Ritchard v. Sniegowski et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
CHARLES RITCHARD,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-01236
SUSAN SNIEGOWSKI, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Deperno’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF
No. 6); Defendant Sebolt’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12); Defendant Moeggenberg’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17); Defendants Henry and West Michigan Process Servers’
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24); Defendant Peterson’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 28);
Defendants Bizon, Erickson, Mast, Miller, Oceana County Board of Commissioners,
Sniegowski, and Walker’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46); Defendant Jordan’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 49); and Defendant Repocast’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 52).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Defendants’
motions be granted and this action terminated.
BACKGROUND
On October 14, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this action against fifteen Defendants.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.3-5). In his Complaint, Plaintiff lists several U.S. codes and
Constitutional amendments as a basis for federal question jurisdiction. (ECF No. 1,
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
1 of 20

-2-
PageID.6). Plaintiff asserts claims against each Defendant in separate affidavits
attached to his form complaint, which are addressed in further detail below. (ECF
No. 1).
Plaintiff states the following under the “relief” section of his form complaint:
The damages have been substantial in terms of lost time, stress, cancer,
personal reputation, professional reputation, lack of attentiveness as
husband, lack of focus as grandfather, unable to write as a journalist on
state of political corruption across state, unable to attend political events
across the state (resulting in an inability to report on events), and unable
to attend events and respond to support needs of family in terms of
shuttling and attending grandkids events.
(ECF No. 1, PageID.7).
All fifteen Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF Nos. 6,
12, 17, 24, 28, 46, 49, 52). Plaintiff responded to the motions to dismiss of Defendants
Henry and West Michigan Process Servers; Defendants Bizon, Erickson, Mast, Miller,
Sniegowski, and Walker; and Defendants Peterson and Jordan. (ECF Nos. 66, 68, 70).
The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 7.2(d).
LEGAL STANDARDS
I. Rule 12(b)(1)
“A Rule 12(b)(1) motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction can challenge the
sufficiency of the pleading itself (facial attack) or the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction (factual attack).” Cartwright v. Garner, 751 F.3d 752, 759 (6th Cir. 2014)
(citing United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.1994)). As the Sixth Circuit
has instructed:
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
2 of 20

-3-
A factual attack challenges the factual existence of subject matter
jurisdiction. In the case of a factual attack, a court has broad discretion with
respect to what evidence to consider in deciding whether subject matter
jurisdiction exists, including evidence outside of the pleadings, and has the
power to weigh the evidence and determine the effect of that evidence on
the court’s authority to hear the case.
Cartwright, 751 F.3d at 759-60 (citing Ritchie).
District courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in civil cases “arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. A claim arises
under federal law if “a federal question is presented on the face of [a] plaintiff's properly
pleaded complaint.” Matthews v. Centrus Energy Corp., 15 F.4th 714, 720 (6th Cir.
2021) (alteration in original) (quoting Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987)). “The ‘arising under’ gateway into federal court . . . has two distinct paths: 1)
‘litigants whose causes of action are created by federal law,’ and 2) ‘state-law claims
that implicate significant federal issues.’ ” See Estate of Cornell v. Bayview Loan
Servicing, LLC, 908 F.3d 1008, 1012 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted). “Where
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff has the
burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.” Moir v. Greater
Cleveland Reg'l Transit Auth., 895 F.2d 266, 269 (6th Cir. 1990).
II. Rule 12(b)(5)
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a defendant may move to
dismiss an action for “insufficient service of process.” “A Rule 12(b)(5) motion
challenges the mode of serving the summons and complaint.” Rose v. Bersa, 327 F.R.D.
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
3 of 20

-4-
628, 632 (S.D. Ohio 2018). The plaintiff bears the burden of proof in determining
whether the summons and complaint were properly served on the defendant. See
Metropolitan Alloys Corp. v. State Metals Indus., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 561, 563 (E.D.
Mich. 2006). Moreover, “actual knowledge and lack of prejudice cannot take the place
of legally sufficient service.” LSJ Inv. Co. v. O.L.D., Inc., 167 F.3d 320, 324 (6th Cir.
1999).
The requirements for service of process are set forth in Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, but the federal rules expressly allow a plaintiff to effectuate
service in accord with the law of the state in which the district court sits. FED. R. CIV.
P. 4(e)(1). The Michigan Rules of Civil Procedure provide that individual service may
be effectuated by (1) delivering a summons and a copy of the complaint to the defendant
personally; or (2) sending a summons and copy of the complaint by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested, and delivery restricted to the addressee. MICH. CT. R.
2.105(A). Service is effectuated against a limited liability company by (1) delivering a
summons and a copy of the complaint on the managing member, the non-member
manager, or the resident agent; or (2) delivering a summons and a copy of the complaint
on a member or other person in charge of an office or business establishment of the
limited liability company and sending a summons and a copy of the complaint by
registered mail, addressed to the registered office of the limited liability company.
MICH. CT. R. 2.105(H)(1)-(2).
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
4 of 20

-5-
III. Rule 12(b)(6)
A claim must be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted unless the “[f]actual allegations [are] enough to raise a right for relief above
the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true.”
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007). As the Supreme Court has
held, to avoid dismissal, a complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted
as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). This plausibility standard “is not akin to a ‘probability
requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” If the complaint simply pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a
defendant’s liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of
‘entitlement to relief.’ ” Id. As the Court further observed:
Two working principles underlie our decision in Twombly. First, the tenet
that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a
complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice . . . Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock
the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions. Second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for
relief survives a motion to dismiss . . . . Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief will, as the Court of Appeals observed, be
a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its
judicial experience and common sense. But where the well pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not “show[n]”—“that the
pleader is entitled to relief.”
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
5 of 20

-6-
Id. at 678-79 (internal citations omitted).
ANALYSIS
I. 	Defendants Deperno, Sebolt, and Moeggenberg
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff asserts the following. (ECF No. 1).
Defendant Deperno committed “multiple felonies under Michigan and [f]ederal law” and
that, specifically, when Defendant Judge Sniegowski “issued a retaliatory action without
due process resulting in illegal search and seizure,” Defendant Deperno was an “affirmed
accomplice to these actions” under 18 U.S.C. § 2. (ECF No. 1-5, PageID.26).
Plaintiff was named as a witness for Defendant Sebolt’s wife in their divorce
proceedings. (ECF No. 1-7, PageID.33; ECF No. 1-6, PageID.30). Defendant Deperno,
on behalf of Defendants Sebolt and Moeggenberg, “file[d] a cease-and-desist order” to
“prevent [his] speaking against [Defendant Sebolt] on behalf of Mr. Sebolt’s wife,”
violating state and federal “witness tampering” statutes, MCL § 750.122 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512. (Id.). Plaintiff asserts that Defendants Deperno, Sebolt, and Moeggenberg
committed federal “mail fraud” because they “used the mail to threaten [him]” in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876 and that “they contrived to restrain [his] speaking,” which
constituted “a RICO [Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations] charge” under
18 USC §§ 1961-1968. (Id.). Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants Sebolt and
Moeggenberg, “with others,” “depriv[ed] [Plaintiff] of [his] civil liberties.” (Id.).
Finally, Plaintiff generally asserts that these Defendants “violated federal and state laws
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
6 of 20

-7-
depriving [him] of civil rights under the US Constitution and under the color of law” in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 241, 18 U.S.C. § 242, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id.).
Defendants Deperno, Sebolt, and Moeggenberg argue that Plaintiff’s allegations
against them fail under Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 7, PageID.92-102;
ECF No. 13, PageID.230-45; ECF No. 18, PageID.374-87). The Court agrees.
Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proving jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
because he points to sections of the state and federal criminal codes that do not provide
private causes of action. See Kordan v. Rigg, No. 21-CV-11419, 2021 WL 3612293, at
*2 (E.D. Mich. July 23, 2021) (“ ‘18 U.S.C. § 2[:] . . . there is no private right of action
under this statute.’ ”); see also Rutkofske v. Anderson, No. 1:22-CV-955, 2022 WL
16847680, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 10, 2022) (dismissing a claim because there is no
private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 876); see also West v. Landau, No. 25-10420,
2025 WL 1108259 at *4 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 14, 2025) (no private cause of action under 18
U.S.C. § 1512); see also United States v. Oguaju, 76 F. App’x 579, 581 (6th Cir. 2003) (no
private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242); see also Ssayed v. W. Michigan
Univ., No. 1:12-CV-797, 2013 WL 3277139, at *3 (W.D. Mich. June 27, 2013) (Michigan
criminal statutes generally do not provide private cause of action and M.C.L. § 750.122
is no exception where the plaintiff did not argue in support of inferring a private right of
action). Notably, to the extent the complaint cites sections of the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1968, namely the civil remedies provision, Plaintiff would have to be a “person
injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
7 of 20

-8-
chapter . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Plaintiff’s complaint does not cite Section 1962, nor
does it raise allegations pertinent to that statutory provision.
Plaintiff’s claims also fail under Rule 12(b)(6). Though the Court construes the
complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and draws all reasonable inferences in
his favor, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants Deperno and Sebolt are legal conclusions
“masquerading as factual conclusions,” which do not suffice. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555;
Mezibov v. Allen, 411 F.3d 712, 716 (6th Cir. 2005). Plaintiff’s affidavits comprising his
complaint contain many overlapping factual allegations and extraneous details. The
complaint’s repetitiveness makes it difficult to ascertain the factual allegations of
unconstitutional conduct against each of the defendants. “The Court and defendants
should not have to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud to identify the allegations at
issue or to link allegations to specific defendants.” Dorie v. Vellanti, No. 2:22-CV-10217,
2022 WL 1695766, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 26, 2022) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). For example, in his affidavit against Defendant Deperno, Plaintiff states,
“since a jury trial was requested with specific duties of the jury and the judge did not
occur, this is a lack of due process and violation of the 7th, 5th, and 14th amendment[s].”
(ECF No. 1-5, PageID.27).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges a civil conspiracy claim under Section 1983, such a
claim “requires (1) a single plan existed, (2) that defendants shared in a general
conspiratorial objective to deprive plaintiffs of their constitutional rights, and (3) an
overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused injury to
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
8 of 20

-9-
plaintiffs.” Siefert v. Hamilton Cty., 951 F.3d 753, 767-68 (6th Cir. 2020) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). “[A] claim for civil conspiracy under § 1983 exists only
where the plaintiff has established a separate and actionable constitutional
injury.” Rapp v. Dutcher, 557 F. App’x 444, 450 (6th Cir. 2014). Beyond Plaintiff’s
conclusory statement that his “civil rights” were violated, there is no allegation as to how
Defendants Deperno, Sebolt, and Moeggenberg were in collusion in violation of Plaintiff’s
“civil rights.” (ECF No. 1-6, PageID.30). There is also no allegation that they agreed
to deprive Plaintiff of his “civil rights.” (Id.). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts
sufficient to support a viable claim upon which relief may be granted, and these claims
should be dismissed.
II. Defendants Henry and West Michigan Process Servers
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Henry “illegally use[d] the LEIN system” to find
out which vehicle was Plaintiff’s wife’s to seize it but that “Judge Sniegowski's order did
not include [his] wife’s vehicle and Mr. Henry, along with West Michigan Process
Servers, committed grand larceny and Mr. Henry used a computer in committing a crime
and stalking under MCL 750.411h.” (ECF No. 1-9, PageID.39). Plaintiff also asserts
that, “[s]ince Mr. Henry and West Michigan Process Servers were working directly with
Judge Sniegowski, they are subject to violating civil rights under the Color of Law, 18
USC 241, 18 USC 242, and 42 USC 1983.” (ECF No. 1-9, PageID.40).
Plaintiff further alleges that, “[i]n the affidavit by West Michigan Process Servers,
in 2024, there were several statements made that were patently untrue and one which
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
9 of 20

-10-
is a direct violation of both state and federal statutes.” (ECF No. 1-8, PageID.36).
According to Plaintiff, the affidavit stated that he was home but would not answer the
door, it listed his “vehicle and license number[s],” and stated that an Amazon package
was on the doorstep although “Amazon does not deliver in [his] area.” (ECF No. 1-8,
PageID.36-37). Plaintiff asserts that “the fact that the West Michigan Process Server
handled the packages is a violation of both state and federal law” and that, “since Judge
Sniegowski contracted with the West Michigan Process Servers to perform some level of
service[,] and because Judge Sniegowski is ultimately responsible, any illegal act by the
West Michigan Process Servers are also attributed to Judge Sniegowski” under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2. (ECF No. 1-8, PageID.37).
Defendants Henry and West Michigan Process Servers move to dismiss under
Rules 12(b)(1), (4), (5), and (6). (ECF No. 24, PageID.503). Specifically, Defendant
Henry argues that Plaintiff improperly attempted service “by certified mail without
restricted delivery.” (Id.). Defendant West Michigan Process Servers argues that
Plaintiff did not serve the resident agent and alternatively did not serve “the office and
by mail as required if not served by the resident agent” and that Plaintiff served “a non-
existent legal entity” because its correct name is “West Michigan Process Service LLC.”
(Id.).
“A challenge to the form of process under Rule 12(b)(4) must identify substantive
deficiencies in the summons, complaint or accompanying documentation.” Jackson v.
Michigan, No. 22-13150, 2023 WL 4996586, at *1 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2023) (quotation
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
10 of 20

-11-
marks and citation omitted). The plaintiff is responsible for serving the summons and
complaint within the time allowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). See FED. R.
CIV. P. 4(c)(1). Under Rule 4(m),
[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is
filed, the court—on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must
dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good
cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an
appropriate period.
“[E]ven in the absence of good cause, Rule 4(m) permits courts to exercise discretion to
extend the time for service as an alternative to dismissal.” Jackson v. Michigan, No. 22-
13150, 2023 WL 4996586, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 14, 2023) (quotation marks, alterations,
and citations omitted). In determining whether to exercise its discretion, the Court
considers the following factors:
(1) whether an extension of time would be well beyond the timely service of
process; (2) whether an extension of time would prejudice the defendant
other than the inherent prejudice in having to defend the suit; (3) whether
the defendant had actual notice of the lawsuit; (4) whether the court’s
refusal to extend time for service substantially prejudices the plaintiff, i.e.,
would the plaintiff's lawsuit be time-barred; (5) whether the plaintiff had
made any good faith efforts to effect proper service of process or was diligent
in correcting any deficiencies; (6) whether the plaintiff is a pro se litigant
deserving of additional latitude to correct defects in service of process; and
(7) whether any equitable factors exist that might be relevant to the unique
circumstances of the case.
Staub v. Nietzel, No. 22-5384, 2023 WL 3059081, at *10 (6th Cir. Apr. 24, 2023) (quoting
Oakland Physicians Med. Ctr., 44 F.4th at 569). The Court recognizes that, “[w]hen the
correct defendant is served, but the complaint identifies the party by the wrong name,
the proper remedy, upon the defendant’s objection, is to amend the pleading to correct
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
11 of 20

-12-
the misnomer.” Bowden v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc., No. 10-12972, 2012 WL
628543, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2012). But Plaintiff’s lack of service of process under
Rule 12(b)(5) is dispositive; and his claims also fail under Rules (12)(b)(1) and (6).
Accordingly, the factors support dismissal over an extension.
As stated above, Plaintiff’s lack of service of process under Rule 12(b)(5) is
dispositive. Defendants asserts that Plaintiff attempted to serve them by regular mail.
(ECF No. 24, PageID.503). Plaintiff bears the burden of proof of service but fails to
address his lack of service in his response to Defendants’ motion, instead reasserting the
merits of his claims. (ECF No. 69, PageID.1222-26). Regular mail is insufficient to
effectuate service on an individual under MICH. CT. R. 2.105(A), see Reid v. Martinrea
Fabco Hot Stampings, Inc., No. 11-13521, 2012 WL 479118, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 14,
2012) (“Service of process by mail on an individual without return receipt requested is
insufficient under Michigan law.”), and on a limited liability company under MICH. CT.
R. 2.105(H)(1)-(2), see Temple v. Sector 7 LLC, 730 F. Supp. 3d 681, 682-83 (E.D. Mich.
2024) (“Certified mail is not sufficient service of process on a corporation or an LLC under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Michigan Court Rules.”). Accordingly, it is
undisputed that Defendants Henry and West Michigan Process Servers have not been
properly served and should be dismissed from this action.
Regardless, Plaintiff’s claims also fail under Rule 12(b)(1) and (6). Plaintiff fails
to meet his burden of proving jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because he points to
sections of the state and federal criminal codes that do not provide private causes of
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
12 of 20

-13-
action. See Kordan, No. 21-CV-11419, 2021 WL 3612293, at *2 (“ ‘18 U.S.C. § 2[:]
. . . there is no private right of action under this statute.’ ”); see also Oguaju, 76 F. App’x
at 581 (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or 242); see also Ssayed, No.
1:12-CV-797, 2013 WL 3277139, at *3 (Michigan criminal statutes generally do not
provide private cause of action).
Further, under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
Plaintiff’s claims fail to identify which “state and federal law[s]” Defendants Henry and
West Michigan Process Servers allegedly violated and are difficult to decipher as the
claims are largely irrelevant factual allegations and legal conclusions. To the extent
that Plaintiff asserts a Section 1983 civil conspiracy claim against Defendants Henry,
West Michigan Process Servers, and Judge Sniegowksi, there is no allegation as to how
these Defendants were in collusion in violation of Plaintiff’s “civil rights.” (ECF No. 1-
9, PageID.40). There is also no allegation that they agreed to deprive Plaintiff of his
“civil rights.” (Id.). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants fail and
should be dismissed.
III. Defendants Peterson and Jordan
In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he attempted to deliver two
“Citizen Arrest Warrant[s]” to the Michigan State Police Hart Post on September 15,
2025, for Defendants Deperno and Judge Sniegowski. (ECF No. 1-12, PageID.49). The
desk officer and his supervisor refused to sign the documents but received them “for
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
13 of 20

-14-
review.” (ECF No. 1-12, PageID.49-50). Plaintiff asserts that the “policies and
actions” of Defendants Peterson and Jordan, as the supervisors of these officers, “violated
[Plaintiff’s] civil rights” under 18 U.S.C. § 242, the First Amendment, and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. (ECF No. 1-12, PageID.50). Defendants Peterson and Jordan argue that
Plaintiff fails to state a claim against them. (ECF No. 29, PageID.551-56; ECF No. 50,
PageID.984-91). In response, Plaintiff reasserts the claims from his complaint. (ECF
No. 68, PageID.1209-12).
Plaintiff points to 18 U.S.C. § 242 of the federal criminal code, which does not
provide a private cause of action. See Oguaju, 76 F. App’x at 581. Further, a plaintiff
alleging a violation of Section 1983 must claim (1) that he suffered the deprivation of a
right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and (2) that the
deprivation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Simescu v. Emmet
County Dept. of Social Servs., 942 F.2d 372, 374 (6th Cir. 1991). If either element is
missing, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim will not prevail. Christy v. Randlett, 932 F.2d
502, 504 (6th Cir. 1991). Plaintiff, seemingly to misunderstand Michigan’s citizen’s
arrest statute, see MCL § 764.16, fails to assert a cognizable claim under the First
Amendment. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to allege facts sufficient to support viable
claims upon which relief may be granted, and these claims should be dismissed.
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
14 of 20

-15-
IV. Oceana County Defendants (Judge Sniegowski; Deputy Clerk Miller;
Sheriff Mast; Prosecutor Bizon; and the Oceana County Board of County
Commissioners, Vice-Chair Erickson and Chair Walker)
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Judge Sniegowski arise from her judicial role
in presiding over state court proceedings in which Plaintiff was a party. (ECF No. 1-1,
PageID.11-14). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Judge Sniegowski’s judicial rulings
were unconstitutional, and he characterizes them as retaliatory and criminal. (Id.).
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Miller improperly rejected filings and failed to
provide notice of hearings in violation of his civil rights. (ECF No. 1-2, PageID.16-18).
Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Sheriff Mast never called him back or served the
“Citizen Arrest Warrant[s]” for Defendants Deperno and Judge Sniegowski that Plaintiff
dropped off at the Sheriff’s Office on September 15, 2025. (ECF No. 1-3, PageID.20-21).
Next, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Prosecutor Bizon “rejected” a case that Plaintiff
seemingly submitted for prosecution. (ECF No. 1-4, PageID.23-24). Finally, Plaintiff
alleges that the Oceana County Board of Commissioners, “orchestrated” by Defendant
Vice-Chair Erickson, successfully voted to remove Plaintiff as Chairman of the Oceana
County Board of Canvassers. (ECF No. 1-11, PageID.46). Plaintiff named Defendant
Walker on the form complaint as a Defendant but failed to articulate any specific
allegations against him. (ECF No. 1, PageID.5).
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
15 of 20

-16-
The “Oceana County Defendants” move to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them
under Rules 12(b)(1), (5), and (6).1 In response, Plaintiff simply reasserts the merits of
his claims. (ECF No. 70, PageID.1235-55).
Addressing dismissal under Rule 12(b)(5) first, the Oceana County Defendants
argue that Plaintiff attempted to serve them by “regular mail.” (ECF No. 47,
PageID.889). This is insufficient to effectuate service under MICH. CT. R. 2.105(A). See
Reid, No. 11-13521, 2012 WL 479118, at *1 (“Service of process by mail on an individual
without return receipt requested is insufficient under Michigan law.”). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants should be dismissed.
Even if Plaintiff properly effectuated service on these Defendants, his claims
against them fail under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6) and on immunity grounds. Plaintiff
again fails to meet his burden of proving jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because he
points to numerous sections of the state and federal criminal codes that do not provide
private causes of action. See Kordan, No. 21-CV-11419, 2021 WL 3612293, at *2 (“ ‘18
U.S.C. § 2[:] . . . there is no private right of action under this statute.’ ”); see also West,
1 Defendants Judge Sniegowski, Prosecutor Bizon, and Deputy Clerk Miller also argue
that they are entitled to judicial, prosecutorial, and quasi-judicial immunity,
respectively. (ECF No. 47, PageID.890-95). The Court agrees. See Brown v. Nelson,
No. 25-13120, 2025 WL 3499116, *6 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 5, 2025) (stating that judges enjoy
judicial immunity for their judicial actions as long as they did not act in “the complete
absence of all jurisdiction” and that court personnel performing functions integral to the
judicial process enjoy quasi-judicial immunity); see also Greene v. Rochester Villas
Apartments, Inc., No. 25-13926, 2026 WL 561122, at *3 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27, 2026)
(stating that a prosecutor enjoys absolute immunity from Section 1983 suits for damages
when he acts within the scope of his prosecutorial duties).
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
16 of 20

-17-
No. 25-10420, 2025 WL 1108259 at *4 (no private cause of action under 18 U.S.C. § 1512);
see also Oguaju, 76 F. App’x at 581 (no private right of action under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241 or
242); see also Ssayed, No. 1:12-CV-797, 2013 WL 3277139, at *3 (Michigan criminal
statutes generally do not provide private cause of action). Notably, as explained above,
Plaintiff cites the RICO Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, namely the civil remedies provision,
but Plaintiff would have to be a “person injured in his business or property by reason of
a violation of section 1962 of this chapter . . .” to claim a private cause of action. 18
U.S.C. § 1964(c). Plaintiff’s complaint does not cite Section 1962.
Under Rule 12(b)(6), “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663.
Plaintiff’s claims against the Oceana County Defendants are precisely the kind of
“unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed–me accusation[s]” that are facially
implausible and not viable under Twombly and Iqbal. See id. at 678. As stated above,
Plaintiff’s claims are long-winded, difficult to decipher, and full of irrelevant factual
allegations. To the extent that Plaintiff asserts a civil conspiracy claim against the
Oceana County Defendants, there is no allegation as to how these Defendants were in
collusion in violation of Plaintiff’s “civil rights.” (ECF No. 1-11, PageID.46). There is
also no allegation that they agreed to deprive Plaintiff of his “civil rights.” (Id.).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claims against these Defendants fail and should be dismissed.
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
17 of 20

-18-
V. Defendant Repocast
Plaintiff alleges that, in removing and storing Plaintiff and his wife’s vehicles,
Defendant Repocast committed larceny, aided and abetted a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 2,
and illegally seized his and his wife’s vehicles under the Fourth Amendment. (ECF
No. 1-10, PageID.42). Defendant Repocast moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims under
Rules 12(b)(1) and (6). (ECF No. 53, PageID.1010-15).
Under Rule 12(b)(1), Plaintiff attempts to assert state and federal criminal code
statutes that do not provide private causes of actions. See Kordan, No. 21-CV-11419,
2021 WL 3612293, at *2 (“ ‘18 U.S.C. § 2[:] . . . there is no private right of action under
this statute.’ ”); see also Ssayed, No. 1:12-CV-797, 2013 WL 3277139, at *3 (Michigan
criminal statutes generally do not provide a private cause of action).
Plaintiff also asserts a Fourth Amendment violation against Defendant Repocast,
but Plaintiff’s claim fails because he has not sufficiently alleged that Defendant Repocast
was a state actor. To prevail on such a claim, Plaintiff must establish that his Fourth
Amendment rights were violated by a person acting under color of state law. See, e.g.,
Rudd v. City of Norton Shores, 977 F.3d 503, 512 (6th Cir. 2020). Generally, “Fourth
Amendment claims are wholly inapplicable to actions committed by private citizens or
entities.” Thornton-Bey v. Comerica Bank, No. 11-13787, 2012 WL 1110008, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 15, 2012) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Defendant
Repocast may be considered a state actor for present purposes only if its alleged conduct
giving rise to Plaintiff’s claim is “fairly attributable to the State.” Marie v. American
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
18 of 20

-19-
Red Cross, 771 F.3d 344, 362 (6th Cir. 2014). Plaintiff must allege facts “giving rise to
a reasonable inference” that Defendant Repocast was functioning as a state actor during
the events in question. Id. at 362-63. Plaintiff’s complaint contains no such
allegations. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Repocast, a private actor, violated his and
his wife’s Fourth Amendment rights by removing and storing their vehicles. (ECF
No. 1-10, PageID.42). Plaintiff has failed to allege facts from which there exists a
reasonable inference that Defendant Repocast was functioning as a state actor.
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet his burden of proving jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1)
as to these claims.
Plaintiff’s claims also fail under Rule 12(b)(6) for the same reasons as the other
Defendants: “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Plaintiff’s claims are
difficult to decipher as they are buried in irrelevant factual allegations and legal
conclusions. Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Repocast also be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be
granted.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned judicial officer recommends
that the Court grant all of the Defendants’ motions to dismiss—Defendant Deperno’s
Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6); Defendant Sebolt’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 12);
Defendant Moeggenberg’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17); Defendants Henry and West
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
19 of 20

-20-
Michigan Process Servers’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 24); Defendant Peterson’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 28); Defendants Bizon, Erickson, Mast, Miller, Oceana County
Board of Commissioners, Sniegowski, and Walker’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 46);
Defendant Jordan’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 49); and Defendant Repocast’s Motion
to Dismiss (ECF No. 52). The undersigned also recommends that this action be
terminated. For the same reasons the undersigned makes these recommendations, the
undersigned finds that an appeal of such would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the undersigned further recommends that an
appeal of this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good faith.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to
appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United
States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Dated: March 11, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
Case 1:25-cv-01236-RJJ-PJG ECF No. 105, PageID.<pageID> Filed 03/11/26 Page
20 of 20