Merkle v. Hinkley

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
MICHAEL CLIFFTON MERKLE,
Petitioner,
v.
DAVID E. GILBERT et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1586
Honorable Ray Kent
OPINION
Petitioner Joshua Milliken is a county detainee currently detained at the Calhoun County
Jail in Battle Creek, Michigan. He has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF No. 1), alleging that his detention violates his constitutional rights. This mater
is presently before the Court on Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF
No. 2), and for preliminary review under 28 U.S.C. § 2243.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Petitioner consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States
magistrate judge. (ECF No. 4.) Section 636(c) provides that “[u]pon the consent of the parties, a
full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all proceedings in a jury or nonjury
civil matter and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c).
Promptly after the filing of a petition for habeas corpus, the Court must undertake a
preliminary review of the petition to determine whether “it plainly appears from the face of the
petition and any exhibits annexed to it that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district
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court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254 Cases; see 28 U.S.C. § 2243.1 The Court is required to
conduct this initial review prior to the service of the petition. Rule 4, Rules Governing § 2254
Cases.
Service of the petition on the respondent is of particular significance in defining a putative
respondent’s relationship to the proceedings. “An individual or entity named as a defendant is not
obliged to engage in litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority,
by formal process.” Murphy Bros. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999).
“Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any
procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and
is required to take action in that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-
asserting measure stating the time within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id.
(citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons
continues to function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil
action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351.
Rule 4, by requiring courts to review and even resolve the petition before service, creates
a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the petitioner. Because
Respondent has not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that Respondent is not presently a
party whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review of the
petition. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
1 The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be applied to petitions filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b),
Rules Governing § 2254 Cases.
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to the action at th[e] time the magistrate entered judgment.”).2 Petitioner’s consent is sufficient to
permit the undersigned to conduct the Rule 4 review.
After undertaking the review required by Rule 4, it plainly appears from the face of the
petition that Petitioner is not entitled to relief because he has failed to exhaust his state court
remedies. Accordingly, the Court will summarily dismiss the petition without prejudice.
Discussion
I. Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis
The filing fee for a habeas corpus action is $5.00. 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). While Petitioner
has not formally requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis, he has submitted an account
statement (ECF No. 2) indicating that he is indigent. It reasonably appears that paying the cost of
this filing fee would impose an undue financial hardship. Prows v. Kastner, 842 F.2d 138, 140 (5th
Cir. 1988). Therefore, the Court will grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
II. Factual Allegations
As noted above, Petitioner is currently detained at the Calhoun County Jail in Battle Creek,
Michigan. Petitioner has named Prosecutor David E. Gilbert, the State of Michigan, the County of
Calhoun, the City of Battle Creek, and the 10th District Judicial Court as Respondents. Public
records indicate that Petitioner is facing charges of assaulting/resisting/obstructing a police officer,
in violation of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.81d and breaking and entering-illegal entry, in violation
2 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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of Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.115. See Case Details, State of Michigan v. Merkle, No. 2025-
C251800-FY (10th Dist. Ct.), https://micourt.courts.michigan.gov/case-search/ (select Continue,
select Calhoun County 10th District Court, input Last Name “Merkle” and Birth Year “1977,”
select Search, select Case ID 2025-C251800-FY) (last visited Dec. 28, 2025). The docket events
reveal that the court found Petitioner incompetent to stand trial on May 19, 2025. Id. There is
nothing in the court’s docket to suggest that Petitioner has since been deemed competent to stand
trial.
In his § 2241 petition, Petitioner asks this Court to compel a prompt trial.
III. Proper Respondents
The Supreme Court has concluded that “[i]n challenges to present physical
confinement . . . the immediate custodian . . . is the proper respondent.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426, 439 (2004). Petitioner’s immediate custodian is Calhoun County Sheriff Steven Hinkley.
The Court directs the Clerk to substitute Sheriff Hinkley as Respondent in place of the Respondents
improperly named by Petitioner.
IV. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies
28 U.S.C. § 2241 confers upon federal courts the jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ
of habeas corpus of state pretrial detainees. Atkins v. People of the State of Michigan, 644 F.2d
543, 546 (6th Cir. 1981). While petitions under § 2241 are not subject to all of the specific statutory
requirements set forth in § 2254, a pretrial detainee may not simply seek relief in federal court
under § 2241 where state relief is still available. Thus, a federal court ordinarily “should abstain
from the exercise of that jurisdiction if the issues raised in the petition may be resolved either by
trial on the merits in the state courts or by other state procedures available to the petitioner.” Atkins,
644 F.2d at 546 & n.1; see also Phillips v. Court of Common Pleas, Hamilton Cnty, Ohio, 668
F.3d 804, 810 n.4 (6th Cir. 2012) (“Unlike exhaustion under § 2254, exhaustion under § 2241 is
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not a statutory requirement. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), with id. § 2241. Rather, in the
§ 2241 context, ‘decisional law has superimposed such a requirement in order to accommodate
principles of federalism.’”).
The Sixth Circuit has approved consideration of a pretrial § 2241 petition only in three
exceptional circumstances: (1) when the petitioner seeks a speedy trial, Atkins 644 F.2d at 546–
47; (2) when a petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on double jeopardy grounds, Delk v.
Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1981); and (3) when a petitioner faces prejudice from prior
ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations on retrial, Turner v. Tennessee, 858
F.2d 1201, 1204 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1990). Petitioner’s claim
suggests that he is being denied the right to a speedy trial.
Even in a case such as this where a pretrial detainee articulates a claim of the type that may
constitute an exceptional circumstance, a habeas petitioner must still properly exhaust available
state court remedies before proceeding in federal court. See Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Court, 410
U.S. 484, 490–91 (1973) (recognizing the long-standing judicial doctrine of exhaustion of state-
court remedies in all habeas action); Klein v. Leis, 548 F.3d 425, 429 n.2 (6th Cir. 2008); Delk,
665 F.2d at 93 (holding that a pretrial detainee may file a § 2241 petition after state remedies are
exhausted). The requirement that a habeas petitioner exhaust state-court remedies before seeking
relief in federal court “protect[s] the state court’s opportunity to confront initially and resolve
constitutional issues arising within their jurisdictions and to limit federal judicial interference in
state adjudicatory processes.” Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546.
To properly exhaust state remedies, a habeas petitioner must have fairly presented each
claim to the state court of appeals and to the state supreme court before raising claims in a federal
habeas corpus petition. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 844-45, 847 (1999); Wagner v.
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Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th Cir. 2009). Petitioner bears the burden of showing exhaustion.
See Rust v. Zent, 17 F.3d 155, 160 (6th Cir. 1994).
Here, Petitioner does not indicate that he has sought relief in the Michigan sppellate courts
for the violation of his speedy trial rights. A challenge to pretrial detention in Michigan is governed
by Mich. Comp. Laws § 765.1 et seq. Under those provisions and the Michigan Court Rules, it
appears that state-court remedies are still available to Petitioner. Michigan Court Rule 6.106(H)
provides for modification of pretrial custody orders—indeed, the rule contemplates circumstances
that warrant emergency release. Additionally, the rule provides for appeal of the custody decision
by motion. Mich. Ct. R. 6.106(H)(1). Alternatively, the state habeas corpus remedy may provide
a means to obtain relief.
Petitioner must pursue the remedies afforded by Michigan Court Rule 6.106 or by the
Michigan habeas corpus statute, including all available appeals. Relief under § 2241 is not
available until after Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies.
V. Certificate of Appealability
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a
“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has disapproved issuance of blanket denials of a
certificate of appealability. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
Rather, the district court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine
whether a certificate is warranted. Id.
The Court concludes that Petitioner’s application is properly denied for lack of exhaustion.
Under Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), when a habeas petition is denied on
procedural grounds, a certificate of appealability may issue only “when the prisoner shows, at
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least, [1] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of
the denial of a constitutional right and [2] that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the
district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Both showings must be made to warrant the
grant of a certificate. Id.
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not find it debatable whether Petitioner’s
application should be dismissed for lack of exhaustion. Therefore, a certificate of appealability
will be denied. Moreover, for the same reasons the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under § 2241 and has failed to make a substantial showing
of a denial of a constitutional right, the Court also concludes that any issue Petitioner might raise
on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Conclusion
The Court will enter an order and judgment granting Petitioner’s request for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis, directing the Clerk to substitute Sheriff Hinkley in place of the
Respondents named by Petitioner, dismissing the petition for lack of exhaustion, and denying a
certificate of appealability.
Dated:
Ray Kent
United States Magistrate Judge
January 2, 2026 /s/ Ray Kent
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