Blanco Silva v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
YEFFERSON BLANCO SILVA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-225
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a combined counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the
following reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner and ordering
Respondents to provide notice and a hearing before an immigration judge prior to redetaining
Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.)
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In an Order entered on January 22, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 27, 2026
(Response, ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed a reply on January 30, 2026 (Pet’r’s Reply,
ECF No. 8).
II. 	Factual Background
Petitioner is a citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.3). On September 21, 2022,
Petitioner presented himself at the Paso Del Norte Texas Bridge. (Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2,
PageID.47.) The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not issue or file a Form I-862,
Notice to Appear (NTA), charging Petitioner with inadmissibility. (Id.) Instead, DHS paroled
Petitioner into the country under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Id.; Pet’r’s Reply, ECF No. 5,
PageID.59–60.) Petitioner filed an application for asylum. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.7; Pet’r’s
Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.69.)
At the end of October 2025, Petitioner was arrested in Illinois. Thereafter, DHS issued an
NTA and transferred Petitioner to North Lake Processing Center. Respondents report that
Petitioner has applied for, and been granted, voluntary departure in lieu of removal. (Order, ECF
No. 4-3.) He was scheduled to voluntarily depart on February 23, 2026, but that date was subject
to extension. (Id.) The parties have not stated whether Petitioner has voluntarily departed.
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
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related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies.
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should
impose administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful
mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-
1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not
formally adopted a standard for determining when prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos
v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However,
courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied the three-factor test, set forth in United States v.
California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States,
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402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to
determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. Here, Petitioner’s § 2241 petition presents principally legal
questions of statutory and regulatory interpretation, which do not require the record that would be
developed if the Court required Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies. Moreover, this
Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a
statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that
“courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an agency
interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges generally do not require exhaustion
because the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process
challenge generally does not require exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable
procedural errors,” such as a claim “that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an
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‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful
that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court
reaches that conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention during removal proceedings. And, recently the
BIA proclaimed that all noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See
Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply unlikely that any
administrative review by the BIA would lead the Government to change its position, and thereby
obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Accordingly, for the foregoing
reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies would likely be futile. Moreover, it is
clear that delay would result in hardship for the Petitioner. It is “unmistakable that . . . depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
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In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention
Here, Petitioner entered the United States at a port of entry and was subsequently paroled
into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	The 	government 	may 	place 	the 	noncitizen 	into 	expedited 	removal
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
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under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. The regulation governing “[t]ermination of parole” states:
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section, upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i).1 That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole
may be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the
public benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP,
2025 WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained
below, the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and
1 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or upon expiration. Respondents do not
argue that either circumstance applies here. Instead, Respondents contend that they are compelled
by statute to detain all noncitizens who are present in the United States and subject to removal
proceedings. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.33.)
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regulatory provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v.
Noem, No. 25-cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the
government failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled
noncitizens cannot be subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No.
25-13202, 2025 WL 3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No.
4:25-cv-2069, 2025 WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Venezuela seeking safety and protection.
He entered the United States at a port of entry. At that time, Petitioner was granted parole pursuant
to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into the United States “for urgent
humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Respondents do not
claim that the purpose of Petitioner’s parole had been accomplished as of October 30, 2025, when
they arrested and detained Petitioner. Indeed, there is nothing before the Court to suggest that the
humanitarian reason or public benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies. Indeed,
Respondents make no argument about whether the requirements for termination of parole in
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) and its regulations have been satisfied.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
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ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, 804 F. Supp. 3d 395, 417–421 (S.D.N.Y. 2025)
(same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D.
Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary
injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-
04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the
context of a motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of
habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s order to release the petitioner). But see Doe v. Noem,
152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025) (reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief
and vacating district court’s stay of the termination notice for previously granted parole because
“Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute,
the Secretary must terminate these grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual
basis”).2 Here, there is no indication in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case
determination regarding the revocation of Petitioner’s parole was made.
2 Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272 (1st Cir. 2025), is distinguishable from the present case. As the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota recently explained in Gabriel B.M. v.
Bondi, a case that is similar to the present action:
First, unlike here, the government in Doe did make a determination that the purpose
of the plaintiffs’ parole had been accomplished. The plaintiffs, non-citizens who
entered into the United States through the Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela
(“CHNV”) parole program, lost parole status when the government, via a lengthy
and thorough notice published in the Federal Register, decided to terminate the
CHNV program altogether, determining that the program no longer served its
implementing purpose. In contrast, for Petitioner’s revocation, there is no evidence
to suggest that such a determination or other finding was made at all, and the
evidence in the record strongly suggests it wasn’t.
Second, the Doe court did not address the regulatory requirements established by
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which implement the parole statute and illuminate the
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In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
procedural requirements for termination of parole. . . . Part 212.5(e)(2)(i) not only
restates the revocation authority enumerated in § 1182(d)(5)(A), but also clarifies
the (admittedly minimal) procedures the Respondents must follow when invoking
the parole statute’s revocation authority. The Respondents’ failure to follow the
governing regulation is equally unlawful. . . .
Finally, 	and 	perhaps 	most 	importantly, 	the 	Doe 	court’s 	interpretation 	of
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) reads the bulk of the revocation clause out of the statute. That
interpretation rests entirely on the fact that the revocation clause does not include
the same “case-by-case” language. But such a myopic focus on that omission elides
a significant portion of the text of the revocation clause. The revocation clause in
the parole statute gives the Secretary of Homeland Security the authority to revoke
parole “when the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary . . .,
have been served.” If Respondents were not required to make such a determination
to effect termination of parole, then there would be no reason for this language to
have been included in the statute. This contradicts “one of the most basic
interpretive canons, that a statute should be construed so that effect is given to all
its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or
insignificant.” Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009) (cleaned up).
Instead, because the parole statute (and its implementing regulation) require such a
preconditional determination to be made, the Court enforces it here.
Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298 (KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *7 (D. Minn. Dec.
1, 2025). Doe v. Noem is distinguishable from the present action for these same reasons.
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to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have
rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at
*5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL
3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025
WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025
WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196,
2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole.3
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in other habeas corpus actions filed by
immigration detainees who had received § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. See Kenzhebaev v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1786, 2025 WL 3737975 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2025); Hernandez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1719, 2025 WL 3730936 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025); Tezara Munoz v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1632, 2025 WL 3687338 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Gil Pirona v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1571, 2025 WL 3687339 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Infante Rodriguez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1560, 2025 WL 3673583 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2025); Quintero-Martinez v. Raycraft,
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B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the removal charges, has access to counsel, may request hearings with an immigration judge,
may request bond, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a relatively short period of time.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
No. 1:25-cv-1507, 2025 WL 3649515 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2025); Puerta Marin v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1444, 2025 WL 3533028 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025); Parra Ocanto v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1447, 2025 WL 3522113 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Arevalo v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1365, 2025 WL 3522106 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025); Godoy Zelaya v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1355, 2025 WL 3496472 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025).
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of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the
United States at a port of entry, and Respondents granted Petitioner parole into the United States,
determining that Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained
Petitioner, and there is no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding
detention, as one of the “most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s
conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from
criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025)
(citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978
F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the
deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income
earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See
Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk
of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized
determination regarding the revocation of his parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit
evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a
revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citation omitted).
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Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown
that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would
be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights.
VI. 	Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein, the Court does
not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
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To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act nationwide, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office
Director and the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court
will dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney
General, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with this
Opinion and the corresponding Judgment. Further, the Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated: 	March 4, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
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