Marrufo-Castellano v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ENWIN MARRUFO-CASTELLANO,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-417
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
(Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF
No. 1, PageID.14–15.)
In an order entered on February 10, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on February 13, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 16, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.58.) Petitioner entered the United States on or about July 4, 2023, at or near Eagle Pass,
Texas, without inspection. (Id.) After Petitioner entered the United States, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) agents encountered Petitioner, and at that time, DHS issued Petitioner
a Form I-862, NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United
States without being admitted or paroled, or who entered in the United States at any time or place
other than as designated by the Secretary of the Homeland Security.” (Id.; Form I-213, ECF
No. 4-3, PageID.69.) DHS then released Petitioner into the United States on his own recognizance
“[i]n accordance with section 236 of the [INA],” which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226. (Order
Release Recognizance, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.62.)
Petitioner applied for asylum, and that application remains pending. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.5.) Petitioner also applied for, and was granted, Temporary Protected Status (TPS)1 from
1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security
may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals of that state cannot return
there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other “extraordinary and
temporary conditions,” unless the Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens]
to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the
United States.”
Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)).
“Such a designation permits certain nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided
in the United States since the effective date of the designation, to register for employment
authorization and protection from deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Id. (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). Additionally, there are other restrictions, including, for example,
that applicants for TPS “must not have been ‘convicted of any felony or 2 or more misdemeanors
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October 16, 2024, to April 2, 2025. (Id.; TPS Approval Notice, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.18.) On April
11, 2025, Petitioner applied to renew his TPS, and this renewal application remains pending. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.5; Receipt Notice, ECF No. 1-2, PageID.20.)2
On January 22, 2026, local police notified ICE that they had arrested Petitioner for retail
fraud and obstruction. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.68.) The next day, ICE arrested
Petitioner. (Id.) Petitioner was scheduled for a master hearing on February 25, 2026, in the Detroit
Immigration Court.3 (Notice of In-Person Hearing, ECF No. 4-5.)
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
committed in the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i)). Further, “TPS does
not provide beneficiaries with a pathway to permanent resident status, nor does it include any right
to petition for visas on behalf of family members in the United States or abroad.” Id.
2 With respect to TPS for Venezuela, “[o]n January 17, 2025, Secretary Mayorkas extended the
2023 [TPS] Designation by eighteen months, through October 2, 2026.” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem,
166 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2026) (footnote and citation omitted). “The extension was set to
become effective on April 3, 2025,” the day after the 2023 TPS Designation was due to expire. Id.
(citation omitted). “On January 24, 2025, DHS began drafting the decision to vacate the TPS
extension” for Venezuela. Id. Thereafter, on January 26, 2025, “DHS began drafting a termination
of Venezuela’s TPS.” Id. On January 28, 2025, Secretary Noem signed off on the decision to
vacate the January 17, 2025, extension of TPS for Venezuela, meaning that the 2023 TPS
Designation for Venezuela effectively expired on April 2, 2025. (Id.) Subsequently, on February
1, 2025, “Secretary Noem signed off on the termination [of TPS]” for Venezuela. Id. (citation
omitted). Secretary Noem did not terminate the 2021 TPS Designation for Venezuela, however,
the 2021 TPS Designation “had only been extended to September 10, 2025.” Id. (citation omitted).
3 The parties do not provide any other information about the February 25, 2026, hearing.
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related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to the mandatory detention provisions set
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.4
4 In addition to arguing that Respondents are unlawfully subjecting Petitioner to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2), Petitioner contends that Respondents have unlawfully detained
Petitioner despite Petitioner’s TPS. Based on this, Petitioner seeks immediate release, alleging a
violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4), which provides that if a noncitizen has TPS, then the
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The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).5
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
noncitizen “shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s immigration
status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). As set forth above, Secretary Noem vacated
the extension of the 2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela and then signed off on the termination
of TPS for Venezuela. See supra note 2. The validity of Secretary Noem’s actions regarding TPS
for Venezuela is currently being litigated. In October 2025, the United States Supreme Court
allowed the termination of TPS for Venezuela to take effect pending the Government’s appeal and
“disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.” Noem v. Nat’l TPS
All., 146 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2025). On January 28, 2026, in National TPS Alliance v. Noem, 166 F.4th
739 (9th Cir. 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the United
States District Court for the Northern District of California’s finding that Secretary Noem
exceeded her statutory authority by revoking TPS protections for Venezuelans and Haitians. At
this time, based on the procedural history of National TPS Alliance v. Noem, this Ninth Circuit
case does not affect the Court’s analysis in this habeas action. Cf. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. at 24
(allowing the termination of TPS for Venezuelan nationals to take effect pending the
Government’s appeal). Therefore, although the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241
petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will not grant Petitioner’s request for immediate
release based on Petitioner’s prior TPS.
5 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At this time, this non-
binding case does not change the Court’s analysis.
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has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a
relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
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To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director, the Acting ICE
Field Office Director, and the United States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents. The
Court will dismiss the United States Attorney General as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.6 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Attorney General as a Respondent.
Dated: March 11, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
6 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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