Reyes Medina v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
EGLIS MANUEL REYES MEDINA,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-123
Honorable Robert J. Jonker
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241
and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the
Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or to conduct a
bond hearing for Petitioner’s removal proceedings. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.29–30.)
In an order entered on January 14, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 20, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on January 24, 2026, (ECF No. 5). Thereafter, Petitioner
filed a motion to order immediate release, in which counsel referenced exhibits that were not
attached to the motion. (ECF No. 6.) In an order entered on February 9, 2026, the Court directed
Petitioner to file the exhibits referenced in the motion within three days. (ECF No. 7.) Petitioner
then filed two exhibits after the response deadline expired (ECF Nos. 8 and 8-1), and Respondents
filed a response to Petitioner’s motion for immediate release. (ECF No. 9.)
II. Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Venezuela. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8; Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.57.) Petitioner entered the United States on December 5,
2022, at the Brownsville, Texas, Port of Entry. (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.57.) At that time, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging
Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “who, at the time of application for admission, is not in
possession of a valid unexpired [immigration or travel document].” (Id., PageID.57, 60.) DHS then
paroled Petitioner into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) for a period of one year.
(2022 Form I-213, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.64.)
In 2023, Petitioner applied for Venezuelan Temporary Protected Status (TPS),1 and he was
granted TPS from June 25, 2024, to April 2, 2024. (Approval Notice, ECF No. 8, PageID.92.) On
1 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security
may designate a foreign state for TPS when nationals of that state cannot return
there safely due to armed conflict, natural disaster, or other “extraordinary and
temporary conditions,” unless the Secretary “finds that permitting the [noncitizens]
to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the
United States.”
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April 2, 2025, Petitioner filed an application to renew his TPS. (Receipt Notice, ECF No. 8-1,
PageID.93.)2
On April 29, 2025, the Atlanta Immigration Court denied Petitioner’s asylum application,
denied withholding of removal, and ordered Petitioner removed to Venezuela. (Order Immigration
Judge, ECF No. 4-3.) Petitioner filed an appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which
remains pending. (See Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.36.) Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA
remains pending, Petitioner’s order of removal is not “administratively final” for purposes of the
INA.3 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(47)(B), 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), 1231(a)(2)(A). On December 5, 2025,
ICE took Petitioner into custody. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, 150 F.4th 1000, 1010 (9th Cir. 2025) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1)(C)).
“Such a designation permits certain nationals of the foreign state, who have continuously resided
in the United States since the effective date of the designation, to register for employment
authorization and protection from deportation for the duration of the TPS period.” Id. (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1254a(a)(1), (b)(2)). Additionally, there are other restrictions, including, for example,
that applicants for TPS “must not have been ‘convicted of any felony or 2 or more misdemeanors
committed in the United States.’” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(c)(2)(B)(i)). Further, “TPS does
not provide beneficiaries with a pathway to permanent resident status, nor does it include any right
to petition for visas on behalf of family members in the United States or abroad.” Id.
2 With respect to TPS for Venezuela, “[o]n January 17, 2025, Secretary Mayorkas extended the
2023 [TPS] Designation by eighteen months, through October 2, 2026.” Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem,
166 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2026) (footnote and citation omitted). “The extension was set to
become effective on April 3, 2025,” the day after the 2023 TPS Designation was due to expire. Id.
(citation omitted). “On January 24, 2025, DHS began drafting the decision to vacate the TPS
extension” for Venezuela. Id. Thereafter, on January 26, 2025, “DHS began drafting a termination
of Venezuela’s TPS.” Id. On January 28, 2025, Secretary Noem signed off on the decision to
vacate the January 17, 2025, extension of TPS for Venezuela, meaning that the 2023 TPS
Designation for Venezuela effectively expired on April 2, 2025. (Id.) Subsequently, on February
1, 2025, “Secretary Noem signed off on the termination [of TPS]” for Venezuela. Id. (citation
omitted). Secretary Noem did not terminate the 2021 TPS Designation for Venezuela, however,
the 2021 TPS Designation “had only been extended to September 10, 2025.” Id. (citation omitted).
3 Section 1231 of Title 8, titled, “Detention and removal of aliens ordered removed,” provides in
relevant part that, “[d]uring the removal period, the Attorney General shall detain the alien.”
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)(A). However, as relevant to this case, the removal period does not begin to
run until “[t]he date the order of removal becomes administratively final.” Id. § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i).
For the purposes of § 1231(a)(1)(B)(i), a removal order “shall become final upon the earlier of (i) a
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such an order; or (ii) the expiration
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III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should pursue a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any unfavorable decision to
the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of
Immigration Appeals.” Id. § 1101(a)(47)(B); see Jusufi v. Chertoff, No. 07-15450, 2007 WL
4591760, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 28, 2007) (discussing that a final removal order becomes
administratively final when the BIA denies an appeal of it); see also Johnson v. Guzman Chavez,
594 U.S. 523, 534–35 (2021) (“[O]nce the BIA has reviewed [and affirmed] the [removal] order
(or the time for seeking the BIA’s review has expired), DHS is free to remove the alien unless a
court issues a stay. That reinforces why Congress included ‘administratively’ before the word
‘final’ in the first provision.”). Because Petitioner’s appeal to the BIA remains pending, § 1231
does not apply, and § 1226(a) governs Petitioner’s detention. See Johnson, 594 U.S. at 533 (“The
parties agree that § 1226 governs the detention of aliens until § 1231’s ‘removal period’ begins.”).
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2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to the mandatory detention provisions set
forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) because Petitioner meets every element for detention under
§ 1225(b)(2),4 and that the statute’s structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation.5
4 For the same reasons set forth in Hernandez Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1610, 2026 WL
32076 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026), the Court disagrees with Respondents’ argument that
Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1225 because the NTA charged him as an “arriving alien.”
5 In addition to arguing that Respondents are unlawfully subjecting Petitioner to mandatory
detention under § 1225(b)(2), Petitioner contends that Respondents have unlawfully detained
Petitioner despite Petitioner’s TPS. (See ECF No. 6.) Based on this, Petitioner seeks immediate
release, alleging a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4), which provides that if a noncitizen has TPS,
then the noncitizen “shall not be detained by the Attorney General on the basis of the alien’s
immigration status in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(d)(4). As set forth above, Secretary
Noem vacated the extension of the 2023 TPS Designation for Venezuela and then signed off on
the termination of TPS for Venezuela. See supra note 2. The validity of Secretary Noem’s actions
regarding TPS for Venezuela is currently being litigated. In October 2025, the United States
Supreme Court allowed the termination of TPS for Venezuela to take effect pending the
Government’s appeal and “disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely
sought.” Noem v. Nat’l TPS All., 146 S. Ct. 23, 24 (2025). On January 28, 2026, in Nat’l TPS All.
v. Noem, 166 F.4th 739 (9th Cir. 2026), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the United States District Court for the Northern District of California’s finding that
Secretary Noem exceeded her statutory authority by revoking TPS protections for Venezuelans
and Haitians. At this time, based on the procedural history of Nat’l TPS All. v. Noem, this Ninth
Circuit case does not affect the Court’s analysis in this habeas action. See Nat’l TPS All., 146 S.
Ct. at 24 (allowing the termination of TPS for Venezuelan nationals to take effect pending the
Government’s appeal). Therefore, although the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241
petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will not grant Petitioner’s request for immediate
release based on Petitioner’s prior TPS.
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The Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States and were already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the
following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577,
at *4–7 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-
cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).6
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may attend hearings with an immigration judge,
has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a
relatively short period of time.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
6 The Court is aware of Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir. 2026), which was
recently issued by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. At this time, this non-
binding case does not change the Court’s analysis.
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Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of the other named Respondents. The Court concludes
that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the reasons set
forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v.
Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025);
Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec.
12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128,
at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the Detroit ICE Field Office Director and the United
States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, and the Executive Office
for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
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Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment with notice to the Parties
as soon as practicable, no later than 24 hours prior to the scheduled hearing, or, in the alternative,
immediately release Petitioner from custody.7 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General,
and the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated: March 3, 2026 /s/ Robert J. Jonker
Robert J. Jonker
United States District Judge
7 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer or only release.
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