Hollingsworth v. Blanche

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ROBERT P. HOLLINGSWORTH, III,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-01342
TODD BLANCHE,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 24, 2026, against Todd Blanche in his
official capacity as the Acting Attorney General of the United States. (ECF No. 1).
Because Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 4), the Court
has reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine
whether it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed and this action terminated.
ANALYSIS
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
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held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
at 678. If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
In his complaint, Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of a Department of
Justice (DOJ) final rule that “amends [the DOJ’s] regulations implementing Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”) to eliminate disparate-impact liability.”
Rescinding Portions of Department of Justice Title VI Regulations to Conform More
Closely with the Statutory Text and To Implement Executive Order 14281, 90 Fed. Reg.
57,141, 57,141 (Dec. 10, 2025). (ECF No. 1, PageID.1). Specifically, Plaintiff asserts
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that, through this rule, Defendant “strip[ped]” Plaintiff of the disparate-impact standard
that he relies upon in his unrelated, pending workplace discrimination actions, which
now “could be dismissed.” 1 (ECF No. 1, PageID.3). Plaintiff alleges that the rule
prevents “law-abiding African-American citizens,” including himself, of “the primary tool
used to redress systemic racism in their own workplaces.” (Id.). Plaintiff’s civil rights
complaint for monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief raises claims under the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the separation
of powers doctrine, and 42 U.S.C. § 1985.2 (ECF No. 1, PageID.3-5).
I. Standing
As courts of limited jurisdiction, “federal court[s] must proceed with caution in
deciding that [they have] subject matter jurisdiction.” Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed.
Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1252 (6th Cir. 1996). “It is to be presumed that a cause
lies outside this limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests
upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511
U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citations omitted). Regardless of whether the parties raise the
issue, a federal court is obligated to examine its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte.
See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314,
324 (6th Cir. 1998).
1 Plaintiff asserts that “Defendant Todd Blanche is automatically substituted for his
predecessor, Pam Bondi,” who “finalized” the rule. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1).
2 The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s due-process and equal-protection claims for
money damages as arising under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388
(1971).
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Article III of the Constitution limits the “judicial power” of federal courts to “cases”
and “controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Standing is one component of Article III
jurisdiction. If a plaintiff lacks Article III standing, the court has no subject matter
jurisdiction to hear the claim. Imhoff Inv., LLC v. Alfoccino, Inc., 792 F.3d 627, 631 (6th
Cir. 2015); Central States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco
Managed Care, LLC, 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)). This Court has no authority to render advisory
opinions, issue opinions on abstract principles, or hear generalized grievances. See
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975);
North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971). Thus, a plaintiff seeking relief must
show that he has standing to assert a claim.
To establish Article III standing, an injury must be “concrete, particularized, and
actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action; and redressable by a
favorable ruling.” Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010). An
injury in fact requires “ ‘an invasion of a legally protected interest’ that is ‘concrete and
particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.’ ” Spokeo, Inc.
v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). The alleged harm
“ ‘must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.’ ” Id. (quoting Lujan, 504
U.S. at 560 n.1).
Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege an injury that is “actual or imminent, not
conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. Plaintiff simply alleges that he
has “active workplace discrimination complaint[s],” that “could be dismissed.” (ECF
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No. 1, PageID.3). Notably, Plaintiff does not allege that his suits have been dismissed
or that such dismissal is imminent. Id. Plaintiff relied on a possible future injury as
the basis for all his claims, but his injury is merely speculative and overall insufficient
to establish standing. See Clapper v. Amnesty Intern. USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013).
II. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity shields the United States from lawsuits.
Jackson v. United States, 751 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Dep’t of the Army v.
Blue Fox, Inc., 525 U.S. 255, 260 (1999)). Suits brought against the United States are
therefore dismissed unless a claimant can point to an express waiver of sovereign
immunity. See id. (citing FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994)). This immunity
extends to federal officials that are sued in their official capacity. Muniz-Muniz v. U.S.
Border Patrol, 741 F.3d 668, 671 (6th Cir. 2013).
Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional in nature and only the United States’ consent
to be sued in any court creates jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Meyer, 510 U.S. at 475.
“Still, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that sovereign immunity has been
waived or abrogated.” Cassaday v. U.S. Dist. Ct., W. Dist. of Mich., No. 1:25-CV-13076,
2025 WL 2997867, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
A. Bivens
Plaintiff has not alleged that sovereign immunity has been either waived or
abrogated regarding his claims under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S.
388 (1971). Further, more importantly, the Sixth Circuit has explained that Congress
has not waived sovereign immunity for Bivens claims. Nuclear Transp. & Storage, Inc.
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v. United States, 890 F.2d 1348, 1352 (6th Cir. 1989). To the extent that Plaintiff sues
Defendant in his official capacity for monetary damages under Bivens, “[w]ithout a
waiver of sovereign immunity, a court is without subject matter jurisdiction over claims
against federal agencies or officials in their official capacities.” Muniz-Muniz, 741 F.3d
at 671. Accordingly, this Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for monetary
damages based on constitutional violations, and those claims must be dismissed.3
B. APA
Comparatively, the APA “provides a broad waiver of sovereign immunity,” limited
by the exceptions provided under the statute. Beamon v. Brown, 125 F.3d 965, 967 (6th
Cir. 1997). The APA provides that:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant
statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof. An action in a court of the
United States seeking relief other than money damages and stating a claim
that an agency or an officer or employee thereof acted or failed to act in an
official capacity or under color of legal authority shall not be dismissed nor
3 Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are not barred by sovereign
immunity, as courts have recognized that Congress has waived immunity for actions
seeking such relief against the United States and its agencies pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 702.
See Robbins v. United States BLM, 438 F.3d 1074, 1080 (10th Cir. 2006) (“We have
recognized that this language [in Section 702] waives sovereign immunity in most suits
for nonmonetary relief against the United States, its agencies, and its officers.”) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); Raz v. Lee, 343 F.3d 936, 938 (8th Cir. 2003)
(stating that “the United States does not enjoy immunity from Raz’s injunctive-relief
action, because section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) expressly waives
sovereign immunity as to any action for nonmonetary relief brought against the United
States”); Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518, 524-25 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The
clear objective of the 1976 amendment [to Section 702] was to waive sovereign immunity
as a defense in actions seeking relief other than money damages.”). Moreover, the
waiver in Section 702 is not limited to claims that are reviewable under the APA.
Blagojevich v. Gates, 519 F.3d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 2008).
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relief therein be denied on the ground that it is against the United States
or that the United States is an indispensable party.
5 U.S.C. § 702. In other words, “ ‘the APA waives sovereign immunity for claims for
equitable relief against federal officials,’ [but] the waiver of sovereign immunity does not
apply to actions seeking money damages.” Haines v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin.,
814 F.3d 417, 425 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages under the APA.
5 U.S.C. § 702.
III. Failure to State a Claim
Even if Plaintiff had standing, his claims are subject to dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
As a preliminary matter, Plaintiff does not allege that his employment
discrimination lawsuits arise under Title VI, and even if he did, no private right of action
exists to pursue disparate-impact claims under Title VI. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275, 285 (2001); see also Ability Ctr. of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d
901 (6th Cir. 2004). Regardless, the undersigned addresses Plaintiff’s underlying
claims.
A. Bivens
In Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482 (2022), the United States Supreme Court held
that Bivens causes of action are limited to three situations: “1) a Fourth Amendment
claim against federal narcotics agents for an illegal seizure, 2) a Fifth Amendment claim
against a member of Congress for sex discrimination, and 3) an Eighth Amendment
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claim against prison officials for inadequate medical care.” Greene v. United States,
2022 WL 13638916, *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2022) (quoting Egbert at 596 U.S. 490-91).
The Supreme Court cautioned that recognizing new causes of action under Bivens
is disfavored. Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491. A court must first determine whether a plaintiff
presents a new Bivens context—one that is different from one of the three situations
stated above. Next, if the claim arises from a new context, the Court must ask whether
there are “special factors” indicating that the Judiciary is in a better position than
Congress to “weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages action to proceed.” Id.
at 492. The Court further stated that these two steps can be resolved by a single
question: “whether there is any reason to think that Congress might be better equipped
to create a damages remedy.” Id. Finally, the Court cannot fashion a new Bivens
remedy if Congress has already provided or authorized the Executive to provide “an
alternative remedial structure,” even where existing remedies do not provide complete
relief. Id. at 493. “If there are alternative remedial structures in place, ‘that alone,’
like any special factor, is reason enough to ‘limit the power of the Judiciary to infer a
new Bivens cause of action.’ ” Id. (citing Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 137 (2017)).
Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are different from any of the three situations
stated above that recognized a Bivens remedy. Plaintiff has not identified any factor
that indicates that the Judiciary is in a better position to fashion a remedy under these
facts than Congress. Similarly, the undersigned cannot identify any factors that favor
a Judicial remedy under these facts. In the opinion of the undersigned, a Bivens judicial
remedy is not available under the facts asserted in Plaintiff’s complaint.
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B. Equal Protection
Plaintiff asserts equal protection claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. The Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the federal government.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit instructs the courts to “evaluate equal protection claims
against the federal government under the Fifth Amendment just as we would evaluate
equal protection claims against state and local governments under the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th
Cir. 2011). “To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that
the government treated the plaintiff “disparately as compared to similarly situated
persons and that such disparate treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets
a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” Id. Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any similar
situated persons. Plaintiff attempts to compare his allegations to the DOJ’s handling
of “White, powerful figures” in the Jeffrey Epstein investigation and “White political
allies” from the January 6, 2021 riots. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4). Plaintiff has not shown
that any person is similarly situated. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that
the equal-protection claims be dismissed.
C. Due Process
The elements of a Fifth Amendment procedural due process claim are: “(1) a life,
liberty, or property interest requiring protection under the Due Process Clause, and (2) a
deprivation of that interest (3) without adequate process.” Fields v. Henry Cnty., Tenn.,
701 F.3d 180, 185 (6th Cir. 2012). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to set forth factual
allegations that support the elements of a Fifth Amendment procedural due process
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claim. Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that he was deprived of an interest. (ECF
No. 1, PageID.3). In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff fails to state a claim that
he was denied procedural due process rights by Defendant.
D. Section 1985 Conspiracy
Section 1985(3) addresses conspiracies to violate civil rights. To establish a
conspiracy claim under this section, a plaintiff must prove: 1) a conspiracy involving two
or more persons; 2) for the purpose of depriving a person or class of persons of the equal
protection of the laws; 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) which causes injury
to a person or property, or a deprivation of any right or privilege of citizen of the United
States. Johnson v. Hills & Dales Gen. Hosp., 40 F.3d 837, 839 (6th Cir. 1994).
“[C]onspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and . . . vague and
conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such
a claim . . . .” Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 395 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing
Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987)).
Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant, in concert with predecessors and administrative
officials, has engaged in a coordinated effort to deprive African-American citizens of
equal legal standing.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.5). He further alleges that “[t]his
conspiracy is evidenced by the simultaneous rescission of civil rights protections for the
marginalized and the affirmative rewarding of political allies.” (Id.).
Plaintiff’s allegations are vague, conclusory, and insufficiently specific to survive
screening. See Moldowan, 578 F.3d at 395. For instance, Plaintiff makes no specific
allegations that would support an inference of a plan, a shared objective, or any overt act
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intended to cause injury attributable to the defendants. Id. Accordingly, Plaintiff has
failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 for which relief may be granted.
E. APA
The APA authorizes persons injured by agency action to obtain judicial review by
suing the United States or one of its agencies, officers, or employees. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
Section 702 “requir[es] a litigant to show, at the outset of the case, that he is injured in
fact by agency action.” Director, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs v. Newport
News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 127 (1995). “Thus, a litigant cannot
bring an APA claim unless and until she suffers an injury.” Corner Post, Inc. v. Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 603 U.S. 799, 808 (2024). As discussed above, Plaintiff
fails to assert an injury in fact. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for
which relief may be granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint (ECF No. 1) be dismissed and that this action be terminated. For the
same reasons the undersigned makes this recommendation, the undersigned finds
that an appeal of such would be frivolous and not made in good faith. Coppedge v.
United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
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OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: May 20, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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