Olson v. Muskegon Heights, City of et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRANDON DALE OLSON,
Plaintiff,
CASE No. 1:26-CV-371
v.
HON. ROBERT J. JONKER
CITY OF MUSKEGON HEIGHTS, et al.,
Defendants.
__________________________________/
ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
INTRODUCTION
Defendant Officer Rueda-Rodriguez stopped and ticketed Plaintiff Brandon Olson for
speeding when Plaintiff passed her police car and on-board radar clocked the car going well above
the posted limit. After a zoom hearing, the State Court Magistrate dismissed the ticket because he
found nothing of record to verify the accuracy and good working order of the officer’s radar at the
beginning and end of the relevant shift. 	Despite prevailing in the proceeding, Plaintiff filed this
federal lawsuit on February 4, 2026. 	The bulk of Plaintiff’s Complaint is a series of objections
to the decisions State Court judges and administrative personnel made along the way before the
ruling in his favor. 	The Magistrate Judge recommended the Court dismiss those claims and the
Court agreed on de novo review over Plaintiff’s objections that those claims were subject to
dismissal for the reasons stated in a March 6, 2026, Order. (ECF No. 19).
What remains is the Fourth Amendment claim relating to the initial speeding stop raised
against Officer Rueda-Rodriguez, the City of Muskegon Heights, and the Muskegon Heights
Police Department. 	On April 14, 2026, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss that claim.
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 42, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/23/26 Page 1
of 5

2
(ECF No. 35). 	On June 8, 2026, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that
determined the motion should be granted and this case dismissed. 	(ECF No. 38). 	Plaintiff
objects. (ECF No. 39).
The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Berens’ Report and Recommendation (ECF No.
38) and Plaintiff’s Objection to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 39). 	Under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where, as here, a party has objected to portions of a Report and
Recommendation, “[t]he district judge . . . 	has a duty to reject the magistrate judge’s
recommendation unless, on de novo reconsideration, he or she finds it justified.” 	12 WRIGHT ,
M ILLER , & M ARCUS , F EDERAL P RACTICE AND P ROCEDURE § 3070.2, at 381 (2d ed. 1997).
Specifically, the Rules provide that:
The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge’s disposition that has been properly objected to. 	The district
judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition;
receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.
FED R. C IV. P. 72(b)(3). 	De novo review in these circumstances requires at least a review of the
evidence before the Magistrate Judge. 	Hill v. Duriron Co., 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981).
The Court has reviewed de novo the claims and evidence presented to the Magistrate Judge; the
Report and Recommendation itself; and Plaintiff’s objections.
On de novo review, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the remaining claim
against the city and police department should be dismissed. 	Plaintiff’s objections fail to deal in
a meaningful way with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis. 	The Magistrate Judge carefully and
thoroughly considered the record, the parties’ arguments and the governing law. 	The Magistrate
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 42, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/23/26 Page 2
of 5

3
Judge properly analyzed Plaintiff’s claims against the city and police department. 	Nothing in
Plaintiff’s objections changes the fundamental analysis as to these defendants.
The Court also agrees with the Magistrate Judge after its de novo review that Plaintiff had
failed to allege any facts showing that Officer Rueda-Rodriguez did not have a lawful basis to
initiate the stop. 	As the Magistrate Judge recognized, “to effect a traffic stop, an officer must
possess either probable cause of a civil infraction or reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”
United States v. Lyons, 687 F.3d 754, 763 (6th Cir. 2012). 	Here, the materials attached to
Plaintiff’s complaint confirmed that the basis of Officer Rueda-Rodriguez’s traffic stop was for
the civil infraction of speeding, and not for criminal activity.
Yet, as the Magistrate Judge noted, it appears that Plaintiff is making a frivolous legal
argument that he has a constitutional right not to be stopped by the police for operating his motor
vehicle in a manner that violates the Motor Vehicle Code, so long as he is not engaged in a crime.
He complains, for example, that his stop was initiated “solely under color of statutory code, not
constitutional law” (Compl. ¶ 3) and in a similar vein further alleges that it was “not based on
public safety or probable cause but solely on statutory code enforcement.” 	(Compl. ¶ 69). The
Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this is not a cognizable claim.
To the extent that Plaintiff’s objections can be read as asserting that he is also alleging a
lack of probable cause for the speeding stop, the Court determines that stretches the scant
allegations in the Complaint too far. 	The basic issue here is well recognized in civil procedure.
It asks whether Plaintiff has alleged enough to state a plausible claim consistent with Rule 8 and
well-established case law including Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 	Recognizing that courts should apply a lenient lens to
pro se pleadings, the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s claim in Count I still came up
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 42, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/23/26 Page 3
of 5

4
short. 	Even under a generous read, the Magistrate Judge determined that Plaintiff’s complaint
contained nothing than formalistic labels and conclusions. 	Plaintiff’s objection primarily asserts
that the Magistrate Judge improperly accepted the defense’s version of events over Plaintiff’s
version. 	But that is not what the Magistrate Judge did. 	Rather, the Magistrate Judge simply
observed that Plaintiff had offered no version of facts at all to support a claim that the traffic stop
lacked probable cause. 	This is an accurate read of Plaintiff’s complaint because the only factual
allegations are that Defendant Rueda-Rodriguez seized Plaintiff on October 5, 2025, while he was
driving in the city of Muskegon Heights. 	Plaintiff then makes a conclusory contention that
because he had not committed a crime, there was no lawful basis for the seizure. 	As the
Magistrate Judge properly observed, this was not enough to survive Rule 12.
Beyond that plaintiff himself attached the transcript of the hearing at which the officer
testified under oath about what she observed on her radar. 	Plaintiff never denied or challenged
her sworn assertion that Plaintiff was speeding. 	And neither did the hearing officer. 	Instead, the
hearing officer ruled the claim was not established by a preponderance of the evidence because
there was no testimony of “same day” calibration of the radar. 	That may be enough to defeat a
preponderance finding under Michigan law, but it no way undermines the original basis for a
probable cause stop especially where, as here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not dispute that he was
speeding.
CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 38) is APPROVED AND ADOPTED as the opinion of the Court.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 35) is
GRANTED,
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 42, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/23/26 Page 4
of 5

5
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this case is DISMISSED.
A separate Judgment shall issue.
Dated: 	June 23, 2026 	/s/ Robert J. Jonker
ROBERT J. JONKER
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:26-cv-00371-RJJ-SJB ECF No. 42, PageID.<pageID> Filed 06/23/26 Page 5
of 5