Niphong v. Maliahiasbe et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
CHARLS PETER NIPHONG,
Plaintiff,
v.
UNKNOWN MALIAHIASBE et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1194
Honorable Paul L. Maloney
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a pretrial detainee under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 1 The
Court has granted Plaintiff’s motion (ECF No. 2) to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the
Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is
frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary
relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly
irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
1See KCCF Inmate Locator https://eisjailviewer.kentcountymi.gov/Home/BookingSearchQuery
_KCSOMI (enter “Niphong” for “Last Name,” enter “Charls” for “First Name,” select “Search”)
(last visited Oct. 29, 2025).
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently detaomed at the Kent County Jail in Grand Rapids, Kent County,
Michigan. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) The events about which he complains occurred at that facility.
(Id.) 	Plaintiff 	sues 	Deputy 	Unknown 	Maliahiasbe, 	Corrections 	Officer 	M. 	Shoop, 	and
Deputy/Corrections Officer Unknown Party. (Id.)
Plaintiff alleges that he entered the Kent County Jail on May 15, 2025, whereupon he was
subjected to a search by Defendant Maliahiasbe. (Id., PageID.3.) Plaintiff states that after the
search was completed, Defendant Maliahiasbe placed his hand on the right side of Plaintiff’s butt
and lifted it upward in an unprofessional manner. (Id.) Plaintiff states that this constituted a sexual
assault and felt the need to protect himself, so he removed his hands from the wall, which resulted
in Plaintiff being slammed against the wall and yelled at. (Id.) Plaintiff asked Defendant
Maliahiasbe why he had touched his butt in that manner, but Defendant Maliahiasbe did not
respond. (Id.) Plaintiff was taken to confinement. (Id.)
Plaintiff filed a grievance and Defendant Shoop responded to the grievance by stating that
Defendant Maliahiasbe had been performing his required duties and that Plaintiff had been
noncompliant. (Id.)
Plaintiff 	states 	that 	Defendants 	violated 	his 	rights 	under 	the 	Fourth 	and 	Eighth
Amendments. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks an investigation into the incident and damages. (Id., PageID.4.)
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
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and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Defendant Unknown Party
In his complaint, Plaintiff lists Unknown Party, named as Deputy/Corrections Officer John
Doe, as a Defendant. (ECF No. 1, PageID.2.) However, Plaintiff fails to make any specific factual
allegations against this individual in the body of his complaint. It is a basic pleading essential that
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a plaintiff attribute factual allegations to particular defendants. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544
(holding that, in order to state a claim, a plaintiff must make sufficient allegations to give a
defendant fair notice of the claim). Where a person is named as a defendant without an allegation
of specific conduct, the complaint is subject to dismissal, even under the liberal construction
afforded to pro se complaints. See Gilmore v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 92 F. App’x 188, 190 (6th Cir.
2004) (dismissing complaint where plaintiff failed to allege how any named defendant was
involved in the violation of his rights); Frazier v. Michigan, 41 F. App’x 762, 764 (6th Cir. 2002)
(dismissing plaintiff’s claims where the complaint did not allege with any degree of specificity
which of the named defendants were personally involved in or responsible for each alleged
violation of rights); Griffin v. Montgomery, No. 00-3402, 2000 WL 1800569, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov.
30, 2000) (requiring allegations of personal involvement against each defendant); Rodriguez v.
Jabe, No. 90-1010, 1990 WL 82722, at *1 (6th Cir. June 19, 1990) (“Plaintiff’s claims against
those individuals are without a basis in law as the complaint is totally devoid of allegations as to
them which would suggest their involvement in the events leading to his injuries”). Because
Plaintiff’s claims fall far short of the minimal pleading standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (requiring
“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), his
complaint must be dismissed against Defendant Unknown Party.
B. 	Defendant Shoop
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Shoop responded to the grievance he filed on Defendant
Maliahiasbe by finding that Defendant Maliahiasbe had not engaged in any wrongdoing and that
Plaintiff 	had 	been 	noncompliant. 	Government 	officials 	may 	not 	be 	held 	liable 	for 	the
unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676; Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
691(1978); Everson v. Leis, 556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009). A claimed constitutional violation
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must be based upon active unconstitutional behavior. Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575–76 (6th
Cir. 2008); Greene v. Barber, 310 F.3d 889, 899 (6th Cir. 2002). The acts of one’s subordinates
are not enough, nor can supervisory liability be based upon the mere failure to act. Grinter, 532
F.3d at 576; Greene, 310 F.3d at 899; Summers v. Leis, 368 F.3d 881, 888 (6th Cir. 2004).
Moreover, § 1983 liability may not be imposed simply because a supervisor denied an
administrative grievance or failed to act based upon information contained in a grievance. See
Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] plaintiff must plead that each
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676.
The Sixth Circuit repeatedly has summarized the minimum required to constitute active
conduct by a supervisory official:
“[A] supervisory official’s failure to supervise, control or train the offending
individual is not actionable unless the supervisor either encouraged the specific
incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it.” Shehee,
199 F.3d at 300 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
interpreted this standard to mean that “at a minimum,” the plaintiff must show that
the defendant “at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in
the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers.”
Peatross v. City of Memphis, 818 F.3d 233, 242 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Shehee, 199 F.3d at 300,
and citing Phillips v. Roane Cnty., 534 F.3d 531, 543 (6th Cir. 2008)); see also Copeland v.
Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375–76 (1976),
and Bellamy v. Bradley, 729 F.2d 416, 421 (6th Cir. 1984)); Leach v. Shelby Cnty. Sheriff, 891
F.2d 1241, 1246 (6th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that Defendant Shoop encouraged or condoned
the conduct of his subordinates, or authorized, approved or knowingly acquiesced in the conduct.
Indeed, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts at all about their conduct other than to assert that
Defendant Shoop responded to his grievance. Plaintiff’s vague and conclusory allegations of
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supervisory responsibility are insufficient to demonstrate that Defendant Shoop was personally
involved in the actions of Defendant Maliahiasbe. Conclusory allegations of unconstitutional
conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678–79; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Because Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant Shoop
is premised on nothing more than respondeat superior liability, he fails to state a claim against
Defendant Shoop.
C. 	Defendant Maliahiasbe
1. 	Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff states that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment. Both the
United States Supreme Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit have
recognized that, under the Fourth Amendment, prisoners and detainees may be subjected to strip
searches and body-cavity searches without individualized suspicion. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 333–34 (2012) (rejecting the argument that correctional officials need
reasonable suspicion to conduct visual body-cavity searches upon inmates at the time they are
admitted to the general jail population); Stoudemire v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 705 F.3d 560, 575
(6th Cir. 2013) (noting that “suspicionless strip searches [are] permissible as a matter of
constitutional law”); see also Salem v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 643 F. App’x 526, 529 (6th Cir. 2016).
Nevertheless, a strip search “may be unreasonable by virtue of the way in which it is conducted.”
Williams v. City of Cleveland, 771 F.3d 945, 952 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at
574). In determining the reasonableness of a search, “Courts must consider the scope of the
particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the
place in which it is conducted.” Stoudemire, 705 F.3d at 572 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 559 (1979)).
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Here, Plaintiff’s merely alleges that he was thoroughly searched and that at the conclusion
of the search, Defendant Maliahiasbe placed his hand on the right side of Plaintiff’s butt and lifted
it. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff alleges no facts to suggest that the search was conducted in an
unreasonable manner. Under these circumstances, based on the facts alleged in the complaint,
Plaintiff fails to state a Fourth Amendment claim.
2. 	Sexual Assault Claim
Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Maliahiasbe violated his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from unwanted sexual touching when he placed his hand on the right side of Plaintiff’s butt
and then lifted it. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) The Court notes that the Eighth Amendment’s protection
against cruel and unusual punishment extends to pretrial detainees through the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 327 (1986).
“[B]ecause the sexual harassment or abuse of an inmate by a corrections officer can never
serve a legitimate penological purpose and may well result in severe physical and psychological
harm, such abuse can, in certain circumstances, constitute the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction
of pain’” forbidden by the Eighth Amendment. Freitas v. Ault, 109 F.3d 1335, 1338 (8th Cir. 1997)
(quoted cases omitted). “To prevail on a constitutional claim of sexual harassment, an inmate must
therefore prove, as an objective matter, that the alleged abuse or harassment caused ‘pain’ and, as
a subjective matter, that the officer in question acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind.”
Freitas, 109 F.3d at 1338 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992)).
However, the Sixth Circuit has held that “isolated, brief, and not severe” instances of sexual
harassment, without more, do not give rise to Eighth Amendment violations. Jackson v. Madery,
158 F. App’x 656, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that harassing comments, even coupled with one
minor instance of sexualized touching during a search, fall short of an Eighth Amendment
violation), abrogated in other part by Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252 (6th Cir. 2018); Violett v.
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Reynolds, 76 F. App’x 24, 27 (6th Cir. 2003) (an offer of sexual favors is not sufficient to state
Eighth Amendment claim); Johnson v. Ward, No. 99-1596, 2000 WL 659354, at *1 (6th Cir. May
11, 2000) (“Johnson’s allegation that Ward made an offensive sexual remark to him does not rise
to the level of a constitutional violation [as such is merely verbal abuse].”). Other courts have
agreed. See, e.g., Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 353 (2d Cir. 2003); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083,
1092 (9th Cir. 1996); Purcell v. Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986).
In contrast, the Sixth Circuit has held that ongoing, coercive verbal harassment may rise to
sexual abuse that violates the Eighth Amendment. Rafferty v. Trumbull Co., 915 F.3d 1087, 1095
(6th Cir. 2019). The Rafferty court found an Eighth Amendment violation when a prison official
sexually harassed a prisoner by repeatedly demanding that the prisoner expose herself and
masturbate while the official watched. The court noted that, in light of the coercive dynamic of the
relationship between prison staff and prisoners, such demands amount to sexual abuse. Id. at 1096.
In this case, Plaintiff merely alleges that Defendant Maliahiasbe lifted the right side of
Plaintiff’s butt with his hand. (ECF No. 1, PageID.3.) Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant
Maliahiasbe made any sexual comments or subsequently acted in a sexually harassing manner
toward Plaintiff. Such allegations are insufficient to support a claim under either the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendments.
3. 	Excessive Force Claim
Plaintiff also seeks to assert an excessive force claim against Defendant Maliahiasbe for
slamming Plaintiff against the wall and yelling at him after Plaintiff removed his hands from the
wall. In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Supreme Court held that the use of
excessive force on pretrial detainees is measured under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The Court rejected a subjective standard, holding that the relevant inquiry is whether
the force purposely or knowingly used against the prisoner was objectively unreasonable. Id. at
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398; see also Coley v. Lucas Cnty., 799 F.3d 530, 538 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Kingsley). In
determining whether the amount of force used was unreasonable, courts consider factors such as
the relationship between the need for the use of force and the amount of force, the extent of any
injury suffered by the plaintiff, the degree of threat reasonably perceived by the defendant officer,
and whether the plaintiff was actively resisting. Whyde v. Sigsworth, No. 3:19 CV 683, 2022 WL
974204, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2022), aff’d, No. 22-3581, 2024 WL 4719649 (6th Cir. Nov.
8, 2024).
The Court notes that not every shove or restraint gives rise to a constitutional violation.
Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 604 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9 (holding
that “[n]ot every push or shove . . . violates a prisoner’s constitutional rights”) (internal quotations
omitted). Moroever, “[a]n inmate who complains of a ‘push or shove’ that causes no discernible
injury almost certainly fails to state a valid excessive force claim.” Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34,
38 (2010) (per curiam) (citing Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9).
As noted above, Plaintiff in this case concedes that he removed his hands from the wall
where he had been instructed to place them during the search, which prompted Defendant
Maliahiasbe to shove Plaintiff against the wall and yell at him. Plaintiff does not allege that the
shove by Defendant Maliahiasbe was severe enough to cause him any injuries. Nor does Plaintiff
allege that Defendant Maliahiasbe took any further action against him once he was restrained.
Because Plaintiff fails to allege any facts which could show that Defendant Maliahiasbe used an
unreasonable amount of force against him, he fails to state a claim under the Eighth or Fourteenth
Amendments for an excessive use of force.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Plaintiff’s complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C.
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§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must next decide whether an
appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See
McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). Although the Court concludes that
Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed, the Court does not conclude that any issue Plaintiff might
raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962).
Accordingly, the Court does not certify that an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Should
Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the $605.00 appellate filing fee pursuant to
§ 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma
pauperis, e.g., by the “three-strikes” rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay
the $505.00 appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	October 31, 2025 	/s/ Paul L. Maloney
Paul L. Maloney
United States District Judge
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