Nguyen v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
NAM-HOANG NGUYEN,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-907
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner under the
conditions of Petitioner’s previous Order of Supervision. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7.)
In an order entered on March 20, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on April 3, 2026,
(ECF No. 8), and Petitioner filed his reply on April 20, 2026, (ECF No. 10.)
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native of Malaysia and a citizen of Vietnam. (McClure Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No.
8-1, PageID.63.) Petitioner entered the United States on October 8, 1979, as a refugee. (Id.)
Following a 2000 criminal conviction for Possession of Cocaine (Less than 25 Grams), Possession
of Marijuana, and Operating While Intoxicated, the United States Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, Notice to Appear (NTA), charging Petitioner with
removability 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I) of the INA, which provides:
Any alien who at any time after admission has been convicted of a violation of (or
a conspiracy or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a State, the United
States, or a foreign country relating to a controlled substance (as defined in section
802 of title 21), other than a single offense involving possession for one’s own use
of 30 grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.
(Id., ¶ 7, PageID.64); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(I).
On November 6, 2001, an Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner removed to Malasia.
(McClure Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.64.) Petitioner did not appeal that decision and,
therefore, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on or about December 6, 2001. (Id.)
On February 5, 2002, INS released Petitioner from custody on an Order of Supervision.
(Id., ¶ 9.) Thereafter, on September 12, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of Controlled Substance
Delivery/Manufacture (Less than 50 Grams) and sentenced to 23 months to 240 months in prison.
(Id., ¶ 10, PageID.64–65.) On October 3, 2005, Petitioner was convicted of Home Invasion, 2nd
degree, and Breaking and Entering with Intent and sentenced to 57 months to 180 months and 23
months to 120 months. (Id., ¶ 11, PageID.65.)
On April 29, 2010, INS served Petitioner with a Notice of Revocation of Release and
detained Petitioner upon his release from the Michigan Department of Corrections; however, on
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July 29, 2010, ICE released Petitioner on an Order of Supervision. (Id., ¶¶ 12–13; 2010 Order of
Supervision, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.12–13.) ICE again detained Petitioner the following month but
released him on an Order of Supervision on September 15, 2010. (McClure Decl. ¶¶ 14–15, ECF
No. 8-1, PageID.65.) Petitioner was convicted of additional crimes in 2013, 2018, and 2025,
including Police Officer-Fleeing 4th degree, Police Officer-Assaulting/Resisting/Obstructing, and
Domestic Violence. (Id., ¶¶ 16–18, PageID.65–66.)
On December 5, 2025, ICE agents detained Petitioner. (Id., ¶ 19, PageID.66.) That same
day, ICE issued Petitioner a Notice of Revocation of Release but did not provide Petitioner with
an informal interview in connection with the Notice. (2025 Notice of Revocation, ECF No. 1-1,
PageID.18.)
ICE issued Petitioner a second Notice of Revocation of Release nearly three months later,
on March 4, 2026. (McClure Decl. ¶ 20, ECF No. 8-1, PageID.66; 2026 Notice of Revocation,
ECF No. 8-2, PageID.69.) Petitioner was scheduled for an informal interview on March 10, 2026.
(2026 Notice of Revocation, ECF No. 8-2, PageID.70.) ICE is presently working with the
government of Vietnam to obtain travel documents for Petitioner. (McClure Decl., ECF No. 8-1,
¶¶ 21–22, PageID.67.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
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IV. 	Merits Discussion
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated Petitioner’s right to due process by re-
detaining him without a hearing to determine whether re-detention is justified. Respondents,
however, contend that Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), following
Petitioner’s final order of removal entered on December 6, 2001.
Ordinarily, when an individual is issued a final order of removal, that person must be
removed from the country within 90 days. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). Except for situations where
the person is “detained or confined” in a case other than the “immigration process,” or where a
court orders a stay of removal, the 90-day removal period begins when the removal order becomes
administratively final. Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Here, it is undisputed that Petitioner’s order of removal
is administratively final.
Under § 1231(a)(6), the government is permitted to continue to detain individuals who are
deemed “inadmissible” beyond the removal period, or it may release them under specified terms
of supervision. Id. § 1231(a)(6). However, once that time passes and after “removal is no longer
reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute,” and the noncitizen
must be released. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 699–700 (2001); see 28 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3)
(“If the alien does not leave or is not removed within the [90-day] removal period, the alien,
pending removal, shall be subject to supervision under regulations prescribed by the Attorney
General.”).
Consistent with § 1231(a)(6), Petitioner was released from detention with an Order of
Supervision, originally dated July 29, 2010, with Petitioner’s last release on September 15, 2010.
The government has promulgated regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations concerning the
release of noncitizens who are subject to a final removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 241.4; 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.13. These regulations—specifically, §§ 241.4 and 241.13—also govern the revocation of
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such noncitizens’ release. The agency must comply with the applicable regulatory and statutory
requirements. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 268 (1954),
superseded in part by statute on other grounds as recognized in Dept. of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 135 (2020) (“[A]s long as the regulations remain operative, the
Attorney General denies himself the right to sidestep” those regulations.). As the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals has explained:
“The Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide
by the regulations it promulgates. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545 (1959);
Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260,
267 (1954). An agency’s failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust
discrimination and deny adequate notice’ and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process. Where a prescribed procedure
is intended to protect the interests of a party before the agency, ‘even though
generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be
scrupulously observed.’ Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 547 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
also Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 629,
630 (1974) (observing that agency violations of regulations promulgated to provide
parties with procedural safeguards generally have been invalidated by courts).”
Wilson v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 545 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. United
States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1998)).
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 generally governs the continued detention of noncitizens under a final
order of removal. Section 241.4(l)(2) provides:
The Executive Associate Commissioner shall have authority, in the exercise of
discretion, to revoke release and return to Service custody an alien previously
approved for release under the procedures in this section. A district director may
also revoke release of an alien when, in the district director’s opinion, revocation is
in the public interest and circumstances do not reasonably permit referral of the
case to the Executive Associate Commissioner. Release may be revoked in the
exercise of discretion when, in the opinion of the revoking official:
(i) The purposes of release have been served;
(ii) The alien violates any condition of release;
(iii) It is appropriate to enforce a removal order or to commence removal
proceedings against an alien; or
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(iv) The conduct of the alien, or any other circumstance, indicates that release
would no longer be appropriate.
8 C.F.R. § 241.4.
Section 241.13 governs the detention of noncitizens under a final order of removal where
“there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(b). If
the noncitizen was released pursuant to § 241.13, release may be revoked if, “on account of
changed circumstances, the Service determines that there is a significant likelihood that the
[noncitizen] may be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” § 241.13(i)(2).
Further, the regulations governing release provide that, upon revocation of release, the
noncitizen “will be notified of the reasons for revocation of his or her release,” and will be given
“an initial informal interview promptly after his or her return to Service custody to afford the alien
an opportunity to respond to the reasons for revocation stated in the notification.” 8 C.F.R.
§ 241.4(l)(1); 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). “The revocation custody review will include an evaluation of
any contested facts relevant to the revocation and a determination whether the facts as determined
warrant revocation and further denial of release.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i). Courts examining the
requirements for revocation of release following a final order of removal have consistently held
that the procedural requirements of notice and an interview are required for revocation of a
noncitizen’s release. Constantinovici v. Bondi, 806 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2025)
(collecting cases; citations omitted). This Court agrees.
An informal interview is required “promptly after [the noncitizen's] return to Service
custody.” 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(l)(1) (emphasis added); § 241.13(i)(3). Here, Petitioner represents that
he was not provided with the required informal interview promptly after his December 5, 2025,
detention and Notice of Revocation of Release. Respondents do not contend otherwise. Even
assuming that a hearing was held on March 10, 2026, in accordance with the 2026 Notice of
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Revocation of Release, over three months after Petitioner’s arrest “cannot reasonably be construed
as a ‘prompt’ informal interview.” Constantinovici, 806 F. Supp. 3d at 1165 (holding that the
respondents violated the INA by failing to hold an informal interview within six weeks of the
petitioner’s arrest).
Moreover, “even if the government has the discretion to revoke [Petitioner’s] supervision,
his constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated by his re-detention.” Villanueva v.
Tate, 801 F. Supp. 3d 689, 704 (S.D. Tex. 2025). “Freedom from imprisonment—from
government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very
liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citation omitted). The
Court finds that Petitioner is entitled to Fifth Amendment due process protections for the reasons
set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *6–8 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025)
8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13, described in detail above, were intended “to provide due
process protections to [noncitizens] following the removal period as they are considered for
continued detention, release, and then possible revocation of release.” Santamaria Orellana v.
Baker, Civil Action No. 25-1788-TDC, 2025 WL 2444087, at *6 (D. Md. Aug. 25, 2025). “The
opportunity to contest detention through an informal interview is not some ticky-tacky procedural
requirement; it strikes at the heart of what due process demands.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-
22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Niz-Chavez v. Garland,
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593 U.S. 155, 172 (2021) (“At one level, today’s dispute may seem semantic, focused on a single
word, a small one at that. But words are how the law constrains power.”)). In its most elemental
formulation, “the fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)
(quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
The Court, therefore, agrees with courts around the country in concluding that the failure
to provide Petitioner with an informal interview promptly after his detention with a meaningful
opportunity to contest the reasons for revocation in accordance with 8 C.F.R. § 241.4 and § 241.13
violates Petitioner’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment and requires release. See,
e.g., Ceesay v. Kurzdorfer, 781 F. Supp. 3d 137, 166 (W.D.N.Y. 2025); Rombot v. Souza, 296 F.
Supp. 3d 383, 387–88 (D. Mass. 2017); M.S.L. v. Bostock, No. 6:25-CV-01204-AA, 2025 WL
2430267, at *10–12 (D. Or. Aug. 21, 2025); Roble v. Bondi, 803 F. Supp. 3d 766, 774 (D. Minn.
2025); Zhu v. Genalo, 798 F. Supp. 3d 400, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2025); Villanueva, 801 F. Supp. 3d at
704; Grigorian, 2025 WL 2604573, at *9; Ghafouri v. Noem, No. 3:25-CV-02675-RBM-BLM,
2025 WL 3085726, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025); Liu v. Carter, No. 25-3036-JWL, 2025 WL
1696526, at *3 (D. Kan. June 17, 2025).
V. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
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Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s Order of Supervision. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States
Attorney General as a Respondent.
Dated: 	April 23, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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