiff’s sur-reply1 (ECF No. 61).
Plaintiff – state prisoner James Edward Robinson – filed a verified civil
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that Defendants violated his rights under
the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments while he was incarcerated at
1 	This Court’s Local Civil Rules allow for a response to a dispositive motion and
then a reply to the response. 	W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(c). 	“The court may permit or
require further briefing.” 	Id. 	This Court has noted that “[i]t is well-established
that parties do not have a right to file a sur-reply brief, whether under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Civil Rules of our district, and both this court
and other federal courts rarely grant leave to file a surreply.” 	Aslani v. Sparrow
Health Sys., No. 1:08-CV-298, 2009 WL 3711602, at *22 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 3, 2009)
(footnote omitted). 	The Court may grant leave to file a sur-reply to afford a party an
opportunity to address new issues raised for the first time in the reply. 	Eldridge v.
Cardif Life Ins. Co., 266 F.R.D. 173, 175 (N.D. Ohio 2010). The Court grants Plaintiff’s
motion to file a sur-reply and considers the sur-reply in the present motion.
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 1
of 15

2
Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Michigan. 	ECF No. 1. 	More
specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants opened and read through his legal mail.
Id., PageID.5. 	In his initial complaint, Plaintiff Robinson explains that he was
challenging his 1987 criminal conviction and sentence, 2 and that he had retained a
lawyer who had sent him over 3,000 pages of “potentially exculpatory material
(documents) that she had obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).”
Id., PageID.2.
Following 	this 	Court’s 	screening 	opinion, 	only 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	against
Defendants 	Benoit, 	Hershman, 	and 	Robinson 	for 	violation 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	First
Amendment rights remained in the case. 	ECF No. 4, PageID.35. 	Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint on February 28, 2025, clarifying allegations in the original
complaint and adding Defendant Diane Edington. 	ECF No. 28. 	Plaintiff also
added a denial of access to the court claim in his amended complaint. 	ECF No. 28,
PageID.97.
At this point, Plaintiff’s First Amendment Denial of Access to the Court claims
against Defendants Benoit, Hershman, Robinson, and Edington remain in the case.3
2 	Plaintiff’s criminal convictions stem from the robbery and murder of an off-
duty Michigan State Trooper in August 1985 by multiple codefendants. 	People v.
Phillips, 227 Mich. App. 28, 30, 575 N.W.2d 784, 785 (1997). 	According to OTIS,
Plaintiff Robinson continues to serve active sentences for armed robbery and second-
degree murder. 	The four codefendants were jointly tried. 	People v. Frazier, 446
Mich. 539, 542, 521 N.W.2d 291, 292 (1994). 	This state criminal case has a
complicated history with multiple reviews by the Michigan Court of Appeals and the
Michigan Supreme Court. 	Id.
3 	In their brief, Defendants address the Fourteenth Amendment claim Plaintiff
references in his amended complaint. 	This Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim in a screening opinion on April 22, 2024. 	ECF No. 4. 	In the
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 2
of 15

3
Plaintiff sues the Defendants in both their individual and official capacities.
On June 23, 2025, Defendants Benoit, Hershman, and Robinson filed a motion
for summary judgment. 	ECF No. 47. 	In the opinion of the undersigned, there is no
genuine dispute of material fact as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. 	Plaintiff’s
access to the courts claim is barred under Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Alternatively, in the opinion of the undersigned, Defendants are entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiff has failed to show an actual injury to sustain a cause of
action. 	Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court grant the
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
II. 	Factual Allegations
In 	his 	amended 	complaint, 	Plaintiff 	alleges 	that, 	on 	October 	16, 	2023,
Plaintiff’s post-conviction attorney mailed him a large envelope of legal documents.
ECF No. 28, PageID.93. 	Plaintiff contends that the URF mailroom received the
envelope on either October 17 or 18, 2023. 	Id.
Plaintiff alleges that URF mailroom employee Edington emailed the post-
conviction attorney on October 18, 2023, to confirm that the attorney sent the
envelope of documents to Plaintiff. 	Further, Plaintiff asserts that Edington opened,
read, inspected, and divided the contents of the envelope into five individual boxes.
Id., PagID.94.
opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not seek to undo any
of the dismissals from the initial screening opinion.
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 3
of 15

4
Next, Plaintiff says that Corrections Officer (CO) Robinson called him out of
his housing unit to receive his legal mail on October 19, 2023. 	Id. 	Plaintiff says
that when they arrived at the mail window, CO Robinson opened one box and
“thoroughly read through Plaintiff’s legal papers.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that CO
Robinson sent Plaintiff to the facility count time and continued inspecting the legal
mail outside of Plaintiff’s presence. 	Id.
After the facility count, Plaintiff says he returned to the legal mail window.
Id., PageID.95. 	Plaintiff asserts the CO Hershman assisted CO Robinson in reading
through the legal documents. 	Plaintiff says that CO Hershman told him to take
some of the boxes of legal documents back to his housing unit and said he would
receive the rest when the mailroom finished inspecting it. 	Id. 	Plaintiff alleges that
later that same day, he received a contraband removal written by CO Robinson
indicating that portions of the legal mail had been confiscated. 	Id.
Plaintiff says that on October 20, 2023, he wrote a grievance against CO
Robinson, CO Hershman, and the URF mailroom. 	Id. 	Plaintiff says he was
interviewed in connection with the grievance on October 25, 2023. 	Id., PageID.96.
Plaintiff asserts that, following the interview, CO Hershman called him out for legal
mail. 	Id. 	When he returned to the mailroom, Plaintiff says he asked CO Hershman
why the boxes containing the legal mail were open. 	Id. 	CO Hershman replied that
she did not know why. 	Id. 	Plaintiff asserts that when he started telling CO
Hershman about the MDOC policy regarding legal mail, she asked if he wanted the
legal mail or not. 	Id. 	Plaintiff says CO Hershman proceeded to read through the
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 4
of 15

5
legal documents and told Plaintiff the box was going back to the mailroom without
further explanation. 	Id.
Plaintiff asserts that Mailroom Supervisor Benoit read his legal documents
before notifying CO Hershman that the papers could be returned to Plaintiff. 	Id.
On October 26, 2023, Plaintiff received the legal documents. 	Plaintiff says that
about 20 pages he received were blacked out and some pages were written on. 	Id.
IV. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251−52 (1986)). 	The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 5
of 15

6
IV. 	Analysis
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s access to the courts claim is barred by the
favorable-termination 	requirement. 	ECF 	No. 	48, 	PageID.185. 	In 	response,
Plaintiff asserts that “[b]y Defendant Robinson and Hershman not giving Plaintiff all
of his legal mail and destroying the rest of Plaintiff’s; legal mail, he was prevented
from being able to file[ ] a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant
to 	MCR 	6.502(G)(2) 	on 	newly 	discovered 	evidence 	grounds.” 	ECF 	No. 	56,
PageID.334.
Prisoners have a fundamental right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith,
430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). The right is derived from the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the First Amendment right
to petition for redress of grievances. Knop v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1002 (6th
Cir.1992). 	A 	prisoner’s 	access 	to 	the 	courts 	must 	be 	adequate, 	effective, 	and
meaningful, which means that prison officials must provide prisoners with adequate
law libraries or assistance from individuals trained in the law. Bounds, 430 U.S. at
822, 828. This right is limited to claims where the underlying action is a direct
criminal appeal, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, or a civil-rights action. Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 346, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996).
In 	Heck 	v. 	Humphrey, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	established 	the 	favorable-
termination requirement for access to the courts claims. 	Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477 (1994). 	The Court explained:
[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district
court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 6
of 15

7
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would,
the complaint must be dismissed unless plaintiff can demonstrate that
the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.
Id. at 486-87.
Furthermore, in Sampson v. Garrett, the Sixth Circuit applied Heck to
an MDOC prisoner’s access to court claim. 	Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F.3d 880,
881 (6th Cir. 2019). 	There, the Court stated:
Heck blocks 	a 	state 	prisoner's § 	1983 claim 	if 	its 	success 	“would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” 512 U.S.
at 487. The idea is to channel what amount to unlawful-confinement
claims to the place they belong: habeas corpus. Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544
U.S. 74, 81, 125 S. Ct. 1242, 161 L. Ed. 2d 253 (2005).
Whether Heck applies to an access-to-the-court claim alleging state
interference with a direct criminal appeal is a new question for us. That
it is a new question, however, does not necessarily make it a hard
question. Because the right of access is "ancillary to [a lost] underlying
claim, without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being
shut out of court," a successful access claim requires a prisoner to show
that 	the 	defendants 	have 	scuttled 	his 	pursuit 	of 	a 	"nonfrivolous,
arguable" claim. Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415, 122 S. Ct.
2179, 153 L. Ed. 2d 413 (2002) (quotation omitted).
Sampson 	maintains 	that 	he 	is 	entitled 	to 	damages 	because 	the
defendants prevented him from using the trial transcripts and other
materials in his direct—and unsuccessful—appeal. He could prevail on
that claim only if he showed that the information could make a
difference in a nonfrivolous challenge to his convictions. He could win in
other 	words only if 	he 	implied 	the 	invalidity 	of 	his 	underlying
judgment. Heck bars this kind of claim.
Id. at 881-82.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “prevented Plaintiff from filing a post-
conviction motion for relief from judgment in the trial court challenging the validity
of his criminal conviction and sentence.” 	ECF No. 32, PageID.97-98. 	In his
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 7
of 15

8
response to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff further alleged that
Defendants’ actions in destroying Plaintiff’s legal mail prevented him from “(1)
discovering evidence which could have helped prove his claim of actual innocence for
the robbery/murder of an off-duty police officer, and (2) form filing a post-conviction
motion in the trial court based on newly discovered evidence.” 	ECF No. 56,
PageID.334. 	Thus, Plaintiff’s claims implicate the validity of his convictions. 	See
Sampson v. Garrett, 917 F. 3d 880, 882 (6th Cir. 2019) (“a favorable judgment on
Sampson’s access-to-the-court claim would necessarily bear on the validity of his
underlying judgment, because that is exactly what he says the defendants kept him
from contesting fairly.”) 	Accordingly, The Sixth Circuit has established that Heck
bars Plaintiff’s access to the court claim.
Furthermore, to maintain his access to the court claim, Plaintiff must establish
that he was adversely affected or that the litigation was prejudiced. 	Lewis, 518 U.S.
at 349; Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Talley-Bey v.
Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. 	The undersigned
offers further analysis of this requirement in the qualified immunity section below.
For the reasons stated below, in the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff has failed
to show an actual injury to sustain a cause of action for violation of his right to access
to the courts.
Therefore, the undersigned respectfully recommends that this Court grant
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s denial of access to
the court claims against Defendants Benoit, Hershman, and Robinson.
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 8
of 15

9
V. 	Qualified Immunity
Alternatively, Defendants argue that they are entitled to dismissal of the
complaint 	based 	upon 	qualified 	immunity. 	“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified
immunity, ‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are
shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.’” 	Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises
the qualified immunity defense, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable
official would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’”
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)).
The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,
712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 9
of 15

10
is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To 	be 	clearly 	established, 	a 	legal 	principle 	must 	have 	a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must
be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 	589 	(1991) 	(per 	curiam), 	which 	means 	it 	is 	dictated 	by
“controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority,’ ” al–Kidd, supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It
is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.
See Reichle, 566 U.S., at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise, the rule is not
one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct.
2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 10
of 15

11
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63−64 (2018).
In the qualified immunity context, if the facts alleged and evidence produced,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to
find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right, dismissal by
summary judgment is inappropriate. 	Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009)).
The Defendants argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity because
they did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights. 	ECF No. 48,
PageID.193-196. 	To maintain a claim that Defendants violated his constitutional
rights by denying access to the courts, Plaintiff must show actual injury to pending
or contemplated litigation. 	Lewis, 518 U.S. at 349; Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257
F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2001); Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d 884, 886 (6th Cir.
1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000.
According to the Sixth Circuit, “in Lewis[,] the Supreme Court held that only
prisoners with non-frivolous underlying claims can have standing to litigate an
access-to-courts action.” 	Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999).
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 11
of 15

12
Thus, “even if someone delays a case or prevents it from coming to court, an actual
injury 	will 	not 	be 	found 	unless 	the 	underlying 	claim 	would 	have 	been
successful.” 	Mikko v. Davis, 342 F. Supp. 2d 643, 647 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
An inmate must make a specific claim that he was adversely affected or that
the litigation was prejudiced. 	Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 578 (6th Cir.
2005). 	“Examples of actual prejudice to pending or contemplated litigation include
having a case dismissed, being unable to file a complaint, and missing a court-
imposed deadline.” 	Harbin-Bey, 420 F.3d at 578 (citing Jackson v. Gill, 92 F. App'x
171, 173 (6th Cir. 2004)).
Here, Plaintiff’s claim of actual prejudice in this case is conclusory. 	Plaintiff
asserts that his inability to access his legal mail prevented him from filing a motion
for relief from judgment under Michigan Court Rule 6.500. 	ECF No. 56, PageID.334.
Plaintiff says that “[s]ome of the papers that were contained inside of the box of legal
mail sent to Plaintiff by attorney Tucker and destroyed by Defendant Robinson and
Hershman contained information about a statement made from a witness who was
interviewed by the Detroit Police Department identifying the two persons who
actually committed the robbery/murder of the off-duty police officer.” 	Id. 	In his
deposition, Plaintiff could not identify a court order or other paperwork indicating
that he suffered actual harm because of not receiving his legal mail. 	ECF No. 48-3,
PageID.228-231.
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to show an actual injury to sustain a cause of
action for violation of his right to access to the courts. 	See Mikko, 342 F.Supp.2d at
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 12
of 15

13
648. See also, Jennings v. Garrett, No. 08-12463, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50538, 2008
WL 2605541 at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2008) (“Plaintiff's claim of actual prejudice in
this case is entirely conclusory, because he has failed to allege the exact nature of the
claims that he sought to present to the Michigan courts in his 6.500 motion for relief
from judgment. Without any information on the validity of the motion for relief from
judgment, plaintiff has failed to show an actual injury to sustain a cause of action for
a violation of his right to access of the courts.”) (internal citation omitted).
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff cannot sustain a denial of access to
the courts claim. 	Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity
because they did not violate Plaintiff’s clearly established constitutional rights.
VI. Official Capacity Claims
To the extent that Plaintiff is suing the individual Defendants in their official
capacities, such claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. 	The Supreme Court
has held “that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’ under § 1983.” 	Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989).
A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity for damages
cannot be maintained pursuant to § 1983 because that official has
Eleventh Amendment immunity. This is true because “a suit against a
state official in her or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” As such, a suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is no different than a suit
against the state.
Clark v. Chillicothe Corr. Inst., No. 2:19-CV-954, 2020 WL 1227224, at *3 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 13, 2020) (citations omitted).
The Sixth Circuit, in interpreting Will, has held “that plaintiffs seeking
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 13
of 15

14
damages under § 1983 [must] set forth clearly in their pleading that they are suing
the state defendants in their individual capacity for damages, not simply in their
capacity as state officials. 	Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989). 	To the
extent that Plaintiff seeks money damages, costs and fees from Defendants in their
official capacity, that part of his lawsuit is barred by sovereign immunity.4
VII. 	Recommendation
In the opinion of the undersigned, there is no genuine dispute of material fact
as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims. 	It is respectfully recommended that the
Court grant the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment and dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendants Robinson, Hershman, and Benoit. 	If the Court adopts
this recommendation, only Plaintiff’s First Amendment claims against Defendant
Edington will remain.5
Dated: 	January 8, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
4 	“There are three exceptions to a State’s sovereign immunity: (a) when the State
has consented to suit; (b) when the exception first set forth in Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies; and (c) when Congress has
properly abrogated a State’s immunity.” 	S & M Brands, Inc. v. Cooper, 527 F.3d
500, 507 (6th Cir. 2008). 	Only the second exception is potentially at issue here.
“Under the Ex parte Young exception, a federal court can issue prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief compelling a state official to comply with federal law.” 	Id.
Plaintiff does not seek prospective relief.
5 	In their brief filed on June 23, 2025, Defendants assert that Edington is not a
party to this suit because Plaintiff never served a summons on Edington. 	On
August 1, 2025, the Court issued an order for service on Defendant Edington. 	On
August 21, 2025, Defendant Edington filed an appearance of counsel. 	Thus,
Defendants’ argument that Edington has not been served is now moot. 	Plaintiff’s
claims against Defendant Edington remain.
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 14
of 15

15
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within
fourteen days of service of this notice on you. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). 	All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich.
LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any
further right of appeal. 	United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 2:24-cv-00034-HYJ-MV ECF No. 64, PageID.<pageID> Filed 01/08/26 Page 15
of 15