Sosa-Mosquera v. Unknown Party #1 et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
MAIKEL NAZARET JOSE SOSA-
MOSQUERA,
Petitioner,
v.
UNKNOWN PARTY #1 et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-635
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering
Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the
requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.)
In an order entered on February 27, 2026, the Court directed Respondent to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 5.) Respondents filed their response on March 3, 2026,
(ECF No. 6). Petitioner did not file a reply.
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; 2022
Form I- 213, ECF No. 6-1, PageID.56.) Petitioner entered the United States in 2022 (Id.) He
contends he surrendered to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and was placed under
humanitarian parole pursuant to section 212(d)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
On or about February 1, 2023, DHS agents encountered Petitioner in Ohio. (2023
Form I- 220A, ECF No. 6-2, PageID.58.) DHS agents served Petitioner with a Notice to Appear
charging 	him 	with 	inadmissibility 	under 	§§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) 	and 	212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) 	of 	the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of application for
admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (2023 I-
862, ECF No. 6-3, PageID.64–68.) Petitioner was released on his own recognizance. (2023 Form
I-220A, ECF No. 6- 2, PageID.58–62.)
Petitioner timely applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2). On May 1, 2025, an Ohio Immigration
Judge issued a decision denying Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture. (Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 6-3,
PageID.69–72.) The Immigration Court also ordered Petitioner removed to Venezuela. (Id.)
Petitioner filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which remains pending.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Petitioner asserts that his appeal has been pending since June 2025. (ECF
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No. 1, PageID.2.) Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, Petitioner’s order of
removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of the INA.1 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B),
1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
ICE agents arrested Petitioner “on [his] way to work on September 5, 2025.” (Decl., ECF
No. 1-1, PageID.8.) He has been detained for five and a half months. (Id).
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
1 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
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IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondent argues that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondent argues
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondent has violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner is
detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondent, 	however, 	contends 	that 	Petitioner 	meets 	every 	element 	for 	detention 	under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondent’s interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
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Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).2
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondent counters Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
can request bond at that time, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has
been detained by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
2 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, No. 25-20496, --- F.4th ----, 2026 WL
323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026), which was recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit. At this time, this non-binding case does not change the Court’s analysis.
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VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all other named Respondents.3 The Court concludes
that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, 	No. 	1:25-cv-1669, 	2025 	WL 	3562651, 	at *8–9 	(W.D. 	Mich. 	Dec. 	12, 	2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025). Nonetheless, the Court will dismiss the Department of
Homeland Security and ICE as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondent to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing or, in the alternative,
3 The Court previously dismissed the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent.
(Order, ECF No. 5.)
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immediately release Petitioner from custody.4 The Court will also order Respondent to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Finally, the Court will
dismiss the Department of Homeland Security and ICE as Respondents.
Dated: 	March 19, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
4 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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