Canizalez Polanco v. Unknown Party #1 et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
RENZO DAVID CANIZALEZ POLANCO,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-747
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the Florence Detention Center in Florence, Arizona, initiated this action by filing a pro
se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the
following reasons, the Court will dismiss Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
In an order entered on March 9, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on March 12, 2026. (ECF
No. 4.)
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II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (2023 Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF
No. 1-5, PageID.25.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about June 22, 2023, at a port of
entry in Brownsville, Texas. (Id.; 2023 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.60.) At that time,
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (2023 NTA, ECF No. 1-5,
PageID.25, 31.) Petitioner was then paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A),
until June 20, 2025. (Form I-94, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.12 (indicating that Petitioner’s “Class of
Admission” is “DT”1).)
1 See United States Citizenship and Immigration Services Guidance Website, https://www.uscis.
gov/save/current-user-agencies/guidance/faqs-on-the-effect-of-changes-to-parole-and-temporary-
protected-status-tps-for-save-agencies (under “Non-Categorical Parole” heading, select “What
does ‘Non-Categorical Parole’ mean?”) (“Aliens who are outside of the United States may request
to be paroled into the United States based on urgent humanitarian reasons or a significant public
benefit. These aliens are not paroled into the United States under a categorical parole program or
process. Often, the Class of Admission (COA) for these aliens is ‘DT’ though other parole related
COAs may have been used.”).
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Petitioner applied for and was granted Temporary Protected Status (TPS)2 from October
10, 2024, to April 2, 2025.3 (TPS Approval Notice, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.10.)
DHS moved to dismiss the removal proceedings against Petitioner, and the Detroit
Immigration Court granted that motion on June 30, 2024. (Order on Motion to Dismiss, ECF
No. 4-3, PageID.65.) On December 10, 2024, Petitioner filed an application for asylum and
withholding of removal with United States Citizenship and Immigration Services. (Receipt Notice,
ECF No. 1-4, PageID.20; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
2 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security
may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals of that state cannot return
there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other “extraordinary and
temporary conditions,” unless the Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens]
to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the
United States.”
Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)).
“Such a designation permits certain nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided
in the United States since the effective date of the designation, to register for employment
authorization and protection from deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Id. (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). Additionally, there are other restrictions, including, for example,
that applicants for TPS “must not have been ‘convicted of any felony or 2 or more misdemeanors
committed in the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i)). Further, “TPS does
not provide beneficiaries with a pathway to permanent resident status, nor does it include any right
to petition for visas on behalf of family members in the United States or abroad.” Id.
With respect to TPS for Venezuela, “[o]n January 17, 2025, Secretary Mayorkas extended
the 2023 [TPS] Designation by eighteen months, through October 2, 2026.” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem,
166 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2026) (footnote and citation omitted). “The extension was set to
become effective on April 3, 2025,” the day after the 2023 TPS Designation was due to expire. Id.
(citation omitted). “On January 24, 2025, DHS began drafting the decision to vacate the TPS
extension” for Venezuela. Id. Thereafter, on January 26, 2025, “DHS began drafting a termination
of Venezuela’s TPS.” Id. On January 28, 2025, Secretary Noem signed off on the decision to
vacate the January 17, 2025, extension of TPS for Venezuela, meaning that the 2023 TPS
Designation for Venezuela effectively expired on April 2, 2025. (Id.) Subsequently, on February
1, 2025, “Secretary Noem signed off on the termination [of TPS]” for Venezuela. Id. (citation
omitted). Secretary Noem did not terminate the 2021 TPS Designation for Venezuela, however,
the 2021 TPS Designation “had only been extended to September 10, 2025.” Id. (citation omitted).
3 There is no indication in the record before the Court that Petitioner filed an application to renew
his TPS when it expired on April 2, 2025.
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On January 12, 2026, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner while Petitioner was
driving his daughter to school. (Appeal, ECF No. 1-6, PageID.38.) That same day, DHS issued
Petitioner a renewed Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under
§ 212(a)(7)(A)(i) of the INA because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application
for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (2026
NTA, ECF No. 4-4, PageID.68, 71.)
On January 23, 2026, the Detroit Immigration Court ordered that Petitioner be removed to
Venezuela. (Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-5, PageID.75.) The immigration judge
found that Petitioner had not submitted an application for relief from removal. (Id.) Petitioner had
until February 23, 2026, to appeal that order. (Id., PageID.76.) Petitioner submitted an appeal of
that order to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) on January 29, 2026, and paid a fee of
$1,010. (Payment Receipt, ECF No. 1-6, PageID.35.) In a notice dated February 6, 2026, the BIA
rejected Petitioner’s appeal because he had not paid the required filing fee of $1,030. (Rejection
of Appeal, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.78.) There is no indication in the record before the Court that
Petitioner made any further attempt to appeal the order of removal.
On March 5, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to the Port Isabel Detention Facility in Los
Fresnos, Texas.4 (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.53.) On March 11, 2026, Petitioner was transferred
to the Florence Detention Center in Florence, Arizona. (Id.)
4 Respondents contend that at the time this case was filed, Petitioner was no longer detained within
the Western District of Michigan, so this Court is not the appropriate venue. (Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.54.) The petition in this case was filed on March 6, 2026, (Pet., ECF No. 1), and the record
before the Court indicates that on March 5, 2026, Petitioner was transferred to Texas. (Transfer
Record, ECF No. 4-7, PageID.81.) But the record also shows that Petitioner signed the petition on
March 3, 2026, and the record shows that Petitioner was detained at the North Lake Processing
Center at that time. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Certificate of Service, ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
Under Sixth Circuit precedent, the application is deemed filed when handed to prison
authorities for mailing to the federal court. Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 (6th Cir.
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III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Merits Discussion
Respondents presented evidence that indicates Petitioner received an order of removal on
January 23, 2026, and that he did not file an appeal—at least not one that the BIA accepted—
during the appeal period. (Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-5, PageID.75; Rejection of
Appeal, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.78.) Respondents argue that Petitioner is subject to an
administratively final order of removal and that he is properly detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231.5
2002). Petitioner dated his application on March 3, 2026, and it was received by the Court on
March 6, 2026. Thus, it must have been handed to prison officials for mailing at some time
between those dates. For purposes of this opinion, the Court has given Petitioner the benefit of
the earliest possible filing date. See Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 925 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding
that the date the prisoner signs the document is deemed under Sixth Circuit law to be the date of
handing to officials) (citing Goins v. Saunders, 206 F. App’x 497, 498 n.1 (6th Cir. 2006)).
Therefore, the petition in this case is deemed to have been filed on March 3, 2026, at which
time Petitioner was detained at North Lake Processing Center. As such, venue is proper in this
Court.
5 Petitioner contends that Respondents have unlawfully detained Petitioner despite Petitioner’s
TPS. Based on this, Petitioner seeks immediate release, alleging a violation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254a(d)(4), which provides that if a noncitizen has TPS, then the noncitizen “shall not be
detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s immigration status in the United
States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). As set forth above, Secretary Noem vacated the extension of the
2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela and then signed off on the termination of TPS for Venezuela.
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Section 1231 provides that “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General shall
remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90 days (in this section referred to as
the ‘removal period’).” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). “During the removal period, the Attorney
General shall detain the alien.” Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). “The removal period begins on the latest of
the following: (i) the date the order of removal becomes administratively final. (ii) If the removal
order is judicially reviewed and if a court orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the
court’s final order. (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an immigration process),
the date the alien is released from detention or confinement.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i)–(iii). An order
of removal “shall become final upon the earlier of . . . a determination by the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirming such order; or . . . the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to
seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(i)–(ii).
Here, as noted above, Petitioner received an order of removal on January 23, 2026, and he
was unable to successfully file an appeal to the BIA during the appeal period. (Order of the
Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-5, PageID.75; Rejection of Appeal, ECF No. 4-6, PageID.78.)
Therefore, Petitioner’s order of removal became final on February 23, 2026, when the appeal
period expired. (Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-5, PageID.76); See 8 U.S.C.
See supra note 2. The validity of Secretary Noem’s actions regarding TPS for Venezuela is
currently being litigated. In October 2025, the United States Supreme Court allowed the
termination of TPS for Venezuela to take effect pending the Government’s appeal and “disposition
of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.” Noem v. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S.
Ct. 23, 24 (2025). On January 28, 2026, in National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739 (9th Cir.
2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California’s finding that Secretary Noem exceeded her statutory
authority by revoking TPS protections for Venezuelans and Haitians. At this time, based on the
procedural history of National TPS Alliance v. Noem, this Ninth Circuit case does not affect the
Court’s analysis in this habeas action. Cf. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. at 24 (allowing the termination
of TPS for Venezuelan nationals to take effect pending the Government’s appeal). Therefore, the
Court will not grant Petitioner’s request for immediate release based on Petitioner’s prior TPS.
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§ 1101(a)(47)(B)(i)–(ii). Furthermore, there is no indication in the record before the Court that
Petitioner’s removal order is the subject of judicial review, see id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(ii), or that
Petitioner was detained or confined for any reason other than under an immigration process after
February 23, 2026, see id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(iii). Therefore, Petitioner’s removal period began on
February 23, 2026, when the appeal period expired and the order of removal became
administratively final. See id. § 1231(a)(1)(B). Because the 90-day removal period has not expired,
Petitioner is properly detained pursuant to § 1231(a).
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment dismissing Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: April 7, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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