Tietz v. Meoli

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
NICOLE MARIE TIETZ,
Plaintiff,
v.
MARCIA R. MEOLI,
Defendant.
______________________________________/
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:25-cv-1279
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Nicole Marie Tietz, the debtor in the currently pending bankruptcy matter
captioned In re Nicole Marie Tietz, No. 25-1454 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.), filed a petition for writ of
mandamus on October 22, 2025, against Marcia R. Meoli, the Chapter 7 Trustee in Tietz’s
bankruptcy case, compelling the Trustee to accept and perform the terms of Tietz’s so-called
private trust. (ECF No. 1.) According to Tietz, on September 3, 2025, Tietz gave the Trustee an
Appointment and Assignment with instructions as to the administration of a trust, of which Tietz
is the alleged beneficiary. Tietz attaches her instructions as Exhibit A to her petition. She alleges
that on September 17, 2025, the Trustee filed a statement with the bankruptcy court indicating that
she had completed administration of the estate, without confirming that she had performed the
instructions in the Appointment and Assignment that Tietz had given her. Tietz requests that the
Court issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Trustee to perform the Appointment and
Assignment in accordance with Tietz’s instructions.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that Tietz’s petition be DISMISSED
for lack of jurisdiction.
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The writ of mandamus has been abolished by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 81(b). Fed.
R. Civ. P. 81(b). However, “[r]elief previously available through [writs of mandamus] may be
obtained by appropriate action or motion under these rules.” Id. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1651, the All
Writs Act, federal courts are granted the authority to issue “all writs necessary or appropriate in
aid of their respective jurisdictions,” including writs in the nature of mandamus. In re Sutton, 652
F.3d 678, 679 (6th Cir. 2011). The statute provides district courts with the power and authority to
enter such orders as may be necessary to enforce and effectuate their own orders and judgments.
Haggard v. Tennessee, 421 F.2d 1384, 1385 (6th Cir. 1970).
Tietz does not seek relief related to an order or judgment of this Court. Instead, she seeks
mandamus relief in the form of an order compelling the Trustee to perform specific acts and
comply with alleged duties owed to Tietz in the bankruptcy proceeding. Congress has provided a
limited grant of mandamus jurisdiction to district courts “to compel an officer or employee of the
United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.” 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
“[T]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked only in extraordinary situations.” Allied
Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 34 (1980). To obtain relief under this statute, an
individual must establish that she has a clear right to relief and that a federal employee has a clear,
nondiscretionary duty to act. See Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S. 602, 616–17 (1984). The issuance
of mandamus relief is not automatic. “Even if the test is met, the district court still retains the
discretion to deny relief.” Johnson v. Reilly, 349 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2003).
To ensure that a writ of mandamus is issued only in extraordinary circumstances, the party
seeking the writ must satisfy two conditions. First, the petitioner must “have no other adequate
means to attain the relief [s]he desires.” Allied Chem. Corp., 449 U.S. at 35 (citation omitted);
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). Second, the petitioner must “satisfy the
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burden of showing that [her] right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” Id. (citing
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384 (1953)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See also In re Post-Newsweek Stations, Michigan Inc., 722 F.2d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 1983). Tietz
fails to meet either of these requirements.
First, Tietz does not argue in her petition that she has no other adequate means to attain the
relief she desires. Regarding mandamus, “jurisdiction to entertain a petition for its issuance cannot
exist unless the plaintiff colorably demonstrates either that [s]he has exhausted all other avenues
of relief, or that further exhaustion should be excused.” Willis v. Sullivan, 931 F.2d 390, 395–96
(6th Cir. 1991) (quoting Slone v. Secretary of H.H.S., 825 F.2d 1081, 1083 (6th Cir. 1987)). Here,
Tietz fails colorably to demonstrate that she has exhausted all other avenues of relief. For example,
she fails to allege that she raised the issue with the bankruptcy court or is precluded from doing
so. Although Tietz claims her rights are equitable in nature, she does not allege why she cannot
seek an order from the bankruptcy court enforcing those rights.
Tietz also fails to show that her right to issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.
Historically, mandamus is an extraordinary remedial process awarded only in the
exercise of sound judicial discretion. Before such a writ may issue, it must appear
that the claim is clear and certain and the duty of the officer involved must be
ministerial, plainly defined, and peremptory. Huddleston v. Dwyer, 10 Cir., 145
F.2d 311. The duty sought to be exercised must be a positive command and so
plainly prescribed as to be free from doubt. Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie,
281 U.S. 206, 50 S. Ct. 320, 74 L. Ed. 809.
Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe of Indians v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1966). Tietz
falls far short of demonstrating that her right to relief is based on a positive command and so plainly
prescribed as to be free from doubt.1
1 In support or her petition, Tietz merely alleges that Meoli, as the Chapter 7 Trustee, holds “a
fiduciary position in trust.” Whether a Trustee owes a fiduciary duty to a debtor appears to be an
unresolved issue in the Sixth Circuit. See In re Munn, No. 92-1287, 1992 WL 198526, at *1 (6th
Cir. Aug. 18, 1992) (noting that “the trustee does not owe a fiduciary duty to the debtor; the
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Accordingly, I recommend that the Court dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, or alternatively, for lack of merit.
Date: October 29, 2025 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
trustee’s duty is to the estate”) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323; In re Bashour, 124 B.R. 52, 54 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1991)); but see New Prods. Corp. v. Tibble (In re Modern Plastics Corp.), 577 B.R.
270, 278 (W.D. Mich. 2017) (stating that the trustee “owes a fiduciary duty both to the debtor and
to the creditors as a group”) (citing Germain v. Connecticut Nat’l Bank, 988 F.2d 1323, 1330 n.8
(2d Cir. 1993)). The existence and/or performance of a bankruptcy trustee’s fiduciary duty can
hardly be said to be a basis for relief that is plainly prescribed and free from doubt.
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