Martin #413601 v. Hill et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
RICKEY LEE MARTIN #413601, 	Case No. 2:23-cv-184
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Maarten Vermaat
U.S. Magistrate Judge
v.
UNKNOWN HILL, et al.,
Defendants.
/
OPINION AND ORDER
I. 	Introduction
This Opinion addresses Defendant’s motion for summary judgment. 	ECF No.
23.
Plaintiff – state prisoner Rickey Lee Martin – filed a verified civil complaint
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that twenty-one Defendants violated his rights under
the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as under the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), while he was incarcerated at
Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Michigan. 	ECF No. 1. 	Following
screening, only Martin’s First Amendment interference with mail claim and his
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim against Mail Room Officer Hill
remain.
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Defendant Hill filed a motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2025. 	ECF
No. 	23. 	Martin 	has 	not 	responded 	to Hill’s 	motion. 1 	In 	the 	opinion 	of 	the
undersigned, Hill has shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact as to
Plaintiff’s 	remaining 	claims. 	Accordingly, 	Defendant’s 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment is granted and the case is dismissed.
II. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff’s complaint includes some 50 hand-written pages of allegations
against 21 named Defendants. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.5-55. 	Plaintiff also included 21
attachments with his complaint. 	ECF No. 1-1 to 1-21. 	The Court issued a
screening opinion in this case and, first, dismissed 18 of these Defendants due to
misjoinder. 	ECF No. 7, PageID.242; ECF No. 8. 	The Court then considered
Martin’s remaining claims against the three remaining Defendants, ultimately
dismissing all but “Plaintiff’s First Amendment interference with mail claims and his
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims against Defendant Mail Room
Officer Hill.” 	ECF No. 7, PageID.254. 	The following is a summary of Martin’s
factual allegations against Mail Room Officer Hill, as taken from the Court’s
screening opinion:
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Ionia Correctional Facility (ICF) in Ionia,
Ionia County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however,
1 	When, as here, the non-movant fails to respond to a motion for summary
judgment, the Court must “examine the movant’s motion for summary judgment to
ensure that he has discharged his initial burden.” 	Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Sch.,
138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Carver v. Bunch, 946 F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir.
1991)).
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occurred at the Baraga Correctional Facility (AMF) in Baraga, Baraga
County, Michigan.
[…]
On January 4, 2022, Plaintiff received notice that his outgoing mail
request had been rejected by Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill due to
insufficient funds. However, Plaintiff’s package was not returned to him.
Plaintiff spoke to Defendant Niemi on January 5, 2022, regarding the
situation and explained that the documents and photos in the package
were irreplaceable, but Defendant Niemi walked away with Plaintiff’s
disbursement forms and did not respond. (Id., PageID.11.) On January
10, 2022, Plaintiff filed a grievance with Defendant Hamel regarding the
loss of his documents and photos. (Id., PageID.11–12.) On January 11,
2022, 	Plaintiff 	wrote 	a 	kite 	to 	the 	mailroom 	seeking 	information
regarding his documents and photos. Plaintiff also filed a grievance and
sent a letter to Internal Affairs stating that he believed his package had
been taken because of a desire to retaliate against him for filing the legal
cases referenced in the outgoing mail. (Id., PageID.12.)
[…]
On February 27, 2022, Plaintiff wrote a kite to Defendant Mail Room
Officer Hill about pictures being removed from his Jpay account and
about emails not being sent to his family members. (Id.) On April 3,
2022, Plaintiff wrote a kite to Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill
inquiring about the rejection of legal books, which had been ordered by
Plaintiff’s family. Plaintiff also wrote a grievance regarding the matter,
and the books were subsequently released to Plaintiff. (Id.)
On June 6, 2022, Plaintiff wrote a grievance on Defendant Mail Room
Officer Hill for rejecting nine family photos, which depicted his brother
and cousin posing with money and cars. Plaintiff states that the reason
given 	for 	the 	rejection 	was 	that 	the 	photos 	showed 	“criminal
activity/threat to orderly security of [the] institution.” (Id., PageID.14.)
Plaintiff asserts that the money and cars were personal wealth, which
his brother and cousin had earned, and that the rejection was based on
racial discrimination because Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill did not
believe that Black men could have wealth based on honest hard work.
(Id.)
On August 2, 2022, Plaintiff wrote a kite to Defendant Mail Room Officer
Hill to ask about the reason for the photos being rejected but did not
receive an answer. (Id.) On August 8, 2022, Plaintiff wrote a kite to
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Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill regarding the censorship of his
outgoing mail. Plaintiff states that he had sent an email to his mother-
in-law saying that he would send money for his wife, but the email was
censored because it was deemed “engaging in business/entering into a
contract.” (Id., PageID.14–15.)
Plaintiff states that on September 12, 2022, he wrote a kite to Defendant
Mail Room Officer Hill regarding retaliatory delays in his outgoing mail
to his attorney. (Id., PageID.15.) On October 19, 2022, Plaintiff received
a mail rejection from Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill for a Nation of
Islam publication called “The Final Call” because it reportedly contained
information regarding disruptions at another MDOC prison, which
could cause a threat to the security and safety of the facility. (Id.,
PageID.16.) Plaintiff told Resident Unit Manager Miller (not a party)
that he believed the mail rejection was racially discriminatory and
motivated by a desire to retaliate against him because he knew that the
eight pages that had been taken out of the paper were not all related to
other 	MDOC 	facilities. 	Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	the 	pages 	contained
information about Elijah Muhammad and Black leaders such as Martin
Luther King, Jr. (Id.)
On October 24, 2022, Plaintiff wrote a grievance on Defendant Mail
Room Officer Hill for the rejection, which was investigated by Defendant
Frantii. Plaintiff states that Defendant Frantii did not interview him
but 	made 	his 	decision 	based 	solely 	on 	the 	mail 	rejection. 	(Id.,
PageID.17.) On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff received a copy of the
administrative hearing report, which he claims was falsified to say that
he had been interviewed and that the rejected portions of the paper were
present at the hearing. (Id.)
On October 19, 2022, Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill rejected photos
sent by Plaintiff’s wife showing Plaintiff and her inside a jewelry store
buying a wedding ring. The reason given for the rejection was that they
presented a threat to the security and good order of the institution. (Id.,
PageID.18.) Defendant Frantii was the hearing investigator on the
rejection and again failed to interview Plaintiff. Plaintiff states that the
rejection was clearly motivated by racial discrimination and a desire to
retaliate. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance on Defendant Frantii on
November 11, 2022, for failing to interview him on the mail rejections.
(Id.) Plaintiff also filed a grievance stating that he feared being targeted
by Corrections Officers and administration and being set up with false
misconduct tickets. (Id., PageID.19.) Plaintiff also kited Defendant
Cummings with these concerns but did not receive a response. (Id.)
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On October 21, 2022, Plaintiff states that he was moved from Housing
Unit 6 to Housing Unit 7 for no apparent reason. Plaintiff had just
completed a class called “Thinking for a Change” and was working as a
food service porter. Plaintiff states that Defendant Mail Room Officer
Hill had family members who worked on Unit 7 and “controlled the
unit.” (Id.)
ECF No. 7, PageID.231-32.
III. 	Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). 	The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” 	State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan,
421 F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251−52 (1986)). 	The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits,
and admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party
opposing the motion. 	Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475
U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Adkins, 400 F.3d 293, 296 (6th Cir.
2005).
IV. 	Analysis
a. First Amendment mail interference
Martin asserts that Hill confiscated his mail containing family pictures and
legal work and unreasonably censored his physical and electronic mail. 	ECF No. 1,
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PageID.41. 	Mailroom Officer Hill argues that the Court should dismiss Martin’s
claim for multiple reasons. 	First, Hill argues that Martin has failed to establish Hill
was personally involved in any mail interference. 	ECF No. 24, PageID.306-07.
“Personal 	involvement 	is 	necessary 	to 	establish 	section 	1983 	liability.”
Murphy v. Grenier, 406 Fed. Appx. 972, 974 (6th Cir. 2011). 	“It is axiomatic that the
liability of persons sued in their individual capacities under section 1983 must be
gauged in terms of their own actions.” 	Rogan v. Menino, 175 F.3d 75, 77 (1st Cir.
1999). 	A defendant cannot be held liable under § 1983 absent a showing that they
personally 	participated 	in, 	or 	otherwise 	authorized, 	approved, 	or 	knowingly
acquiesced in, the allegedly unconstitutional conduct. 	Leach v. Shelby County
Sheriff, 891 F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989); Hays v. Jefferson, 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th
Cir. 1982).
Here, Martin mentions Mailroom Officer Hill twice in his complaint section
regarding the mail interference. 	First, Martin asserts that he filed a grievance
against R. Niemi and Mailroom Officer Hill. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.12. 	However, the
grievance Martin includes with his complaint, shown below, does not identify
Mailroom Officer Hill:
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ECF No. 1-1, PageID.63.
Additionally, Martin says in his Complaint that he wrote a kite to Mailroom
Officer Hill on April 3, 2022, regarding mail interference. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.13.
Martin includes the following kite addressed to “Mailroom Officer Ms. Hill”:
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ECF No. 1-2, PageID.74.
Furthermore, Martin includes a kite addressed to “AMF Mailroom Officer Hill
or Other” dated February 27, 2022. 	In that kite, Martin asserts that his pictures
were removed from his JPay and thirteen emails were not delivered to his family
members. 	ECF No. 1-2, PageID.72.
In Mailroom Officer Hill’s affidavit, she states that she was one of several staff
members in the mailroom who reviewed and processed mail and JPay messages
throughout 2022. 	ECF No. 24-3, PageID.352. 	Hill states that on April 6, 2022, she
sent Martin three books after proper authorization and received a signed receipt on
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April 7, 2022. 	Id. 	Hill asserts that she has never had direct interaction with
Martin and at no time did she maliciously stop Martin from sending or receiving mail.
Defendant Hill argues in her motion that the record does not support the
conclusion that she had any personal involvement in Martin’s mail interference
claims. 	However, Hill’s own affidavit supports the fact that she had some level of
involvement 	in 	filtering 	through 	Martin’s 	mail. 	ECF 	No. 	24-3, 	PageID.352.
Additionally, Hill states that she was one of the mailroom employees reviewing mail
and JPay at the time of Martin’s allegations. 	Id. 	In the opinion of the undersigned,
there remains a genuine issue of material fact regarding Mailroom Officer Hill’s
personal involvement with Martin’s claims.
Alternatively, Mailroom Officer Hill argues that any mail restrictions were
issued in accordance with legitimate MDOC policy. 	ECF No. 24, PageID.312-13.
MDOC mail policy differs based on the prisoner’s housing unit and whether the mail
is legal mail. 	Martin states in his deposition that the physical mail he attempted to
send was not legal mail. 2 	ECF No. 24-2, PageID.339-40. 	Furthermore, in his
Complaint, Martin also asserts he was in a special housing unit during the alleged
events. 	Id., PageID.339. 	It is unclear to the undersigned whether Martin was in
administrative segregation or general population while in the special housing unit.
In any event, one of the two following MDOC policy directives allow staff to inspect
2 	The Sixth Circuit has also held “that the prisoner’s interest in unimpaired,
confidential communication with an attorney is an integral component of the
judicial process and, therefore, that as a matter of law, mail from an attorney
implicated a prisoner’s protected legal mail rights.” Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868,
877 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
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outgoing mail. 	MDOC Policy Directive 05.03.118 states the following regarding
outgoing mail for general population inmates:
ECF No. 24-4, PageID. 357-58.
Regarding administrative segregation inmates, the policy states:
ECF No. 24-4, PageID.357
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Regarding JPay, the MDOC Director’s Memorandum includes the following
policy:
ECF No. 24-5, PageID.371.
The 	Court 	previously 	explained 	the 	parameters 	of 	a 	prisoner’s 	First
Amendment right to send and receive mail as follows:
The First Amendment provides: “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. “[A] prison inmate retains those First
Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a
prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system.” Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974). Plaintiff’s free
speech rights are “uncontrovertedly limited by virtue of [Plaintiff’s]
incarceration.” Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 393 (6th Cir. 1999).
ECF No. 7, PageID.250.
“While prisoners have some First Amendment rights in receiving mail, it is
clear that prison officials may place reasonable restrictions upon these rights.”
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 603 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal citations omitted).
Although inmates have a First Amendment right to communicate with the outside
world by sending and receiving mail, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.
Ct. 1874, 104 L. Ed. 2d 459 (1989); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 85, 107 S. Ct. 2254,
96 L. Ed. 2d 64 (1987), that right is not absolute. 	Prisons may restrict an inmate’s
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right to send mail so long as their policies are “reasonably related to legitimate
penological interests.” 	Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
To determine whether a prison official’s actions are reasonably related to a
legitimate penological interest, the Court must assess the official’s actions by
reference to the following issues:
1. does there exist a valid, rational connection between the prison
regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to
justify it;
2. are there alternative means of exercising the right that remain open
to prison inmates;
3. the impact that accommodation of the asserted constitutional right
will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison
resources generally; and
4. 	whether 	there 	are 	ready 	alternatives 	available 	that 	fully
accommodate 	the 	prisoner's 	rights 	at de 	minimis cost 	to 	valid
penological interests.
Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475, 484 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at
89-91).
Failure to satisfy the first factor renders the regulation or action infirm,
without 	regard 	to 	the 	remaining 	three factors. 	Flagner, 	241 	F.3d 	at
484 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-90) (“a regulation cannot be sustained where the
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logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to
render the policy arbitrary or irrational”).
If the first factor is satisfied, the remaining three factors are considered and
balanced together; however, they are “not necessarily weighed evenly,” but instead
represent “guidelines” by which the court can assess whether the policy or action at
issue is reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest. 	Flagner, 241 F.3d at
484 (citations omitted). 	It should further be noted that the Turner standard is “not
a ‘least restrictive alternative’ test” requiring prison officials “to set up and then shoot
down 	every 	conceivable 	alternative 	method 	of 	accommodating 	the 	claimant's
constitutional complaint.” 	Id. 	Instead, the issue is simply whether the policy or
action 	at 	issue 	is 	reasonably 	related 	to 	a 	legitimate 	penological
interest. 	Id. 	“However, ‘if an inmate claimant can point to an alternative that fully
accommodates the prisoner's rights at de minimis cost to valid penological interests,
a court may consider that as evidence that the regulation does not satisfy the
reasonable relationship standard.’” 	Id. at 484 (quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 91.)
First, the Defendants have established a legitimate government interest in
screening outgoing mail. 	Outgoing prison mail poses a level of security risk. 	Prison
officials have a legitimate interest in searching outgoing mail to prevent the
transmission of “escape plans, plans relating to ongoing criminal activity, and threats
of 	blackmail 	or 	extortion.” 	Thornburgh, 	490 	U.S. 	at 	412. 	In 	another 	case
challenging a prison mail policy, the Sixth Circuit explained:
As for a “rational connection” between the policy and these interests, the
issue is not whether the prohibited materials have in fact caused
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problems 	or 	are 	even 	“likely” 	to 	cause 	problems, 	but 	whether 	a
reasonable 	official 	might 	think 	that 	the 	policy 	advances 	these
interests. 	Surely in this instance the relationship between the policy
(prohibiting materials that advocate anarchy or contain obscenity) and
the goals (security, order, and rehabilitation) is not “so remote as to
render the policy arbitrary or irrational.”
Thompson v. Campbell, 81 Fed. Appx. 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Turner, 482
U.S. at 89-90) (internal citations omitted.) 	Similarly, there is a rational connection
between the policy of prohibiting materials that encourage ongoing criminal activity
and the MDOC’s goals of prison security and order.
As to the remaining Turner factors, Martin has the right to send and receive
other communications that are not restricted by the MDOC policy. 	In fact, Inspector
Pynnonen’s affidavit states that Martin’s JPay records indicate that he received
approximately 350 JPay messages and sent out over 250 JPay messages in 2022.
ECF No. 24-6, PageID.374. 	Thus, alternative channels of communication were still
available 	to 	Martin 	under the 	MDOC 	policy. 	Finally, 	in 	the 	opinion 	of 	the
undersigned, there exists no reasonable alternative with de minimis risk that could
accommodate Martin’s desire to send mail officials deem as a security risk under the
policy. 	Thus, Officer Hill’s compliance with the MDOC mail policy was reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.
Furthermore, many courts have held that prison officials do not violate the
First Amendment by inspecting an inmate’s non-legal mail. 	See, e.g., Caldwell v.
Beard, 305 F. App’x 1, 4 (3d Cir. 2008) (prison officials did not violate the First
Amendment by reading inmate’s outgoing mail to his family); Altizer v. Deeds, 191
F.3d 540, 547-48 (4th Cir. 1999) (“Without question, the opening and inspecting of an
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inmate’s outgoing mail is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests,” and
therefore does not violate the First Amendment.); Smith v. Delo, 995 F.2d 827, 830
(8th Cir. 1993) (prison officials are justified in screening outgoing nonlegal mail for
escape plans, contraband, threats, or evidence of illegal activity); Stow v. Grimaldi,
993 F.2d 1002, 1004-05 (1st Cir. 1993) (state prison practice requiring that non-
privileged outgoing mail be submitted for inspection in unsealed envelopes did not
violate prisoner’s constitutional rights); United States v. Whalen, 940 F.2d 1027, 1035
(7th Cir. 1991) (“[I]t is well established that prisons have sound reasons for reading
the outgoing mail of their inmates.”); Gaines v. Lane, 790 F.2d 1299, 1304 (7th Cir.
1986) (upholding prison regulations authorizing the inspection of incoming and
outgoing nonlegal mail); Jensen v. Klecker, 648 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1981) (“Non-
privileged inmate mail is clearly not immune to inspection, thus such inspections
cannot give rise to civil rights violations.”); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
576, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974) (“[F]reedom from censorship is not
equivalent to freedom from inspection or perusal.”).
Consistent with the decisions of these other courts, the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit has established that mail regulation strikes a proper balance
between 	constitutional 	rights 	and 	legitimate 	prison 	concerns 	when 	the 	policy
delineates censorable mail with specificity, does not give prison officials the freedom
to impose their own standards, and promotes prison security. 	Meadows v. Hopkins,
713 F.2d 206, 208 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding a federal mail policy authorizing the
inspection of incoming and outgoing non-legal correspondence to and from prisoners).
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Here, Plaintiff has not responded to Defendant Hill’s assertions regarding the
constitutionality of the MDOC’s mail policy. 	The undersigned concludes that the
MDOC’s policy authorizing prison officials to search Martin’s ordinary personal
correspondence does not violate his rights under the First Amendment.
That conclusion does not, however, end the inquiry. 	In Parrish v. Johnson,
the Sixth Circuit concluded that “[a] capricious interference with a prisoner’s
incoming 	mail 	based 	upon 	a 	guard’s 	personal 	prejudices 	violates 	the 	First
Amendment.” 	800 F.2d at 604. 	“In balancing the competing interests implicated
in restrictions on prison mail, courts have consistently afforded greater protection to
legal mail than to non-legal mail, as well as greater protection to outgoing mail than
to incoming mail.” 	Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted) (italics added). 	Thus, the undersigned concludes that Parrish’s prohibition
on capricious interference with incoming mail based on personal prejudice applies
equally to outgoing mail.
At the screening stage, the undersigned concluded that the facts alleged in
Plaintiff’s Complaint “support a finding that Defendant Mail Room Officer Hill
interfered with Plaintiff’s mail based on her own personal prejudices.” 	ECF No. 7,
PageID.250. 	This conclusion was based on assertions Plaintiff made in his verified
Complaint. 	See ECF No. 1, PageID.18 (asserting that Hill rejected photo of Plaintiff
sent by Plaintiff’s wife based on “cultural and racial discrimination”), PageID.43
(asserting that Hill rejected photos based on racial and cultural discrimination).
Now, at the summary judgment stage, the Court considers all the Rule 56(c)
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evidence, including deposition testimony. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint was verified. 	ECF
No. 1, PageID.55. 	Thus, his Complaint may be considered for purposes of evaluating
Hill’s motion for summary judgment. 	Miller v. Jones, 483 F. App’x 202, 203 (6th Cir.
2012) (noting that “courts should consider the allegations in a pro se prisoner’s
verified 	complaints 	(which 	are 	effectively 	affidavits) 	before 	entering 	judgment
against him, even if the prisoner fails to cite that evidence in response to a motion for
summary judgment”).
However, Martin’s testimony during his deposition demonstrates that his
claims of racial discrimination are not supported by evidence. 	In his deposition,
Martin concedes that he has not interacted directly with Mailroom Officer Hill:
ECF No. 24-2, PageID.338-39.
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Id., PageID.341.
Similarly, in her affidavit, Mailroom Officer Hill asserts that she did not
discriminate against Martin for any reason and has never even directly interacted
with Martin. 	ECF No. 24-3, PageID.352.
To the extent that Martin's deposition testimony differs from the allegations
in his complaint, the Court must rely on his deposition testimony when assessing
Defendant’s 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment. 	“When 	a 	claimant’s 	testimony
contradicts the allegations in his complaint, [the court] will credit his later testimony
. . . A claimant may not create a triable issue of fact by saying one thing in a complaint
and something else in a deposition.” 	Leary v. Livingston Cnty., 528 F.3d 438, 444
(6th Cir. 2008). 	Accordingly, the record before the Court at the summary judgment
stage supports that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding Martin’s
assertions that Mailroom Officer Hill capriciously interfered with Plaintiff’s mail
based upon Hill’s personal prejudices. 	Thus, Martin’s claims that Hill discriminated
against him based on his culture and race are undercut by his deposition, where he
explained that, “man, she[‘s] the mail lady. 	You don’t see them. 	It’s no interaction.
She’s the mail lady.” 	ECF No. 24-2, PageID.339.
To summarize, the undersigned concludes that a genuine issue of fact remains
regarding 	Hill’s 	personal 	involvement 	with 	Plaintiff’s 	mail. 	Second, 	the
undersigned concludes that the MDOC mail and email policies involved here are
constitutional. 	Third, the undersigned concludes that Martin could still survive
Hill’s motion for summary judgment if he presented evidence showing that a genuine
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issue of material fact remained regarding whether Hill capriciously interfered with
his mail based on her own personal prejudices. 	However, Martin has not presented
Rule 56(c) materials that create a genuine issue of material fact on this point. 	Thus,
Hill has shown that she is entitled to summary judgment, and the undersigned
grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Plaintiff’s First
Amendment claim.
b. Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
In his Complaint, Martin asserts that Officer Hill discriminated against him
based on race, culture, and religion. 	ECF No. 1, PageID.43-44. 	Defendant Hill
argues that Martin cannot establish that any mail rejections were disparately applied
to him or made with a discriminatory purpose. 	ECF No. 24, PageID.318.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” 	U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. 	To state
an equal protection claim, a plaintiff “must adequately plead that the government
treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that
such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class,
or has no rational basis.” 	Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d
365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011). 	The Supreme Court has also recognized what is referred
to as a “class-of-one” equal protection claim in which the plaintiff does not allege
membership in a particular class or group but instead alleges that he “has been
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
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rational basis for the difference in treatment.” 	Davis v. Prison Health Services, 679
F.3d 433, 441 (6th Cir. 2012).
Here, Martin asserts the following discrimination claim in his Complaint:
ECF No. 1, PageID.43.
Additionally, in his deposition, Martin states the following in response to
Defendant’s question about racial discrimination:
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ECF No. 24-2, PageID.345.
As 	described 	above, 	in 	Martin’s 	deposition 	testimony 	and 	Officer 	Hill’s
affidavit, both parties assert that they never interacted with one another. 	ECF No.
24-2, PageID.338-39; ECF No. 24-3, PageID.352. 	Thus, in the undersigned’s
opinion, 	Martin’s 	allegations 	of 	discrimination 	are 	speculative 	and 	plainly
insufficient to state an equal protection claim. 	See Steed v. Harry, No. 1:17-CV-540,
2017 WL 3205764, at *6 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2017) (“[V]ague, conclusory allegations
of discrimination are not enough to state an equal protection claim.”); Chapman v.
City of Detroit, 808 F.2d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 1986) (“It is not enough for a complaint
under § 1983 to contain mere conclusory allegations of unconstitutional conduct by
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persons acting under color of state law.”) 	Accordingly, the undersigned grants
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as it pertains to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth
Amendment claim.
V. 	Qualified Immunity
Defendant argues that she is entitled to dismissal of the complaint against him
based 	upon 	qualified 	immunity. 	“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity,
‘government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from
liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established
statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’”
Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). 	Once a defendant raises the qualified
immunity 	defense, 	the 	burden 	shifts 	to 	the 	plaintiff 	to 	demonstrate 	that 	the
defendant officer violated a right so clearly established “that every ‘reasonable official
would have understood that what he [was] doing violate[d] that right.’” 	Ashcroft v.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640
(1987)).
The analysis entails a two-step inquiry. 	Martin v. City of Broadview Heights,
712 F.3d 951, 957 (6th Cir. 2013). 	First, the court must “determine if the facts
alleged make out a violation of a constitutional right.” 	Id. 	(citing Pearson v.
Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (1982)). 	Second, the court asks if the right at issue was
“‘clearly established’ when the event occurred such that a reasonable officer would
have known that his conduct violated it.” 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 232). 	A
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court may address these steps in any order. 	Id. (citing Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236).
A government official is entitled to qualified immunity if either step of the analysis
is not satisfied. 	See Citizens in Charge, Inc. v. Husted, 810 F.3d 437, 440 (6th Cir.
2016).
In applying the first step of the qualified immunity analysis, a court must
identify “the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed” and determine whether
a violation occurred. 	Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989). 	The court
considers the state of the law at the second step. 	As the Supreme Court has
observed, “this Court’s case law does not require a case directly on point for a right to
be clearly established, [but] existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” 	White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 78 (2017)
(internal quotation marks and original brackets omitted) (quoting Mullenix v. Luna,
577 U.S. 7, 11 (2015)). 	As explained by the Supreme Court:
To 	be 	clearly 	established, 	a 	legal 	principle 	must 	have 	a
sufficiently clear foundation in then-existing precedent. The rule must
be “settled law,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116
L.Ed.2d 	589 	(1991) 	(per 	curiam), 	which 	means 	it 	is 	dictated 	by
“controlling authority” or “a robust ‘consensus of cases of persuasive
authority,’ ” al–Kidd, supra, at 741–742, 131 S.Ct. 2074 (quoting Wilson
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999)). It
is not enough that the rule is suggested by then-existing precedent. The
precedent must be clear enough that every reasonable official would
interpret it to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to apply.
See Reichle, 566 U.S., at 666, 132 S.Ct. 2088. Otherwise, the rule is not
one that “every reasonable official” would know. Id., at 664, 132 S.Ct.
2088 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The “clearly established” standard also requires that the legal principle
clearly prohibit the officer’s conduct in the particular circumstances
before him. The rule’s contours must be so well defined that it is “clear
to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he
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confronted.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150
L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). This requires a high “degree of specificity.” Mullenix
v. Luna, 577 U.S. ––––, ––––, 136 S.Ct. 305, 309, 193 L.Ed.2d 255 (2015)
(per curiam). We have repeatedly stressed that courts must not “define
clearly established law at a high level of generality, since doing so avoids
the 	crucial 	question 	whether 	the 	official 	acted 	reasonably 	in 	the
particular circumstances that he or she faced.” Plumhoff, supra, at 2023
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). A rule is too general if
the unlawfulness of the officer’s conduct “does not follow immediately
from the conclusion that [the rule] was firmly established.” Anderson,
supra, at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In the context of a warrantless arrest, the
rule must obviously resolve “whether ‘the circumstances with which [the
particular officer] was confronted ... constitute[d] probable cause.’”
Mullenix, supra, at 309 (quoting Anderson, supra, at 640–641, 107 S.Ct.
3034; some alterations in original).
D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 63−64 (2018).
In the qualified immunity context, if the facts alleged and evidence produced,
viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, would permit a reasonable juror to
find that the officer violated a clearly established constitutional right, dismissal by
summary judgment is inappropriate. 	Barton v. Martin, 949 F.3d 938, 947 (6th Cir.
2020) (citing Morrison v. Bd. of Trs. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2009)).
Defendant Hill argues she is entitled to qualified immunity. 	The undersigned
agrees; 	because 	there 	are 	no 	genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	and 	it 	is 	the
undersigned’s opinion that Defendants did not violate Plaintiffs’ rights, it is the
undersigned’s opinion that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity in their
individual capacities. 	See Phillips v. Roane Cty., 534 F.3d 531, 538 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“Under 	the 	doctrine 	of 	qualified 	immunity, 	‘government 	officials 	performing
discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar
as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
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of which a reasonable person would have known.’” (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
VI. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, it is the opinion of the undersigned that there
are 	no 	genuine 	issues 	of 	material 	fact 	as 	to 	Plaintiff’s 	remaining 	claims.
Accordingly, 	the 	undersigned 	GRANTS 	Defendant 	Hill’s 	motion 	for 	summary
judgment. 	No claims remain. 	As such, Plaintiff’s case is hereby dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	February 11, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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