Drane v. Catholic Charities West Michigan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CYNTHIA DRANE,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-1478
CATHOLIC CHARITIES WEST
MICHIGAN, et al.
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Cynthia Drane has sued her former employer, Catholic Charities West Michigan
(CCWM), and CCWM EFC Supervisor Shreatta Wells, CCWM Director of Child Welfare Leticia
A. Pittman, CCWM Program Manager Joe Styf, and CCWM employee Victoria Hanna, alleging
claims of discrimination and retaliation based on her religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. Drane also alleges that Defendants
violated the First Amendment’s free exercise clause. Drane was granted leave to proceed in forma
pauperis on November 18, 2025. (ECF No. 4.)
Presently before me is Defendants CCWM, Wells, Pittman, and Styf’s Motion to Dismiss
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 1 (ECF No. 12.) Drane has filed a response titled “Plaintiff’s
Declaration in Support of Response to Motion to Dismiss” (ECF No. 22), and Defendants have
1 Defendant Hanna is not included in the present motion to dismiss as she has not been served and
is no longer employed by CCWM. (ECF No. 13 at PageID.41 n.2.)
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filed a reply.2 (ECF No. 26.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court
GRANT the motion and dismiss this action.3
I. 	Background
CCWM employed Drane as a Foster Care Specialist (FCS). (ECF No. 1 at PageID.5.)
During the weekend of November 25–26, 2023, Drane was scheduled as the on-call FCS. On
November 25, 2023, Drane received a call indicating that a child might need a placement. Drane
relayed this information to Wells, who was a supervisor. (Id.) Drane also told Wells that she
“need[ed] to be in church on Sunday, and that she has obligations in church every Sunday.” (Id.)
Wells responded that Drane should have let her know of the situation “before now.” Drane replied
that Sunday work obligations had never arisen before that weekend on-call work assignment.
Wells then told Drane that “she need[ed] to let her acting Supervisor (Hannah) know first thing on
Monday [] what [her] obligations in [her] church are and when.” (Id.)
2 On February 7, 2026, after Defendants had filed their reply, Drane filed a second response to the
motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 28.) As Drane has already filed a response, I consider the second
response an unauthorized sur-reply, which I will disregard in analyzing the present motion.
3 On January 13, 2026, Drane filed a motion for leave to amend. (ECF No. 21.) In her motion,
Drane characterized the amendment as an amendment as a matter of course under Rule 15(a)(1).
Had Drane been correct, a motion for leave to amend would have been unnecessary. Because
Drane sought to amend more than 21 days after Defendants filed their motion to dismiss, it was
not an amendment as a matter of course, and she was required to obtain leave by filing a motion
or to obtain Defendants’ written consent to the amendment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). On January
14, 2026, I issued an order notifying Drane that she failed to file a separate certificate as required
by Local Civil Rule 7.1(d)(ii) and advising her that the motion for leave to amend would be held
in abeyance for five days pending compliance with Local Rule 7.1(d). The order also stated that
the motion would be dismissed if Drane failed to file the required certificate within that time. (ECF
No. 23.) On January 23, 2026, I dismissed the motion based on Drane’s lack of compliance with
the January 14, 2026 Order. (ECF No. 25.) In spite of her pro se status, Drane is still required to
comply with all applicable rules and orders. See Jackson v. Dep’t of Human Servs., No. 3:09–cv–
38, 2010 WL 3491165, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2010) (“Even though Plaintiff is proceeding
pro se, she is required to follow the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules like any
other party represented by counsel.”).
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On Monday, November 7, 2023, Drane told Hanna about her church obligations and
requested a religious accommodation to attend a Bible study on Thursday afternoons, including a
request to “flex” her time on Thursdays to facilitate her attendance. (Id.) Hanna said that she would
see if that was possible. On December 5, 2023, however, Hanna denied Drane’s scheduling
request. (Id.) On or about December 7, 2023, Drane sent “Defendant 6” an email asking about
CCWM’s policy for requesting religious accommodations. On or about December 15, 2023,
Pittman told Drane that there was an opening for an EFC Specialist, and she wanted Drane to apply
for it. (Id.)
II. 	Motion Standard
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a claim must be dismissed for failure
to state a claim on which relief may be granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to
raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s
allegations are true.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007) (internal citations
and footnote omitted). As the Supreme Court has held, to satisfy this rule, a complaint must contain
“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). This plausibility
standard “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. If the complaint simply “pleads facts that are merely
consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility
of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet that a
court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice. Rule 8 marks a
notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of
a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with
nothing more than conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible
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claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be a
context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. But where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the
court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has
alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Id. at 678–79 (internal citations omitted).
Because Drane is proceeding pro se, her pleading must be construed liberally. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But this standard “is not without its limits, and does not
‘abrogate basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.’” Clark v. Johnston, 413 F. App’x 804, 817 (6th
Cir. 2011) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)). Stated differently,
“[l]iberal construction does not require a court to conjure allegations on a litigant’s behalf.” Erwin
v. Edwards, 22 F. App’x 579, 580 (6th Cir. 2001). To require otherwise “would not only strain
judicial resources . . . but would also transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role
to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful
strategies for a party.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
III. 	Discussion
A. 	First Amendment Claim
Defendants seek dismissal of Drane’s First Amendment claim because they are private, not
state, actors. Although Drane does not cite 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in her complaint, she must bring her
constitutional claim under that statute. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must
allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Dominguez v. Corr. Med. Servs., 555 F.3d 543, 549 (6th Cir. 2009). In general, an
individual who is not a state or public employee cannot be deemed to have acted under color of
state law. Johnson v. Bently, No. 90-5019, 1991 WL 191554, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 1991) (citing
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Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978)). Private actors may be held liable under Section
1983 only if “the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [may] be fairly
attributable to the State.” Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). Here, Drane
alleges no fact indicating that Defendants—a religious organization and its employees—are state
actors.
In order for a private actor to act under color of state law, there must be “a sufficiently
close nexus between the State and the challenged action of [the defendant] so that the action of the
latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102
(6th Cir. 1991) (citing Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974)). Where a defendant
is not a state official or entity, its conduct will be deemed to constitute state action only if it meets
one of three narrow tests. The first is the symbiotic relationship test, or nexus test, in which the
inquiry focuses on whether “the State had so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with the [private party] that it was a joint participant in the enterprise.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357–
58. Second, the state compulsion test describes situations “in which the government has coerced
or at least significantly encouraged the action alleged to violate the Constitution.” NBC v.
Commc'ns Workers of Am., 860 F.2d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 1988); accord Blum v. Yaretsky, 457
U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970). Finally, the public
function test covers private actors performing functions “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of
the State.” Jackson, 419 U.S. at 353; accord West, 487 U.S. at 49–50. See generally Lugar, 457
U.S. at 936–39 (discussing three tests).
Here, Drane alleges no fact indicating that CCWM’s conduct could be fairly attributed to
the State under any of these tests. Even if CCWM receives state and/or federal funding, that fact
is insufficient to characterize its actions as those of the State. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S.
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830, 839 (1982); see also Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1336 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding private
not-for-profit corporation which derived “a significant portion of its funding from the government”
and which leased one of its facilities from the government at nominal cost was not a state actor);
Adams v. Vandemark, 855 F.2d 312, 316 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that the defendant, a non-profit
corporation, was not a state actor even though it was “funded almost entirely by public sources,
and [was] subject to regulation”).
Accordingly, Drane’s First Amendment claim should be dismissed.
B. 	Title VII Individual Employee/Supervisor Liability
Drane was employed by CCWM, and although she has sued CCWM in her Title VII claims,
she has also sued four individual employees/supervisors employed by CCWM. Defendants
contend that these claims fail because the Sixth Circuit has held that employees and supervisors
who do not otherwise qualify as an “employer” cannot be held individually liable under Title VII.
Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400, 404–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Drane’s response (ECF No.
22) fails to address this argument. Regardless, the Sixth Circuit has consistently held that “[a]n
individual cannot be held personally liable for violations of Title VII.” Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689
F.3d 584, 600 (6th Cir. 2012). Because nothing in the complaint indicates that the individual
Defendants qualified as Drane’s employer, the individuals are properly dismissed from this action.
See Hamood v. Trinity Health Corp., No. 2:18-cv-13194, 2021 WL 735789, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb.
25, 2021) (dismissing individual defendants because “Doctors Vettraino and Patel did not employ
Plaintiff, only Trinity did”); Minevich v. Spectrum Health-Meijer Heart Ctr., 1 F Supp. 3d 790,
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800 (W.D. Mich. 2014) (dismissing individual defendants as they were not the plaintiff’s
“employers” as defined by Title VII). 4
C. 	Title VII Claims
Defendants also contend that Drane fails to state a plausible Title VII violation under the
Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard. In her first and second causes of action, Drane alleges that Styf
denied her religious accommodation request, but that it was granted after 101 days. (ECF No. 1 at
PageID.7.) In her fourth and fifth causes of action under Title VII, Drane alleges that Defendants
harassed her in response to a protected act, and she suffered adverse actions, including “sudden
written reprimands, withholding of earnings, bullying and termination within two months of [her]
religious accommodation request.” (Id. at PageID.8.)
Title VII prohibits an employer from “discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . .
discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to h[er] compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s . . . religion[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
“The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee’s .
. . religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s
business.” Id. § 2000e(j). “The heart of the failure-to-accommodate claim is that an employer
discharges (or otherwise discriminates against) an employee for failing a job-related requirement
instead of abiding by its ‘statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the religious
observances’ of its employees.” Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932, 943–44 (6th Cir. 2024)
(quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977)).
4 Although CCWM has not included Defendant Hanna in its motion, the Court is authorized to
dismiss her from this action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
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Defendants contend that Drane fails to allege plausible Title VII discrimination or
retaliation claims because she provides nothing more than conclusions without supporting facts.
They note that Drane even admits that CCWM did not deny her accommodation request but simply
delayed granting it by “101 days.” (Id. at PageID.7.) And, they point out, Drane jumps from her
allegation that she sought to “flex” her schedule on Thursdays to her conclusory allegation that
CCWM “harassed [her] in retaliation” for having requested an accommodation. In short,
Defendants contend that Drane fails support her claims with allegations showing that the alleged
harassment or cited adverse actions were “because of” her request for a religious accommodation.
(ECF No. 13 at PageID.45–46.)
Although Drane is entitled to have her complaint construed liberally, she fails to provide
sufficient factual detail supporting a plausible allegation that CCWM discriminated or retaliated
against her because of her request for a religious accommodation. Drane does not address the
sufficiency of her complaint allegations in her response. Instead, she challenges CCWM’s factual
allegations in its letter to the EEOC responding to Drane’s allegations in her EEOC complaint.
(ECF No. 22 at PageID.65–67.) But CCWM’s response to the EEOC is not focus of CCWM’s
motion to dismiss. Rather, CCWM’s motion to dismiss takes issue with the sufficiency of the
complaint, and Drane fails to provide any persuasive basis to reject CCWM’s contention that the
complaint fails to state a claim under Twombly/Iqbal. Moreover, because Draine fails to address
this issue in her response, she has waived any argument she may have supporting the sufficiency
of her complaint. See Akaazua v. Walker Novak Legal Grp., LLC, No. 19-2183, 2021 WL 4097500,
at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 8, 2021) (“The district court did not err in granting the motions to dismiss filed
by Imperial Valley Properties and MERS because Akaazua’s failure to respond constituted a
waiver of any argument that the dismissal was improper.”); Gomery v. Continental Cas. Co., No.
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1:13-cv-947, 2014 WL 4209648, at *4 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2014) (“Plaintiffs’ failure to respond
to Defendant’s business-enterprise-exclusion argument amounts to a waiver of their argument on
the issue and a fatal omission in this case.”).
III. 	Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, I recommend that the Court grant Defendants’ Motion to
Dismiss (ECF No. 12) and dismiss this action with prejudice.
Dated: February 18, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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