Hernandez Condeno v. Unknown Party

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
YSNANDY JOSE HERNANDEZ
CONDENO,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY,
Respondent.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1364
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility in Battle Creek, Calhoun County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondent to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) In an order entered on
April 29, 2026, the Court directed Respondent to show cause, within three business days, why the
writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF
No. 3.) Respondent filed a response on May 1, 2026. (ECF No. 4.)
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 1
of 10

2
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.53.) On September 13, 2024, Petitioner entered “the United States at the Paso Del Norte
Port of Entry in El Paso, [Texas].” (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
issued 	Petitioner 	a 	Form 	I-862, 	NTA, 	charging 	him 	with 	inadmissibility 	pursuant 	to
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who,
at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel
documents].” (Id., PageID.56.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), until September 12, 2026.1 (Form I-94, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58 (indicating
that Petitioner’s “Class of Admission” is “DT”2).) On November 6, 2024, Petitioner filed a Form
I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding Removal. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3,
PageID.61.)
On September 22, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (2025 Form I-213,
ECF No. 4-3, PageID.61.) Subsequently, the Detroit Immigration Court entered on order granting
1 In a Form I-213 created on September 23, 2025, DHS stated that “[o]n 04/18/2025, [Petitioner’s]
parole was terminated under DHS discretion.” (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.62.) There
is no additional information regarding this termination of Petitioner’s parole. In April of 2025,
DHS “issued a blanket termination of parole.” See Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-
1504, 2025 WL 3511093, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025) (citation omitted); (see Form I-94, ECF
No. 5-3, PageID.71).
2 	See 	United 	States 	Citizenship 	and 	Immigration 	Services 	Guidance 	Website,
https://www.uscis.gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to-
parole-and-temporary-protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies 	(under 	“Non-Categorical 	Parole”
heading, select “What does ‘Non-Categorical Parole’ mean?”) (“Aliens who are outside of the
United States may request to be paroled into the United States based on urgent humanitarian
reasons or a significant public benefit. These aliens are not paroled into the United States under a
categorical parole program or process. Often, the Class of Admission (COA) for these aliens is
‘DT’ though other parole related COAs may have been used.”).
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 2
of 10

3
DHS’s motion to pretermit Petitioner’s Application for Asylum and for Withholding Removal.
(Jan. 22, 2026, Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.70.)
On January 30, 2026, the Detroit Immigration Court ordered that Petitioner be removed to
Ecuador. (Jan. 30, 2026, Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-7, PageID.73.) Petitioner appealed
that order of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
That appeal remains pending. (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.16.) Because Petitioner’s appeal to the
BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of
the INA.3 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
3 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 3
of 10

4
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondent argues that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court declines to enforce
the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude
that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is
appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following
cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL
570449, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.53; Form I-94,
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58.) Petitioner also filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding Removal, which remained pending at the time of his arrest in September 2025. (2025
Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.61; see Jan. 22, 2026, Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-6,
PageID.70.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 4
of 10

5
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of persecution.” Id. at 1132 & n.8
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). The government may place the noncitizen into expedited
removal proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into
regular removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33
(citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 5
of 10

6
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, [4] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondent failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole had been accomplished at the time of his arrest. Petitioner left Venezuela,
seeking asylum in the United States, and Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry.
4 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 6
of 10

7
(NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.53; 2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.61.) At that time,
Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into
the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A). (See Form I-94, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.58.) Petitioner filed a Form I-589
Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remained pending at the time of his
arrest. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.61; see Jan. 22, 2026, Order Immigration Judge,
ECF No. 4-6, PageID.70.) Thus, when Petitioner was recently arrested and detained, Petitioner
was still seeking asylum. Moreover, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the
humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applied at the time
of his arrest. Indeed, Respondent makes no argument about whether the requirements for
termination of parole in § 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations have been satisfied.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 7
of 10

8
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner).5
Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made. Instead, Respondent
submitted a Form I-213, which states that Petitioner’s parole was terminated on April 18, 2025,
the date on which a “blanket termination of parole” was issued to noncitizens throughout the
country. (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.62); see Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025). This does not constitute
a case-by-case determination.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondent followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondent did not follow those
requirements, then it did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there [wa]s
some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk S. Ry.
5 But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant
of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously
granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing
that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole]
program[s] on an individual basis”). The Court finds that Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the
present case for the same reasons the Court found it distinguishable in Caceres Martinez v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *5 n.3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v.
Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *5 n.2 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado
Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL 570449, at *4 n.2 (W.D.
Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL
547955, at *5 n.6 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 8
of 10

9
Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondent does not claim that there was any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondent argues that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. As set forth in Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Nos. 25-1965, 1969,
1978, 1982, 2026 WL 1283891 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, this Court, and other courts throughout the country have rejected this argument.6
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondent failed to
follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondent counters Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
6 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th
1128 (8th Cir. 2026), which was issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit. These non-binding cases do not change the Court’s analysis.
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 9
of 10

10
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge,
may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The 	Court 	concludes 	that 	Petitioner’s 	current 	detention 	violates 	Petitioner’s 	Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondent to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. The Court will also order Respondent to file a status report
within three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with
this opinion and the corresponding judgment.
Dated: June 5, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-01364-HYJ-SJB ECF No. 6, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/05/26 Page 10
of 10