Hernandez-Dominguez v. Raycraft et al

1:26-cv-00696MiwdApr 2, 2026

Full text

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
GUILLERMO HERNANDEZ-
DOMINGUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-696
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled combined petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons,
the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition and brief, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current
detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of
habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or
ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.15–16; Br., ECF No. 2.)
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 1
of 8
2
In an order entered on March 5, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause, within
three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner should
not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 9.) Respondents filed their response on March 10, 2026, (ECF
No. 10), and Petitioner filed his reply on March 11, 2026, (ECF No. 11).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 10-2,
PageID.459.) Petitioner entered the United States without inspection at least 17 years ago at an
unknown location. (Id.; Pet, ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Prior to Petitioner’s present detention, he
resided in Michigan and was the primary financial support for his partner and four United States
citizen children. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.)
On October 2, 2018, ICE agents searched for, and arrested, Petitioner. (Form I-213, ECF
No. 10-1, PageID.456.) At that time, Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a
Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General.” (NTA, ECF No. 10-2, PageID.459.) The Detroit
Immigration Court then granted Petitioner’s request for a custody redetermination and ordered that
Petitioner be released under a bond of $5,000. (Custody Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF
No. 10-3, PageID.464.)
On March 13, 2020, the Detroit Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s application for
cancellation of removal under § 240A(b)(1) of the INA. (Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF
No. 10-4, PageID.468; Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.57.) In that
same order, the Detroit Immigration Court granted Petitioner’s application for voluntary departure
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 2
of 8
3
“with an alternate order of removal to Mexico.” 1 (Order of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 10-4,
PageID.468; Oral Decision of the Immigration Judge, ECF No. 2-1, PageID.57.)
Petitioner appealed the Detroit Immigration Court’s order to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA). (BIA Order, ECF No. 10-5, PageID.477.) In an order entered on May 30, 2024,
the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s denial of Petitioner’s application for cancellation of
removal. (Id.) Regarding the immigration judge’s grant of voluntary departure, the BIA determined
that the immigration judge had failed to adequately advise Petitioner regarding certain aspects of
the voluntary departure process, so it remanded the case to the Immigration Court “for the sole
purpose of determining whether [Petitioner] remains statutorily eligible for, and merits, post-
conclusion voluntary departure, and, if so, to grant a new period of voluntary departure and to
provide all the required advisals.” (Id., PageID.478.)
On remand, the Detroit Immigration Court entered an order on September 24, 2024, which
granted Petitioner voluntary departure until November 25, 2024, and provided certain information
to Petitioner regarding voluntary departure. (Order of the Immigration Court, ECF No 2-1,
PageID.38.) That order also stated that if Petitioner did not abide by the conditions of that voluntary
departure, the alternate order of removal to Mexico would immediately take effect. (Id.) On
November 12, 2024, Petitioner appealed that order to the BIA. (Receipt for Appeal, ECF No. 2-1,
PageID.37.) This appeal remains pending. 2 (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.427.) Respondents do not
argue that Petitioner has received a final order of removal, and they do not argue that Petitioner is
subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). (See generally id.)
1 “Upon granting a request made for voluntary departure either prior to the completion of
proceedings or at the conclusion of proceedings, the immigration judge shall also enter an alternate
order or removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1240.26(d).
2 The parties do not provide any further information regarding the contents of this appeal.
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 3
of 8
4
On February 6, 2026, DHS agents arrested Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.6.) There
is no indication in the record before the Court that Petitioner is currently scheduled for a hearing
in Immigration Court.
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 4
of 8
5
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, 	however, 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). 3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
3 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, and Avila v. Bondi,
No. 25-3248, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL 819258 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026), which was recently issued
by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. At this time, these non-binding cases
do not change the Court’s analysis.
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 5
of 8
6
has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a
relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. 4 The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
4 The Court previously dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent.
(Order, ECF No. 9.)
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 6
of 8
7
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the Department
of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, the Director of the Executive Office
for Immigration Review, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody. 5 The Court will also order Respondents to file a
status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, the Director
5 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 7
of 8
8
of the Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review
as Respondents.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
/s/ Jane M. Beckering	April 2, 2026
Case 1:26-cv-00696-JMB-SJB ECF No. 14, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/02/26 Page 8
of 8

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.