Haver v. Acurast

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHERYL HAVER,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-01473
ACURAST,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated this action on May 5, 2026, against Acurast. (ECF No. 1).
Because Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 4), the Court
has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine
whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed and this action terminated.
ANALYSIS
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
Case 1:26-cv-01473-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 1
of 4

2
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
at 678. If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), but does not have to accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true if they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible, Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
In her initial complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she created a gaming website while
working for Acurast as a processor and that Acurast was profiting $2.2 million off of her
website using her bitcoin account. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4-5). Plaintiff attached several
screenshots of her alleged website through Acurast. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.8-12).
Case 1:26-cv-01473-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 2
of 4

3
Given that these allegations were confusing and her claims difficult to discern, the Court
afforded Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint. (ECF No. 6). Plaintiff
submitted an amended complaint, but it suffers from the same defect as her initial
complaint. (ECF No. 7). In Plaintiff’s amended complaint, she further alleges that she
“should be getting payment for [her] website” and that “Acurast has discriminated
[against] [her].” (ECF No. 7, PageID.26-27). Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations are
precisely the kind of “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed–me accusation[s]”
that are facially implausible and not viable under Twombly and Iqbal. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677-78; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 678-79. Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to
support a claim upon which relief may be granted. Accordingly, the undersigned
recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may
be granted and that this action be terminated. For the same reasons the
undersigned makes this recommendation, the undersigned finds that an appeal of
such would be frivolous and not made in good faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369
U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Case 1:26-cv-01473-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 3
of 4

4
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: June 3, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:26-cv-01473-HYJ-PJG ECF No. 8, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/03/26 Page 4
of 4