Olivera Arreaga v. Unknown Party

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
LUIS RAUL GUAMAN DUTAN,
proceeding by his next friend
FLERIDA B. OLIVERA ARREAGA
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY,
Respondent.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-2475
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee,
currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County,
Michigan, proceeding by his next friend Flerida B. Olivera Arreaga, filed this petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s
detention.1 (Pet., ECF No. 1.) The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s current
detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process.
(Id., PageID.8.)
A court must promptly order an answer or grant the writ under § 2241, “unless it appears
from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Ms. Olivera Arreaga to proceed as next friend of
Petitioner in this action.
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After undertaking the review required by § 2243, the Court concludes that the petition is properly
dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
I. 	Next Friend Status
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Olivera Arreaga may
proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing
and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her]
behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163
(1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which
[she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the
real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore,
is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is
unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence,
or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see
West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.
1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to
the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with
that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety
of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted).
Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically
to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
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“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee
if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly
and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements”
because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise
deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most
significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not
set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163.
In this action, the Court concludes that the petition, brief, and attached documents
adequately demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an
ICE detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Ms. Olivera Arreaga,
Petitioner’s friend, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner, and that she is
truly dedicated to acting in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms.
Olivera Arreaga to proceed as next friend to Petitioner.
II. 	Discussion
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Ecuador. (Pet. Brief, ECF No. 2, PageID.12.) Petitioner
entered the United States in 2003 and has remained in the United States since that time. (Id.) On
July 27, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents arrested Petitioner. (Pet. ECF
No. 1, PageID.7.) Respondents filed their response to Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
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corpus on September 2, 2026.2 (ECF No. 6.) Petitioner filed his reply on September 21, 2026.
(ECF No. 8.) Respondents have not provided Petitioner an individualized bond hearing before an
immigration judge as contemplated by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).3
Since September of 2025, this Court has considered hundreds of petitions similar to the
present petition. In resolving those petitions, until recently, the Court has declined to require that
immigration detainees exhaust their administrative remedies before seeking habeas relief or, in the
alternative, the Court has waived the exhaustion requirement. Then, turning to the merits, the Court
has determined that immigration detainees in Petitioner’s circumstance are properly detained, if at
all, under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and, accordingly, entitled to a custody redetermination hearing if the
government intends to continue the detention.
On May 11, 2026, in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also concluded that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A),
governs the detention of persons in Petitioner’s position. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit explained:
Noncitizens who have “passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled
only after proceedings conforming to traditional standards of fairness encompassed
in due process of law.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206,
212 (1953); see also Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903). Thus,
noncitizens within the interior of the United States are entitled to the protections of
the Due Process Clause, “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful,
temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). “It is well
established that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in
[removal] proceedings.” Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); see also Demore
v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003). Consequently, the government may not deny
“notice” or “an opportunity to be heard” to a noncitizen “who has entered the
country, and has become subject in all respects to its jurisdiction, and a part of its
population, although alleged to be illegally here.” Yamataya, 189 U.S. at 100–01.
2 Both parties filed their briefs before the entry of the Court’s Order to Show Cause. Upon review
of the parties’ briefs, the Court concludes that the information presently before the Court is
sufficient to resolve the case and no further briefing from Respondents is required.
3 The materials submitted by the parties do not suggest that Petitioner is subject to a final order of
removal or that Petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
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Lopez-Campos, 175 F.4th at 732. The Sixth Circuit therefore upheld the lower courts’
determinations that the government’s detention of the Lopez-Campos petitioners “without bond
under § 1226(a) was a deprivation of liberty that violated [their] due process rights.” Id. at 734.
In Respondents’ submissions to this Court, they indicate their intention to comply with the
binding holdings of Lopez-Campos and afford Petitioner a custody redetermination hearing, if
Petitioner requests a custody redetermination hearing in Immigration Court. (Resp., ECF No. 6,
PageID.33.) This changes the Court’s exhaustion analysis. At present, the Court concludes that
exhaustion would not be futile, and that the balance of prudential exhaustion factors weighs in
favor of requiring exhaustion.
There are no applicable statutes or rules that mandate administrative exhaustion by
Petitioner. Thus, whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.”
See Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan,
503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an
agency as a ‘judge-made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co.
v. Bryan, 937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion
rule must comply with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94.
Notably, the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative
exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention,”
Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025)
(citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL
2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a
standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft,
No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However, courts within
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the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care
Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479,
484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to determine whether
prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See id. (citations omitted). A court may choose to
rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and
delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000)
(citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of administrative remedies
would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
In resolving hundreds of prior petitions like Petitioner’s, this Court concluded that
prudential exhaustion should not be required after balancing the prudential considerations and the
likely futility of starting with an agency decision. But after the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Lopez-
Campos and the government’s unequivocal commitment to apply its holding in this case,
administrative review of the controlling legal question is likely to result in an agency decision that
honors the law. This, in turn, means that exhaustion is no longer futile.
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Therefore, the Court will require Petitioner to exhaust the available administrative
remedies by requesting a custody redetermination hearing in Immigration Court. The Court will
dismiss the petition without prejudice. Should the administrative remedies prove to be an
unavailable path to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes, Petitioner may file a new petition.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing the petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: 	October 15, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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