Crawford #849652 v. Rubley et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
DEJUAN CRAWFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
RAY RUBLEY et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1400
Honorable Maarten Vermaat
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all
matters in this action under the jurisdiction of a United States magistrate judge. (ECF No. 1,
PageID.4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
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Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, 	Plaintiff 	has 	consented 	to 	a 	United 	States 	magistrate 	judge 	conducting 	all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA,, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under
federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint
indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as
true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33
(1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a
claim.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) in Kincheloe, Chippewa County, Michigan. (Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.5.) The events about which he complains occurred at the Bellamy Creek
Correctional Facility (IBC) in Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff named as Defendants in
this case IBC Correctional Officer Ray Rubley, IBC Sergeant Hill, IBC “ADD” Shawn, IBC
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Warden Matthew McCauley, IBC Correctional Officer Troy Allen, and the MDOC. (Id.,
PageID.1, 2.)
Plaintiff alleges that he was assaulted by unnamed correctional officers and put in solitary
confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff asked the unnamed
correctional officers why he was “being placed in the hole,” and the unnamed correctional officers
told Plaintiff it was for “threatening behavior.” (Id.) Plaintiff requests that the Court “help stop the
things that take place in prison.” (Id., PageID.3, 4.)
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d
468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to
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dismissals 	of 	prisoner 	cases 	on 	initial 	review 	under 	28 	U.S.C. 	§§ 1915A(b)(1) 	and
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Defendant MDOC
Plaintiff brings this suit against the MDOC, among several named defendants. As an initial
matter, Plaintiff does not name Defendant MDOC in the body of his complaint. See Gilmore v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff
failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights). And,
Defendant MDOC is subject to dismissal for this reason alone.
Moreover, § 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, the State of Michigan (acting through the
MDOC) is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding a state is not a “person”); Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App’x
922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Will and holding that the MDOC is not a “person.”).
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Defendant MDOC
upon which relief may be granted.
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B. 	Defendants Rubley, Hill, Shawn, McCauley, and Allen
In the instant case, Plaintiff names Defendants Rubley, Hill, Shawn, McCauley, and Allen
as Defendants; however, these Defendants are not named in the body of Plaintiff’s complaint, and
the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint do not specify who committed the alleged acts.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1, 2.)
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544 (holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must
make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named
as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even
under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore, 92 F. App’x at 190;
Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002) (dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the
complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity which of the named defendants were
personally involved in or responsible for each alleged violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery,
No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal
involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v. Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th
Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against those individuals are without a basis in law as the
complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to them which would suggest their involvement in the
events leading to his injuries”).
Here, Plaintiff does not name any Defendants in the body of his complaint. (See Compl.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit “has consistently
held that damage claims against government officials arising from alleged violations of
constitutional rights must allege, with particularity, facts that demonstrate what each defendant did
to violate the asserted constitutional right.” Heyne v. Metro. Nashville Pub. Sch., 655 F.3d 556,
564 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 684 (6th Cir. 2008)). And,
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“[s]ummary reference to a single, five-headed ‘Defendants’ does not support a reasonable
inference that each Defendant is liable for retaliation.” Boxill v. O’Grady, 935 F.3d 510, 518 (6th
Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). Plaintiff refers only to “C/Os” as an unnamed group in his complaint,
and this is insufficient to show that any of the named Defendants were personally involved in the
alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. Because Plaintiff’s claims falls far short of
the minimal pleading standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), his complaint is subject to dismissal for
failure to state a claim.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold any of the named Defendants liable due
to their supervisory positions, government officials, may not be held liable for the unconstitutional
conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676; Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A
claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v.
Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir.
2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon
the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368
F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a
supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in
a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the
minimum required to constitute active conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
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interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995)); Walton v. City of Southfield,
995 F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that any Defendants encouraged or
condoned the conduct of their subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
their conduct.
Accordingly, for these reasons, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are subject to
dismissal for failure to state a claim.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Plaintiff’s
complaint will be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an
appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons the Court
concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court also concludes that any issue
Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445
(1962). Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	June 5, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge
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