Pacheco Padilla v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ARLIN A. PACHECO PADILLA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1147
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) The Court grants Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the
following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.20–21.)
In an order entered on April 13, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
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not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on April 16, 2026, (ECF
No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on April 21, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Honduras. (De Leon Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-3,
PageID.43.) Petitioner entered the United States in December 2015 without inspection, and after
Petitioner entered the United States, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered
Petitioner. (Id. ¶ 5.) At that time, DHS issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner
with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). (Id.
¶ 6, PageID.43–44.) DHS then released Petitioner into the United States on his own recognizance
“[i]n accordance with section 236 of the [INA],” which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Id. ¶ 7,
PageID.44.) “The NTA was filed with the Baltimore Immigration Court,” and “[a] master calendar
hearing was scheduled for August 10, 2016.” (Id.)
“On August 10, 2016, the Immigration Judge ordered [Petitioner] removed to Honduras in
absentia.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Petitioner did not appeal the order of removal. (See Case Information, ECF
No. 4-2.) On October 13, 2016, a warrant of removal/deportation was entered based upon
Petitioner’s final order of removal. (Form I-205, ECF No. 4-8.)
Subsequently, on December 23, 2022, Petitioner filed an asylum application with the
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), and on August 20, 2025, Petitioner
filed an application for advance permission to enter as a nonimmigrant with USCIS. (Id. ¶¶ 9, 10.)
On April 1, 2026, ICE arrested Petitioner. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-7, PageID.60.) ICE “does
not have a firm removal date.” (De Leon Decl. ¶ 16, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.45.)
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
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Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Merits Discussion
Petitioner has a final order of removal, and therefore, Petitioner’s present detention is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. (See Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.29.) Petitioner contends that his
detention is unlawful and violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See generally
Pet., ECF No. 1.) In response, Respondents argue that Petitioner’s continued detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful and does not implicate the constitutional concerns identified in
Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.29–31.)
Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that
after expiration of the 90-day removal period, the Government may continue to detain the
noncitizen for some period of time, so long as the detention is reasonably necessary to ensure the
alien’s successful removal. 533 U.S. at 699. Because the Court recognized the difficulty of
determining whether continued detention after the removal period is reasonable, it designated six
months as a “presumptively reasonable period” of time for the Government to continue to detain
the alien. See id. at 701. Following that six-month period, “once [a noncitizen] provides good
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reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.1
Here, Petitioner is still within the six-month window following the removal period. Under
Zadvydas, detention during this period is presumptively reasonable. Therefore, based on the
information presently before the Court, the Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition without
prejudice.2
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: April 22, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
1 The Court notes that the Supreme Court recently held that § 1231(a)(6) does not require the
“Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which
the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen
poses a flight risk or a danger to the community.” See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573,
576 (2022). The Court, however, did not reach Arteaga-Martinez’s constitutional or Zadvydas
claims, concluding that such claims were not properly before the Court. See id. at 583–84.
2 “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable
detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the
reasonableness of his detention before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.
Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701). That is, during the
six-month period, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the default, but if a person ‘can prove’
that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption,” which
means that “before the six-month period elapses, the government bears no burden to justify
detention, and the petitioner must claim and prove[] that his removal is not reasonably
foreseeable.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). Based on the information currently before the Court,
Petitioner has not met this burden.
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