Huerta-Rojas v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
ERICK ANTONIO HUERTA-ROJAS,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:26-cv-118
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan,
initiated this action by filing a counseled petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, assume jurisdiction over this matter and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 either ordering Respondents to release Petitioner or ordering
Respondents to conduct a bond hearing to satisfy the requirements of due process. (Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.29–30.)
In an order entered on January 14, 2026, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on January 20, 2026,
(ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on January 24, 2026, (ECF No. 5).
II. Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2; Notice to Appear
(NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.43.) Petitioner entered the United States approximately 30 years ago
(Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2) at an unknown location without inspection (NTA, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.43). At one time, “Petitioner had [Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)]
status.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.9.)
In 2016, Petitioner was convicted of a misdemeanor traffic offense, and, in 2018, he was
convicted of driving under the influence of liquor, also a misdemeanor. (I-213, ECF No. 4-3,
PageID.50.)
On October 17, 2019, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (I-213, ECF No. 4-
3, PageID.50.) The Department of Homeland Security issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA,
charging Petitioner with inadmissibility under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) because Petitioner is an immigrant “present in the United States without
being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as
designated by the Attorney General.” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.43.) Petitioner was released
from custody on bond. (Notice of Custody Determination, ECF No. 4-2, PageID.46.)1
In March 2024, Petitioner was arrested on a charge of driving under the influence of liquor,
which remains pending. (I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.50.) ICE lodged a detainer with local
authorities. (Id.) Following Petitioner’s release from custody on the criminal charges on September
1 Respondents do not contend that Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which
refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens” and do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted
of any crime(s) listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A).
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24, 2025, ICE agents encountered and arrested Petitioner. (Id., PageID.49.) Petitioner “was
detained without bond as custody redetermination.” (I-213, ECF No. 4-3, PageID.50.) The Court
has not been provided with reason(s) for the immigration judge’s denial of bond.
III. Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. Specifically, Respondents argue
that Petitioner should appeal the decision denying him bond to the Board of Immigration Appeals.
The Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against Petitioner, and
even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court concludes in the
alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate, for the reasons set forth in the Court’s
exhaustion analysis in each of the following cases: Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669,
2025 WL 3562651, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-
1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *2–4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025 WL 3558128, at *2–3 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
Accordingly, the Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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V. Merits Discussion
A. Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
Respondents, however, do not provide the Court with the statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention
and do not provide the Court with any details concerning the immigration judge’s denial of bond,
including whether that decision was on the merits or for lack of jurisdiction. The Court is, however,
aware the BIA and, by extension, the immigration courts, take the position that any individual who
has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond
and is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29
I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). Here, because Respondents have not explained the legal authority
justifying Petitioner’s continued detention or contested Petitioner’s assertion that he is detained
under § 1225(b)(2), the Court presumes that Respondents have applied § 1225(b)(2) to Petitioner
and thus denied him an individualized bond determination.
To the extent that Respondents purport to detain Petitioner under § 1225(b)(2), the Court
concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have
resided in the United States and were already within the United States when apprehended and
arrested for the reasons set forth in the Court’s statutory analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *4–6 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *4–7 (W.D.
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Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *3–6 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).2
B. Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice
of the charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an
immigration judge, has the right to appeal the custody determination.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights
for the reasons set forth in the Court’s constitutional analysis in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *7–8 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *7–9 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *6–8 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
VI. Other Claims and Other Forms of Relief
Because the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition as set forth herein,
the Court does not address other claims and other requested relief in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
2 Petitioner claims that he was, at one time a DACA recipient and was not provided with notice
concerning the termination of his DACA benefits. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) However,
Petitioner has not provided the Court with any further information concerning Petitioner’s DACA
status. DACA status is not permanent but is subject to renewal every two years. 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.23(a)(4). USCIS is prohibited from granting DACA status to a noncitizen with a
misdemeanor conviction for driving under the influence. 8 C.F.R. § 236.22(b)(6)(i). Therefore,
even if Petitioner may have, at one time been entitled to DACA status, he was not entitled to
renewal in the two years immediately preceding his September 24, 2025, arrest.
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VII. Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. The Court
concludes that the ICE Detroit Field Office Director is not the only proper Respondent for the
reasons set forth in the Court’s analysis of the same argument in each of the following cases:
Antele Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1669, 2025 WL 3562651, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12,
2025); Candela Bastidas v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1528, 2025 WL 3562638, at *8–9 (W.D. Mich.
Dec. 12, 2025); Acuna Sanchez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1442, 2025 WL 3562577, at *9–10 (W.D.
Mich. Dec. 12, 2025); Penagos Robles v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1578, 2025
WL 3558128, at *9–10 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
To ensure that this Court’s orders regarding a hearing or release will bind at least one
Respondent with authority to act in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will retain the ICE Detroit Field Office Director and the Secretary
for the Department of Homeland Security as Respondents. The Court will dismiss the United States
Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General, the Executive Office for
Immigration Review as Respondents.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a judgment conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment or, in the alternative,
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immediately release Petitioner from custody.3 The Court will also order Respondents to file a status
report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify
compliance with this opinion and the corresponding judgment. The status report shall include if
and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was granted, the
conditions of the bond, or if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further, the Court will
dismiss the United States Department of Homeland Security, the United States Attorney General,
the Executive Office for Immigration Review as Respondents.
Dated: February 2, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 This Court has adopted a standard practice of requiring such a hearing within five business days,
even if the Petitioner requests a deadline that is shorter or longer.
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