Avenue A Holdings, Inc. v. Springfield, City of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AVENUE A HOLDINGS, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF SPRINGFIELD,
Defendant.
___________________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-2096
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Plaintiff Avenue A Holdings, Inc., brings this lawsuit against the City of Springfield,
Michigan, alleging that the City violated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and state law by unjustifiably denying its application to rezone
its property. Before the Court is the City’s motion to dismiss for lack of ripeness and failure to
state a claim (ECF No. 10). As explained below, the Court finds that Avenue A’s claims are ripe,
but that Avenue A fails to state a claim for violation of any constitutional provision. In the absence
of a cognizable federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any
state claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
For the purposes of this motion, the Court accepts the following allegations from Avenue
A’s amended complaint as true. Avenue A owns a vacant ten-acre lot in Springfield that it has
been trying to sell for about a decade. (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7, 11, ECF No. 7.) Avenue A finally
secured a buyer in 2026. (Id. ¶¶ 11–14.) The buyer planned to develop the property into a storage
facility for recreational vehicles and boats. (Id. ¶ 16.) The buyer agreed to buy the property on
the condition that it be rezoned. (Id. ¶ 18.) The property was zoned as B-2 General Commercial,
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but it needed to be zoned as Industrial/Research/Technology (“IRT”) to accommodate the
proposed storage facility. (See id. ¶¶ 8, 21.)
Springfield’s City Code gives the City Council the power to rezone properties.
(Springfield, Mich., City Code § 50-7.5B, ECF No. 7-3 (“The City Council may, from time to
time, amend, modify, supplement or revise the zoning district boundaries . . . .”).) When deciding
whether to rezone a property, the “City Council shall consider the following criteria”:
1. Consistency with the goals, policies and Future Land Use Map of the Springfield
Master Plan. If conditions have changed since the Master Plan was adopted, the
consistency with recent development trends in the area.
2. Compatibility of the site’s physical, geological, hydrological and other
environmental features with the host of uses permitted in the proposed zoning
district.
3. Evidence from the applicant that it cannot receive a reasonable return on
investment through developing the property with the uses permitted under the
current zoning.
4. The compatibility of all the potential uses allowed in the proposed zoning district
with surrounding uses and zoning in terms of land suitability, impacts on the
environment, density, nature of use, traffic impacts, aesthetics, infrastructure and
potential influence on property values.
5. The capacity of utilities and services sufficient to accommodate the uses
permitted in the requested district without compromising the health, safety and
welfare of the city.
6. The capability of the street system to safely and efficiently accommodate the
expected traffic generated by uses permitted in the requested zoning district.
7. The apparent demand for the types of uses permitted in the requested zoning
district relative to the amount of land in the city currently zoned and available to
accommodate the demand.
8. The boundaries of the requested rezoning district are reasonable in relationship
to surroundings and construction on the site will be able to meet the dimensional
regulations for the zoning district.
9. The requested rezoning is to the most appropriate district.
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10. If the request is for a specific use, is rezoning the land more appropriate than
amending the list of permitted or special land uses in the current zoning district to
allow the use?
11. The requested rezoning will not create an isolated and unplanned spot zone.
12. The request has not previously been submitted within the past one (1) year,
unless conditions have changed or new information has been provided.
13. An offer of conditions submitted as part of a conditional rezoning request shall
bear a reasonable and rational relationship to the property for which rezoning is
requested.
14. Other factors as appropriate.
(Id. § 50-7.5.E.)
Avenue A submitted its application for rezoning in February of 2026. (Rezoning
Application, ECF No. 7-1, PageID.350.) In April of 2026, the zoning administrator issued a report
regarding the application. (Zoning Administrator Report, ECF No. 7-4.) The zoning administrator
found that all of the applicable criteria listed above supported granting the application except for
number seven: “[t]he apparent demand for the types of uses permitted in the requested zoning
district relative to the amount of land in the city currently zoned and available to accommodate the
demand.” (Springfield, Mich., City Code § 50-7.5.E.) The report noted that the City already had
self-storage facilities and that the supply could be oversaturated. (Zoning Administrator Report,
PageID.413.) However, the zoning administrator ultimately recommended that the City Council
grant the rezoning application. (Id., PageID.417.)
The City Council held a public hearing on the rezoning application on May 18, 2026. (Am.
Compl. ¶ 45.) Before the hearing, Avenue A sent a letter to the City Council addressing the zoning
administrator’s concern about the oversaturation issue. The letter explained that the proposed
storage facility was distinct from existing self-storage facilities because it was specifically for
vehicles and boats. (Id. ¶¶ 45–49.) In advance of the hearing, two members of the City Council
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texted each other about the rezoning application. (Text Messages, ECF No. 7-7.) One
councilmember explained that they did not want to grant the application because “[a]ll the things
that I want to see there, are covered under the current zoning.” (Id., PageID.445.) The
councilmembers discussed the possibility of rezoning the property without allowing the proposed
storage facility, but they concluded it was not feasible to “pass the zoning request but put [a]
moratorium in place before [the buyer] could get their project approved.” (Id.) One
councilmember noted that Avenue A’s application would have been approved if it had not
specified what the buyer intended to do with the property. (Id., PageID.446.)
At the May 18 meeting, after hearing public comments, the City Council denied the
rezoning application without explanation. (City Council Meeting Tr. 32, ECF No. 7-9.)1 The City
Council directed the zoning administrator and City Attorney to draft a resolution setting out the
reasons for the denial. (Id. at 32–33.) At a meeting on June 1, 2026, the City Council adopted the
resolution. (6/1/2026 Meeting Minutes, ECF No. 7-11.) The resolution stated that eight of the
factors in § 50-7.5.E weighed against granting the rezoning application. In particular, the
resolution explained that: the proposed rezoning was less consistent with the City’s goals than the
current zoning; the proposed rezoning was less compatible with the area’s environmental features
and had a greater potential to create a nuisance than the current zoning; Avenue A had not
established that the lot was unprofitable under its current zoning; the proposed rezoning was less
compatible with surrounding uses and more likely to reduce property values than the current
zoning; there was other land in the area that could support the proposed project without a need for
rezoning; the proposed rezoning was less appropriate for the area than the current zoning; rezoning
1 It is unclear exactly how many councilmembers voted for and against the proposal. The minutes state that the vote
was five to one against the proposal (5/18/2026 Meeting Minutes, ECF No. 7-8, PageID.452), whereas the transcript
indicates that it was four to two (City Council Meeting Tr. 32).
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was not more appropriate than a specific variance allowing for the proposed project; and rezoning
would create an isolated spot zone. (Id. at 2–5.) Avenue A was not given advance notice that the
City Council would adopt this resolution at the June 1 meeting or provided a further opportunity
to address the City Council’s concerns about the proposed development. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 107.)
Following the denial of the rezoning application, the prospective buyer terminated the sale
of the property. (Id. ¶ 108.) Avenue A subsequently filed this lawsuit in Calhoun County Circuit
Court; the City then removed the suit to this Court based on federal question jurisdiction.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint may be dismissed
for failure to state a claim if it fails “to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration
in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not
contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and
conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements
of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The Court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. When considering a motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6), courts “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting
all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.” Parrino v. Price, 869 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 2017).
III. ANALYSIS
The City seeks dismissal on the grounds that Avenue A’s constitutional claims are unripe
and Avenue A’s complaint fails to state a claim. As set out below, the Court finds that Avenue
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A’s claims are ripe but that it has failed to state a federal claim. The Court will also decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Avenue A’s state law claims.
A. Ripeness
“[T]he ripeness doctrine arises ‘both from Article III limitations on judicial power and from
prudential reasons for refusing to exercise jurisdiction.’” In re Cassim, 594 F.3d 432, 437 (6th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 (1993)). The doctrine
“prevent[s] the courts, through premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract
disagreements.” Id. Thus, a claim is only ripe when it involves “existing, substantial
controversies, not hypothetical questions or possibilities.” Id.
The City argues that Avenue A’s constitutional claims are unripe because the City has not
yet made a final decision regarding what uses of the property in question are permissible. This
argument rests on prudential, rather than jurisdictional, ripeness. See A Forever Recovery, Inc. v.
Township of Pennfield, 606 F. App’x 279, 282 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Horne v. Dep’t of Agric.,
569 U.S. 513, 526 (2013)). The seminal Supreme Court case regarding the final decision rule is
Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S.
172 (1985). There, the Court held that a takings claim based on a zoning decision is unripe unless
two conditions are met: the government has made a final decision on the issue, and the plaintiff
has sought compensation through any available state procedures. Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at
186, 194. In a subsequent decision, the Court partially overruled Williamson County and
eliminated the second condition (the need to exhaust state procedures). Knick v. Township of Scott,
588 U.S. 180, 185 (2019). But the Court left in place the first condition (the finality requirement).
Id. at 188.
The finality requirement has several justifications: it “aids in the development of a full
record,” it allows the court to see “precisely how a regulation will be applied to a particular parcel,”
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it increases the chance that a property owner will obtain relief without any “judicial entanglement
in constitutional disputes,” and it “evinces the judiciary’s appreciation that land use disputes are
uniquely matters of local concern more aptly suited for local resolution.” Insomnia Inc. v. City of
Memphis, 278 F. App’x 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Murphy v. New Milford Zoning Comm’n,
402 F.3d 342, 348 (2d Cir. 2005)). As the Supreme Court has explained, the finality requirement
“responds to the high degree of discretion characteristically possessed by land–use boards in
softening the strictures of the general regulations they administer.” Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,
533 U.S. 606, 620 (2001) (quoting Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 738 (1997)).
Thus, before seeking a judicial remedy, “a landowner must give a land-use authority an
opportunity to exercise its discretion” in the landowner’s favor. Id.
In the context of zoning, a final decision usually means the denial of a request for a
variance. A variance allows a property to be used for some previously unpermitted purpose
without changing the underlying zoning classification. In Williamson County, the government had
determined that the plaintiff’s proposed development did not comply with existing zoning
regulations, but the plaintiff had an additional available avenue for relief: it could have sought a
variance from the board of zoning appeals. 473 U.S. at 188. The Court held that because the
plaintiff had not sought a variance, the government had made no final decision, and the plaintiff’s
claim was unripe. Id. at 194. The Supreme Court has since reiterated that a takings claim “depends
upon the landowner’s first having followed reasonable and necessary steps to allow regulatory
agencies to . . . grant any variances or waivers allowed by law.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 620–21.
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has explained “that ‘a zoning determination cannot be deemed final
until the plaintiffs have applied for, and been denied, a variance.’” Crosby v. Pickaway Cnty. Gen.
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Health Dist., 303 F. App’x 251, 261 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights,
968 F.2d 584, 587 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Here, a variance request would be addressed to the City Council sitting as the Board of
Appeals. (Springfield, Mich., City Code § 50-7.4.C.) Avenue A contends that because the Council
has denied its rezoning application, seeking a variance from the same governmental body would
be futile; thus, the denial is effectively a final decision. Finality is “a factual determination” that
depends on the procedures available to the plaintiff and the government’s past actions. DLX, Inc.
v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511, 525 (6th Cir. 2004). “The finality requirement is relatively modest,”
Pakdel v. City & County of San Francisco, 594 U.S. 474, 478 (2021), and “nothing more than de
facto finality is necessary,” id. at 478. If the government’s prior decisions have made it clear that
further efforts by the plaintiff would be futile, the decision is considered final. DLX, 381 F.3d at
525; see also Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville, 958 F.2d 1354, 1362–63 (6th Cir. 1992) (“By
finality we mean that the actions of the city were such that further administrative action by [the
plaintiff] would not be productive.”).
In principle, the City Council’s denial of the rezoning application does not necessarily
foreclose a variance request. Many of the cited reasons for that denial relate to the relative costs
and benefits of an IRT district versus a B-2 district. It is possible, then, that the Council would be
willing to grant a variance as long as the property stays zoned as B-2. But Avenue A also points
to text messages in which a councilmember stated that if Avenue A’s application had not specified
that its property would be used for a storage facility, the Council would have approved Avenue
A’s rezoning application. (Text Messages, PageID.446.) This message suggests that the Council
did not reject the application based on the general downsides of rezoning to IRT, but that the
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Council was opposed to the specific proposed development. And if the Council is opposed to the
development, requesting a variance would be futile.
In response, the City asserts that the opinion of one member of the Council does not
indicate how the other members would vote. But the texts in question contain the councilmember’s
assessment of how the entire Council viewed the application—not just the member’s
representation as to their own position. And it is not surprising that one councilmember would
know how the others planned to vote. So while the City is correct that the motives of one member
cannot be imputed to the others, if the Court draws all reasonable inferences for Avenue A, the
texts establish that a majority of the Council was set against allowing a storage facility to be built.
Insofar as the Council’s report suggests the opposite—that the Council was more concerned about
rezoning the property to IRT than about allowing a particular development—the report creates a
factual dispute that is unresolvable at this stage. Thus, based on the allegations in the complaint,
the finality requirement is satisfied and Avenue A’s takings claim is ripe.
The finality requirement also applies to some (but not all) procedural and substantive due
process claims. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Mich. Dep’t of Nat. Res., 970 F.2d 154, 160 (6th Cir. 1992)
(procedural due process); Smithfield Concerned Citizens v. Town of Smithfield, 907 F.2d 239 (1st
Cir. 1990) (substantive due process). Because the Court finds that the finality requirement is met,
it is unnecessary to determine whether Avenue A’s due process claims are subject to that
requirement. Therefore, the Court will proceed to the merits of Avenue A’s claims.
B. Merits
1. Takings Clause
“The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not ‘be
taken for public use, without just compensation.’” Andrews v. City of Mentor, 11 F.4th 462, 468
(6th Cir. 2021). The “quintessential takings claim” is “based on ‘direct government appropriation
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or physical invasion of private property.’” Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S.
528, 537 (2005)). Avenue A’s takings claim, on the other hand, is a “regulatory taking,” where a
government regulation reduces the value of a property. Id. One type of regulatory taking is “a
total regulatory taking,” which “occurs where a land-use regulation deprives the land of all
economically beneficial use.” Id. (cleaned up). But Avenue A does not allege that its property
has no economically beneficial use. Instead, it argues that a less-than-total taking can be found
based on the Penn Central factors, which “includ[e] (1) the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant; (2) the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations; and (3) the character of the governmental action.” Id. (citing Murr v. Wisconsin, 582
U.S. 383, 393 (2017)).
In order to state a takings claim, Avenue A must allege an underlying property interest
impacted by the challenged governmental action. Id. at 469. The Sixth Circuit has acknowledged
that the definition of a property interest for purposes of a takings claim is subject to some debate.
See id. at 470. Although there is significant case law regarding what constitutes a property interest
in the due process context, it appears “that the property rights protected by takings law are broader
[than] (or at least not coextensive with) the property rights protected by due process.” Id. at 469.
To determine whether a given use of land fits within the titleholder’s bundle of rights—and thus
can be subject to a taking—the Court must conduct “a searching inquiry into ‘background
principles of the State’s law of property and nuisance already placed on land ownership,’ and
‘objective factors, such as the nature of the land use proscribed.’” Id. at 472 (cleaned up) (first
quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992), then quoting Palazzolo, 533
U.S. at 630). Here, the parties do not address the issue of background state law, and it is
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unnecessary to resolve it. Even if Avenue A has a property interest in the proposed development,
the Penn Central factors do not indicate that a taking has occurred.
Economic impact. Avenue A argues that the denial of its amendment had significant
economic impact because it is unable to sell the property as currently zoned. Although Avenue A
does not specify the value of the contract with the prospective buyer or the loss in property value
caused by the amendment denial, the Court accepts that Avenue A has plausibly alleged some
diminution in economic value, and thus that this factor weighs slightly in its favor. However, note
that “even a significant loss of property value, absent more, will not suffice to prove a taking.”
Lifestyle Cmtys., Ltd. v. City of Worthington, 165 F.4th 1013, 1023 (6th Cir. 2026) (finding no
taking despite loss of 94% of property value); see also Raceway Park, Inc. v. Ohio, 356 F.3d 677,
687 n.8 (6th Cir. 2004) (“[D]iminution in the value of property is insufficient to demonstrate a
taking.”); Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 125 (“Zoning laws . . . have been viewed as permissible
governmental action even when prohibiting the most beneficial use of the property.”).
Investment-backed expectations. Avenue A contends that its contract with the proposed
developer created investment-backed expectations. However, “to establish ‘a reasonable
investment-backed expectation,’ [Avenue A] needs to show ‘more than a unilateral expectation or
an abstract need.’” Lifestyle Cmtys., 165 F.4th at 1024 (quoting Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,
467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984)). Thus, it is not enough that Avenue A executed a sale contingent on
approval of the application; it must also have had reason to believe the application would be
approved.
Avenue A contends that it reasonably expected its application would be granted because
the application complied with the criteria set out in the municipal code. But the code does not
create reasonable expectations because it provides significant discretion to the Council. The code
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requires the Council to “consider” a set of criteria and make a decision “based on” that
consideration, but it does not specify how much weight to give each criterion. (Springfield, Mich.,
City Code §§ 50-7.5.C.3, 50-7.5.E.) Many of the criteria require the Council to consider complex
factors such as “[t]he compatibility of all the potential uses allowed in the proposed zoning district
with surrounding uses,” which could plainly be the subject of reasonable disagreement. (Id. § 50-
7.5.E.4.) Thus, even if Avenue A believed the proposed development was supported by the code’s
criteria, it should not have expected that the Council would necessarily agree.
Avenue A also notes that the zoning administrator recommended approval of its
application. But that recommendation could not create a reasonable expectation because it was
not binding on the Council. Cf. id. (rules binding planning commission could not create reasonable
investment-backed expectation where the city council “is always free to depart from the
[commission]’s recommendations”). Avenue A also asserts, based on the zoning administrator’s
recommendation, that “the City subjected this particular application to its prescribed criteria based
review and determined that eleven of the twelve applicable criteria supported approval.” (Pl.’s
Opp’n Br. 23, ECF No. 17.) But the City did not make any such determination; rather, one City
official (the zoning administrator) concluded that most of the criteria supported approval, and
made a recommendation that the City Council was free to disagree with. Again, regardless of what
the zoning administrator said, Avenue A was aware that the City Council could reach its own
contrary conclusions, so it should not have formed any expectations of success. Ultimately,
Avenue A “cannot establish a taking ‘simply by showing that [it has] been denied the ability to
exploit a property interest that [it] heretofore had believed was available for development.” Id.
(quoting Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130).
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Character of government action. “[A] taking is more likely to occur when the interference
with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government, or when the government
action lacks a legitimate public purpose.” Id. (cleaned up). Here, denial of the rezoning application
was not akin to a physical invasion of Avenue A’s property. Avenue A notes that the City
Council’s decision was specific to the property in question—in contrast to a generally applicable
zoning ordinance—but it provides no authority for the notion that individualized property
determinations are inherently a form of physical invasion. Avenue A also contends that the City
Council had no legitimate public purpose for denying its request. In support of this contention, it
notes that the zoning administrator found the application to be supported by various public interest
factors. But as discussed above, there is no reason to treat the zoning administrator’s opinion as
conclusive on the matter, and the City Council was free to disagree. Avenue A fails to engage
with most of the reasons cited in the Council’s report justifying the denial of its application, so it
cannot establish that the Council acted without a public purpose.
Avenue A also asserts that the public interest factors cited in the Council’s report were not
the true basis for its decision, and that the Council’s real motive was to “prevent[] this purchaser’s
particular project from proceeding.” (Pl.’s Opp’n Br. 26.) But it was within the Council’s
authority to deny the zoning application in order to prevent a particular project from proceeding,
as long as its opposition to that project was grounded in a legitimate public purpose. Even the
zoning administrator’s report, which Avenue A heavily relies on, provides some reasons why
allowing a storage facility would not be in the public interest: “storage units are generally not
considered to be drivers of economic development, nor do they create a significant amount of
employment opportunities.” (Zoning Administrator Report, PageID.409.) Avenue A provides no
basis to think that these reasons are illegitimate.
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In sum, the first Penn Central factor weighs slightly in Avenue A’s favor, but the second
and third weigh against Avenue A. Putting everything together, Avenue A has not established that
the City committed a taking.
2. Procedural Due Process
“The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause bars ‘any State’ from “depriv[ing] any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’” Lifestyle Cmtys., 165 F.4th at
1026 (quoting U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, § 1). “To succeed on a procedural-due-process claim, a
plaintiff must show: (1) deprivation by state action of a protected interest in life, liberty, or
property, and (2) inadequate state process.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Avenue A’s
procedural due process claim fails on the first prong, as it cannot establish the deprivation of a life,
liberty, or property interest.2
Avenue A asserts that the City Council’s decision deprived it of a property interest.
“Property owners generally do not have a property interest in the expectation of rezoning” because
“a party cannot possess a property interest in the receipt of a benefit when the state’s decision to
award or withhold the benefit is wholly discretionary.” Id. at 1027. A property interest may exist,
however, where “a statute substantively limits official discretion” regarding zoning applications.
Callihan v. Sudimack, No. 96-3711, 1997 WL 397212, at *5 (6th Cir. July 10, 1997) (citing
Simpson ex rel. Tony L. v. Childers, 71 F.3d 1182, 1185 (6th Cir. 1995)); see Coleman v. McGinnis,
843 F. Supp. 320, 324 (E.D. Mich. 1994). In order to sufficiently limit discretion, state law must
“establish[] substantive predicates to govern official decision making, and . . . mandate[] the
2 Whether a zoning decision is subject to procedural due process depends on its character as a legislative or
administrative action. Here, the decision appears administrative—and thus subject to due process—because it applied
only to a single property. See Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Sterling Heights, 949 F.2d 890, 896 (6th Cir.
1991).
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outcome to be reached upon finding a certain required criteria.” Callihan, 1997 WL 397212, at
*5; see also Ky. Dep’t of Corrs. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 462 (1989).
Avenue A contends that the City Council’s rezoning decision was not discretionary
because the city code uses mandatory language when it states that “the City Council shall approve
or deny [a zoning] amendment, based on its consideration of the [listed] criteria.” (Springfield,
Mich., City Code § 50-7.5.C.3 (emphasis added).) The problem with this argument is that the code
does not dictate how the City Council should reach a decision from its consideration of those
criteria. The code is silent on how much weight each criterion should be given, or how many of
the criteria must be satisfied before approval is required. In other words, the code does not
“mandate[] the outcome to be reached upon finding a certain required criteria.” Callihan, 1997
WL 397212, at *5. Thus, the Council’s decision regarding Avenue A’s zoning application was
discretionary, and Avenue A has no property interest in approval of the application. Accordingly,
Avenue A cannot state a procedural due process claim.
3. Substantive Due Process
“Property owners ‘have a substantive due process right not to be subjected to arbitrary or
irrational zoning decisions.’” Lifestyle Cmtys., 165 F.4th at 1028 (quoting White Oak Prop. Dev.,
LLC v. Washington Township, 606 F.3d 842, 853 (6th Cir. 2010)). The Sixth Circuit has
sometimes suggested that a plaintiff may establish a substantive due process claim based on a
defendant’s arbitrary actions—i.e., actions that “shock the conscience”— regardless of whether
the plaintiff has an underlying life, liberty, or property interest. Range v. Douglas, 763 F.3d 573,
589 (6th Cir. 2014) (“Our case law on substantive due process is somewhat conflicted as to whether
an underlying constitutionally-protected right must be established in order for a government action
to violate one’s rights by shocking the conscience.”). But more recent case law appears to reject
this view. See Guertin v. State, 912 F.3d 907, 922 n.5 (6th Cir. 2019). More importantly, the Sixth
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Circuit has repeatedly indicated that regardless of how substantive due process claims may arise
in other contexts, when it comes to zoning, “government action will not shock the conscience
unless it touches on a protectable interest.” Range, 763 F.3d at 589; see also Silver v. Franklin
Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 966 F.2d 1031, 1036 (6th Cir. 1992) (“[B]efore Silver can establish
a violation of substantive due process he must demonstrate that he had a property interest in the
use of the undeveloped parcel as a condominium complex.”); EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo,
698 F.3d 845, 862 (6th Cir. 2012); Braun v. Ann Arbor Charter Township, 519 F.3d 564, 573 (6th
Cir. 2008); Andreano v. City of Westlake, 136 F. App’x 865, 870–71 (6th Cir. 2005); Siefert v.
Hamilton County, 951 F.3d 753, 765 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, because Avenue A lacks a property
interest in the proposed development, it cannot state a substantive due process claim.
Even if a property interest is not required for a shocks-the-conscience claim, Avenue A has
not alleged behavior that shocks the conscience. Conscience-shocking behavior is that which
involves “extreme irrationality,” Pearson, 961 F.2d at 1222, and which “shake[s] the foundations
of this country,” EJS Props., 698 F.3d at 862.
Contrary to what Avenue A argues, the fact that the zoning administrator recommended
granting the application does not make the City Council’s decision to reject it irrational. The City
Council is entitled to reach its own independent conclusion on the merits of a rezoning application.
The zoning administrator’s recommendation may establish that reasonable minds can disagree on
the merits of the zoning application, but it does not show that the Council’s countervailing
determination was incorrect.
Avenue A also contends that the zoning administrator’s report caused Avenue A to focus
its advocacy on the one criterion the administrator had found lacking (the oversaturation issue)
rather than on the criteria ultimately used by the City to justify denying the application.
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Essentially, Avenue A’s view is that the Council was obligated to warn it beforehand about each
specific concern the Counsel had with the application. This objection seems like a procedural due
process issue, and thus is misplaced in an argument regarding substantive due process. More
importantly, the objection is meritless. Avenue A was on notice from the beginning that the City
Council would consider a specific set of criteria set out in the city code, and those were ultimately
the criteria that the Council cited in its final decision. The zoning administrator’s report changed
nothing; if the report caused Avenue A to focus only on the oversaturation criterion, and to assume
that the other criteria were a foregone conclusion, that was Avenue A’s mistake.
Avenue A also takes issue with the fact that the City Council did not explain its reasoning
until June 1, several weeks after the initial denial of Avenue A’s application. Again, this objection
seems more procedural than substantive; a failure to explicitly state one’s reasons when making a
decision does not entail that one has no reasons to speak of. Moreover, Avenue A cites no authority
for the proposition that a decisionmaker is required to fully explain its reasoning at the moment of
making a decision, rather than two weeks later. If anything, a decisionmaker who takes additional
time to carefully formulate their reasoning is acting more rationally. The Council acted no
differently from a judge who makes an oral ruling at a hearing and then sets out their reasoning in
a subsequent written opinion.
Avenue A attempts to infer from the timing of events that the reasons set out in the June 1
report must have been fabricated after the fact, and that the May 18 vote must have been the product
of other (presumably illicit) motivations. But this inference does not follow from the facts alleged.
Avenue A asserts that the inference does not need to follow from the alleged facts because
“[w]hether the Resolution memorialized Council’s preexisting reasoning or supplied new reasons
after the May 18 vote presents a factual dispute that cannot be resolved against Plaintiff on a
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motion to dismiss.” (Plaintiff’s Opp’n Br. 19.) But this contention overreads the liberality of
notice pleading. A plaintiff cannot premise a substantive due process claim on the bare allegation
that a decisionmaker had secret (unspecified) motives for acting. Rather, the plaintiff must allege
facts from which one can reasonably infer that the defendant acted in an unconstitutional manner.
And Avenue A alleges no such facts.
Avenue A does point to a text chain between councilmembers that, it argues, reveals that
the Council’s explanations for denying the application were pretextual. Even assuming that a
decision justified by pretext is necessarily an irrational one, Avenue A has not shown pretext. The
texts indicate that the Council would have accepted the application if it did not know about the
proposed development. But this fact does not undermine the Council’s stated reasons for denying
the application; those reasons—such as the fact that a B-2 zone accords more with the surrounding
properties—are entirely consistent with the idea that the Council wanted to prevent the proposed
storage facility. Avenue A apparently thinks it improper for the Council to make a zoning decision
based on its desire to stop a specific development from being built, but the Court does not share
this intuition, and Avenue A cites no authority supporting its view. Nor does the Court find
suspicious a councilmember’s statement that “[a]ll the things that [they] want[ed] to see [on the
property], are covered under the current zoning.” (Text Messages, PageID.445.) The Council is
entitled to deny a zoning request because the present zoning category is preferable to any other;
indeed, that is the exact basis on which it should make such a decision. Thus, these texts do not
establish that the Council acted irrationally or that its proffered reasons for denying the application
were pretextual.
In sum, Avenue A has not stated a substantive due process claim.
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4. State Law Claims
Avenue A also brings claims under state law. Ordinarily, where a district court has
exercised jurisdiction over a state law claim solely by virtue of supplemental jurisdiction and the
federal law claim is dismissed before trial, the court will dismiss the remaining state law claims.
Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2010) (“When all federal claims are
dismissed before trial, the balance of considerations usually will point to dismissing the state law
claims . . . .”); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3) (court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction” when it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction”). “In
determining whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, the district court should balance several
factors, including judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Williams v. Addison
Cmty. Schs., 168 F.4th 791, 794–95 (6th Cir. 2026). Dismissal, however, remains “purely
discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)); Orton v. Jonny’s Lunch Franchise, LLC, 668 F.3d 843, 850 (6th Cir. 2012).
Here, the balance of the relevant considerations weighs against the continued exercise of
supplemental jurisdiction, so the Court will dismiss Avenue A’s state law claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
As explained above, Avenue A’s constitutional claims are ripe for decision, but it has failed
to state a claim under the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause. Accordingly, the Court will
dismiss Avenue A’s federal claims and decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over its state
law claims.
An order and judgment will enter in accordance with this Opinion.
Dated: October 13, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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