Singh v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
KAMALJIT SINGH,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-211
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled combined petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the
following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a
bond hearing. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.15.)
In an order entered on January 21, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 23, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply later that same day, (ECF No. 5).
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of India. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.1; Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.91.) Petitioner entered the United States in August 2024 without
inspection. (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.91.) Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agents
encountered Petitioner on August 1, 2024, and at that time, DHS issued Petitioner a Form I-862,
NTA, charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under §§ 212(a)(6)(A)(i) and 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time
or place other than as designated by the Attorney General,” and “who, at the time of application
for admission, is not in possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id.)
DHS then paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(d)(5) for a period of
one year starting on August 29, 2024. (Notice Parole, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.94.)
On October 1, 2025, ICE took Petitioner into custody. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) On
January 7, 2026, the Detroit Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s asylum application and ordered
Petitioner removed to India. (Order Immigration Judge, ECF No. 4-3.) Petitioner has until
February 6, 2026, to appeal the order of removal. (See id., PageID.100.) Because Petitioner is
within his appeal period, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes
of the INA.1 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A).
1 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
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III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Here, Petitioner’s appeal period runs to February 6, 2026.
Therefore, § 1231 does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594
U.S. at 533 (“The parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal
period’ begins.”).
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2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2), and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
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immigration judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for a short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the United States Secretary of Homeland Security as
a Respondent. The Court concludes that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper
Respondent for the reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
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To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director and the United
States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.2 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: January 30, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
2 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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