Rondan Jarrett v. Kevin Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
RAMON A. RONDAN JARRETT,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-244
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled combined petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for declaratory, injunctive, and mandamus and emergency request
for stay of removal. (Pet., ECF No. 1; Am. Pet., ECF No. 8.) For the following reasons, the Court
will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
Petitioner originally filed his combined § 2241 petition in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) With the petition, Petitioner also sought a
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction staying Petitioner’s removal and requesting
expedited consideration of his pending application for adjustment of status. (ECF No. 2.) The
Eastern District Court issued a temporary restraining order prohibiting ICE from removing
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Petitioner from the United States on December 2, 2025, and, on December 16, 2025, extended it
until the final resolution of this case. (Docket Text Dec. 2, 2025, and Dec. 16, 2025.)
The Eastern District Court subsequently granted Petitioner leave to file an amended § 2241
petition. (ECF No. 7.) In Petitioner’s amended § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness
of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this action,
declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and issue a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 8,
PageID.113.) Respondents filed their response on January 12, 2026, (ECF No. 10), and Petitioner
filed his reply on January 20, 2026, (ECF No. 11).
On January 21, 2026, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
transferred this action to this Court for further proceedings. (ECF No. 12.) The Parties have
stipulated that the issues with respect to Petitioner’s request for habeas relief are ripe for
consideration. (ECF No. 15.)
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cuba. (Am. Pet., ECF No. 8, PageID.95.) On or about
July 24, 2022, Petitioner entered the United States at an unknown location (Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 10-3, PageID.223.) On July 28, 2022, Petitioner was paroled into the United
States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Notice of Parole, ECF No. 8-2, PageID.119 (stating that
Petitioner was paroled into the United States “under Section 212(d)(5) of the Nationality and
Immigration Act,” which is codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)).) On January 20, 2023, Petitioner
filed a Form I-589, Application for Asylum and for Withholding Removal. (I-589 Notice of
Action, ECF No. 8-3, PageID.122.) Then, on October 11, 2024, Petitioner filed an application for
adjustment of status under the Cuban Adjustment Act. (I-797C Notice of Action, ECF No. 8-4,
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PageID.124.) On June 13, 2025, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
closed Petitioner’s pending asylum application without a decision on the merits. (Am. Pet., ECF
No. 8, PageID.99.)
On September 3, 2025, an immigration judge concluded that Petitioner did not have a
credible fear of harm if removed to Cuba and, therefore, returned the case “to [the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS)] for removal of the Applicant.” (Immigration Judge Order, ECF No. 3-
4, PageID.76.) DHS did not immediately detain Petitioner.
On October 22, 2025, Petitioner was arrested and detained by ICE agents. (Am. Pet., ECF
No. 8, PageID.95.) That same day, without prior notice to Petitioner, the Department of Homeland
Security issued Petitioner a notice and order of expedited removal, charging Petitioner with
inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA because Petitioner is an immigrant who,
at the time of application for admission, is “not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or
travel document].” (Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, ECF No. 8-5, PageID.126; Am. Pet.,
ECF No. 8, PageID.99.) 1 Respondents do not claim that Petitioner’s parole expired or was revoked
prior to his arrest. (See Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.185.)
On December 22, 2025, a USCIS officer interviewed Petitioner and found that Petitioner
had a credible fear of harm if he were removed to Mexico. (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.175.) The
Department of Homeland Security, therefore, vacated Petitioner’s order of expedited removal “to
adjudicate his claim for asylum” and issued Petitioner a notice to appear charging Petitioner with
inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA because Petitioner is an
1 Respondents do not contend that Petitioner is subject to a final order of removal and, with it,
mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). For the purposes of § 1231(a), a removal
order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration
Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted
to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
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immigrant “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the
United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,” and “who,
at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or
travel document].” (Id.; Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 10-3, PageID.223.)
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Jurisdiction
Respondents contend that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review Petitioner’s claim for
habeas relief. (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.177.) They claim that, because the Notice and Order of
Expedited Removal originally charged Petitioner with expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1), this
Court’s § 2241 habeas inquiry is limited by 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A), titled “[r]eview relating to section 1225(b)(1), provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including
section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361
and 1651 of such title, no court shall have jurisdiction to review—
(i) except as provided in subsection (e), any individual determination or to
entertain 	any 	other 	cause 	or 	claim 	arising 	from 	or 	relating 	to 	the
implementation or operation of an order of removal pursuant to section
1225(b)(1) of this title.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(A)(i). Subsection (e) provides:
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Judicial review of any determination made under section 1225(b)(1) of this title is
available in habeas corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to determinations of--
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under such section, and
(C) whether the petitioner can prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the petitioner is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, has
been admitted as a refugee under section 1157 of this title, or has been
granted asylum under section 1158 of this title, such status not having been
terminated, and is entitled to such further inquiry as prescribed by the
Attorney General pursuant to section 1225(b)(1)(C) of this title.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2).
Here, however, Petitioner is not presently detained under § 1225(b)(1) for expedited
removal. Respondents acknowledge that the Notice and Order of Expedited Removal has been
vacated based upon a finding of credible fear (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.175; NTA, ECF No.
10-3, PageID.223) and that Petitioner is now in full § 1229a removal proceedings pursuant to a
notice to appear (see NTA, ECF No. 10-3, PageID.223); see 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1) (providing
that “removal proceedings under section 1229a of this title” begin with the government issuing a
“notice to appear”); see also Reyes v. Nielsen, No. CV H-18-3971, 2020 WL 1442349, at *3 (S.D.
Tex. Feb. 6, 2020), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Sequeria Reyes v. Nielsen, No.
4:18-CV-3971, 2020 WL 1444920 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2020) (explaining that an “NTA is not
issued in a[n] Expedited Removal because an alien is not entitled to a hearing before an
Immigration Judge and is detained. See 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(2)(ii-iii)”).
However, even if Petitioner were still detained under § 1225(b)(1), and regardless of the
reach of § 1252(a)(2)(A), this Court would have jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s § 2241 habeas
petition. The Suspension Clause forbids suspension of the writ of habeas corpus “unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. As
the Court explained in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008):
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The Clause protects the rights of the detained by a means consistent with the
essential design of the Constitution. It ensures that, except during periods of formal
suspension, the Judiciary will have a time-tested device, the writ, to maintain the
‘delicate balance of governance’ that is itself the surest safeguard of liberty.
Id. at 745. The protection exists even in the face of otherwise valid jurisdiction stripping statutes
where the Suspension Clause ensures that “[h]abeas remains available to ensure that no branch of
government detains a person in violation of law.” Eliseo A.A. v. Olson, No. 25-cv-3381, 2025 WL
2886729, at a*6 (D. Minn. Oct. 8, 2025) (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (“[T]he writ . . . is
itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of powers.”)).
The Boumediene Court set forth a two-part inquiry for determining whether the Suspension
Clause applies to make habeas relief available in the face of an otherwise valid jurisdiction-
stripping statute: (1) the Court must “determine whether a given habeas petitioner is prohibited
from invoking the Suspension Clause due to some attribute of the petitioner or to the circumstances
surrounding his arrest or detention.” Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. United States of Am., 893 F.3d
153, 166 (3d Cir. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Then, if the petitioner
is not prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause, [this Court must] turn to the question
whether the substitute for habeas is adequate and effective to test the legality of the petitioner’s
detention (or removal).” Id.
As to the first question, while noncitizens apprehended “within hours of surreptitiously
entering the United States” are prohibited from invoking the Suspension Clause, Castro v. United
States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 445 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Landon v. Plasencia, 459
U.S. 21, 32 (1982)), those facts are not present here. Petitioner followed the procedure set forth by
the government: he presented himself at a port of entry and, on July 28, 2022, was paroled into the
United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5). (Am. Pet., ECF No. 8, PageID.91; Notice of
Parole, ECF No. 8-2, PageID.119.) He has remained in the United States since that time. As the
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Supreme Court observed in Landon, “once an alien gains admission to our country and begins to
develop the ties that go with permanent residence his constitutional status changes accordingly.”
Landon, 459 U.S. at 32; see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990)
(explaining that “aliens receive constitutional protections when they have come within the territory
of the United States and developed substantial connections with this country”).
Moreover, in his petition, Petitioner is not challenging his right to remain in the United
States, but “merely seeks release from custody—the traditional purpose of the habeas writ.” Y-Z-
L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1142 (D. Or. 2025). Petitioner was apprehended and
detained within the United States. Moreover, Respondents do not suggest that any government
objectives would be compromised if this Court exercised habeas corpus jurisdiction over
Petitioner’s petition.
Finally, as to the second factor, if the Court accepts Respondent’s’ position that 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1252(a)(2)(A) and 1252(e)(2) strips courts of all jurisdiction to consider the legality of
Petitioner’s detention, including whether § 1225(b)(1) is lawfully applied to Petitioner, “the statute
stripping jurisdiction . . . has [not] provided adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus.”
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771.
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that even if §§ 1252(a)(2)(A)(i)
and (e)(2) preclude this Court from reviewing Respondents’ decision to detain Petitioner, the Court
may exercise jurisdiction over Petitioner’s challenge to his detention pursuant to the Suspension
Clause. 2
2 This conclusion accords with other courts that have considered the Boumediene factors in actions
challenging detention by those subject to expedited removal proceedings. See, e.g., Alfonso Perez
v. Mordant, No. 2:25-cv-00947-SPC-DNF, 2025 WL 3466956, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 3, 2025);
Noori v. Larose, No. 25-cv-3006-BAS-MMP, 2025 WL 3295386, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 26,
2025); Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1141–43. This Court has not located, and the parties have not
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V. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
identified, any case law declining to exercise jurisdiction under the Suspension Clause over habeas
corpus actions involving similar facts and procedural postures.
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402 U.S. 479, 484 (1971); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95 (1969)),” to determine
whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. (cleaned up). Under this three-factor test:
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. Here, Petitioner’s § 2241 petition presents principally legal
questions of statutory interpretation, which do not require the record that would be developed if
the Court required Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this Court is not
bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a statute. See Loper
Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that “courts need not and
under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency interpretation of the
law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges generally do not require exhaustion
because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process
challenge generally does not require exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable
procedural errors,” such as a claim “that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an
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‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful
that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court
reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings. And, recently the
BIA proclaimed that all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any
administrative review by the BIA would lead the Government to change its position, and thereby
obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would likely be futile. Moreover, it is
clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
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In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VI. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner also filed a Form I-589
Application for Asylum and Withholding Removal, which remains pending. Respondents
nonetheless claim that Petitioner is subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1).
First, Petitioner is not properly subject to expedited removal.
There are two provisions within § 1225(b)(1) providing for expedited removal: the
“arriving aliens provision” and the “designated as provision.” “The Arriving Aliens Provision
imposes expedited removal and detention on any noncitizen who is inadmissible due to lack of
entry documents or fraud or willful misrepresentation on an admission application and ‘who is
arriving in the United States.’” Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, No. 2:25-cv-6065 (NJC), 2025
WL 3314420, at *19 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)) (emphasis
in Rodriguez-Acurio). It is undisputed that Petitioner was, at one time, an “arriving alien,” who
was granted humanitarian parole into the United States as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
However, Respondents do not contend that Petitioner presently falls within this category. (See
Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.179) and, for the same reasons set forth in detail in Hernandez Montiel
v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL 32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), Petitioner is not an
“arriving alien” subject to mandatory detention and expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
See Rodriguez-Acurio, 2025 WL 3314420 (holding that the petitioner, who entered the United
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States as an “arriving alien,” was paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5), and
who remained in the United States after the expiration of parole, cannot be classified as an
“arriving alien” subject to expedited removal).
Respondents contend that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) is “the relevant provision at issue in this
case.” (Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.179.) Section 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii), the “designated as provision”
allows the Attorney General to invoke expedited removal for “certain other aliens” who have “not
been admitted or paroled into the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Respondents
concede that Petitioner was paroled into the United States at the time of his October 22, 2025,
arrest. And as discussed in detail below, Petitioner’s parole was not properly terminated in
accordance with the INA at that time. Therefore, the Court finds that § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii) does not
apply. See Aviles-Mena v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06783-RFL, 2025 WL 2578215, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 5, 2025) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)) (holding that, “because Aviles-Mena was ‘paroled
into the United States,’ he cannot be subject to expedited removal under section 1225(b)(1)”);
Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *30
(D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that individuals who had been paroled into the United States cannot
be subject to expedited removal under § 1225(b)(1)).
Second, Petitioner’s parole was not properly terminated at the time of his October 22, 2025,
arrest. The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
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but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	The 	government 	may 	place 	the 	noncitizen 	into 	expedited 	removal
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
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To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole”:
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[3] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
Based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Cuba, seeking asylum in the United
States. At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which
3 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
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provides for parole into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public
benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Petitioner filed a Form I-589 Application for Asylum and
Withholding Removal, which is currently pending. (See Resp., ECF No. 10, PageID.175.) There
is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified
Petitioner’s parole no longer applies.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner). But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025)
(reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the
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termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these
grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”). 4 Here, there is no indication
4 Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025), is distinguishable from the present case. As the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota recently explained in Gabriel B.M. v.
Bondi, a case that is similar to the present action:
First, unlike here, the government in Doe did make a determination that the purpose
of the plaintiffs’ parole had been accomplished. The plaintiffs, non-citizens who
entered into the United States through the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
(“CHNV”) parole program, lost parole status when the government, via a lengthy
and thorough notice published in the Federal Register, decided to terminate the
CHNV program altogether, determining that the program no longer served its
implementing purpose. In contrast, for Petitioner’s revocation, there is no evidence
to suggest that such a determination or other finding was made at all, and the
evidence in the record strongly suggests it wasn’t.
Second, the Doe court did not address the regulatory requirements established by
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which implement the parole statute and illuminate the
procedural requirements for termination of parole. . . . Part 212.5(e)(2)(i) not only
restates the revocation authority enumerated in § 1182(d)(5)(A), but also clarifies
the (admittedly minimal) procedures the Respondents must follow when invoking
the parole statute’s revocation authority. The Respondents’ failure to follow the
governing regulation is equally unlawful. . . .
Finally, 	and 	perhaps 	most 	importantly, 	the 	Doe 	court’s 	interpretation 	of
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) reads the bulk of the revocation clause out of the statute. That
interpretation rests entirely on the fact that the revocation clause does not include
the same “case-by-case” language. But such a myopic focus on that omission elides
a significant portion of the text of the revocation clause. The revocation clause in
the parole statute gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to revoke
parole “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary . . .,
have been served.” If Respondents were not required to make such a determination
to effect termination of parole, then there would be no reason for this language to
have been included in the statute. This contradicts “one of the most basic
interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up).
Instead, because the parole statute (and its implementing regulation) require such a
preconditional determination to be made, the Court enforces it here.
Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec.
1, 2025). Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the present action for these same reasons.
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in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case determination regarding the revocation
of Petitioner’s parole was made prior to Petitioner’s October 22, 2025, detention. (See Resp., ECF
No. 10, PageID.185.)
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than
his status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether
they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject
to mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have
rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at
*5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL
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3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025
WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025
WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196,
2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. 5
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that the process due under the
constitution is coextensive with the administrative immigration procedures provided by Congress.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
5 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in other habeas corpus actions filed by
immigration detainees who had received § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. See Kenzhebaev v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1786, 2025 WL 3737975 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2025); Hernandez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1719, 2025 WL 3730936 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025); Tezara Munoz v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1632, 2025 WL 3687338 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Gil Pirona v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1571, 2025 WL 3687339 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Infante Rodriguez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1560, 2025 WL 3673583 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2025); Quintero-Martinez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1507, 2025 WL 3649515 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2025); Puerta Marin v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1444, 2025 WL 3533028 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025); Parra Ocanto v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1447, 2025 WL 3522113 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Arevalo v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1365, 2025 WL 3522106 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025); Godoy Zelaya v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1355, 2025 WL 3496472 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025).
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Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the
United States at a port of entry, and Respondents granted Petitioner parole into the United States,
determining that Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained
Petitioner, and there is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding
detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s
conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from
criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025)
(citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the
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deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income
earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See
Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk
of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized
determination regarding the revocation of his parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit
evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a
revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citation omitted).
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown
that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would
be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights.
VII. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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VIII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s Orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director, the District
Director of ICE, and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The
Court will dismiss the Warden of North Lake Processing Center as a Respondent.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with this
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Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the Warden of North
Lake Processing Center Warden as a Respondent.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
February 6, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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