Berry #336048 v. Lee

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
DEANDRE BERRY,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN LEE,
Defendant.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-781
Honorable Ray Kent
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all
matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendant is of particular significance in defining a putative
defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
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longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendant has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is
required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The
Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff sues Unknown Lee, a doctor at the Muskegon Correctional Facility (MCF) in
Muskegon, Muskegon County, Michigan. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–2.) Plaintiff sues
Defendant Lee in her individual and official capacities.
In March 2025, Plaintiff alleges he was lifting weights and “experienced excruciating pain
in his left arm, elbow, and hand, which was visibly swollen, and . . . he could barely move his
fingers.” (Id., PageID.2.) Plaintiff wrote a kite to MCF’s health care and was evaluated that month
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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by nursing staff, who referred him to the doctor, Defendant Lee. (Id.) In April 2025, Plaintiff
claims Defendant Lee examined him and prescribed pain medication. (Id.) Then, in May 2025,
Plaintiff submitted another kite because “he was constantly in pain and his left hand had swelled
up.” (Id., PageID.3.) In response to this kite, Plaintiff was evaluated by nursing staff and again
examined by Defendant Lee in June 2025. (Id.) At that time, Defendant Lee gave Plaintiff a
“steroid injection and an oral steroid prescription.” (Id.) After this appointment, Plaintiff alleges
that he continued to have pain and his left hand swelled further. (Id.) Plaintiff submitted another
kite, was evaluated again by nursing staff, and referred to Defendant Lee later in June 2025. (Id.)
Defendant Lee ordered x-rays on Plaintiff’s left hand and elbow, and the x-rays were performed
in July 2025. (Id.) According to Plaintiff’s complaint, MCF nursing staff informed him that
“nothing significant was noted on [his] x-rays.” (Id., PageID.4.)
In September 2025, Plaintiff submitted a kite requesting an MRI because he “continued to
suffer from the pain in his hand and arm, his hand was still swollen, and that he could not sleep.”
(Id.) He was evaluated by nursing staff that month and evaluated by Defendant Lee in October
2025. (Id.) Plaintiff told Defendant Lee at that evaluation that his “pain was terrible and he could
barely move his fingers in his left hand.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Lee “determined
that no further work up was indicated” and he should submit another kite if his symptoms became
worse. (Id.) There are no further allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint. (See generally id.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendant Lee violated his Eighth
Amendment rights relating to his medical care. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, as
well as compensatory and punitive damages.
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
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550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
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A. Section 1983 Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff sues Defendant Lee in her official and individual capacities. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.1.) A suit against an individual in his or her official capacity is equivalent to a suit against
the governmental entity. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989); Matthews
v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 (6th Cir. 1994). Defendant Lee is a doctor at MCF (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.2), but it is not clear based upon Plaintiff’s complaint whether Defendant Lee is an
employee of MDOC or of a private entity that contracts with the state. The Court will address both
scenarios in turn.
1. Defendant’s Employment by the MDOC
If Defendant Lee is employed by the MDOC, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim is
equivalent to a claim against the MDOC.
The states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh Amendment from suit in
the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or Congress has expressly abrogated
Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465
U.S. 89, 98–101 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24
F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994). Congress has not expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment
immunity by statute, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and the State of Michigan has
not consented to civil rights suits in federal court. Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir.
1986). And, regardless, the State of Michigan (acting through the MDOC) is not a “person” who
may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617
(2002) (citing Will, 491 U.S. at 66).
Here, Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and monetary damages. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.6.) However, as noted above, the MDOC is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983
for money damages. See, e.g., Lapides, 535 U.S. at 617. Similarly, Plaintiff may not seek monetary
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damages against Defendant Lee in her official capacities. Will, 491 U.S. at 71 (“We hold that
neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983.”).
Although damages claims against Defendant Lee in her official capacity are properly
dismissed, an official capacity action seeking injunctive or declaratory relief constitutes an
exception to sovereign immunity. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908) (holding that
the Eleventh Amendment immunity does not bar prospective injunctive relief against a state
official). The United States Supreme Court has determined that a suit under Ex parte Young for
prospective injunctive relief should not be treated as an action against the state. Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985). Instead, the doctrine is a fiction recognizing that
unconstitutional acts cannot have been authorized by the state and therefore cannot be considered
done under the state’s authority. Id.
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has cautioned that, “Ex parte Young can only be used to
avoid a state’s sovereign immunity when a ‘complaint alleges an ongoing violation of federal law
and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.’” Ladd v. Marchbanks, 971 F.3d 574, 581
(6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Verizon Md. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
Past exposure to an isolated incident of illegal conduct does not, by itself, sufficiently prove that
the plaintiff will be subjected to the illegal conduct again. See, e.g., Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S.
95 (1983) (addressing injunctive relief); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127
(2007) (addressing declaratory relief). A court should assume that, absent an official policy or
practice urging unconstitutional behavior, individual government officials will act constitutionally.
Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102. In the present action, Plaintiff does not allege the existence of an official
policy or practice, and Plaintiff’s allegations relate solely to past harm, not future risk of harm. In
fact, Plaintiff complains about events that occurred six months prior to him filing this complaint.
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Therefore, Plaintiff does not seek relief properly characterized as prospective. See Ladd, 971 F.3d
at 581.
Accordingly, for these reasons, if Defendant Lee is employed by the MDOC, Plaintiff’s
official capacity claim against Defendant Lee will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
2. Defendant’s Employment by a Prison Medical Provider that Contracts
with the State
If Defendant Lee is employed by a private entity that contracts with the state to provide
healthcare to inmates, Plaintiff’s official capacity claim is equivalent to a suit against the private
entity. A private entity that contracts with a governmental entity to perform a traditional
governmental function like providing healthcare to inmates can “be sued under § 1983 as one
acting ‘under color of state law.’” Hicks v. Frey, 992 F.2d 1450, 1458 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting
West, 487 U.S. at 54). The requirements for a valid § 1983 claim against a municipality apply
equally to private corporations that are deemed state actors for purposes of § 1983. See Starcher
v. Corr. Med. Sys., Inc., 7 F. App’x 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that the holding in Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), has been extended to private corporations); Street,
102 F.3d at 817–18 (same); Rojas v. Alexander’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 409 (2d Cir.
1990) (same); Cox v. Jackson, 579 F. Supp. 2d 831, 851–52 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (same).
“Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while a municipality can be held liable for a constitutional
violation, there is no vicarious liability based on the acts of its employees alone.” Lipman v. Budish,
974 F.3d 726, 747 (6th Cir. 2020) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 690–91). Instead, a municipality “can
be sued under § 1983 only when a policy or custom of that government caused the injury in
question.” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he finding of a policy or custom is the initial determination
to be made in any municipal liability claim.” Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d 495, 509 (6th Cir.
1996). Further, the policy or custom must be the moving force behind the constitutional injury,
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and a plaintiff must identify the policy, connect the policy to the governmental entity, and show
that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Turner v. City of
Taylor, 412 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 815 (6th Cir.
2003)); Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d at 508–09.
A policy includes a “policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted
and promulgated” by the entity. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 690. Moreover, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has explained that a custom “for the purposes of Monell liability
must be so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom or usage with the force of law.”
Claiborne Cnty., 103 F.3d at 507. “In short, a ‘custom’ is a ‘legal institution’ not memorialized by
written law.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege that any policy or custom was the moving force behind his
alleged constitutional injury. Where a plaintiff fails to allege that a policy or custom existed,
dismissal of the action for failure to state a claim is appropriate. Rayford v. City of Toledo, No. 86-
3260, 1987 WL 36283, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb. 2, 1987). Furthermore, even liberally construing
Plaintiff’s complaint, as the Court is required to do, even if Plaintiff intended to suggest the
existence of a custom, his allegations are wholly conclusory. Cf. Bilder v. City of Akron, No. 92-
4310, 1993 WL 394595, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 6, 1993) (affirming dismissal of § 1983 action when
plaintiff allegation of policy or custom was conclusory, and plaintiff failed to allege facts tending
to support the allegation). Accordingly, because Plaintiff fails to allege the existence of a policy
or custom of the private entity, Plaintiff’s official capacity claims against Defendant Lee, if she is
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employed by a private entity that contracts with the state to provide healthcare to inmates, will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.2
B. Eighth Amendment Medical Care Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Lee violated his Eighth Amendment rights as related to her
examinations and treatment of his hand and arm injury. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.)
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment against
those convicted of crimes. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment obligates prison
authorities to provide medical care to incarcerated individuals, as a failure to provide such care
would be inconsistent with contemporary standards of decency. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
103–04 (1976). The Eighth Amendment is violated when a prison official is deliberately
indifferent to the serious medical needs of a prisoner. Id. at 104–05; Comstock v. McCrary, 273
F.3d 693, 702 (6th Cir. 2001).
A claim for the deprivation of adequate medical care has an objective and a subjective
component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). To satisfy the objective component,
the plaintiff must allege that the medical need at issue is sufficiently serious. Id. In other words,
the inmate must show that he is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm. Id.
The subjective component requires an inmate to show that prison officials have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind” in denying medical care. Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 867
(6th Cir. 2000). Deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence,” but can
2 In summary, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff fails to state any § 1983 claims against
Defendant Lee in her official capacity. Moreover, as set forth in this opinion, Plaintiff fails to state
an Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Lee, and this determination also resolves both
Plaintiff’s official capacity and individual capacity claims against Defendant Lee.
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be “satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with
knowledge that harm will result.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. “[T]he official must both be aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and
he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837.
However, not every claim by a prisoner that he has received inadequate medical treatment
states a violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. As the United States Supreme
Court explained:
[A]n inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to
constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the
conscience of mankind. Thus, a complaint that a physician has been negligent in
diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of medical
mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not become
a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. In order to state
a cognizable claim, a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to
evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.
Id. at 105–06 (quotations omitted). Thus, differences in judgment between an inmate and prison
medical personnel regarding the appropriate medical diagnoses or treatment are not enough to state
a deliberate indifference claim. Darrah v. Krisher, 865 F.3d 361, 372 (6th Cir. 2017); Briggs v.
Westcomb, 801 F. App’x 956, 959 (6th Cir. 2020); Mitchell v. Hininger, 553 F. App’x 602, 605
(6th Cir. 2014). This is so even if the misdiagnosis results in an inadequate course of treatment and
considerable suffering. Gabehart v. Chapleau, No. 96-5050, 1997 WL 160322, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr.
4, 1997).
The Sixth Circuit distinguishes “between cases where the complaint alleges a complete
denial of medical care and those cases where the claim is that a prisoner received inadequate
medical treatment.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976). If “a prisoner has
received some medical attention and the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal
courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims
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which sound in state tort law.” Id.; see also Perez v. Oakland Cnty., 466 F.3d 416, 434 (6th Cir.
2006); Kellerman v. Simpson, 258 F. App’x 720, 727 (6th Cir. 2007); McFarland v. Austin, 196
F. App’x 410, 411 (6th Cir. 2006); Edmonds v. Horton, 113 F. App’x 62, 65 (6th Cir. 2004); Brock
v. Crall, 8 F. App’x 439, 440–41 (6th Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561, 566 (6th Cir.
1998). “Where the claimant received treatment for his condition, . . . he must show that his
treatment was ‘so woefully inadequate as to amount to no treatment at all.’” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x
at 605 (quoting Alspaugh v. McConnell, 643 F.3d 162, 169 (6th Cir. 2011)). The prisoner must
show that the care the prisoner received was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as
to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” See Miller v. Calhoun Cnty.,
408 F.3d 803, 819 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Waldrop v. Evans, 871 F.2d 1030, 1033 (11th Cir.
1989)).
1. Objective Component
Plaintiff alleges that he had pain in his left arm, elbow, and hand. (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.2.) He further alleges that his left hand was swollen and he had limited movement of his
fingers in his left hand. (See id., PageID.2–4.) These symptoms lasted from March 2025 through
October 2025. (Id.) At this stage of the proceedings, the Court assumes, without deciding, that
Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to show a serious medical condition.
2. Subjective Component
Turning to the subjective component—i.e., the requirement that a plaintiff alleges
sufficient facts to show that “the official [or medical provider was] both . . . aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exist[ed],” and that the
official or medical provider “also dr[e]w the inference,” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837—the Court
addresses Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendant Lee below.
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Plaintiff claims that Defendant Lee violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment
because she was “aware of [Plaintiff’s] hand and arm injury, and performed a perfunctory
examination.” (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) However, Plaintiff’s allegations contradict this
conclusion. When Defendant Lee first examined Plaintiff in April 2025, she prescribed pain
medication at that examination. (Id., PageID.2.) Plaintiff submitted a medical kite in May 2025
regarding his continued pain and was again examined by Defendant Lee in June 2025. (Id.,
PageID.3.) At that examination, Defendant Lee gave Plaintiff a steroid injection and prescribed
oral steroid medication. (Id.) When Plaintiff’s pain continued, he submitted another medical kite
and was examined by Defendant Lee that same month. (Id.) Defendant Lee ordered x-rays on his
left hand and elbow at that visit, and Plaintiff “went out for x-rays” in July 2025. (Id.) According
to Plaintiff, “nothing significant was noted on [the] x-rays.” (Id., PageID.4.) Plaintiff requested an
MRI in September 2025 and informed Defendant Lee in October 2025 that he was still in pain and
had difficulty moving his fingers in his left hand. (Id.) Defendant Lee “determined that no further
work up was indicated” and told Plaintiff that if his symptoms became worse, he should submit
another kite. (Id.) Plaintiff makes no further allegations after his October 2025 examination with
Defendant Lee. (See id.)
Plaintiff’s allegations amount to faulting Defendant Lee for “fail[ing] to provide more or
better treatment, not indifference to his condition.” Mitchell, 553 F. App’x at 605. As detailed
above, Plaintiff was examined by Defendant Lee at least four times, received several different
medical treatments to address Plaintiff’s hand pain and swelling, and received at least one
diagnostic x-ray. (See generally Compl. ECF No. 1, PageID.2–4.) Although Plaintiff requested an
MRI after nothing significant was noted on his x-ray, his request amounts to a difference in
judgment regarding medical diagnoses or treatment. Plaintiff’s complaints regarding the course of
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treatment he received are insufficient to state a deliberate indifference claim. See Darrah, 865 F.3d
at 372; see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105 (“[T]he question whether an X-ray or additional diagnostic
techniques or forms of treatment is indicated is a classic example of a matter for medical judgment.
A medical decision not to order an X-ray, or like measures, does not represent cruel and unusual
punishment.”). Plaintiff asks the Court to second guess Defendant Lee’s medical judgments, “as
opposed to enforce the cruel-and-unusual-punishments ban in the Eighth Amendment.” Mitchell,
553 F. App’x at 605. Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to show that Defendant Lee’s actions
constituted deliberate indifference, Plaintiff fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim against
Defendant Lee.
In summary, for the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action
would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might
raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: June 8, 2026 /s/ Ray Kent
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
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