Morales v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
EVANGELINA MORALES,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1472
Honorable Hala Y. Jarbou
OPINION
Petitioner initiated this action on November 17, 2025, by filing a counseled combined
petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and complaint for declaratory and
injunctive relief. (Corr. Pet., ECF No. 2.) Petitioner is a United States Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the North Lake Processing Center located in
Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of her current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: to assume jurisdiction over this action; to enter a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction prohibiting Respondents from transferring Petitioner or any putative
class member outside the jurisdiction of the Court without prior notice and Court approval; to
declare that Petitioner’s and the putative class members’ detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
is unlawful and contrary to the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”), and the Constitution of the United States; to declare that Petitioner and
all class members [who] are or will be detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and therefore are
entitled to individualized bond hearings before a neutral immigration judge, at which the
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government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that continued detention is necessary;
to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and (b)(2), defined as:
All current and future noncitizens detained at the North Lake Processing Center,
the Calhoun County Correctional Center, or any other immigration detention
facility within the Western District of Michigan who: (1) entered the United States
without inspection; (2) have been placed in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a; (3) are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or
post-order detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231; and (4) are or will be detained without
an individualized bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)[;]
to appoint Petitioner as class representative and Petitioner’s counsel as class counsel for the
proposed class; to postpone the effective date of Matter of Yajure-Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216
(BIA 2025), pending final resolution of this case under the APA, 5 U.S.C. § 705, and set aside and
vacate that decision as unlawful under 5 U.S.C. § 706(2); to declare that Respondents’ detention
of class members without bond hearings violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
and the Suspension Clause of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution; to issue a writ
of habeas corpus ordering Respondents to release Petitioner immediately, or in the alternative,
require individualized bond hearings before an immigration judge within seven (7) days of the
Court’s order; to issue class-wide injunctive relief enjoining Respondents from detaining class
members under § 1225(b)(2)(A) without bond hearings and requiring Respondents to provide such
hearings under § 1226(a) for all affected individuals going forward; and to award attorneys’ fees
and costs. (Corr. Pet., PageID.71–72.)
In an order entered on November 20, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to show cause,
within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested on behalf of
the named Petitioner should not be granted. (Order, ECF No. 4.) In accordance with that order,
Respondents filed their response on November 25, 2025 (ECF No. 9), and Petitioner filed her reply
on November 28, 2025 (ECF No. 10). The question of relief on behalf of the named Petitioner is
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therefore ripe for review.1 For the following reasons, the Court will conditionally grant Petitioner’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Background
Petitioner “is a native and citizen of Mexico who has resided continuously in the United
States since 2001.” (Corr. Pet., PageID.44.) She has four children, all of whom are United States
citizens, and two of whom are on the autism spectrum. (Id.) Her children rely upon her for
emotional and financial support. (Id., PageID.44–45.)
On October 28, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by ICE officers without a warrant while
inside her boyfriend’s apartment. (Id., PageID.45.) That same day, the Department of Homeland
Security issued Petitioner a Notice to Appear, charging her as inadmissible under § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)
of the INA on the ground that she is “present in the United States without being admitted or paroled
or . . . arrived in the United States at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney
General.” (Notice to Appear, ECF No. 9-1, PageID.188.) Petitioner was subsequently served with
additional charges of inadmissibility under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) on the ground that she “is not in
possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing card, or other valid
entry document required by the Act, and a valid unexpired passport, or other suitable travel
document, or document of identity as required under the regulations issued by the Attorney
General under section 211(a) of the Act.” (Additional Charges, ECF No. 9-1, PageID.192.)
Petitioner has not been given a bond hearing. (Corr. Pet., PageID.45.)
1 Petitioner’s requests for class certification and for relief on behalf of the proposed class are presently
pending before the Court and will be addressed separately.
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II. 	Habeas Corpus Legal Standard
The Constitution guarantees that the writ of habeas corpus is “available to every individual
detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S.
Const., Art I, § 9, cl. 2). Section 2241 of Title 28 confers the federal courts with the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus to persons “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241. This includes challenges by non-citizens in immigration-
related matters. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001); see also A. A. R. P. v. Trump,
145 S. Ct. 1364, 1367 (2025).
III. 	Exhaustion
Respondents argue that the Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas corpus relief
because Petitioner has not requested a bond hearing before the immigration court and, therefore,
has not exhausted her administrative remedies. (Resp., ECF No. 9, PageID.166.) Respondents
further argue that Petitioner should request a bond hearing and, if necessary, appeal any
unfavorable decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). (Id., PageID.168)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593–94 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144
(1992)). “Courts have described an implied requirement to raise issues with an agency as a ‘judge-
made,’ ‘prudential,’ or ‘common law’ duty to exhaust,” Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan, 937 F.3d
738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply
with statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the Sixth
Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose administrative exhaustion in the context
of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory detention,” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez Torrealba
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v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL 2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25,
2025)), and “[t]he Sixth Circuit has not formally adopted a standard for determining when
prudential exhaustion applies.” Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL
2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied
the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241, 1248 (9th
Cir. 1983) (derived from McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479, 484[ (1971)]; McKart v. United
States, 395 U.S. 185, 193–95[ (1969)),]” to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be
required. Id. Under this three-factor test,
Courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination is
principally a legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that would
be developed if the Court required Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies. Moreover,
this Court is not bound by, and is not required to give deference to, any agency interpretation of a
statute. See Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 144 S. Ct. 2244, 2273 (2024) (discussing that
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“courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply
because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to her detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner, which
are not premised on “correctable procedural errors,” generally do not require exhaustion because
the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See Sterkaj v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th
Cir. 2006) (discussing that “an alien’s due process challenge generally does not require
exhaustion,” but noting that an “alien must raise correctable procedural errors,” such as a claim
“that the BIA denied him due process by relying upon an ‘incomplete and inaccurate’ transcript to
review his case,” “to the BIA”). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of Petitioner’s custody
would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that conclusion based upon the fact
that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that § 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all noncitizens
who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest and detention. Notably, the BIA
recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the United States unlawfully and was
later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to mandatory detention under
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216, 229 (BIA 2025). It is simply
unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA of that denial would lead the Government to
change its position, and thereby obviate the need for judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4
(citations omitted). A court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the
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“legal question is ‘fit’ for resolution and delay means hardship.” Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long
Term Care, Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if
the “pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594
(citation omitted).
Here, given the Government’s position and the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado,
requiring Petitioner to exhaust her administrative remedies and request a bond hearing would likely
be futile. Moreover, it is clear that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. There is no evidence
in the record as to how long Petitioner would have to wait for a bond hearing to be scheduled.
Petitioner’s request would likely be denied given the BIA’s recent decision in Yajure Hurtado.
Then, Petitioner would have the opportunity to appeal any unfavorable decision to the BIA.
Appeals of bond denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” Rodriguez
v. Bostock, 779 F. Supp. 3d 1239, 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (citation omitted). It is “unmistakable
that . . . depriving [Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates
to hardship. And any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.”
See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that exhaustion is warranted, the Court
concludes in the alternative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court will
proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
IV. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2). (See
Corr. Pet., PageID.60–61.) Respondents, however, contend that Petitioner meets every element for
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detention under § 1225(b)(2), and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its
structure and history support Respondents’ interpretation of the statute.” (Resp., ECF No. 9,
PageID.169.)
Section 1225(b)(2)(A) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). And, § 1226(a) states:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained
pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.
Except as provided in subsection (c)[2 ] and pending such decision, the Attorney
General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on—
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,
and containing conditions prescribed by, the Attorney
General; or
(B) conditional parole . . . .
Id. § 1226(a). The plain language of these provisions indicates that both § 1225 and § 1226 govern
the detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The difference is that § 1225 provides
for mandatory detention and § 1226 allows for the release of the noncitizen on conditional parole
or bond. As explained below, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs
Petitioner’s detention.
“A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Hibbs v. Winn,
542 U.S. 88, 101 (2004) (citation omitted); see Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009);
2 Subsection (c) refers to the “[d]etention of criminal aliens,” which does not apply here. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(c). The parties do not contend that Petitioner has been convicted of any crime listed under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A).
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see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir. 2022) (noting that courts “must give effect
to the clear meaning of statutes as written” (citation omitted)). “When interpreting a statute, the
inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In
re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). But, “the ‘meaning—
or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in context.’”
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 486 (2015) (citation omitted). And, “the words of a statute must be
read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-
Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012) (citation omitted). The Court must also “use every tool
at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo,
144 S. Ct. 2244, 2266 (2024).
As set forth above, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention “of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking
admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)
(emphasis added). The INA defines an “applicant for admission” as “[a]n alien present in the
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States” See id. § 1225(a)(1).
The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the lawful entry of the alien into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” See id. § 1101(a)(13).
The word “entry,” is not defined in the INA, see generally id. § 1101, but the dictionary definition
of “entry” is “the right or privilege of entering” or “the act of entering.” Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, 	https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/entry 	(last 	visited 	Dec. 	1, 	2025).
“Entry” has long been understood to mean “a crossing into the territorial limits of the United
States.” Hing Sum v. Holder, 602 F.3d 1092, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Matter of Pierre,
14 I&N Dec. 467, 468 (BIA 1973)). Further, the phrase “seeking admission” is also undefined in
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the statute. The dictionary definition of “seeking” is “ask[ing] for,” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/seeking (last visited Dec. 1, 2025), and the word
“seeking” “necessarily implies some sort of present-tense action.” Martinez v. Hyde, 792 F. Supp.
3d 211, 218 (D. Mass. July 24, 2025) (citations omitted).
Respondents argue that any noncitizen who has not been lawfully admitted, regardless of
whether they are already present and residing in the United States, is “an alien seeking admission”
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225. However, that reading of § 1225 would render the
qualifier “seeking admission” in the statute entirely unnecessary. “It is ‘a cardinal principle of
statutory construction’ that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be
prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.’” TRW Inc. v.
Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citations omitted). Given Congress’s decision to use different
terms in § 1225—i.e., “applicant for admission” and “alien seeking admission”—the Court will
presume that Congress intended these phrases to mean different things. See Pulsifer v. United
States, 144 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2024) (“In a given statute, . . . different terms usually have different
meanings.” (citation omitted)).
Here, Petitioner is not actively seeking to lawfully cross into the territorial limits of the
United States because she already entered the United States over two decades ago, in 2001. (See
Corr. Pet., PageID.44.) As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
explained when addressing this issue:
[S]omeone who enters a movie theater without purchasing a ticket and then
proceeds to sit through the first few minutes of a film would not ordinarily then be
described as “seeking admission” to the theater. Rather, that person would be
described as already present there. Even if that person, after being detected, offered
to pay for a ticket, one would not ordinarily describe them as “seeking admission”
(or “seeking” “lawful entry”) at that point—one would say that they had entered
unlawfully but now seek a lawful means of remaining there. As § 1225(b)(2)(A)
applies only to those noncitizens who are actively “seeking admission” to the
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United States, it cannot, according to its ordinary meaning, apply to [the petitioner],
because he has already been residing in the United States for several years.
Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 25 Civ. 5937 (DEH), 2025 WL 2371588, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13,
2025); see Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *6 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 29, 2025) (“[S]eeking admission’ . . . implies action – something that is currently occurring,
and in this instance, would most logically occur at the border upon inspection.”).
In comparison to § 1225, “[s]ection 1226(a) is less specific.” Pizarro Reyes v. Raycraft,
No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 9, 2025). Section 1226 provides that
“[o]n a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Looking at both § 1225 and § 1226, even if the statutory text appears unambiguous when viewed
in isolation, “courts are to interpret the words of a statute in context.” Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101
(citation omitted); see Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537 (2015) (“The plainness or
ambiguity of statutory language is determined [not only] by reference to the language itself, [but
as well by] the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the
statute as a whole.” (alterations in original) (citations omitted)).
Section 1225 	is 	titled: 	“Inspection 	by 	immigration 	officers; 	expedited 	removal 	of
inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for hearing.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. A title such as this “is
especially valuable [where] it reinforces what the text’s nouns and verbs independently suggest.”
Yates, 574 U.S. at 552 (Alito, J., concurring). Additionally, Congress’s decision to include the
word “arriving,” as well as the decision to include references to methods of physical arrival, such
as “stowaways” and “crewmen,” in § 1225 evidences an intent to address noncitizens arriving “at
a border or port of entry.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5; 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(2)(3). In
contrast, § 1226 is titled: “Apprehension and detention of aliens.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226. “That Congress
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separated removal of arriving aliens[, as set forth in § 1225,] from its more general section for
‘Apprehension and detention of aliens,’ [as set forth in] § 1226, implies that Congress enacted
§ 1225 for a specific, limited purpose.” Pizarro Reyes, 2025 WL 2609425, at *5 (citing Dubin v.
United States, 143 S. Ct. 1557, 1567–68 (2023)).
Further, in Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018), the United States Supreme Court
explained that § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at the Nation’s
borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien seeking to
enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. The United States Supreme Court
stated that, in contrast, “[s]ection 1226 generally governs the process of arresting and detaining
. . . aliens [already living within the United States] pending their removal.” Id. at 288. Thus, in
Jennings, the United States Supreme Court differentiated between noncitizens initially arriving to
the United States who are governed by § 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country who
are governed by § 1226. See id. at 288–89.
The broader language of the statute, as recently amended, further supports the Court’s
conclusion. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe
a subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). If the Court accepted
Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, then § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered entirely
superfluous. See Hibbs, 542 U.S. at 101 (“[W]e follow the cardinal rule that statutory language
must be read in context [since] a phrase gathers meaning from the words around it. . . . [And,] [t]he
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rule against superfluities complements the principle that courts are to interpret the words of a
statute in context.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted)).
Accordingly, for the above-discussed reasons, the Court concludes that § 1226(a), not
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as Petitioner, who have resided in the United States
and were already within the United States when apprehended and arrested.3
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that her detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (See Corr. Pet., PageID.61–63.) Respondents counter Petitioner’s arguments by stating
that Petitioner has received due process because “Petitioner received notice of the charges against
her, has access to counsel, can request bond at that time, has the right to appeal the denial of any
request for bond, and has been detained by ICE for a short time.” (Resp., ECF No. 9, PageID.183.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001) (citation omitted). The Fifth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause extends to all persons, regardless of status. See A. A. R. P. v. Trump, 145 S. Ct.
1364, 1367 (2025). Thus, noncitizens such as Petitioner are entitled to its protections. See id.; see
also Chavez-Acosta v. Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 246837, at *3 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
3 The Court has recently reached the same conclusion in a number of other habeas corpus actions filed by
immigration detainees. See, e.g., Salgado Mendoza v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1252, 2025 WL 3077589, at *6
(W.D. Mich. Nov. 4, 2025); Ruiz Mejia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1227, 2025 WL 3041827, at *5–6 (W.D.
Mich. Oct. 31, 2025); De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1261, 2025 WL 3039266, at *5 (W.D. Mich.
Oct. 31, 2025); Escobar-Ruiz v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-cv-1232, 2025 WL 3039255, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
31, 2025); Marin Garcia v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1271, 2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025);
Cervantes Rodriguez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025);
Puerto-Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025);
Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2025);
Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 17, 2025). And,
this Court is far from the first federal District Court to reach this conclusion.
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Respondents contend that Petitioner is entitled to no further process at this time. (See Resp.
ECF No. 9, PageID.183.) Respondents’ assertion, however, is contradicted by their own
supporting evidence—there is nothing in the record before the Court to suggest that a bond hearing
has been scheduled. Respondents claim further “that statutory provisions denying bond during
administrative removal proceedings do not violate the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause.” (Id., PageID.181
(citation omitted).)
If 	the 	Court 	agreed 	with 	Respondents 	that 	Petitioner’s 	detention is 	governed 	by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), then the Government’s due process argument might carry more weight. However,
as set forth above, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is
governed 	by 	§ 1225(b)(2)(A). 	Instead, 	Petitioner’s 	detention 	is 	governed 	by 	§ 1226(a).
Section 1226(a) clearly sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien
subject to that provision. The statute allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested
alien, or release the alien on “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions 	prescribed 	by, 	the 	Attorney 	General,” 	or 	“conditional 	parole.” 	See 	8 	U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(1)–(2). 	This 	discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an
individualized custody determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See, e.g., United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852–56 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If this court
has previously addressed the due-process claim, then we are bound by precedent; if the claim is an
issue of first impression, then we generally apply the three-factor test the Supreme Court set out
in Mathews v. Eldridge.”). Under Mathews, the Court must consider the following three factors:
“(1) the private interest that will be affected by official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation
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of that interest; and (3) the government’s interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedures entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004)
(citation omitted). The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e.,
“whether a detainee is held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See
Günaydin v. Trump, 784 F. Supp. 3d 1175, 1187 (D. Minn. 2025) (citing Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons,
10 F.4th 19, 28 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d Cir. 2020)). Here,
Petitioner, through counsel, represents that she has four children, all of whom are United States
citizens, and two of whom are on the autism spectrum, and that Petitioner’s detention puts her
family at financial risk. (Corr. Pet., PageID.44–45.) There can be no doubt that she is “experiencing
[many of] the deprivations of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss
of income earning, . . . lack of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of
movement.” See Günaydin, 784 F. Supp. 3d at 1187.
The second Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. An individualized bond
hearing ensures that an immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk or a
danger to the community, reducing the risk that Petitioner will suffer an “erroneous deprivation”
of her rights. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
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2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sep. 9, 2025) (citation omitted). However, Respondents have not
established a significant interest in “detaining someone who [could convince] a neutral adjudicator,
following a hearing and assessment of the evidence, that her ongoing detention is not warranted.”
See id. Furthermore, Respondents have not established that an individualized hearing would
impose 	significant 	“administrative 	or 	financial 	costs” 	in 	this 	case—“[t]o 	the 	contrary,”
Respondents’ position “requires the government to continue funding and overseeing [Petitioner’s]
detention[.]” See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.4
V. 	Suspension Clause Considerations
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the Suspension Clause by “effectively
suspend[ing] the privilege of the writ for an entire category of detainees—those who entered the
United States without inspection, were apprehended in the interior, and are now detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).” (Corr. Pet., PageID.69.) They claim that “individuals are categorically
denied access to any administrative or judicial mechanism for testing the legality of their
detention.” (Id.) Respondents counter that “[t]he Suspension Clause does not apply here.” (Resp.,
ECF No. 9, PageID.185.)
4 Petitioner also claims that her detention give rise to a claim under the APA. (See Corr. Pet., PageID.66–
68.) However, the APA only provides for review of agency action “for which there is no other adequate
remedy in a court . . . .” 5 U.S.C. § 704; see also Trump v. J. G. G., 145 S. Ct. 1003, 1006–07 (2025)
(Kavanaugh, J., concurring). Here, the Court has concluded that the writ of habeas corpus provides an
adequate remedy for Petitioner’s claims that her detention violates both the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause and the INA. Accordingly, “habeas corpus, not the APA, is the proper vehicle here,” see J. G. G.,
145 S. Ct. at 1007 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); the Court declines to consider Petitioner’s APA claims at
this time.
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The Suspension Clause forbids suspension of the writ of habeas corpus “unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2. This
includes in the face of otherwise valid jurisdiction stripping statutes where the Suspension Clause
ensures that “[h]abeas remains available to ensure that no branch of government detains a person
in violation of law. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008):
Here, the parties do not contend that any statute has stripped this Court of jurisdiction to
consider Petitioner’s present request for habeas relief pertaining to her detention. And Petitioner’s
claim that “individuals are categorically denied access to any administrative or judicial mechanism
for testing the legality of their detention” is belied by this Court’s review—and conditional grant—
of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition. Therefore, the Court finds that Petitioner’s claims concerning the
Suspension Clause do not apply to the questions presently before the Court.
VI. 	Proper Respondents
Respondents argue that the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is the only proper Respondent
in this action, and they seek the dismissal of all of the other named Respondents. (Resp., ECF
No. 9, PageID.185–86.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of § 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ “within its jurisdiction”
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
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The Sixth Circuit has concluded “that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the [Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the predecessor to the
present immigration-related agencies,] District Director for the district where he is being
detained—as the respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322
(6th Cir. 2003). Here, Petitioner has named as Respondents the Attorney General of the United
States, the Acting Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, the Secretary of the
United States Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Director of ICE, and the Acting Field
Office Director for the Detroit ICE Field Office.
In Roman v. Ashcroft, the Sixth Circuit stated that although it “conclude[d] that the
immediate custodian rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, . . . [there is] the
possibility of exceptions to this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court explained:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas[ v. Olsen], 194 F. Supp. 2d [368,] 374
[(D.N.J. 2002)]. Aliens remaining in detention for extended periods are often
transferred several times during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp.
2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-
to-day custodian, frequently change when detainees are transferred among INS
facilities, all of which are under the control of the Attorney General.”); . . . . In light
of these transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent
other than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official,
such as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event
of a transfer. Arias–Agramonte[ v. Comm’r], [No. 00 CIV. 2412 (RWS),] 2000 WL
1617999, at *8 [(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000)] (explaining that a petition naming only
one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was transferred to
another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
In light of the foregoing, to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s conditional grant of habeas relief—i.e., the Court’s directive that Petitioner receive a bond
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hearing or, alternatively, be released—in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western
District of Michigan, the Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to the petition
under § 2241. The Court will, however, dismiss the Attorney General of the United States, the
Acting Director of the Executive Office of Immigration Review, and the Acting Director of ICE
as Respondents to the petition for habeas relief. But the Court will not dismiss these officials as
Defendants to Petitioner’s claims for declaratory or injunctive relief under the APA and the
Constitution because the Court has not resolved those claims.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter an order conditionally granting
Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. The Court will order
Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five
business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and order or, in the alternative, immediately
release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order Respondents to file a status report within
six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and judgment to certify compliance with this
opinion and the corresponding order. The status report shall include if and when the bond hearing
occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was denied, the reasons for the denial. Further,
the Court will dismiss the Attorney General of the United States, the Acting Director of the
Executive Office of Immigration Review, and the Acting Director of ICE as respondents to
Petitioner’s § 2241 petition but it will not dismiss them as Defendants to the claims for relief under
the APA or the Constitution.
Dated: December 9, 2025 	/s/ Hala Y. Jarbou
HALA Y. JARBOU
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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