Dubravec v. Wexford, County of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NICHOLAS MARTIN DUBRAVEC,
Plaintiff,
v.
DONNA RINNAS, et al.,
Defendants.
______________________________________/
Hon. Jane M. Beckering
Case No. 1:25-cv-1904
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Nicholas Martin Dubravec filed his pro se complaint on December 26, 2025,
against 31 Defendants asserting that this matter arises under federal law. Having granted Plaintiff’s
motion to proceed as a pauper (ECF No. 4), I have conducted an initial review of the complaint
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). I conclude that the complaint must be dismissed for failure to
state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
I. Background
Although far from clear, it appears that Plaintiff is currently subject to a pending state
criminal proceeding. He attaches a list of Defendants to his form complaint (ECF No. 1-1) but
provides no information as to why he has included them in this action and, with the exception of
Michigan Attorney General Dana Nessel, Michigan Department of Health and Human Services
Director of Evaluation & Forensic Services Donna Rinnas, Ph.D., and Plaintiff’s defense attorney,
Patrick Cherry, he does not indicate who they are. (ECF No. 1-2.) Further, with the possible
exception of his father, Plaintiff attributes no act or conduct to any of these Defendants. Under his
“Statement of Claim,” Plaintiff states that: (1) he alleges unspecified violations of 42 U.S.C. §
1983; (2) the state court denied his request to fire his public defender and represent himself; (3)
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his father admitted in a police interview that he uses court proceedings for his own purposes; (4)
Defendants have committed perjury in “psych petitions, statements, and in sworn statements via
police records;” and (5) he has been denied discovery. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.4.) For relief, Plaintiff
requests “a public jury trial to interview all defendants on the stand,” and a total of $750,000 in
damages. (ECF No. 1 at PaeID.4.) Plaintiff also notes that he has a competency evaluation
scheduled for December 29, 2025. (Id. at 5.)
II. Discussion
Pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). The
Court, however, is required to dismiss an in forma pauperis action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it
fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or
fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989).
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless
the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a
‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” If the complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant’s liability,
it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’” Id. As the
Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. . . Rule 8 marks a
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notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged – but it has not “show[n]” – “that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim because he fails to allege sufficient facts.
The complaint is essentially devoid of factual allegations. It fails to allege acts supporting a claim,
fails to attribute any act giving rise to a claim to any Defendant, and, other than broadly asserting
that his action arises under Section 1983, fails to articulate what claim(s) Plaintiff brings. Simply
put, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts which, if proven, would entitle him to relief.
In addition, it is firmly established that a court may dismiss an action sua sponte “for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“when the allegations of a complaint are totally implausible, attenuated, unsubstantial, frivolous,
devoid of merit, or no longer open to discussion.” Apple v. Glenn, 183 F.3d 477, 479–80 (6th Cir.
1999); see also Wagenknecht v. United States, 533 F.3d 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2008). Plaintiff’s
complaint clearly meets this standard.
Finally, to the extent Plaintiff is challenging a current or pending prosecution, the Court
should decline to intervene in an ongoing state criminal prosecution. As has long been recognized,
federal courts should abstain from interfering in ongoing state criminal matters “unless
extraordinary circumstances are present.” Marjamaa v. Mitchell, No. 2:19-CV-197, 2019 WL
5853486 at *1-2 (W.D. Mich., Nov. 8, 2019) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44-55 (1971)).
Plaintiff’s allegations fall well short of establishing the sort of extraordinary circumstances that
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would justify interference by this Court in an on-going state criminal matter. Marjamaa, 2019 WL
5853486 at *2.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to state a claim and lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The Court must also decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within
the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). Good faith is judged objectively, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962), and
an appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous, defined as lacking an
arguable basis either in fact or law. See Dellis v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 511 (6th Cir.
2001). For the same reasons that I recommend dismissal of the action, I discern no good faith basis
for an appeal and recommend that, should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court assess the
$605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to Section 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11.
Date: January 5, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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