Deak v. Schuitema et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
JONATHAN DAVID DEAK,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-01610
MIKE SCHUITEMA, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 15, 2026, against Mike Schuitema and
Dana Nessel in their official capacities as the Emmet County Prosecuting Attorney
and the Michigan Attorney General, respectively. (ECF No. 1). Because Plaintiff
has been permitted to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 6), the Court has reviewed
Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine whether it is
frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was “denied the right to counsel” in state
child support proceedings, resulting in the issuance of a child support order against him.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.1-2). Plaintiff further alleges that he is in arrears on his child
support obligation and is facing felony prosecution but that he has no pending charges
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currently. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4-5). Plaintiff states that Defendants “have the
authority to initiate criminal prosecution against [him].” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4).
Plaintiff asserts 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of his due-process rights under
the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.7-12). Plaintiff requests declaratory and injunctive relief. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.12).
ANALYSIS
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
at 678. If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
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the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
I. Standing
As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal court[s] must proceed with caution in
deciding that [they have] subject matter jurisdiction.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed.
Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1996). “It is to be presumed that a cause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Regardless of whether the parties raise the
issue, a federal court is obligated to examine its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314,
324 (6th Cir. 1998).
Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial power” of federal courts to “cases”
and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Standing is one component of Article III
jurisdiction. If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the claim. Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc., 792 F.3d 627, 631 (6th
Cir. 2015); Central States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco
Managed Care, LLC, 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
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Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). This Court has no authority to render advisory
opinions, issue opinions on abstract principles, or hear generalized grievances. See
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975);
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Thus, a plaintiff seeking relief must
show that he has standing to assert a claim.
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). An
injury in fact requires “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The alleged harm
“ ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560 n.1).
Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege an injury that is “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff does not explain how he
was harmed by Defendants to give him standing for this suit. Plaintiff merely asserts
in his complaint that Defendants “have the authority to initiate criminal prosecution
against [him]” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4) but later admits that that he “has no pending state
criminal charges” although he was in arrears in child support (ECF No. 1, PageID.5).
Plaintiff relies on a possible future injury as the basis for his claims, but his injury is
merely speculative and overall insufficient to establish standing. See Clapper v.
Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
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II. Failure to State a Claim
Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against either Defendant, other than to note
that they both have the authority to prosecute him in their respective roles and official
capacities. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). Plaintiff seeks declaratory and prospective
injunctive relief, requesting that Defendants be enjoined from pursuing criminal
prosecution against him for failure to pay his child support. (ECF No. 1, PageID.12).
An official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an
exception to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Ex Parte Young,
209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
bar prospective injunctive relief against a state official). Similarly, “prosecutorial
immunity does not bar declaratory and injunctive relief.” Bridges v. Blackmon, No. 23-
3911, 2024 WL 4615351, at *1 (6th Cir. May 8, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1079, 220
L. Ed. 2d 395 (2025).
Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under
Ex Parte Young for prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action
against the state. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). The Ex parte
Young doctrine “rests on the premise—less delicately called a ‘fiction’—that when a
federal court commands a state official to do nothing more than refrain from violating
federal law, he is not the State for sovereign immunity purposes.” Virginia Off. for Prot.
& Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 255 (2011) (citation omitted).
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The Supreme Court has cautioned that “Ex parte Young can only be used to avoid
a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal
law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’ ” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971
F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md.,
535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
But, even if Plaintiff had standing, he fails to allege a violation of federal law
under Ladd. As such, the complaint should be dismissed, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for
failure to state a cognizable claim.
As a preliminary matter, “the Sixth Amendment does not govern civil cases.”
Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011). Moreover, Michigan courts have not
explicitly recognized a parental right to counsel in child custody proceedings. See
Gupton v. Gupton, No. 367426, 2025 WL 1729983, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. June 20, 2025).
Plaintiff points to Turner, and Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18
(1981), to support his claim otherwise, but Plaintiff misapplies these cases. (ECF No.
1, PageID.6).
In Turner, the central question was “whether the Due Process Clause grants an
indigent defendant, such as Turner, a right to state-appointed counsel at a civil contempt
proceeding, which may lead to his incarceration.” 564 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege that has been found in civil contempt, that he is facing
civil contempt proceedings, or that he has been criminally charged for his arrears. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.5). As such, Turner is inapplicable and does not create an automatic
parental right to counsel in child custody proceedings.
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Likewise, Lassiter is also inapplicable and does not stand for Plaintiff’s contention.
The Lassiter Court held that indigent parents do not have an absolute constitutional
right to an appointed attorney in termination of parental rights cases. Lassiter, 452
U.S. at 31-32. Plaintiff alleges that the underlying state proceedings here concern child
support, not termination of his parental rights. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3-4). Accordingly,
neither of these cases that Plaintiff cites creates an automatic constitutional parental
right to counsel in child custody proceedings.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a
right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation
was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,
48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). If either
element is missing, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim will not prevail. Christy v. Randlett,
932 F.2d 502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991).
Because Section 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of
substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under Section 1983 is to identify the
specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994). Plaintiff alleges that his constitutional rights to counsel and due process were
violated when he did not receive appointed counsel in the underlying child support
proceedings. (ECF No. 1, PageID.7-10). But Plaintiff was not entitled to counsel in
those proceedings, as discussed above, so his lack of appointed counsel cannot be the
basis for his alleged constitutional violations under Section 1983. As such, Plaintiff fails
to identify a constitutional right that Defendants infringed upon, and his claims
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necessarily fail. Accordingly, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support a claim
upon which relief may be granted, and the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted and that this action be terminated. For the same reasons the
undersigned makes this recommendation, the undersigned finds that an appeal of
such would be frivolous and not made in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: June 4, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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