Aray Lattinez v. Mullin et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ALBEIRO ANTONIO ARAY LATTINEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1072
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1,
PageID.10.) On January 24, 2024, Petitioner applied for admission into the United States at the
Paso Del Norte Port of Entry. (NTA, ECF No. 1, PageID.10.) The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility
under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an
immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired
[immigration or travel document].” (Id., PageID.10–13.) At that time, Petitioner was “paroled . . .
into the United States pursuant to Section 212(d)(5) of the [INA],” which is codified at 8 U.S.C.
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§ 1182(d)(5)). (Id., PageID.10.) Petitioner’s parole remained valid until January 22, 2026. (Form
I-94, ECF No. 1, PageID.21.) On October 12, 2023, Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for
Asylum and Withholding of Removal, which remains pending. (Application, ECF No. 1,
PageID.20; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)
On January 10, 2026, ICE agents arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4; 2026
Form I-213, ECF No. 1, PageID.16.)
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.) In an order entered on April 2,
2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within three business days, why the writ of
habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.)
Respondents filed their response on April 7, 2026, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on
April 9, 2026, (ECF No. 5). Because neither party refutes that Petitioner’s parole expired on
January 22, 2026,1 this proceeding ultimately boils down to the same analysis of §§ 1225 and 1226
that the Court has applied in hundreds of recent immigration detention proceedings. See Mujica-
Pena v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-684, ECF No. 10, PageID.149 (W.D. Mich. April 6, 2026).
HABEAS CORPUS LEGAL STANDARD
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
1 A stated term of immigration parole expires by its terms and without any requirement of notice to the immigrant on
parole. See 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1) (providing that parole “automatically terminate[s] without written notice . . . at the
expiration of the time for which parole was authorized”).
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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
DISCUSSION
I. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. The Court declines to enforce
the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and even if the Court were to conclude
that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is
appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s exhaustion analysis in each of the following
cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich.
Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar.
4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-216, 2026 WL
570449, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No.
1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *3–4 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
II. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
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apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).2
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge,
may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in
each of the following cases: Caceres Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-547, 2026 WL 621359, at
*7–8 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 5, 2026); Nazari v. Raycraft, No. 1:26-cv-540, 2026 WL 607704, at *7–8
(W.D. Mich. Mar. 4, 2026); Delgado Vilchez v. Warden, North Lake Corr. Facility, No. 1:26-cv-
216, 2026 WL 570449, at *5–7 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 2026); Ramirez Gonzalez v. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 1:26-cv-373, 2026 WL 547955, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026).
2 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was recently issued by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258
(8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At
this time, these non-binding cases do not change the Court’s analysis.
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III. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents.
The Court concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director, the Acting
Director of ICE and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The
Court will dismiss the United States Attorney as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
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immediately release Petitioner from custody.3 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: April 20, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
3 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days, even if the Petitioner
requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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