Castillo Rodriguez v. Putra et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ADONIAS CASTILLO RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MATTHEW PUTRA et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-2658
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current detention and asks the
Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the
requirements of due process. (Id., PageID.14, 15.)
In an order entered on September 28, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on October 1, 2026,
(ECF No. 4.) Petitioner filed a reply on October 2, 2026. (ECF No. 5.) After reviewing the parties’
submissions, the Court concludes that the petition is properly dismissed without prejudice for
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
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Discussion
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) Petitioner
entered the United States in 2021 and has remained in the United States since that time. (Id.,
PageID.1, 2.) On August 31, 2026, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered
and arrested Petitioner. (Id., PageID.2.) At Petitioner’s first custody redetermination hearing on
September 21, 2026, the Immigration Court found that it lacked jurisdiction to grant bond because
Petitioner was detained under § 1225.1 (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.39; Order Immigration Judge,
ECF No. 1-6.) Subsequently, a custody redetermination hearing was scheduled for October 1,
2026, in Immigration Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and at the hearing, Petitioner withdrew
his bond request. (Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-6; Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.63.)2 In
Petitioner’s reply, Petitioner states that at the October 1, 2026, the government indicated that it
was no longer arguing that Petitioner was detained under § 1225 and no longer arguing that the
Immigration Court lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s bond request. (See Reply, ECF
No. 5, PageID.63.) In Respondents’ response in the present action, they state that Petitioner is
detained under § 1226. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.40.)
Since September of 2025, this Court has considered hundreds of petitions similar to the
present petition. In resolving those petitions, until recently, the Court has declined to require that
immigration detainees exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief or, in the
alternative, the Court has waived the exhaustion requirement. Then, turning to the merits, the Court
has determined that immigration detainees in Petitioner’s circumstance are properly detained, if at
1 In Respondents’ response, Respondents state that at the bond hearing held on September 21,
2026, Respondents’ statement that 8 U.S.C. § 1225 governed Petitioner’s detention was “made in
error.” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.40.)
2 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and, accordingly, entitled to a custody redetermination hearing if the
government intends to continue the detention.
On May 11, 2026, in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also concluded that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs the detention of persons in Petitioner’s position. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not deny
“notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 732. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations that the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond
under § 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at 734.
In Respondents’ submissions to this Court, they indicate their intention to comply with the
binding holdings of Lopez-Campos and afford Petitioner a custody redetermination hearing, if
Petitioner requests a custody redetermination hearing in Immigration Court. (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.40.) This changes the Court’s exhaustion analysis. At present the Court concludes that
exhaustion would not be futile, and that the balance of prudential exhaustion factors weighs in
favor of requiring exhaustion.
There are no applicable statutes or rules that mandate administrative exhaustion by
Petitioner. Thus, whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.”
See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan,
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503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an
agency as a ‘judge-made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co.
v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion
rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94.
Notably, the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative
exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention,”
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025)
(citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL
2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a
standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,
No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However, courts within
the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care
Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479,
484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to determine whether
prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
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Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See id. (citations omitted). A court may choose to
rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and
delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)
(citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of administrative remedies
would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
In resolving hundreds of prior petitions like Petitioner’s, this Court concluded that
prudential exhaustion should not be required after balancing the prudential considerations and the
likely futility of starting with an agency decision. But after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lopez-
Campos and the government’s unequivocal commitment to apply its holding in this case,
administrative review of the controlling legal question is likely to result in an agency decision that
honors the law. This, in turn, means that exhaustion is no longer futile.
Therefore, the Court will require Petitioner to exhaust the available administrative
remedies by requesting a custody redetermination hearing in Immigration Court. The Court will
dismiss the petition without prejudice. Should the administrative remedies prove to be an
unavailable path to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes, Petitioner may file a new petition.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated:
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
October 16, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
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