Portillo Luzardo v. Unknown Party et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
LUIS ALBERTO PEREZ VALERA,
proceeding by his next friend EYLIMAR
ISABEL PORTILLO LUZARDO,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-810
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
proceeding by his next friend Ms. Portillo Luzardo, filed this petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging the lawfulness of Petitioner’s detention. 1 (Pet., ECF
No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
1 As set forth below, the Court will permit Ms. Portillo Luzardo to proceed as next friend of
Petitioner in this action.
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corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a
bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.4.) 2
In an order entered on March 16, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. 3 (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on March 19, 2026.
(ECF No. 10.)
II. 	Next Friend Status
As a preliminary matter, the Court must determine whether Ms. Portillo Luzardo may
proceed as “next friend” of Petitioner. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus must be in writing
and “signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in [her]
behalf,” known as a “next friend.” 28 U.S.C. § 2242; Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 163
(1989). “A ‘next friend’ does not [herself] become a party to the habeas corpus action in which
[she] participates, but simply pursues the cause on behalf of the detained person, who remains the
real party in interest.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163 (citations omitted). Next friend status, therefore,
is an exception to 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: “In all courts of the United States the parties
may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts,
respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
2 In addition to filing the § 2241 petition, Petitioner also filed several motions in this action asking
the Court to take the following actions during the pendency of the case: order Petitioner’s
immediate release, stay Petitioner’s removal and transfer, and order Petitioner’s release without a
monetary bond. (ECF Nos. 4, 5, 6.) As set forth in this opinion, the Court will conditionally grant
Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, which resolves the case. In light of this, the entry of the Court’s
opinion and corresponding judgment moots Petitioner’s pending motions.
3 In the March 16, 2026, Order to Show Cause, the Court also granted Petitioner leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and substituted Kevin Raycraft, the Field Office Director of Enforcement and
Removal Operations for the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Detroit Field Office, for
Respondent Unknown Party.
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To act on a detainee’s behalf, a putative next friend must demonstrate that the detainee is
unable to prosecute the case on his or her own behalf due to “inaccessibility, mental incompetence,
or other disability” and that the next friend is “truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on
whose behalf he [or she] seeks to litigate.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 163–64 (citations omitted); see
West v. Bell, 242 F.3d 338, 341 (6th Cir. 2001); Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.
1998). The Whitmore Court noted that the next friend might demonstrate his or her dedication to
the “best interests” of the real party in interest by showing “some significant relationship” with
that party. Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 164. The putative next friend must clearly establish “the propriety
of his [or her] status” in order to “justify the jurisdiction of the court.” Id. (citations omitted).
Standing to proceed as next friend on behalf of a prisoner “is by no means granted automatically
to whomever seeks to pursue an action on behalf of another.” Id. at 163.
“[A] next-friend may not file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a detainee
if the detainee . . . could file the petition.” Wilson v. Lane, 870 F.2d 1250, 1253 (7th Cir. 1989)
(citing Weber v. Garza, 570 F.2d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 1978)). The putative next friend “must clearly
and specifically set forth facts sufficient to satisfy the[] Art[icle] III standing requirements”
because “[a] federal court is powerless to create its own jurisdiction by embellishing otherwise
deficient allegations of standing.” Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 155–56 (citation omitted). Most
significantly, “when the application for habeas corpus filed by a would be ‘next friend’ does not
set forth an adequate reason or explanation of the necessity for resort to the ‘next friend’ device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.” Weber, 570 F.2d at 514; see Whitmore,
495 U.S. at 163.
In this action, the Court concludes that the petition and attached documents adequately
demonstrate that the justice system is inaccessible to Petitioner, who is detained in an ICE
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detention facility with limited English proficiency. Moreover, Ms. Portillo Luzardo, Petitioner’s
spouse, has demonstrated both a significant relationship with Petitioner, and that she is truly
dedicated to acting in Petitioner’s best interests. Accordingly, the Court will permit Ms. Portillo
Luzardo to proceed as next friend to Petitioner.
III. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 10-1,
PageID.93.) On February 19, 2023, Petitioner entered the United States at the Hildago, Texas, Port
of Entry. (Id.) At that time, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form
I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for
admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id.,
PageID.93, 96.) DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States for a period of one year. (2023
Form I-213, ECF No. 10-2, PageID.100.)
On February 5, 2026, ICE encountered and arrested Petitioner while conducting “targeted”
surveillance near Flint, Michigan. 4 (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 10-3, PageID.104.) Petitioner is
scheduled for an individual hearing before the Detroit Immigration Court on May 27, 2026. See
Automated Case Information, https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/ (enter “244018177” for the A-
Number, select “Venezuela” for the Nationality, and select Submit) (last visited Apr. 16, 2026).
4 As noted above, Respondents indicate that Petitioner was encountered while ICE was conducting
“targeted” surveillance. (2026 Form I-213, ECF No. 10-3, PageID.104.) Respondents do not argue
that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), and there is
nothing in the record presently before the Court to suggest that Petitioner was a law enforcement
target for any reason other than his status as a noncitizen. (See id.)
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IV. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
V. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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VI. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation. 5
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). 6
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
5 Additionally, to the extent that Respondents argue that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225 because the NTA charged him as an “arriving alien,” for the same reasons set forth in
Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026),
the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument, and the Court concludes that § 1226(a) governs
Petitioner’s detention.
6 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
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of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a
relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VII. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. 7
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
7 Although Respondents argue that the “proper Respondent is the Acting Director of ICE’s Detroit
Field Office,” Respondents do not specifically seek the dismissal of any of the other named
Respondents in this action. (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.62.)
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immediately release Petitioner from custody. 8 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
8 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
April 20, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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