Davila-Palacios v. Raycraft et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JUAN MIGUEL DAVILA-PALACIOS,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1665
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
Petitioner, a United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently
detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan, initiated
this action by filing a counseled combined petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. (Pet., ECF No. 1.) For the following
reasons, the Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Procedural History
In Petitioner’s § 2241 petition, Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention
and asks the Court to, inter alia, accept jurisdiction over this action and issue a writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Petitioner’s immediate release. (Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID.23.)
In an Order entered on December 8, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested by Petitioner
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should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 3.) Respondents filed their response on December 11,
2025, (ECF No. 4), and Petitioner filed his reply on December 16, 2025, (ECF No. 5).
II. 	Relevant Factual Background
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nicaragua. (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8; Notice to
Appear (NTA), ECF No. 4-1, PageID.67.) Petitioner entered the United States on May 15, 2024,
and at that time, Petitioner was paroled into the United States pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
for a period of two years. (Pet’r’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID1, 8;
Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.49.)
“Respondents issued a blanket termination of parole in 2025,” terminating “Petitioner’s
parole effective June 12, 2025.” (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8.) On September 29, 2025, “Petitioner
was at his place of employment when Respondents’ agents carried out a worksite raid.” (Id.,
PageID.20.) ICE issued Petitioner a Form I-862, NTA, charging him with inadmissibility pursuant
to § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) for being “an immigrant who,
at the time of application for admission, is not in possession of [valid immigration and travel
documents].” (NTA, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.67, 70.) 1
III. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
1 In their response, Respondents state that Petitioner “has a final order of removal and is awaiting
a hearing date” (Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.49 (citing “Ex. A, I-213 and NTA”)); however, the
documents cited by Respondents do not show that Petitioner has a final order of removal.
Therefore, this statement appears to be an error in Respondents’ filing.
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the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory and Regulatory Basis for Petitioner’s Parole and Recent Detention
Here, Petitioner was paroled into the United States under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). (Pet’r’s
Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID1, 8; Resp., ECF No. 4, PageID.49.)
The INA “establishes the framework governing noncitizens’ entry into and removal from
the United States, with regulations promulgated by the enforcing agencies providing further
governance.” Y-Z-L-H v. Bostock, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1123, 1132 (D. Or. 2025). “Noncitizens who
arrive at a port of entry without a visa or other entry document, like Petitioner, are deemed
‘inadmissible’ under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)” due to their lack of entry documents. Id. at 1132 & n.7
(noting that “[d]epending on the circumstances, other categories of inadmissibility may also apply,
but § 1182(a)(7) applies for noncitizens without proper documentation”). Once a noncitizen is
deemed inadmissible, “the immigration officer must order the noncitizen’s removal unless the
noncitizen indicates an intention to apply for asylum or fear of prosecution.” Id. (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). 	The 	government 	may 	place 	the 	noncitizen 	into 	expedited 	removal
proceedings, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1), or the government may place the noncitizen into regular
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See Y-Z-L-H, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1132–33 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)).
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). However, “applicants for admission
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may be temporarily released on parole [into the United States] ‘for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,’” as set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583
U.S. 281, 288 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). The decision to grant parole pursuant to
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is determined “on a case-by-case basis.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Then,
“when the purpose of the parole has been served,” § 1182(d)(5)(A) provides that “the alien shall
forthwith return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and thereafter his case
shall continue to be dealt with in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to
the United States.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)).
To terminate the previously granted parole, the agency must comply with the applicable
regulatory and statutory requirements. As set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i), which governs the
“[t]ermination of parole,”
In cases not covered by paragraph (e)(1) of this section,[2] upon accomplishment of
the purpose for which parole was authorized or when in the opinion of one of the
officials listed in paragraph (a) of this section, neither humanitarian reasons nor
public benefit warrants the continued presence of the alien in the United States,
parole shall be terminated upon written notice to the alien and he or she shall be
restored to the status that he or she had at the time of parole.
8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(2)(i). That is, “[u]nder the governing regulation, [§ 1182(d)(5)(A)] parole may
be terminated only if the purpose of parole is accomplished, or humanitarian reasons and the public
benefit no longer warrant parole.” Loaiza Arias v. LaRose, No. 3:25-cv-02595-BTM-MMP, 2025
WL 3295385, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(e)). As explained below,
the Court concludes that Respondents have failed to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory
provisions to terminate Petitioner’s parole. Cf. Coal. for Humane Immigrant Rts. v. Noem, No. 25-
2 Paragraph (e)(1) provides for the automatic termination of parole without written notice where
the noncitizen has either departed from the United States or at the expiration of time for which the
parole was authorized. The parties have not suggested that either circumstance applies here.
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cv-872 (JMC), 2025 WL 2192986, at *2 (D.D.C. Aug. 1, 2025) (holding that the government failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory provisions and that paroled noncitizens cannot be
subject to expedited removal proceedings); Salgado Bustos v. Raycraft, No. 25-13202, 2025 WL
3022294, at *5–7 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025) (same); E.V. v. Raycraft, No. 4:25-cv-2069, 2025
WL 2938594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 16, 2025) (same).
First, based on the information before the Court, it does not appear that the purpose of
Petitioner’s parole has been accomplished. Petitioner left Nicaragua, and he has expressed a
credible fear of returning to Nicaragua. (Pet’r’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25; Pet., ECF No. 1,
PageID1, 8; Reply, ECF No. 5, PageID.74.) When Petitioner entered the United States, he was
granted parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), which provides for parole into the United
States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public benefit,” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).
(Pet’r’s Ex. 1, ECF No. 1-1, PageID.25; Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID1, 8; Resp., ECF No. 4,
PageID.49.) There is nothing before the Court to suggest that the humanitarian reason or public
benefit that justified Petitioner’s parole no longer applies.
Further, district courts that have addressed the termination of § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole “have
found that just as a grant of parole requires an individualized review, revocation of parole requires
a case-by-case assessment to comply with the statute,” and the Court finds the reasoning in these
non-binding cases to be persuasive. Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 146
(W.D.N.Y. 2025) (citations omitted) (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s motion
for preliminary injunction and ordering that the petitioner be released); see, e.g., Y-Z-L-H, 792 F.
Supp. 3d at 1137–47 (addressing this issue, and granting the petitioner’s habeas petition and
ordering that the petitioner be released from custody); Loaiza Arias, 2025 WL 3295385, at *2–4
(same); Noori v. LaRose, No. 25-cv-1824-GPC-MSB, 2025 WL 2800149, at *10–13 (S.D. Cal.
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Oct. 1, 2025) (same); Munoz Materano v. Arteta, No. 25 CIV. 6137 (ER), --- F. Supp. 3d ----, 2025
WL 2630826, at *14–17 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (same); Gabriel B.M. v. Bondi, No. 25-cv-4298
(KMM/EMB), 2025 WL 3443584, at *6–7 (D. Minn. Dec. 1, 2025) (addressing this issue, and
granting the petitioner’s request for a preliminary injunction and ordering the petitioner’s release
from custody); Orellana v. Francis, No. 25-cv-04212 (OEM), 2025 WL 2822640, at *2–3
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 2025) (addressing the issue in the context of a motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondents, and affirming the court’s grant of habeas relief to the petitioner and the court’s
order to release the petitioner). But see Doe v. Noem, 152 F.4th 272, 278–79, 285 (1st Cir. 2025)
(reversing district court’s grant of preliminary relief and vacating district court’s stay of the
termination notice for previously granted parole because “Plaintiffs ha[d] not demonstrated a
strong likelihood of success in showing that under the statute, the Secretary must terminate these
grants of parole under the [parole] program[s] on an individual basis”). Here, there is no indication
in the record before the Court that any such case-by-case determination regarding the revocation
of Petitioner’s parole was made. Instead, Petitioner indicates that Respondents “issued a blanket
termination of parole” to noncitizens throughout the country, (Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.8), which
does not constitute a case-by-case determination.
In summary, as explained above, based on the information that is presently before the
Court, there is no indication that Respondents followed the applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s parole. If Respondents did not follow those
requirements, then they did not have the authority to arrest and detain Petitioner, “unless there
[wa]s some other valid reason to arrest him.” Mata Velasquez, 794 F. Supp. 3d at 145; cf. Norfolk
S. Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., No. 21-3369, 2022 WL 17369438, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 2, 2022)
(discussing that “an agency’s action that fails to observe the procedures required by its own
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regulations should be set aside” (citation omitted)); Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541,
545 (6th Cir. 2004) (“It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to
follow their own regulations[,] . . . [and] ‘[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations tends
to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice and consequently may result in a violation
of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.’” (additional internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. U.S. Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 1998))).
Respondents do not claim that they had any reason to arrest and detain Petitioner other than his
status as a noncitizen. Indeed, Respondents argue that any noncitizen, regardless of whether they
are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission” subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225. This Court and other courts throughout the country have
rejected this argument. Cf., e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589,
at *6 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at
*5–6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL
3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025
WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025
WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196,
2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025); Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025).
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Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that Respondents failed
to follow the applicable statutory and regulatory requirements to revoke or terminate Petitioner’s
§ 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. 3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner has received notice of the
charges against him, has access to counsel, is scheduled to attend hearings with an immigration
judge, has the right to appeal the denial of any request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for
a short period time.
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens, such as Petitioner, are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in other habeas corpus actions filed by
immigration detainees who had received § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. See Kenzhebaev v. Noem,
No. 1:25-cv-1786, 2025 WL 3737975 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 29, 2025); Hernandez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1719, 2025 WL 3730936 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 26, 2025); Tezara Munoz v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1632, 2025 WL 3687338 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Gil Pirona v. Noem, No. 1:25-
cv-1571, 2025 WL 3687339 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 19, 2025); Infante Rodriguez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1560, 2025 WL 3673583 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2025); Quintero-Martinez v. Raycraft,
No. 1:25-cv-1507, 2025 WL 3649515 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 17, 2025); Puerta Marin v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1444, 2025 WL 3533028 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 10, 2025); Parra Ocanto v. Lynch,
No. 1:25-cv-1447, 2025 WL 3522113 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Arevalo v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1365, 2025 WL 3522106 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 2025); Rodriguez Martinez v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-
cv-1504, 2025 WL 3511093 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 8, 2025); Godoy Zelaya v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-
1355, 2025 WL 3496472 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025).
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The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. Here, Petitioner entered the
United States, and Respondents granted Petitioner parole into the United States, determining that
Petitioner was not a flight risk or danger. Respondents have now detained Petitioner, and there is
no dispute that Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the
“most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 529 (2004) (citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of
confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal
incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing
Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842,
851 (2d Cir. 2020)). There can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations of
incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack
of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F.
Supp. 3d at 1187.
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The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Clearly, there is a high risk
of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom if Petitioner does not receive an individualized
determination regarding the revocation of his parole. “To mitigate the risk of erroneous
deprivation, due process would require, ‘at [a] minimum, the opportunity for [Petitioner] to submit
evidence relevant to whether [the government] should revoke [his parole] before [it] make[s] a
revocation decision.’” Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 794 F. Supp. 3d 128, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)
(citation omitted).
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not shown
that they have a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably, continuing to
enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government, as it would
be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention violates Petitioner’s Fifth
Amendment due process rights. 4
V. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents.
4 Because the Court will grant Petitioner’s § 2241 petition for the reasons set forth herein, the Court
does not, and need not, address other claims raised in Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named the Director of the Detroit Field Office of ICE, the
Acting Director of ICE, and the United States Secretary of Homeland Security as Respondents.
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
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1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s grant of habeas relief in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District
of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss the Acting Director of ICE and the United States Secretary
of Homeland Security as Respondents to these proceedings.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter a Judgment granting Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The Court will
order Respondents to release Petitioner from custody, subject to any conditions that existed under
Petitioner’s § 1182(d)(5)(A) parole. Additionally, the Court will enjoin Respondents from
re-detaining Petitioner absent a material change in circumstances unless the requirements of due
process have been satisfied. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
three days of the issuance of the Court’s Opinion and Judgment to certify compliance with this
Opinion and the corresponding Judgment.
Dated:
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
January 15, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
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