De Jesus Ramirez v. Noem et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
IRWIN DAVID DE JESUS RAMIREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KRISTI NOEM et al.,
Respondents.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1261
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
Petitioner Irwin David De Jesus Ramirez initiated this action on October 17, 2025, by filing
a 	counseled 	combined 	petition 	for 	writ 	of 	habeas 	corpus 	pursuant 	to 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 2241 and complaint for emergency injunctive relief. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1.) Petitioner is a
United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) detainee currently detained at the
North Lake Processing Center located in Baldwin, Lake County, Michigan.
Petitioner challenges the lawfulness of his current detention and asks the Court for the
following relief: accept jurisdiction over this action; order Respondents not to transfer Petitioner
out of the Western District of Michigan while these proceedings are pending to preserve
jurisdiction and access to counsel; declare that Respondents’ actions to detain Petitioner violate
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Immigration and Nationality Act; to issue
a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering Respondents to immediately release
Petitioner because the immigration court already ruled it has no jurisdiction over Petitioner’s bond;
and to award attorneys’ fees and costs for this action. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.18–19.)
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In an order (ECF No. 3) entered on October 21, 2025, the Court directed Respondents to
show cause, within three business days, why the writ of habeas corpus and other relief requested
by Petitioner should not be granted. Respondents filed their response (ECF No. 4) on October 24,
2025. Petitioner filed his reply (ECF No. 5) on October 29, 2025. For the following reasons, the
Court will grant Petitioner’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Petitioner “is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States at an unknown
date, time and place without being inspected and admitted or paroled by immigration officials.”
(Hughley Decl. ¶ 4, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.120.) Petitioner avers that he “has been present in the
United States since summer of 1996, when he was about six months old.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No.
1, PageID.1.) Petitioner indicates that he “graduated high school and is eligible to apply for
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals. He is also the survivor of an aggravated crime and is in
the process of applying for a U visa.” (Id., PageID.2.)
Respondents state that on September 24, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner “after encountering
him at a traffic stop performed by the Indiana State Police in Lowell, Indiana.” (Hughley Decl.
¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.121.) Petitioner, however, states that he was “detained while working
for a moving company. He was a passenger in the moving truck when Indiana State Police
interrogated him at a weigh station, not a traffic stop, and handed him over to” ICE.” (§ 2241 Pet.,
ECF No. 1, PageID.2.)
ICE served Petitioner with a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, charging him with
inadmissibility pursuant to § 212(a)(6)(A)(i)(I) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
because Petitioner was an “immigrant who is present in the United States without having been
admitted or paroled, or who arrived at a time or place not designated by the Attorney General.”
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(Hughley Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.122.) ICE also charged Petitioner with inadmissibility
under § 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the INA for “being an immigrant who, at the time of application for
admission, is not in possession of valid immigration and travel documents.” (Id.) ICE detained
Petitioner “without bond under INA § 235 because [Petitioner] is seeking admission and he is not
clearly and beyond doubt entitled to admission.” (Id. ¶ 6.)
Petitioner is “currently in removal proceedings on the detained docket before the Detroit
Immigration Court.” (Id. ¶ 7.) On September 29, 2025, Petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion
for bond redetermination with the immigration court. (ECF No. 1-5.) On October 7, 2025,
Petitioner, through counsel, submitted a request for parole, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 212.5(b), to the
Deputy Field Office Director of the ICE Detroit Field Office. (ECF No. 1-4.) Petitioner and his
attorney appeared before the Detroit Immigration Court for a bond hearing on October 16, 2025.
(Hughley Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.122.) The immigration judge denied Petitioner’s request
for a change in custody status on the basis that he had “[n]o jurisdiction.” (ECF No. 1-6.) Petitioner
reserved his right to appeal that decision, and any appeal must be filed with the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) by November 17, 2025. (Hughley Decl. ¶ 8, ECF No. 4-1,
PageID.122.)
On October 22, 2025, Petitioner and his attorney appeared before the Detroit Immigration
Court. (Id. ¶ 9.) The hearing was continued until November 25, 2025, for attorney preparation, at
Petitioner’s request. (Id.)
II. 	Exhaustion
Respondents first contend that this Court should deny Petitioner’s request for habeas
corpus relief because Petitioner has not exhausted his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 6,
PageID.54.) Specifically, Respondents argue that Petitioner “has the right to appeal the denial of
his bond motion in Immigration Court to the [BIA] until November 17, 2025.” (ECF No. 4,
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PageID.100.) Petitioner asserts that exhaustion is not required for petitions brought under § 2241.
(ECF No. 5, PageID.125.) Petitioner avers further that exhaustion would be “futile at this
juncture.” (Id., PageID.124.)
Here, no applicable statute or rule mandates administrative exhaustion by Petitioner. Thus,
whether to require exhaustion is within this Court’s “sound judicial discretion.” See Shearson v.
Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 593 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145
(1992)). This discretion is referred to as “prudential” exhaustion, Island Creek Coal Co. v. Bryan,
937 F.3d 738, 746 (6th Cir. 2019), and such a court-made exhaustion rule must comply with
statutory schemes and Congressional intent, Shearson, 725 F.3d at 593–94. Notably, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has not yet decided “whether courts should impose
administrative exhaustion in the context of a noncitizen’s habeas petition for unlawful mandatory
detention.” See Pizzaro Reyes v. Raycraft, No. 25-cv-12546, 2025 WL 2609425, at *3 (E.D. Mich.
Sept. 9, 2025) (citing Hernandez v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:25-cv-1621, 2025 WL
2444114, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2025)). However, courts within the Sixth Circuit “have applied
the three-factor test, set forth in United States v. California Care Corp., 709 F.2d 1241 (9th Cir.
1983), to determine whether prudential exhaustion should be required.” See Lopez-Campos v.
Raycraft, No. 2:25-cv-12486, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 29, 2025). Thus,
courts may require prudential exhaustion when:
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate a proper
record and reach a proper decision;
(2) relaxation of the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the
administrative scheme; and
(3) administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes
and to preclude the need for judicial review.
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Id. (citing Shweika v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 1:06-cv-11781, 2015 WL 6541689, at *12
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2015)).
Upon consideration of these factors, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion should
not be required in Petitioner’s case. First, the central question presented by Petitioner’s § 2241
petition is whether 8 U.S.C. § 1225 or 8 U.S.C. § 1226 applies to Petitioner. That determination
relies upon a purely legal question of statutory interpretation and does not require the record that
would be developed should the Court require Petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Moreover, this Court is not bound by and is not required to give deference to any agency
interpretation of a statute. See Loper Bright Enter. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 413 (2024) (noting
that “courts need not and under the [Administrative Procedure Act (APA)] may not defer to an
agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous”).
Second, Petitioner’s constitutional challenge to his detention does not require exhaustion.
The Sixth Circuit has noted that due process challenges, such as the one raised by Petitioner here,
generally do not require exhaustion because the BIA cannot review constitutional challenges. See
Sterkaj v. Gonzalez, 439 F.3d 273, 279 (6th Cir. 2006). Finally, it is doubtful that BIA review of
Petitioner’s custody would preclude the need for judicial review. The Court reaches that
conclusion based upon the fact that the Government has clearly set forth its belief that
§ 1225(b)(1)(A) applies to all aliens who have resided within the United States prior to their arrest
and detention. Notably, the BIA recently proclaimed that any individual who has ever entered the
United States unlawfully and was later detained is no longer eligible for bond and is subject to
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216,
229 (2025). It is simply unlikely that any administrative review by the BIA would lead to the
Government changing its position and precluding judicial review of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that prudential exhaustion is not
required.
Alternatively, even in situations where a court may ordinarily apply prudential exhaustion,
the court may still choose to waive exhaustion. See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *4. A
court may choose to rule upon the merits of the issues presented when the “legal question is fit for
resolution and delay means hardship.” See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc., 529
U.S. 1, 13 (2000) (citation omitted). A court may also waive exhaustion if the “pursuit of
administrative remedies would be a futile gesture.” Shearson, 725 F.3d at 594 (citation omitted).
Here, there is no question that delay would result in hardship to Petitioner. Appeals of bond
denials “typically take six months or more to be resolved at the BIA.” See Rodriguez v. Bostock,
779 F. Supp. 3d 1239. 1245 (W.D. Wash. 2025). As set forth above, Petitioner is scheduled to
appear before the immigration court for a master calendar hearing on November 25, 2025.
However, the record is silent as to when Petitioner will be scheduled for his final merits hearing.
It is possible that a determination from the BIA as to whether Petitioner is entitled to bond would
come before any final decision regarding removal. Nevertheless, it is unmistakable that “depriving
[Petitioner] of his liberty while awaiting a BIA appeal decision certainly equates to hardship. And
any delay results in the very harm [Petitioner] is trying to avoid . . . – detention.” See Lopez-
Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *5.
In sum, the Court declines to enforce the doctrine of prudential exhaustion against
Petitioner. Moreover, even if the Court were to conclude that prudential exhaustion is warranted,
the Court concludes in the alterative that waiver of exhaustion is appropriate. Accordingly, the
Court will proceed to address the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition.
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III. 	Merits Discussion
A. 	Statutory Basis for Petitioner’s Detention
Petitioner contends that Respondents have violated the INA by concluding that Petitioner
is detained pursuant to the mandatory detention provisions set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2).
(§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.18.) According to Petitioner, noncitizens who “previously entered
the country and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in
removal proceedings” are detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “and are eligible for release on
bond, “unless they are subject to § 1225(b)(1), § 1226(c), or § 1231.” (Id.) Respondents, however,
contend that Petitioner “unambiguously meets every element for detention under § 1225(b)(2),”
and that “even if the text of § 1225(b)(2) were ambiguous, its structure and history support the
agency’s interpretation of the statute.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.102.)
In order to address the parties’ arguments, this Court must engage in principles of statutory
interpretation. “A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions.” Corey v.
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see also Kentucky v. Biden, 23 F.4th 585, 603 (6th Cir.
2022 (noting how courts “must give effect to the clear meaning of statutes as written”). When
engaging in statutory interpretation, the Court’s “inquiry ‘begins with the statutory text, and ends
there as well if the text is unambiguous.’” See In re Vill. Apothecary, Inc., 45 F.4th 940, 947 (6th
Cir. 2022) (quoting Binno v. Am. Bar Ass’n, 826 F.3d 338, 346 (6th Cir. 2016)). But, “the
‘meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or phrases may only become evident when placed in
context.’” Id. (quoting FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000)).
“The words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.” Roberts v. Sea-Land Servs., Inc., 566 U.S. 93, 101 (2012). This Court must also
“use every tool at [its] disposal to determine the best reading of the statute.” Raimondo, 603 U.S.
at 400.
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With these principles in mind, the Court begins with the language of the statutes in
question. Section 1225(b)(2)(a) provides that “in the case of an alien who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(a). An “applicant for admission” is
defined as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the
United States.” See id. § 1225(a)(1). The INA further defines “admission” and “admitted” as “the
lawful entry of the alien into the United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration
officer.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13). Section 1226(a), on the other hand, states that “[o]n a warrant
issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on
whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents argue that Petitioner “unambiguously is an ‘applicant for admission’ under
the plain text of [§ 1225] because he is a noncitizen, he was not admitted to the United States, and
he was present in the United States when he was apprehended.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.103 (citing 8
U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1); Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 140 (2020)).
Respondents assert further that because “Petitioner has not agreed immediately to depart, logically
he must be seeking to remain—a legal action that requires ‘admission,’ i.e., a lawful entry.” (Id.,
PageID.105.) Respondents also argue that “applicant for admission” presumptively “characterizes
all unlawfully present noncitizens as applying for admission until they are either removed or
successfully obtain a lawful entry, regardless of their subjective intent.” (Id.) Essentially,
Respondents assert that § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates the detention of any noncitizen who is “present”
in the United States and who has not been lawfully admitted. However, for the reasons discussed
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below, this Court agrees with the numerous other courts in the country that have concluded that
Respondents’ interpretation of the statute is too broad.
As set forth supra, § 1225(b)(2)(A) provides for the detention of an “alien seeking
admission” after an “examining immigration officer” determines that the alien “is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.” In this Court’s opinion, the phrase “seeking admission”
refers to an action that is currently occurring and that would occur at the United States’ border
when the alien is being inspected. Here, under the facts and circumstances of Petitioner’s case, an
“examining immigration officer” did not make a determination as to whether Petitioner was not
clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted when Petitioner came into the United States at
some point in 1996. Instead, Respondents state that on September 24, 2025, ICE arrested Petitioner
“after encountering him at a traffic stop performed by the Indiana State Police in Lowell, Indiana.”
(Hughley Decl. ¶ 5, ECF No. 4-1, PageID.121.) Petitioner, however, states that he was “detained
while working for a moving company. He was a passenger in the moving truck when Indiana State
Police interrogated him at a weigh station, not a traffic stop, and handed him over to” ICE.”
(§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) Regardless of whether the incident was a traffic stop, the fact
remains that Petitioner was not crossing the border when he was arrested and detained.
Granted, Petitioner states that he is currently in the “process of applying for a U visa.”
(§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) There is nothing in the record before the Court, however,
suggesting when Petitioner initiated this process. Thus, there is nothing in the record currently
before the Court to suggest that Petitioner ever attempted to gain lawful status in the United States
before being apprehended and detained.
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to aliens
undergoing inspection, which generally occurs at the United States’ border, when they are seeking
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lawful entry into the United States. Thus, because the record clearly shows that Petitioner resided
in the United States for approximately 29 years before being arrested and detained, there is simply
no logical reason to interpret § 1225(b)(2)(A) as applying to Petitioner given that Petitioner was
not actively “seeking admission” during those 29 years.
Unlike § 1225(b)(2)(A), section 1226(a) provides that, when dealing with “apprehension
and detention of aliens,” the Attorney General may issue a warrant and “arrest[] or detain[] [an
alien] pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” See 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a). Here, § 1226(a) clearly applies to Petitioner’s situation—Petitioner was
apprehended during a stop of his company vehicle, arrested, and detained. Petitioner has been
detained pending removal proceedings before an immigration judge; thus, under § 1226(a), the
Attorney General has discretion to either detain or release Petitioner on bond or conditional parole.
This language clearly allows the alien to request a bond redetermination by an immigration
judge—which is exactly what Petitioner did at his hearing before the immigration judge on
October 16, 2025.
This Court’s conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s clarification that sections
1225 and 1226 apply in different circumstances. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281 (2018).
As the Jennings Court noted, § 1225 is part of the “process of decision [that] generally begins at
the Nation’s borders and ports of entry, where the Government must determine whether an alien
seeking to enter the country is admissible.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 287. Section 1226, however,
applies to the process of “arresting and detaining” aliens who are already living within the United
States but are still subject to removal. See id. at 287. Thus, in Jennings, the Supreme Court
differentiated between noncitizens arriving to the United States, who are, therefore, governed by
§ 1225, and noncitizens already present in the country and are, accordingly, governed by § 1226.
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Moreover, the Court cannot ignore Congressional intent when conducting statutory
analysis. Recently, Congress passed the Laken Riley Act, which amended § 1226 to prescribe a
subset of noncitizens who are exempt from the discretionary bond analysis. Specifically, the Act
added a subsection that explicitly mandates detention for those noncitizens who are inadmissible
under §§ 1182(a)(6)(A), 1182(a)(6)(C), and 1182(a)(7), and who have been arrested for, charged
with, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E). Quite simply, were the Court
to agree with Respondents’ interpretation of §§ 1225 and 1226, § 1226(c)(1)(E) would be rendered
entirely superfluous.
The Court concludes that § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs noncitizens, such as
Petitioner, who have resided in the United States for many years and were already within the
United States when apprehended and arrested. The reading of the pertinent statutes clearly supports
this conclusion. This Court has recently reached the same conclusion in five other habeas corpus
matter filed by detainees at the North Lake Processing Center. See Marin Garcia v. Noem, No.
1:25-cv-1271, 2025 WL 3017200, at *5 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Cervantes Rodriguez v.
Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1196, 2025 WL 3022212, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2025); Puerto-
Hernandez v. Lynch, No. 1:25-cv-1097, 2025 WL 3012033, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 28, 2025);
Rodriguez Carmona v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1131, 2025 WL 2992222, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 24,
2025); Sanchez Alvarez v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-1090, 2025 WL 2942648, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct.
17, 2025). Moreover, this Court is far from the first federal district court to reach this conclusion. 1
1 See, e.g., Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *8; see also Rodriguez, 779 F. Supp. 3d at 1256–
61; Singh v. Lewis, No. 4:25-cv-96-RGJ, 2025 WL 2699219, at *3–5 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 22, 2025);
Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, No. EP-25-CV-337-KC, 2025 WL 2691828, at *7–12 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 22,
2025); Campos Leon v. Forestal, 1:25-cv-1774-SEB-MJD, 2025 WL 2694763, at *2–5 (S.D. Ind.
Sept. 22, 2025); Hasan v. Crawford, No. 1:25-cv-1408 (LMB/IDD), 2025 WL 2682255, at *5–9
(E.D. Va. Sept. 19, 2025); Garcia Cortes v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-2677-CNS, 2025 WL 2652880, at
*2–3 (D. Colo. Sept. 16, 2025); Kostak v. Trump et al., No. 3:25-cv-01093-JE-KDM, 2025 WL
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Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s case is governed by § 1226(a), and he
is subject to the discretionary bond determination set forth therein.
B. 	Fifth Amendment Due Process Considerations
Petitioner also argues that his detention violates the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.16.) Petitioner avers that there is “no credible argument”
that he “cannot be safety released back to his community and family.” (Id., PageID.17.) He
contends that the Government had deprived him “of his liberty by refusing him the opportunity to
request a bond hearing before the Immigration Court, considering . . . an Immigration Judge ruled
he had no jurisdiction to adjudicate his bond request.” (Id., PageID.16–17.) According to
Petitioner, “[b]y issuing its decision in Matter of Yajure Hurtado, the BIA has taken nearly all
bond authority away from Immigration Judges.” (Id., PageID.17–18.) Respondents counter
Petitioner’s arguments by stating that Petitioner “admits that he entered the country without
inspection and evaded detection for nearly three decades.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.117.) Respondents
aver further that Petitioner is not entitled to any further due process because Petitioner “received
notice of the charges against him, has access to counsel, may appear before an immigration judge,
2472136, at *2–4 (W.D. La. Aug. 27, 2025); Romero v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11631-BEM, 2025 WL
2403827, at *8–13 (D. Mass. Aug. 19, 2025); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 0:25-cv-03142-SRN-SGE,
2025 WL 2374411, at *9–16 (D. Minn. Aug. 15, 2025); dos Santos v. Noem, No. 1:25-cv-12052-
JEK, 2025 WL 2370988, at *6–9 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2025); Lopez Benitez v. Francis, No. 1:25-
cv-05937-DEH, 2025 WL 2371588, at *3–9 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2025); Rosado v. Figueroa, No.
2:25-cv-02157-DLR, 2025 WL 2337099, at *6–11 (D. Ariz. Aug. 11, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 2349133 (D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2025); Gomes v. Hyde, No. 1:25-
cv-11571-JEK, 2025 WL 1869299, at *6–8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025). This is just a representative
sampling of the various federal district courts that have reached the same conclusion as this Court.
In his reply, Petitioner has provided an “overall sample of recent [district courts] that have all
disagreed with Respondents’ interpretation and have subsequently granted relief to habeas
petitions.” (ECF No. 5, PageID.129–131.)
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has requested bond, has the right to appeal the denial of his request for bond, and has been detained
by ICE for less than six weeks.” (Id.)
“Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of
physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause] protects.” See
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extends
to all persons, regardless of status. See A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605 U.S. 91, 94 (2025). Thus,
noncitizens such as Petitioner are entitled to its protections. See id.; see also Chavez-Acosta v.
Garland, No. 22-3045, 2023 WL 236837, at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 18. 2023).
Granted, if this Court agreed with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), the Government’s due process argument might hold true. However, as set forth
supra, this Court does not agree with Respondents that Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). Instead, Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a). Section 1226(a) clearly
sets forth a discretionary framework for detention or release of an alien subject to that provision.
The statute explicitly allows the Attorney General to continue to detain the arrested alien, or release
the alien with either “bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing conditions
prescribed by, the Attorney General,” or “conditional parole.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1), (2). This
discretionary 	framework 	“requires 	a 	bond 	hearing 	to 	make 	an 	individualized 	custody
determination.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9.
The Sixth Circuit has held that the balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), regarding the adequacy of process, applies in the context of immigration detention.
See United States v. Silvestre-Gregorio, 983 F.3d 848, 852 (6th Cir. 2020). Thus, under Mathews,
this Court must consider the following three factors: “(1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the government’s
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interest, including the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedures
entail.” See Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379, at *9 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The first Mathews factor clearly weighs in favor of Petitioner. There is no dispute that
Petitioner has a significant private interest in avoiding detention, as one of the “most elemental of
liberty interests” is to be free from detention. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004).
The Court may also consider Petitioner’s conditions of confinement, i.e., “whether a detainee is
held in conditions indistinguishable from criminal incarceration.” See Günaydin v. Trump, No. 25-
CV-01151 (JMB/DLM), 2025 WL 1459154 at *7 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025) (citing Hernandez-
Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 27 (1st Cir. 2021); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 851 (2d
Cir. 2020)). Petitioner, through counsel, represents that he lives with his mother and siblings in
Chicago, Illinois. (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) He argues that his detention puts him and
his family “at risk without his support.” (Id.) In the request for bond redetermination filed with the
immigration court, Petitioner represented that he is “the father of a U visa applicant.” (ECF No. 1-
5, PageID.90.) In the request for parole, Petitioner stated that he “has been acting as a paternal
figure for his young sister, who is a U.S. citizen, considering their father is not in the picture.”
(ECF No. 1-4, PageID.30.) Petitioner also mentioned that he “has been undergoing intense testing
because of pain in one of his legs,” and that doctors recently “mentioned they would like to
continue testing him for a rare form of bone cancer due to some concerning results.” (Id.,
PageID.29.) Here, Petitioner is now detained at a processing center that is located in a different
state from his family, and there can be no doubt that he is “experiencing [many of] the deprivations
of incarceration, including loss of contact with friends and family, loss of income earning, . . . lack
of privacy, and, most fundamentally, the lack of freedom of movement.” See Günaydin, 2025 WL
1459154 at *7.
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Likewise, the second Mathews factor weigh in Petitioner’s favor, Clearly, there is a high
risk of erroneously depriving Petitioner of his freedom should he not receive an individualized
bond hearing at which the immigration judge can assess whether Petitioner poses a flight risk
and/or a danger to the community.
Finally, under the third Mathews factor, the Court recognizes that the Government “does,
indeed, have a legitimate interest in ensuring noncitizens’ appearance at removal proceedings and
preventing harms to the community.” See Sampiao v. Hyde, No. 1:25-cv-11981-JEK, 2025 WL
2607924, at *12 (D. Mass. Sept. 9, 2025). However, on the record before the Court, Respondents
have not shown that it has a significant interest in Petitioner’s continued detention. Notably,
continuing to enforce Petitioner’s detention would likely impose more costs upon the Government,
as it would be required to continue funding and overseeing Petitioner’s detention. See id.
In sum, the Court’s balancing of the Mathews factors weighs in Petitioner’s favor.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s current detention under the mandatory detention
framework set forth in § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due process rights.
IV. 	Prohibition on Transfer
Petitioner requests that the Court order Respondents “not to transfer Petitioner out of the
Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these proceedings to preserve jurisdiction
and access to counsel.” (§ 2241 Pet., ECF No. 1, PageID.19.)
“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the
person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” Braden v. 30th Jud. Circuit Ct.
of Ky., 410 U.S. 494–95 (1973). Thus,
[r]ead literally, the language of [§] 2241(a) requires nothing more than that the court
issuing the writ have jurisdiction over the custodian. So long as the custodian can
be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’
requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim,
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or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself
is confined outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
Id. at 495.
The Sixth Circuit has “concluded that a detained alien generally must designate his
immediate custodian—the INS District Director for the district where he is being detained—as the
respondent to his habeas corpus petition.” Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 2003).
Here, Petitioner has named Robert Lynch, the ICE Field Office Director, and Kristi Noem,
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, as Respondents. Respondents request that
Secretary Noem be dismissed because “only the Detroit ICE Field Office Director is a proper
respondent in this case.” (ECF No. 4, PageID.118.)
In Roman, the Sixth Circuit stated that while it “conclude[d] that the immediate custodian
rule generally applies to alien habeas corpus petitioners, [there is] the possibility of exceptions to
this rule.” Roman, 340 F.3d at 322. The Roman court went on to note:
Some courts are also willing to make an exception to the immediate custodian rule
in other extraordinary circumstances. For example, courts have noted the INS’s
ability, as a practical matter, to deny aliens any meaningful opportunity to seek
habeas corpus relief simply by transferring aliens to another district any time they
filed a habeas corpus petition. Chavez–Rivas, 194 F. Supp. 2d at 374. Aliens
remaining in detention for extended periods are often transferred several times
during their detention. See Lee v. Ashcroft, 216 F. Supp .2d 51, 55 (E.D.N.Y.2002)
(“[T]he location of custody, and the identity of the day-to-day custodian, frequently
change when detainees are transferred among INS facilities, all of which are under
the control of the Attorney General.”); Rosenbloom, supra, at 549. In light of these
transfers, one court reasoned that an alien may properly name a respondent other
than his immediate custodian because a petition naming a higher level official, such
as the Attorney General, could be adjudicated without interruption in the event of
a transfer. Arias–Agramonte, 2000 WL 1617999, at *8 (explaining that a petition
naming only one’s immediate custodian would be dismissed when the alien was
transferred to another local district).
Id. at 325–26. Thus, the Sixth Circuit concluded, “an exception might be appropriate if the INS
were to exercise its transfer power in a clear effort to evade an alien’s habeas petitions.” Id. at 326.
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In light of the foregoing, the Court declines to enter an order directing Respondents not to
transfer Petitioner out of the Western District of Michigan during the pendency of these
proceedings. However, in order to ensure that Respondents maintain authority to enforce this
Court’s grant of habeas relief and directive that Petitioner receive a bond hearing or, alternatively,
be released in the event that Petitioner is transferred out of the Western District of Michigan, the
Court will not dismiss Secretary Noem as a Respondent to these proceedings.
V. 	Summary
As the Eastern District of Michigan recently stated, “[t]he recent shift to use the mandatory
detention framework under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) is not only wrong but also fundamentally unfair.
In a nation of laws vetted and implemented by Congress, we don’t get to arbitrarily choose which
laws we feel like following when they best suit our interests.” Lopez-Campos, 2025 WL 2496379,
at *10. For the reasons set forth above, the Court disagrees with Respondents that Petitioner’s
detention is governed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) and, therefore, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory
detention. Instead, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s detention is governed by § 1226(a) and,
therefore, that Petitioner is entitled to a discretionary and individualized bond determination as set
forth in that statute. Likewise, the Court finds that because Petitioner’s detention is governed by
§ 1226(a), his current detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) violates Petitioner’s Fifth Amendment due
process rights.
Although Petitioner requests immediate release from detention, as set forth above,
§ 1226(a) provides that an alien may be released on either bond or conditional parole. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1226(a)(2). In light of the statute, the Court concludes that it is more prudent to direct that
Petitioner receive an individualized bond determination, and that the immigration judge is in the
better position to evaluate whether Petitioner poses a flight risk and a danger to the community.
Accordingly, the Court leaves to the immigration judge’s sound discretion a determination on that
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issue. However, in the alternative, the Court will direct that Petitioner be immediately released if
Respondents choose not to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing within the time period set forth
below.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will enter an order and judgment granting
Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (ECF No. 1.) The
Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)
within five business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and accompanying order and judgment
or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody. The Court will also order
Respondents to file a status report within six business days of the date of this Court’s opinion and
accompanying order and judgment to certify compliance with this opinion. The status report shall
include if and when the bond hearing occurred, if bond was granted or denied, and if bond was
denied, the reasons for the denial.
Dated: 	October 31, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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