Martin #794831 v. Michigan Department of Corrections et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
CHRISTIEN D. MARTIN,
Plaintiff,
v.
MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1348
Honorable Maarten Vermaat
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court
will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action
under the jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.8.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is required to conduct this initial
review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131,
1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997).
Service of the complaint on the named defendants is of particular significance in defining a
putative defendant’s relationship to the proceedings.
“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in litigation unless
notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by formal process.” Murphy Bros.,
Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 347 (1999). “Service of process, under
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longstanding tradition in our system of justice, is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a
named defendant.” Id. at 350. “[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in
that capacity, only upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That is, “[u]nless
a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to function as the sine qua non
directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil action or forgo procedural or substantive
rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA, by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s
claims before service, creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the
proceeding—the plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette
Cnty. Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court
screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was made upon any of
the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting all
proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that “[u]pon the consent
of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may conduct any or all
proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the
named Defendants have not yet been served, the undersigned concludes that they are not presently
parties whose consent is required to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under
the PLRA, in the same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this
opinion. See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain a
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consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they were not parties
to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal
law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2),
1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they
are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).
Applying these standards, the Court will partially dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure
to state a claim as detailed below.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC)
at the St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF) in St. Louis, Gratiot County, Michigan. The events
about which he complains, however, occurred at the Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility (IBC) in
Ionia, Ionia County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues the following 15 Defendants: 	the MDOC, IBC
Corrections Officer Collin Pratt, IBC Corrections Officer Matthew Donahue, IBC Sergeant
Derek Serritos, IBC Corrections Officer Jesse Nelson, IBC Corrections Officer Aaron Shattuck,
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir. 2017)
(concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to proceed before a
United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context matters” and the context the
United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy Bros. was nothing like the context of a
screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c));
Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for
the definition of “parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to its meaning
in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of ‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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IBC Corrections Officer Danon Neustifter, IBC Corrections Officer James Crandell, IBC
Lieutenant Unknown Rowland, IBC Corrections Officer Tyler Moreno, IBC Corrections Officer
Richard Van Hoose, IBC Corrections Officer Gilbert Mendez, IBC Corrections Officer James
Burch, IBC Corrections Officer Mitchell Jones, and IBC Corrections Officer Phillip Burton.
(Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1–4.)
Plaintiff sues all IBC Defendants in their official and personal capacities. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that on April 20, 2024, while he was “in restraints” on the ground,
Defendants Pratt and Donahue “started to knee [him] and punch [him] with close[d] fist[s] multiple
times.” (Id., PageID.5.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Moreno and Pratt kicked, punched,
and “threw [him] up against the glass.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nelson then told
Plaintiff that he would “kick [Plaintiff’s] face and kill [him].” (Id.) Plaintiff further alleges that
Defendant Nelson kneed and punched Plaintiff while he was “not moving at all or not resisting
and [he] was doing everything the CO staff told [him] to do.” (Id.)
According to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendants Shattuck and Neustifter then arrived at the
incident and “started to knee [him] and punch [him] while in restraints and [he] was not moving
[his] legs or body.” (Id.) Plaintiff then alleges Defendant Nelson put his boot over Plaintiff’s head
and asked CO Donahue: “[C]an I stomp his head in and kill him[?]” (Id., PageID.6.)
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Crandell and Van Hoose came to the incident and
“started to punch and knee [him].” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants Rowland, Mendez,
Burch, Crandell, Burton and Jones came to the area, and “all these staff were punching [him] and
striking [him] with knees.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges throughout his complaint that he was “complying
[with] all request[s] from staff,” “never resisting at any time,” and was “doing everything the CO
staff told [him] to do.” (Id., PageID.5–6.)
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Plaintiff alleges that he sustained injuries resulting from the incident. The injuries included
bruises to his face and head (id., PageID.5.), a concussion, (id.) and a dislocated right shoulder.
(Id., PageID.6.)
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff avers that Defendants’ use of force was
excessive and violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to “ensure [his] safety” and a transfer to a different MDOC facility.
Plaintiff further seeks punitive and compensatory damages.
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
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(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
III. 	Analysis
A. 	Defendant MDOC
Plaintiff names the MDOC as a Defendant. (Compl., ECF No. 1, PageID.1.) As an initial
matter, Plaintiff does not name Defendant MDOC in the body of his complaint. See Gilmore v.
Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir. 2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff
failed to allege how any named defendant was involved in the violation of his rights). Defendant
MDOC is subject to dismissal for this reason alone.
Moreover, § 1983 expressly requires that a named defendant be a “person.” See Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, the State of Michigan (acting through the
MDOC) is not a “person” within the meaning of § 1983. See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989) (holding a state is not a “person”); Parker v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 65 F. App’x
922, 923 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Will and holding that the MDOC is not a “person.”).
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff fails to state any claim against Defendant MDOC
upon which relief may be granted.
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B. 	Defendant Serritos
Plaintiff lists Defendant Serritos, a Sergeant at IBC, as a Defendant in this action; however,
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing how Defendant Serritos was personally involved in the
violation of his constitutional rights. (See generally Compl., ECF No. 1.)
It is a basic pleading essential that a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular
defendants. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–61 (2007) (holding that, in order
to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a defendant fair notice of the
claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation of specific conduct, the
complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction afforded to pro se complaints.
See Gilmore, 92 F. App’x at 190; Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged
violation of rights).
Here, Plaintiff does not name Defendant Serritos in the body of his complaint. (See
generally Compl., ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Serritos therefore fall far short
of the minimal pleading standards under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are
subject to dismissal. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) (requiring “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”).
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to hold Defendant Serritos liable due to his
supervisory position, government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct
of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability. Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009); Monell, 436 U.S. at 691; Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir.
2009). A claimed constitutional violation must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th
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Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based
upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532 F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis,
368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004). Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because
a supervisor denied an administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained
in a grievance. See Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly summarized the minimum required to constitute active
conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300);
see also Copeland v. Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995); Walton v. City of Southfield, 995
F.2d 1331, 1340 (6th Cir. 1993).
Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Serritos encouraged or
condoned the conduct of his subordinates, or authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
their conduct.
Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Serritos will be
dismissed for failure to state a claim.
C. 	Eighth 	Amendment 	Excessive 	Force 	Claims 	Against 	Defendants 	Pratt,
Donahue, Nelson, Shattuck, Neustifter, Crandell, Rowland, Moreno, Van
Hoose, Mendez, Burch, Jones, and Burton
Plaintiff claims that the force used by Defendants Pratt, Donahue, Nelson, Shattuck,
Neustifter, Crandell, Rowland, Moreno, Van Hoose, Mendez, Burch, Jones, and Burton was
excessive. Plaintiff claims that these Defendants, in sum, punched him and used knee strikes while
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he was in restraints and “complying [with] all request[s] from staff.” (Compl., ECF No. 1,
PageID.5.)
As relevant to excessive force claims, the Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of
confinement which, although not physically barbarous, “involve the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain.” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 183 (1976)). Among unnecessary and wanton inflictions of pain are those that are
“totally without penological justification.” Id. However, not every shove or restraint gives rise to
a constitutional violation. Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). “On occasion, ‘[t]he maintenance of prison security and
discipline may require that inmates be subjected to physical contact actionable as assault under
common law.’” Cordell v. McKinney, 759 F.3d 573, 580 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Combs v.
Wilkinson, 315 F.3d 548, 556 (6th Cir. 2002)). Prison officials nonetheless violate the Eighth
Amendment when their “offending conduct reflects an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.”
Williams v. Curtin, 631 F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Pelfrey v. Chambers, 43 F.3d 1034,
1037 (6th Cir. 1995)); Bailey v. Golladay, 421 F. App’x 579, 582 (6th Cir. 2011).
There is a subjective component and an objective component to Eighth Amendment claims.
Santiago v. Ringle, 734 F.3d 585, 590 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693,
702 (6th Cir. 2001)). First, “[t]he subjective component focuses on the state of mind of the prison
officials.” Williams, 631 F.3d at 383. Courts ask “whether force was applied in a good-faith effort
to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm.” Hudson, 503 U.S.
at 7. Second, “[t]he objective component requires the pain inflicted to be ‘sufficiently serious.’”
Williams, 631 F.3d at 383 (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). The objective
component requires a “contextual” investigation that is “responsive to ‘contemporary standards of
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decency.’” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 8 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976)). Although
the extent of a prisoner’s injury may help determine the amount of force used by the prison official,
it is not dispositive of whether an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred. Wilkins v. Gaddy,
559 U.S. 34, 37 (2010). “When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause
harm, contemporary standards of decency always are violated . . . [w]hether or not significant
injury is evident.” Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9.
At this early stage in the proceedings, the Court must take Plaintiff’s factual allegations as
true and in the light most favorable to him. Therefore, at this time, the Court will not dismiss
Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against Defendants Pratt, Donahue, Nelson,
Shattuck, Neustifter, Crandell, Rowland, Moreno, Van Hoose, Mendez, Burch, Jones, and Burton.
Conclusion
The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2). Having
conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that Defendants MDOC and
Serritos will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b),
and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Pratt,
Donahue, Nelson, Shattuck, Neustifter, Crandell, Rowland, Moreno, Van Hoose, Mendez, Burch,
Jones, and Burton remain in the case.
An order consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	May 29, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
Maarten Vermaat
United States Magistrate Judge
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