Duc Duong v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
THI DUY DUC DUONG,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1390
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee, initiated
this action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
The habeas petition challenges the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention and asks the Court
to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to
release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.18.) In an order entered on April 30, 2026, the Court
directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus
and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Later that same
day, Petitioner filed an emergency motion for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because
Petitioner had been re-detained by ICE at a routine check-in on April 27, 2026, despite the United
States District Court for the District of Arizona ordering Petitioner’s release on March 17, 2026.
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(Mot. TRO, ECF No. 6, PageID.51.) On May 1, 2026, the Court granted Petitioner’s motion for a
TRO and ordered her released from custody subject to the conditions of her prior order of
supervision. (Order, ECF No. 7.)
Respondents filed their response on May 5, 2026, (ECF No. 8.) On May 6, 2026,
Respondents filed a status report confirming that Petitioner had been released from custody on
May 6, 2026, pursuant to the Court’s order. (Status Report, ECF No. 9.) Petitioner filed a reply on
May 8, 2026. (ECF No. 10.)
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Vietnam. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) Petitioner
entered the United States on or about December 20, 2024, and has remained in the United States
since that time. (Id., PageID.9.) On October 7, 2025, Petitioner was ordered removed from the
United States, but Petitioner was granted withholding of removal because the Immigration Judge
(IJ) found it was “more likely than not that [Petitioner’s] life or freedom would be threatened on
account of a protected ground if she were removed to Vietnam.” (Id.) “Both parties waived appeal,
and the order became administratively final that same day.” (Id.)
“After nearly six months of post-final-order detention, [Petitioner] filed a writ of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona challenging her continued
detention under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).” (Id.) On March 17, 2026, the District
of Arizona granted Petitioner’s habeas petition “after the Government conceded that it could not
establish a ‘significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,’ and ordered
her immediate release from custody.” (Id.; D. Ariz. Order, ECF No. 1, PageID.22–23.) Petitioner
was released from custody on March 20, 2026. (Notice of Compliance, ECF No. 1, PageID.25.)
Petitioner was “placed under an Order of Supervision (“OSUP”) and complied with all conditions
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imposed by ICE, including appearing for scheduled check-ins as directed.” (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.10.)
On April 27, 2026, Petitioner attended a routine check-in at the Detroit ICE Field Office
and was re-detained for removal to a third country. (Id.; Notice of Revocation of Release, ECF
No. 8-1, PageID.71–72.) That same day, ICE “conducted an information interview to allow
Petitioner an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation of her order of supervision.” (See
Resp., ECF No. 8, PageID.61; Alien Informal Interview, ECF No. 8-2, PageID.74.) On an
unknown date, Petitioner was “accepted to be removed to Palau pursuant to a Third Country
Removal agreement between the United States and Palau that was signed on December 24, 2025.”
(Mull Decl. ¶¶ 4–6, ECF No. 8-3, PageID.77.) ICE intended to remove Petitioner to Palau on May
4, 2026, “absent any stay or temporary restraining order.” (Id. ¶ 7.) In a declaration, Acting Deputy
Assistant Director of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations, Janese Mull, states, “The
Petitioner’s acceptance by Palau and placement on the manifest for this charter serves as the travel
document in the Petitioner’s removal.” (Id.) Mull also states that “[s]hould the Petitioner not make
the May 4, 2026 flight, ICE would be able to remove the Petitioner on the next scheduled charter
to Palau for third country removal[] absent any stay or temporary restraining order.” (Id. ¶ 8.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers upon the federal courts the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
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IV. 	Jurisdiction
The Court has jurisdiction over this action because Petitioner was detained in this district
when she filed the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and the government’s subsequent movement
and release of Petitioner does not deprive the Court of jurisdiction. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 441 (2004).
V. 	Merits Discussion
The parties agree that 8 U.S.C. § 1231 governs Petitioner’s detention because she is subject
to a final order of removal. (See Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.12; Resp., ECF No. 8, PageID.62.)
However, Petitioner argues that she has shown there is good reason to believe that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, pursuant to Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). In response, Respondents contend that re-detention is lawful because
Palau’s acceptance of Petitioner constitutes a change of circumstances such that there is now a
significant likelihood that Petitioner will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). Here, as noted above, Petitioner’s order of
removal became final on October 7, 2025. The 90-day removal period following the order expired
well before Petitioner filed the present action. See id. § 1231(a)(1) (“The [90-day] removal period
begins on . . . [t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.”).
In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that following the removal period, the Government
may continue to detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of time, which the
Supreme Court concluded equaled a total of six months in detention. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that
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there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.1 “[O]nce [a noncitizen’s] removal
is no longer reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Id.
at 699.
Here, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted Petitioner’s first
petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on her claim under Zadvydas that her detention exceeded
the removal period and that there was no significant likelihood of her removal in the reasonably
foreseeable future. (D. Ariz. Order, ECF No. 1, PageID.22.) In that case, Respondents’ response
stated, “Undersigned counsel is unable to ascertain sufficient facts at this time to establish that
there is a ‘significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.’ [Zadvydas, 533
U.S. at 701.] Accordingly, Respondents do not oppose Petitioner’s request for release at this time.”
(Id.) The District of Arizona thus accepted Respondents’ concession as non-opposition to granting
Petitioner’s habeas petition. (Id.)
In this case, Respondents now argue that there has been a change in circumstances such
that Petitioner’s removal is significantly likely to occur in the reasonably foreseeable future. To
support this assertion, Respondents provide the declaration of Janese Mull, which indicates that
Petitioner was accepted to be removed to Palau on a charter flight on May 4, 2026. Petitioner did
not make the flight, as this Court ordered her release on May 1, 2026, and she was in fact released
on May 6, 2026.
1 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
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The declaration also states that “[s]hould the Petitioner not make the May 4, 2026 flight,
ICE would be able to remove the Petitioner on the next scheduled charter to Palau for third country
removal[] absent any stay or temporary restraining order.” However, Respondents do not provide
any more details as to when the “next scheduled charter to Palau” is scheduled to occur or whether
Respondents have currently valid travel documents to allow Respondents to effect Petitioner’s
removal. There is nothing in the record before the Court to indicate that Respondents have taken
any further action since May 4, 2026, including securing currently valid travel documents, to effect
the deportation of Petitioner. Therefore, at this time, the Court is unable to conclude that
Respondents have provided sufficient facts to show that removal is likely to occur in the reasonably
foreseeable future. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action. They seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding habeas relief
will bind at least one Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred
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outside the area under the authority of the ICE Detroit Field Office, the Court will retain all of the
remaining Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order Petitioner’s
continued release subject to the conditions under which she was released from custody by the
United States District Court for the District of Arizona’s order. The Court will order Respondents
to file a status report within five days to certify compliance with this opinion.
Dated: 	June 4, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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