Espinoza-Vallecil #525802 v. Dungy et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JORGE GABIEL ESPOINOZA-
VALLECIL,
Plaintiff,
v.
AARON R. DUNGY, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1622
Honorable Phillip J. Green
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Plaintiff has also filed a motion seeking immediate release from prison without
conditions. (ECF No. 2.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.9.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct
this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform
Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d
601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of
particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s relationship to the
proceedings.
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“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by
formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,
347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice,
is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350.
“[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only
upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That
is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to
function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil
action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA,
by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service,
creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the
plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty.
Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district
court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was
made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party
to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting
all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that
“[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may
conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”
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28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the
undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required
to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the
same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion.
See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain
a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they
were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought
under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and
accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly
incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards,
the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Moreover, the
Court will deny Plaintiff’s motion seeking immediate release.
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir.
2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context
matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy
Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500,
503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
“parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to
its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of
‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the Central Michigan Correctional Facility (STF) in St. Louis,
Gratiot County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following members of the Michigan
Parole Board. Aaron R. Dungy; Brian J. Shipman; Timothy S. Flanagan; Caitlin A.
McGinn; and Crissa D. Blankenburg. Plaintiff sues each Defendant in his or her
personal capacity.
Plaintiff is serving a sentence of 7 to 15 years’ imprisonment for reckless
driving causing death in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 257.6264. See MDOC
Offender 	Tracking 	Information 	System 	(OTIS),
https://mdocweb.state.mi.us/otis2/otis2profile.aspx?mdocNumber=525802 	(last
visited Mar. 9, 2026). Under Michigan’s indeterminate sentencing system, Plaintiff’s
earliest release date—the date he first became eligible for parole—was February 10,
2021; Plaintiff’s maximum discharge date—the date he will complete the entire
maximum sentence of 15 years—is August 10, 2032. Id.
Plaintiff contends that each Defendant has played some role in failing to
release him on parole. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff contends that
Defendants’ actions violate Plaintiff’s rights under MDOC Policy Directives, state
law, and the federal Second Chance Act. Plaintiff claims that Defendants’ failure to
parole him renders his sentence cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.
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Plaintiff seeks immediate release from incarceration along with clothing,
transportation, and $500.00 on his release date.
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
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To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of
a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
Plaintiff has no Right to Parole
The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint to raise a procedural due process
claim regarding his right to receive parole. (See Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.3 (stating
that by denying him parole, Defendants have interfered with his “life and liberty”).)
To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must show that (1)
he was deprived of a protected liberty or property interest, and (2) such deprivation
occurred without the requisite due process of law. Club Italia Soccer & Sports Org.,
Inc. v. Charter Twp. of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 296 (6th Cir. 2006); see also Swihart v.
Wilkinson, 209 F. App'x 456, 458 (6th Cir. 2006). To the extent that Plaintiff raises
a procedural due process claim based on a right to parole, he fails to raise a claim of
constitutional magnitude because he has no liberty interest in being released on
parole. Indeed, there is no constitutional or inherent right to be conditionally
released before the expiration of a prison sentence. Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb.
Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979). Although a state may establish a parole
system, it has no duty to do so; thus, the presence of a parole system by itself does
not give rise to a constitutionally protected liberty interest in parole release. Id. at
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7, 11; Bd. of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 373 (1987). Rather, a liberty interest is
present only if state law entitles an inmate to release on parole. Inmates of Orient
Corr. Inst. v. Ohio State Adult Parole Auth., 929 F.2d 233, 235 (6th Cir. 1991).
In Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d 1162, 1164–65 (6th Cir. 1994) (en banc), the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, noting “the broad powers of the
Michigan authorities to deny parole,” held that the Michigan system does not create
a liberty interest in parole. The Sixth Circuit reiterated the continuing validity of
Sweeton in Crump v. Lafler, 657 F.3d 393, 404 (6th Cir. 2011). In Crump, the Sixth
Circuit held that the adoption of specific parole guidelines since Sweeton does not lead
to the conclusion that parole release is mandated upon reaching a high probability of
parole. See id.; see also Carnes v. Engler, 76 F. App'x 79, 80 (6th Cir. 2003). In
addition, the Sixth Circuit has rejected the argument that the Due Process Clause is
implicated when changes to parole procedures and practices have resulted in
incarcerations that exceed the subjective expectation of the sentencing judge. See
Foster v. Booker, 595 F.3d 353, 369 (6th Cir. 2010). Finally, the Michigan Supreme
Court has recognized that there exists no liberty interest in parole under the
Michigan system. Glover v. Mich. Parole Bd., 596 N.W.2d 598, 603–04 (Mich. 1999).
Under this authority, Plaintiff has no reasonable expectation of liberty until
he has served his maximum sentence, which is 15 years. The discretionary parole
system in Michigan holds out “no more than a mere hope that the benefit will be
obtained.” Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 11. Thus, any failure or refusal by the Michigan
Parole Board to consider Plaintiff for, or grant him, parole does not implicate a federal
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right. In the absence of a liberty interest, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation
of his procedural due process rights. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
procedural due process claim will be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Plaintiff’s Sentence is not Cruel and Unusual
Plaintiff claims that the denial of parole constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The Eighth Amendment imposes
a constitutional limitation on the power of the states to punish those convicted of
crimes. Punishment may not be “barbarous,” nor may it contravene society's
“evolving standards of decency.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1981).
The Amendment, therefore, prohibits conduct by prison officials that involves the
“unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th
Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 346). The deprivation alleged
must result in the denial of the “minimal civilized measure of life's necessities.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347; see also Wilson v. Yaklich, 148 F.3d 596, 600–01 (6th Cir.
1998). The Eighth Amendment is only concerned with “deprivations of essential food,
medical care, or sanitation” or “other conditions intolerable for prison confinement.”
Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 348 (citation omitted). Moreover, “[n]ot every unpleasant
experience a prisoner might endure while incarcerated constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Ivey, 832 F.2d at 954.
“Routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their
offenses against society.’ ” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (quoting Rhodes,
452 U.S. at 347). As a consequence, “extreme deprivations are required to make out
a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Id.
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Plaintiff's allegations regarding the denial of parole do not involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain as is required to state a claim under the
Eighth Amendment. Carnes v. Engler, No. 03-1212, 2003 WL 22177118, at *3 (6th
Cir. Sept. 19, 2003) (citing Ivey v. Wilson, 832 F.2d 950, 954 (6th Cir. 1987)). See also
Johnson v. Booker, No. 08–CV–12726, 2008 WL 3020878, [at] *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 4,
2008) (rejecting similar challenge to parole denial); accord Lee–Bryant v. Sindles, No.
2:08–CV–121, 2009 WL 528959, [at] *4 (W.D. Mich. March 2, 2009) (adopting
magistrate judge's report). The denial of parole is a disappointment rather than a
punishment of cruel and unusual proportions. Carnes, 2003 WL 22177118, at *3;
Smith v. Heyns, No. 12-11373, 2013 WL 3944474, at *9 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2013)
(citations omitted). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim is properly
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
The Michigan Parole Board did not Violate the Federal Second
Chance Act
The entirety of Plaintiff’s Second Chance Act claim reads as follows: “On April
13, 2024, Aaron R. Dungy and Brian J. Shipman issue[d] a 12 months[‘] continuance
against me in violation of the second chance act under federal law.” (Compl., ECF
No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff also attaches three specific statutory sections impacted by
the Act: 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3624, and 3632. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.37–47.)
“Congress enacted the Second Chance Act to improve prisoner reentry into
society and reduce recidivism, see Pub. L. No. 110-199, 1222 Stat. 657 (2008) (codified
as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3621, 3624).” Sclafani v. Kane, No. 20-cv-0463 (EK
(VMS), 2020 WL 4676414, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 12, 2020). But, “the Act did not . . .
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give prisoners an enforceable liberty interest.” Id. Moreover, the Act applies to
prisoners of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, not state prisoners. Accordingly, Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim for violation of the Second Chance Act.
Violation of Michigan Law or MDOC Policy Directives
Claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of state
law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d
1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants violated state law
or MDOC policy directives, therefore, fails to state a claim under § 1983.
Plaintiff is not entitled to Immediate Release
As set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to state any claim upon which relief may
be granted. For that reason, he is not entitled to immediate release. Plaintiff’s
motion seeking immediate release will be denied.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the
Court determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a
claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next
decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir.
1997). For the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly
dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal
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would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly,
the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: March 11, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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