Henrique Rodrigues v. Lynch et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
CARLOS HENRIQUE ROGRIGUES,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-1044
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.22–23.)
In an order entered on April 2, 2026, the Court directed Respondent to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
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not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed a response on April 7, 2026. (ECF No. 4.)
On May 1, 2026, the Court ordered Respondents to provide additional information regarding a
possible bond hearing ordered by the Detroit Immigration Court on January 20, 2026. (May 1,
2026, Order, ECF No. 5). Respondents filed their Advisory pertaining to the Court’s May 1, 2026,
Order on May 5, 2026. (ECF No. 6.).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Brazil who lawfully entered the United States in 2019.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5; Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.131.) Petitioner
remained beyond the period of time authorized by his B-2 nonimmigrant visa. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.5; NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.131.) Petitioner subsequently applied for a Form I-914,
Application for T Nonimmigrant Visa in September 2025, which remains pending. (Form I-914,
Application, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.27–54; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
On October 21, 2025, ICE detained and arrested Petitioner at the Westville, Indiana toll
road parking lot in Indiana.1 (2025 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.137.) On December 14,
2025, approximately two months after Petitioner was detained, ICE served Petitioner with an NTA
charging him with removability under “[§] 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA), as amended, in that after admission as a nonimmigrant under Section 101(a)(15) of the Act,
[Petitioner] remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted, in violation of this Act
or any other law of the United States.” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.131.)
On December 15, 2025, Petitioner requested a custody determination hearing by an
immigration judge but later withdrew that request on December 22, 2025, as his attorney did not
1 Respondents do not argue that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c), and there is nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner
was a law enforcement target for any reason other than his status as a noncitizen. (See Form I-213,
ECF No. 4-2, PageID.134–38.)
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appear for the hearing. (Dec. 22, 2025, Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.139.)
Petitioner subsequently filed a second motion for custody redetermination. (Jan. 20, 2026, Order
Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-5, PageID.141.) On January 20, 2026, an immigration judge
granted Petitioner’s motion; however, no custody redetermination hearing was ever held. (Id.;
Advisory, ECF No. 6.)
Also on January 20, 2026, the Detroit Immigration Court ordered Petitioner removed to
Brazil. (Jan. 20, 2026, Order Immigration Judge II, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.143.) Petitioner filed an
appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which was received on February 16, 2026, and
remains pending. (ECF No. 1-9, PageID.73–77; https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation,
last visited May 7, 2026.) Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s
order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of the INA.2 See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
2 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
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III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondent argues that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondent argues
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondent has violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner is
detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondent, 	however, 	contends 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondent’s interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondent counters Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
can request bond at that time, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has
been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
3 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director, the Acting
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Director of ICE, and the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The
Court will dismiss the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, and the United States Attorney General as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.4 The Court will also order Respondent to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Finally, the Court will
dismiss the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Immigration and Enforcement,
and the United States Attorney General as Respondents.
Dated: May 11, 2026 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
4 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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