Harmon v. Michigan, State of et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
CASEY HARMON, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-01457
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Jane M. Beckering
U.S. District Judge
v.
STATE OF MICHIGAN, et al.,
Defendants
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Pro se Plaintiff Kent County inmate Casey Harmon filed his civil complaint
alleging 	that 	his 	rights 	were 	violated 	because 	hearsay 	evidence 	was 	used 	in
accordance with Mich. Comp. Laws § 766.11b, during his November 27, 2024
preliminary examination. 	(ECF No. 1.) 	Harmon asserts that this statute, which
allows hearsay evidence to be admitted during a preliminary examination seeking to
determine if probable cause exists, violates his Constitutional due process rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment. 	Plaintiff names as Defendants the State of
Michigan, Prosecutor Lachman, Detective Weston, Judge Ross, and Attorney General
Nessel. Plaintiff seeks damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment.
Plaintiff was granted in forma pauperis status on December 16, 2025. 	(ECF
No. 7.)
II. Standard of Law
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the court must dismiss any action brought in
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forma pauperis if the action is (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id. The court
must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). 	Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a
“probability requirement, . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
In addition, the Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true,
unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S.
25, 33 (1992).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff 	asserts 	that 	during 	his 	preliminary 	examination, 	the 	Medical
Examiner Report was admitted into evidence without the testimony from the Medical
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Examiner who authored the report. 	Michigan law provides that certain hearsay
evidence is allowable during a preliminary examination. 	Mich. Comp. Laws §
766.11b(1). That statute provides:
(1) 	The rules of evidence apply at the preliminary examination
except that the following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay
and 	shall 	be 	admissible 	at 	the 	preliminary 	examination 	without
requiring the testimony of the author of the report, keeper of the records,
or any additional foundation or authentication:
(a) 	A report of the results of properly performed drug analysis
field testing to establish that the substance tested is a controlled
substance.
(b) 	A 	certified 	copy 	of 	any 	written 	or 	electronic 	order,
judgment, decree, docket entry, register of actions, or other record of any
court or governmental agency of this state.
(c) 	A report other than a law enforcement report that is made
or kept in the ordinary course of business.
(d) 	Except for the police investigative report, a report prepared
by a law enforcement officer or other public agency. Reports permitted
under this subdivision include, but are not limited to, a report of the
findings of a technician of the division of the department of state police
concerned with forensic science, a laboratory report, a medical report, a
report of an arson investigator, and an autopsy report.
(2) 	The 	magistrate 	shall 	allow 	the 	prosecuting 	attorney 	or 	the
defense to subpoena and call a witness from whom hearsay testimony
was introduced under this section on a satisfactory showing to the
magistrate that live testimony will be relevant to the magistrate's
decision whether there is probable cause to believe that a felony has
been committed and probable cause to believe that the defendant
committed the felony.
Id.
In addition, there are other ways that a Medical Examiner’s report can be
admissible during a preliminary examination, such as where the Medical Examiner
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was unavailable to testify. Knight v. Davids, No. 2:17-CV-11469, 2019 WL 6339658,
at *14 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 27, 2019). 	And of course, evidence may be admitted where
there exists no objection.
Here, 	Plaintiff 	was 	represented 	by 	counsel 	during 	his 	preliminary
examination, and he admits that his counsel did not object to the admissibility of the
Medical Examiner’s report. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) Plaintiff also attached portions
of the preliminary examination transcript, which confirm that defense counsel stated
that he had “no objection for the prelim purposes” to the Medical Examiner’s report.
(ECF No. 1-7., PageID.16.) The report was admitted for the purpose of showing the
location of the victim’s injury – a gunshot to the head. Id. For this reason, Plaintiff’s
lawsuit is frivolous.
Additionally, Plaintiff is essentially asking the Court to interfere with his state
criminal proceeding. 	“Since the beginning of this country’s history Congress has,
subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases
free from interference by federal courts.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43 (1971).
Generally, federal courts should abstain from deciding a matter that would interfere
with 	pending 	state 	proceedings 	involving 	important 	state 	matters 	unless
extraordinary circumstances are present. 	Id. at 44−55. 	This principle is based on
notions of equity and comity, “and a continuance of the belief that the National
Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform
their separate functions in their separate ways.” Id. at 44. A federal court may raise
abstention sua sponte. O’Neill v. Coughlan, 511 F.3d 638, 641-42 (6th Cir. 2008).
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Younger generally permits a federal court to abstain from considering a
plaintiff's 	claims 	where: 	(1) 	the 	state 	proceedings 	are 	ongoing; 	(2) 	the 	state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the state proceedings afford
an adequate opportunity to raise the federal questions. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm.
v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982). 	Criminal defendants “need be
accorded only an opportunity to fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the
ongoing 	state 	proceedings 	. 	. 	. 	and 	their 	failure 	to 	avail 	themselves 	of 	such
opportunities does not mean that the state procedures were inadequate.” Juidice v.
Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977) (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577 (1973)).
Exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine have been recognized in the
following circumstances: (1) where “the state proceeding is motivated by a desire to
harass or is conducted in bad faith,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 611
(1975); (2) where “[a] challenged statute is flagrantly and patently violative of express
constitutional prohibitions,” Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424 (1979) (quoting
Huffman, 420 U.S. at 611); and (3) where there is “an extraordinarily pressing need
for immediate federal equitable relief,” Kugler v. Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 125 (1975).
These exceptions have been interpreted narrowly. 	Zalman v. Armstrong, 802 F.2d
199, 205 (6th Cir. 1986).
The three factors supporting Younger abstention are present in this case.
First, 	Plaintiff’s 	case 	is 	pending 	in 	state 	court. 	Second, 	Plaintiff’s 	criminal
proceedings 	involve 	important 	state 	interests. 	See 	Younger, 	401 	U.S. 	at 	43
(recognizing that when the state proceeding is criminal in nature, the policy against
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federal interference is “particularly” strong); see also Parker v. Turner, 626 F.2d 1, 8
(6th Cir. 1980) (stating that “Younger established a near-absolute restraint rule when
there are pending state criminal proceedings”). 	Third, the state court proceedings
provide an adequate opportunity for Plaintiff to raise his claims.
In the opinion of the undersigned, Plaintiff’s civil claims, assuming one exists,
are premature. 	Plaintiff’s damage claims are not cognizable until his criminal
proceeding is resolved in his favor. Dismissal without prejudice is appropriate where
the complaint seeks both equitable and legal relief and the Court abstains under the
Younger doctrine. See Schwab v. Wyoming Police Dep’t., 2020 WL 3603283, at *7-8
(W.D. Mich. July 2, 2020) (noting that dismissal without prejudice is an option when
both equitable and legal relief is sought but deciding to stay pending final resolution
of the criminal prosecution).
Finally, there exists additional reasons for the Court to dismiss the individual
Defendants from this lawsuit.
Plaintiff names as Defendant the State of Michigan. 	Regardless of the form
of relief requested, the states and their departments are immune under the Eleventh
Amendment from suit in the federal courts, unless the state has waived immunity or
Congress has expressly abrogated Eleventh Amendment immunity by statute. 	See
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98-101 (1984); Alabama v.
Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978); O’Hara v. Wigginton, 24 F.3d 823, 826 (6th Cir. 1994).
In the opinion of the undersigned, the State of Michigan is entitled to dismissal from
this lawsuit.
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Plaintiff also names Judge Ross as a Defendant. 	Judges are absolutely
immune from a suit for monetary damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9–10 (1991)
(“[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of
justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested in him, shall be free
to act upon his own convictions, without apprehension of personal consequences to
himself.”) (internal quotations omitted); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 254 (6th
Cir. 1997); Barnes v. Winchell, 105 F.3d 1111, 1115 (6th Cir. 1997). Absolute judicial
immunity may be overcome in only two instances. First, a judge is not immune from
liability for non-judicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity.
Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11; see Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229 (1988) (noting that
immunity is grounded in “the nature of the function performed, not the identity of
the actor who performed it”). 	Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though
judicial in nature, that are taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. 	Id. at 12;
Bright v. Gallia Cnty., 753 F.3d 639, 649 (6th Cir. 2014) (recognizing the difference
between an “excess of jurisdiction and the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the
subject matter[,]” and noting that only the latter deprives a judge of judicial
immunity).
Plaintiff’s factual allegations clearly fail to implicate any exceptions to judicial
immunity. The act of conducting a preliminary examination and admitting evidence
during a hearing are clearly judicial and Plaintiff may not sue Judge Ross in this
action.
Plaintiff 	names 	as 	Defendants 	Attorney 	General 	Nessel 	and 	Prosecutor
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Lachman. 	Prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from damages when engaging in
activities “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-431 (1976). Immunity shields against liability
for actions “undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial
proceedings for trial,” which includes the evaluation of the evidence assembled by
police. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 272-273 (1993). 	Adams fails to allege
anything other than that Prosecutor Lachman is prosecuting him for the alleged
crimes. Accordingly, in the opinion of the undersigned, Attorney General Nessel and
Prosecutor Lachman are entitled to immunity.
Additionally, because Plaintiff asserts no factual claims against Detective
Weston, the detective is entitled to dismissal from this action.
III. Recommendation
Accordingly, 	it 	is 	respectfully 	recommended 	that 	the 	Court 	dismiss 	the
complaint.
Dated: 	December 26, 2025 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
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