Albarracin-Puerta v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
BRAYAN ALDAIR ALBARRACIN-
PUERTA,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-189
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will deny Petitioner’s petition for
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
Petitioner initiated this action on January 17, 2026. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) In Petitioner’s § 2241
petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court to, inter
alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.81.)
In an order entered on January 27, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) Respondents filed their response on January 30, 2026,
(ECF No. 5), and Petitioner filed his reply on February 4, 2026, (ECF No. 6).
II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Notice to Appear (NTA), ECF No. 1-2,
PageID.88.) Petitioner entered the United States near Brownsville, Texas on or about December
29, 2023. (Declaration of Ryan Serevitch, ECF No. 5-1, PageID.116.) On October 21, 2025, an
immigration judge in the Detroit, Michigan Immigration Court ordered Petitioner’s removal from
the United States, but granted Petitioner withholding of removal to Venezuela. (Id., PageID.117–
118.) Petitioner reserved his right to appeal that decision, but he did not file an appeal by the
November 20, 2025, deadline. (Id., PageID.118.) The removal order became administratively final
on that date. (Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.109.) Respondents report that they are pursuing
“coordination for third country removal to Mexico.” (Id., PageID.108.) Petitioner’s detention at
North Lake continues.
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
The parties agree that because Petitioner has a final order of removal, Petitioner’s present
detention is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231. (See Resp., ECF No. 5, PageID.109; Reply, ECF No. 6,
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PageID.126.) However, Petitioner contends that his detention is unlawful and violates the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Reply, ECF No. 6, PageID.126.) Respondents argue that
Petitioner’s continued detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) remains lawful and does not implicate
the constitutional concerns identified in Zadvydas v. Davis 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001).” (Resp.,
ECF No. 5, Page 109–111.)
The 90-day removal period expired February 18, 2026.1 In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme
Court held that after expiration of the 90-day removal period, the Government may continue to
detain the noncitizen for a “presumptively reasonable period” of time, which the Supreme Court
concluded equaled six months. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. Following that six-month period,
“once [a noncitizen] provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
Here, because Petitioner is within the six-month presumptively reasonable period of
detention as addressed by the Supreme Court in Zadvydas, based on the information presently
before the Court, the Court will deny Petitioner’s § 2241 petition without prejudice.2
1 As the Supreme Court explained in Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523 (2021):
Once an alien is ordered removed, DHS must physically remove him from the
United States within a 90-day “removal period.” 8 U. S. C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). The
removal period begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal
becomes “administratively final,” (2) the date of the final order of any court that
entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on which the alien is released from non-
immigration detention or confinement. § 1231(a)(1)(B). During the removal period,
detention is mandatory. § 1231(a)(2).
Johnson, 594 U.S. at 528.
2 “Although the Supreme Court established a six-month period of presumptively reasonable
detention,” courts have found that Zadvydas does “not preclude a detainee from challenging the
reasonableness of his detention before such time.” See, e.g., Munoz-Saucedo v. Pittman, 789 F.
Supp. 3d 387, 395–96 (D.N.J. 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–701). That is, during the
six-month period, “[t]he presumption of reasonableness is the default, but if a person ‘can prove’
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Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment denying Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 without prejudice.
Dated: 	February 25, 2026 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then he can overcome that presumption,” which
means that “before the six-month period elapses, the government bears no burden to justify
detention, and the petitioner must claim and prove[] that his removal is not reasonably
foreseeable.” Id. at 397 (citations omitted). Based on the information currently before the Court,
the Court does not find that Petitioner has proven that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable.
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