Bryant #618035 v. Middleton et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BOBBY FREDRICK BRYANT, JR.
#618035,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:26-cv-01277
UNKNOWN MIDDLETON, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 20, 2026. (ECF No. 1). Because
Plaintiff has been permitted to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 7), the Court has
reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine
whether it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that
Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against Judge Middleton of the 3B District Court in
St. Joseph County and the 3B District Court. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2). Plaintiff alleges
the following in his complaint. On July 11, 2025, Plaintiff had a court date at the 3B
District Court before a Judge Patterson, who “was so busy” that he had Judge Middleton
take “a dozen or so people into another courtroom,” including Plaintiff, to conduct
proceedings. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3). Plaintiff appeared before Judge Middleton that
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day, but on July 30, 2025, Plaintiff was arrested on a warrant signed by Judge Middleton
and jailed for failing to appear for his July 11 court date. (Id.). Approximately “34
hours later,” Plaintiff appeared before Judge Patterson, who apologized and ordered
Plaintiff’s release upon reviewing courtroom camera footage. (Id.). Plaintiff seeks
monetary damages, alleging that Judge Middleton’s mistake “caus[ed] a series of
events[,] which got [Plaintiff] into prison, caused [his] eviction, [his] break up, and
relapsing.” (ECF No. 1, PageID.4).
ANALYSIS
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the
speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 677-78 (2009). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’
but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id.
at 678. If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
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not suffice . . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff cannot bring suit against Judge Middleton because he is entitled to
absolute judicial immunity in this matter. See Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. App’x
462, 466 (6th Cir. 2016). “[A] judge is immune from a suit for money damages.” Id.
(citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991)). “There are only two sets of circumstances
in which judicial immunity does not attach to a judge’s acts: (1) if the judge’s actions
were non-judicial; or (2) if the judge performed the actions ‘in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction.’ ” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12). “An act is non-judicial if it is one
not normally performed by a judicial officer or if the parties did not deal with the judge
in his official capacity.” King v. Love, 766 F.2d 962, 965 (6th Cir. 1985). Judges are
entitled to absolute judicial immunity when issuing an arrest warrant because that is a
judicial function. See Ireland v. Tunis, 113 F.3d 1435, 1441 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[T]he
judicial nature of the act of issuing an arrest warrant cannot seriously be challenged.”).
Judge Middleton’s actions are therefore judicial acts entitled to absolute judicial
immunity from claims for money damages.
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To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims against the 3B District Court, these claims
also fail. “A court is . . . a place in which justice is judicially administered.” State ex
rel. Cleveland Mun. Ct. v. Cleveland City Council, 296 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ohio 1973)
(quoting Todd v. United States, 158 U.S. 278, 284 (1895)). It “is not sui juris,” so
“[a]bsent express statutory authority, a court can neither sue nor be sued in its own
right.” Id. Because Plaintiff failed to cite any statute allowing him to sue the 3B
District Court, the undersigned’s recommendation to dismiss the claims against the
court are proper. See Cooper v. Rapp, 702 F. App’x 328, 334-35 (6th Cir. 2017).
Plaintiff’s claims against the 3B District Court are also subject to dismissal because
Michigan state courts are entitled to sovereign immunity. See Pucci v. Nineteenth Dist.
Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 763 (6th Cir. 2010). Accordingly, the undersigned recommends
dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed herein, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s
complaint be dismissed and that this action be terminated. (ECF No. 1). For the
same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the undersigned
further recommends that an appeal of this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good
faith. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
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appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: June 24, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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