Atkinson v. Kent County Correctional Facility, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
DERREK D. ATKINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
KENT COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY,
Defendant.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-1179
Honorable Jane M. Beckering
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In a separate
Order, the Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Under the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), the Court is required to dismiss
any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state
a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff’s
pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept
Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v.
Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s
amended complaint for failure to state a claim against Defendants Kent County Correctional
Facility Kent County Correctional Facility (KCCF), Flanigan, Fennema, Knott, and Pavlovic. The
Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against remaining
Defendant Curtis: First Amendment claims concerning the right to send and receive mail, access
to the courts, and free exercise of religion, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, claims
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regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance process, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Curtis remains in the case.
Discussion
I. 	Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated in the KCCF, located in Grand Rapids, Michigan. The
events about which he complains occurred at that facility. Plaintiff sues the KCCF, as well as the
following KCCF staff: Deputy Sheriff Michael Curtis, Sergeant B. Flanigan, Sergeant Unknown
Fennema, Lieutenant B. Knott, and Captain J. Pavlovic.
Plaintiff alleges that in June 2024, Defendant Curtis played Christian music loudly over his
Bluetooth speaker. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11, PageID.25.) Plaintiff, a Muslim, complained to
Defendant Curtis. (Id.) On June 12, 2024, Defendant Curtis gave Plaintiff a Bible, saying “you
need this.” (Id.)
On February 17, 2025, Defendant Curtis instructed his trustee to remove Plaintiff’s
cleaning supplies while Plaintiff was still cleaning and “only half done.” (Id.) When Plaintiff told
Defendant Curtis that he was not done cleaning, Defendant Curtis told Plaintiff, “You are now!”
(Id.) The trustee told Plaintiff that Plaintiff was taking too long to clean and “he was ready to go
back to bed.” (Id.)
On February 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed a grievance against Defendant Curtis. (Id.) Defendant
Flanigan and a non-party sergeant visited Plaintiff and spoke with him. (Id.) Plaintiff ultimately
“declined to press a grievance.” (Id., PageID.26.)
On February 20, 2025, Defendant Curtis “timed [Plaintiff] in,” claiming that Plaintiff did
not answer him loudly enough during morning head count. (Id.) Later than morning, Defendant
Curtis stopped Plaintiff at lunch to remind him of his being timed in. (Id.) That afternoon, Plaintiff
submitted a kite, requesting to file a grievance; however, Defendant Curtis intercepted Plaintiff’s
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kite. (Id.) Plaintiff and others later saw Defendants Flanigan and Fennema “passing a single kite.”
(Id.) That evening, Plaintiff asked non-party Deputy Lane to retrieve his missing kite, but it was
gone. (Id.) Plaintiff never received a response to this kite or “several more.” (Id., PageID.26–27.)
On March 3, 2025, two white inmates never woke to answer Defendant Curtis during
morning head count but were not reprimanded. (Id., PageID.27.)
On August 15, 2025, after repeated requests, non-party Sergeant Vernocke allowed
Plaintiff to file a grievance. (Id.) However, on August 20, 2025, Defendant Knott “interviewed
[Plaintiff] with aggressive hostile impatience,” and told Plaintiff that they would not be
investigating Plaintiff’s claims. (Id.) Plaintiff noticed that the cover page of an affidavit that
Plaintiff had mistakenly submitted to the 61st District Court was in Defendant Knott’s papers. (Id.)
Defendant Knott told Plaintiff that the court had sent it back to “them to resolve.” (Id.)
Defendant Pavlovic agreed with Defendant Knott’s decision not to investigate Plaintiff’s
grievance. (Id., PageID.28.)
Plaintiff alleges that the foregoing actions demonstrate “discrimination, retaliation,
intimidation, obstruction[,] and conspiracy.” (Id.) He seeks monetary and punitive damages. (Id.,
PageID.29.)
II. 	Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the defendant
fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint
need not contain detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels
and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The
court must determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
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is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Although the plausibility
standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71
(6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard applies to dismissals of
prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right
secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by
a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr.
Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating
federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271
(1994).
A. 	Claims Against KCCF
Plaintiff names KCCF as a Defendant. However, KCCF is a building that houses inmates;
it is not a person and it “is not a legal entity susceptible to suit.” Watson v. Gill, 40 F. App’x 88,
89 (6th Cir. 2002); see also Goldman v. Kalamazoo Cnty. Jail, No. 1:16-cv-359, 2016 WL
3180043, at *2 (W.D. Mich. June 8, 2016) (collecting cases that hold a local jail is not a person
subject to suit under § 1983). For that reason alone, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s amended
complaint against KCCF.
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B. 	First Amendment Retaliation Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants retaliated against him, in violation of his First Amendment
rights. Retaliation based upon a prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutional rights violates the
Constitution. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). To set forth
a First Amendment retaliation claim, a plaintiff must establish three elements: (1) he was engaged
in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against him that would deter a person of
ordinary firmness from engaging in that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated, at least
in part, by the protected conduct. Id. Moreover, a plaintiff must be able to show that the exercise
of the protected right was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s alleged retaliatory
conduct. See Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1037 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Mount Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)).
First, it is well-established that an inmate has a right to file “non-frivolous” complaints and
grievances against prison officials on his own behalf, whether written or oral. Maben v. Thelen,
887 F.3d 252, 265 (6th Cir. 2018). Here, Plaintiff alleges that he first complained to Defendant
Curtis about Defendant Curtis’ Christian music in June 2024. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11,
PageID.25.) Plaintiff also complained verbally and in writing that Defendant Curtis instructed the
trustee to take Plaintiff’s cleaning supplies on February 17, 2025 (id.), and that Defendant Curtis
gave Plaintiff a warning on February 20, 2025 (id., PageID.26). For purposes of this early stage of
the proceedings, the Court finds Plaintiff has alleged that he engaged in First Amendment protected
conduct when Plaintiff filed complaints and grievances on his own behalf. However, that does not
end the Court’s inquiry.
To establish the second element of a retaliation claim, a prisoner-plaintiff must show
adverse action by a prison official sufficient to deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising
his constitutional rights. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 396. The adverseness inquiry is an objective one
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and does not depend on how a particular plaintiff reacted. The relevant question is whether the
defendant’s conduct is “capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness”; the plaintiff need not
show actual deterrence. Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 606 (6th Cir. 2002). Finally, to satisfy the
third element of a retaliation claim, Plaintiff must allege facts that support an inference that the
alleged adverse action was motivated by the protected conduct.
Here, Plaintiff alleges that, eight months after Plaintiff commented about Defendant Curtis’
Christian music, Defendant Curtis told the trustee to remove Plaintiff’s cleaning supplies when
Plaintiff was only half done with his cleaning assignment. He also claims that, after filing a
grievance against Defendant Curtis, Defendant Curtis issued Plaintiff an unfounded reprimand and
intercepted Plaintiff’s kite requesting to file a grievance. While Plaintiff has by no means proven
his claims, the Court will allow Plaintiff to proceed with his First Amendment retaliation claims
against Defendant Curtis at this stage of the litigation.
As against the remaining Defendants, Plaintiff claims that he saw Defendants Flanigan and
Fennema “passing a single kite.” He alleges that Defendant Knott was angry and impatient with
him when determining not to investigate his grievance, and that Defendant Pavlovic agreed with
Defendant Knott’s decision not to investigate his grievance. Taking these allegations as true,
Plaintiff merely alleges the ultimate fact of retaliation without providing any supporting facts. Such
“conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive ‘unsupported by material facts’” do not state a claim
under § 1983. Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 580 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted); see
Murray v. Unknown Evert, 84 F. App’x 553, 556 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that in complaints
screened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, “[c]onclusory allegations of retaliatory motive with no
concrete and relevant particulars fail to raise a genuine issue of fact for trial” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Lewis v. Jarvie, 20 F. App’x 457, 459 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[B]are allegations of
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malice on the defendants’ parts are not enough to establish retaliation claims [that will survive
§ 1915A screening].” (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 588 (1998))). Accordingly, the
Court 	will 	dismiss 	Plaintiff’s 	First 	Amendment 	retaliation 	claims 	against 	the 	remaining
Defendants.
C. 	First Amendment Right to Send and Receive Mail Claims
Plaintiff contends that his mail, including a cover page of an affidavit sent mistakenly to
the 61st District Court, was “intercepted.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11, PageID.27–28.) Defendant
Knott told Plaintiff that the court had sent the paper back to “them to resolve, and not back to the
center to be readdressed.” (Id., PageID.27.)
“A prisoner’s right to receive mail is protected by the First Amendment.” Knop v. Johnson,
977 F.2d 996, 1012 (6th Cir. 1992) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). “Mail is
one medium of free speech, and the right to send and receive mail exists under the First
Amendment.” Al-Amin v. Smith, 511 F.3d 1317, 1333 (11th Cir. 2008) (citing City of Cincinnati
v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427 (1993)). A prisoner, however, retains only those
First Amendment freedoms which are “not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with
legitimate penological objectives of the corrections systems.” Martin v. Kelley, 803 F.2d 236, 240
n.7 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Pell, 417 U.S. at 822); see Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
The Sixth Circuit has held that “‘blatant disregard’ for mail handling regulations
concerning legal mail violates constitutional protections,” Merriweather v. Zamora, 569 F.3d 307,
317 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 1993)), and that “[t]wo
or three pieces of mail opened in an arbitrary or capricious way suffice to state a claim.” Id. (citing
Sallier v. Brooks, 343 F.3d 868, 879–80 (6th Cir. 2003); Lavado, 992 F.2d at 609). However,
“isolated instances of interference with prisoners’ mail” may not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation under the First Amendment. See Johnson v. Wilkinson, No. 98-3866, 2000 WL 1175519,
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at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 11, 2000) (“This random and isolated interference with Johnson’s mail did not
violate his constitutional rights.” (citation omitted)); see also Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427,
431 (8th Cir. 1997) (holding that an “isolated incident, without any evidence of improper motive
resulting interference with [the inmate’s] right to counsel or to access to the courts, does not give
rise to a constitutional violation” (citations omitted)); Okoro v. Scibana, 63 F. App’x 182, 184 (6th
Cir. 2003) (stating that “Okoro was only able to provide one specific incident where he allegedly
did not receive the full contents of a letter from his wife,” and concluding that “[s]uch a random
and isolated incident is insufficient to establish a constitutional violation” (citation omitted)); cf.
Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 293 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Johnson for the holding that “isolated
interference” with prisoners’ rights may not rise to the level of a First Amendment violation).
Recently, in Smith v. Goostrey, No. 23-1025, 2023 WL 5024659 (6th Cir. Aug. 4, 2023), the Sixth
Circuit, citing Colvin, confirmed that a single isolated event of tampering with legal mail “does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.” Id. at *3.
Here, Plaintiff alleges only a single instance of the improper handling of Plaintiff’s mail.
These facts, accepted as true, do not suggest blatant disregard for mail handling. See Okoro, supra;
Johnson, 2000 WL 1175519, at *2.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to plausibly suggest that any named Defendant
intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s ability to send and receive mail. Plaintiff contends that he
believes that this piece of mail should have been given to him, but he does not allege facts that
support an inference that any named Defendant intentionally withheld his mail. Plaintiff must
allege more factual content to “nudge his claim . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 683 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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It is well established that negligent conduct will not state a constitutional claim under
§ 1983. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (holding that the protections of the Due
Process Clause of the constitution are not “triggered by a lack of due care by prison officials.”)
(citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (“Medical malpractice does not become a
constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner. . .”), and Baker v. McCollum, 443
U.S. 137, 1464 (1979) (holding that false imprisonment does not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment simply because the defendant is a state official)). Numerous courts have recognized
that a prison official’s negligent interference with a prisoner’s First Amendment rights does not
violate the constitution. See, e.g., Colvin, 605 F.3d at 293–94 (holding that isolated incidents of
negligence by prison officials in implementing kosher food requirements is not actionable under
the First Amendment); Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (isolated acts
of negligence in providing kosher diet do not support a free-exercise claim); Lovelace v. Lee, 472
F.3d 174, 201 (4th Cir. 2006) (“[Plaintiff] must assert conscious or intentional interference with
his free exercise rights to state a valid claim under § 1983.”) (citing Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330).
Because Plaintiff’s amended complaint fails to allege facts that would plausibly suggest
that the named Defendants intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s right to send and receive mail,
he fails to state a First Amendment claim arising out of any interference with his mail.
D. 	First Amendment Access to the Courts Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he had been missing the cover page of the “affidavit from [his]
complaint” found in Defendant Knott’s papers. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11, PageID.27.) The Court
has liberally construed Plaintiff’s allegations to raise claims for interference with Plaintiff’s access
to the courts.
It is well established that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.
Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). The right of access to the courts prohibits prison
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officials from erecting barriers that may impede the inmate’s access to the courts. See Knop v.
Johnson, 977 F.2d 996, 1009 (6th Cir. 1992).
To state a viable claim for interference with his access to the courts, a plaintiff must show
“actual injury.” Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996); see also Talley-Bey v. Knebl, 168 F.3d
884, 886 (6th Cir. 1999); Knop, 977 F.2d at 1000. In other words, a plaintiff must plead that the
defendants actions have hindered, or are presently hindering, his efforts to pursue a nonfrivolous
legal claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351–53; see also Pilgrim v. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.
1996). The Supreme Court has strictly limited the types of cases for which there may be an actual
injury:
Bounds does not guarantee inmates the wherewithal to transform themselves into
litigating engines capable of filing everything from shareholder derivative actions
to slip-and-fall claims. The tools it requires to be provided are those that the inmates
need in order to attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to
challenge the conditions of their confinement. Impairment of any other litigating
capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences
of conviction and incarceration.
Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355. “Thus, a prisoner’s right to access the courts extends to direct appeals,
habeas corpus applications, and civil rights claims only.” Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 391. Moreover,
the underlying action must have asserted a non-frivolous claim. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353; accord
Hadix v. Johnson, 182 F.3d 400, 405 (6th Cir. 1999) (Lewis changed actual injury to include
requirement that action be non-frivolous).
In addition, the Supreme Court squarely has held that “the underlying cause of action . . .
is an element that must be described in the complaint, just as much as allegations must describe
the official acts frustrating the litigation.” Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 415 (2002)
(citing Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3). “Like any other element of an access claim, the underlying
cause of action and its lost remedy must be addressed by allegations in the complaint sufficient to
give fair notice to a defendant.” Id. at 415.
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not include any well-pleaded factual allegations that
would allow the Court to infer that the issues with Plaintiff’s mail hindered a non-frivolous legal
claim in a direct appeal, habeas corpus application, or civil rights claim. Therefore, any claims for
interference with Plaintiff’s access to the courts related to the missing page of Plaintiff’s affidavit
are properly dismissed.
To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to raise a First Amendment access to the Court’s
claim based upon the denial of Plaintiff’s grievances, he cannot. Defendants’ actions (or inactions)
in response to Plaintiff’s grievances have not barred Plaintiff from seeking a remedy for his
complaints. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (1972). Indeed, Plaintiff’s ability to seek redress
is underscored by his pro se invocation of the judicial process. See Azeez v. DeRobertis, 568 F.
Supp. 8, 10 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his right of access
to the courts to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be
compromised by his inability to file institutional grievances, and he therefore cannot demonstrate
the actual injury required for an access-to-the-courts claim. See, e.g., Lewis, 518 U.S. at 355
(requiring actual injury); Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821–24. The exhaustion requirement only mandates
exhaustion of available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were
improperly denied access to the grievance process, the process would be rendered unavailable, and
exhaustion would not be a prerequisite for initiation of a civil rights action. See Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 632, 640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by
policy or by the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is
not required); Kennedy v. Tallio, 20 F. App’x 469, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2001).
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Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a cognizable
First Amendment claim for interference with his access to the courts
E. 	First Amendment Free Exercise of Religion
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Curtis “forc[ed] his religion” on Plaintiff when Defendant
Curtis played his Christian music loudly and gave Plaintiff a Bible. (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11,
PageID.25.)
The First Amendment provides “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .” U.S. Const. amend I. The right to freely
exercise one’s religion falls within the fundamental concept of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Accordingly, state legislatures
and those acting on behalf of a state are “as incompetent as Congress” to interfere with the right.
Id.
While “lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many
privileges and rights,” inmates retain the First Amendment protection to freely exercise their
religion. See O’Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 348 (1987) (citations omitted). To claim that this
right has been violated, Plaintiff must plead facts that would plausibly suggest (1) that the belief
or practice he seeks to protect is religious within his own “scheme of things,” (2) that his belief is
sincerely held, and (3) that Defendant’s behavior infringes upon this practice or belief. Kent v.
Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224–25 (6th Cir. 1987); see also Flagner v. Wilkinson, 241 F.3d 475,
481 (6th Cir. 2001) (same).
A practice will not be considered to infringe on a prisoner’s free exercise of religion unless
it “place[s] a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice . . . .”
Hernandez v. C.I.R., 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989). “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that the
‘substantial burden’ hurdle is high.” Living Water Church of God v. Charter Twp. of Meridian,
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258 F. App’x 729, 734 (6th Cir. 2007). “[A] ‘substantial burden’ is a difficult threshold to cross.”
Id. at 736. Such a burden “must place more than an inconvenience on religious exercise.” Id. at
739 (quoting Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2014)).
A particular government action will not be considered a substantial burden merely because it “may
make [the] religious exercise more expensive or difficult.” Id. A burden is substantial where it
forces an individual to choose between the tenets of his religion and foregoing governmental
benefits or places “substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs.” Living Water, 258 F. App’x at 733–34 (citations omitted); Marshall v. Frank, 2007 WL
1556872, at *5 (W.D. Wis. May 24, 2007) (discussing that a substantial burden is one which
renders religious exercise “effectively impracticable” (quoting Civil Liberties for Urban Believers
v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 761 (7th Cir. 2003)).
Here, Plaintiff has not provided the Court with any facts regarding his religious beliefs
such that the Court could conclude that the Defendant Curtis’ action placed a substantial burden
on Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs. In relying solely upon conclusory allegations and
legal conclusions without any supporting facts, Plaintiff asks the Court to fabricate plausibility to
his claim from mere ambiguity; but ambiguity does not support a claim. Conclusory allegations of
unconstitutional conduct without specific factual allegations fail to state a claim under § 1983. See
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79. Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s First Amendment free
exercise claims.
F. 	Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Claims
Plaintiff alleges that he brings claims of “discrimination.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11,
PageID.28.) He claims that Deputy Curtis verbally reprimanded Plaintiff for not answering loud
enough during morning headcount while two white inmates “who never wake to answer, escape
any reprimand whatsoever.” (Id., PageID.26–27.)
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The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that a state may not
“deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws,” which is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. U.S. Const. amend. XIV; City
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). To state an equal protection claim,
Plaintiff must plead facts to show “intentional and arbitrary discrimination” by the state; that is,
Plaintiff must show that Plaintiff “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated.” Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000). The threshold element of an
equal protection claim is disparate treatment. Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d
250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006). Further, “‘[s]imilarly situated’ is a term of art—a comparator . . . must
be similar in ‘all relevant respects.’” Paterek v. Vill. of Armada, 801 F.3d 630, 650 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637, 651 (6th Cir. 2011)).
Plaintiff’s amended complaint does not contain sufficient facts or allegations to support an
equal protection claim. He alleges that two white inmates were not reprimanded in the same
manner that he was reprimanded. However, Plaintiff does not provide the Court with any facts that
would suggest that these inmates were similarly situated to Plaintiff in all relevant respects.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s allegations of discriminatory treatment fail to state a claim under § 1983
and will be dismissed.
G. 	Claims Regarding Plaintiff’s Use of the Grievance Process
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants interfered with his use of the grievance process. This
allegation fails to state a claim for violation of Plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
First, Plaintiff has no due process right to file a jail administrative grievance. The courts
have repeatedly held that there exists no constitutionally protected due process right to an effective
prison grievance procedure. See Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); Walker v. Mich. Dep’t
of Corr., 128 F. App’x 441, 445 (6th Cir. 2005); Argue v. Hofmeyer, 80 F. App’x 427, 430 (6th
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Cir. 2003); Young v. Gundy, 30 F. App’x 568, 569–70 (6th Cir. 2002); Carpenter v. Wilkinson,
No. 99-3562, 2000 WL 190054, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 7, 2000); see also Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81
F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996); Adams v. Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 75 (4th Cir. 1994) (collecting cases).
Michigan law does not create a liberty interest in the grievance procedure. See Olim v. Wakinekona,
461 U.S. 238, 249 (1983); Keenan v. Marker, 23 F. App’x 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2001); Wynn v. Wolf,
No. 93-2411, 1994 WL 105907, at *1 (6th Cir. Mar. 28, 1994). Because Plaintiff has no liberty
interest in the grievance process, the conduct of Defendants related to Plaintiff’s use of or
attempted use of the grievance process did not deprive Plaintiff of due process.
Second, any actions (or inactions) of Defendants with regard to the grievance process could
not constitute a violation of the First Amendment right to petition the government. The First
Amendment “right to petition the government does not guarantee a response to the petition or the
right to compel government officials to act on or adopt a citizen’s views.” Apple v. Glenn, 183
F.3d 477, 479 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Minn. State Bd. for Cmty. Colls. v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271,
285 (1984) (holding the right to petition protects only the right to address government; the
government may refuse to listen or respond).
Third, Plaintiff has not been barred from all means of petitioning the government for
redress of grievances. Even if Plaintiff had been improperly prevented from filing a grievance, his
right to petition for redress of his grievances (i.e., by filing a lawsuit) cannot be compromised by
his inability to file institutional grievances. The exhaustion requirement only mandates exhaustion
of available administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). If Plaintiff were improperly
denied access to the grievance process, the process would be rendered unavailable, and exhaustion
would not be a prerequisite for initiation of a civil rights action. See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632,
640–44 (2016) (reiterating that, if the prisoner is barred from pursuing a remedy by policy or by
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the interference of officials, the grievance process is not available, and exhaustion is not required);
Kennedy, 20 F. App’x at 470–71.
Therefore, for each of the foregoing reasons, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
related to Plaintiff’s use of the grievance process.
H. 	Conspiracy Claims
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants engaged in a “conspiracy.” (Am. Compl., ECF No. 11,
PageID.28.) A civil conspiracy under § 1983 is “an agreement between two or more persons to
injure another by unlawful action.” See Hensley v. Gassman, 693 F.3d 681, 695 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quoting Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must show the
existence of a single plan, that the alleged coconspirator shared in the general conspiratorial
objective to deprive the plaintiff of a federal right, and that an overt action committed in
furtherance of the conspiracy caused an injury to the plaintiff. Id.; Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658
F.3d 598, 602 (6th Cir. 2011). Moreover, a plaintiff must plead a conspiracy with particularity, as
vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are insufficient. Twombly, 550
U.S. at 565 (recognizing that allegations of conspiracy must be supported by allegations of fact
that support a “plausible suggestion of conspiracy,” not merely a “possible” one); Fieger v. Cox,
524 F.3d 770, 776 (6th Cir. 2008); Spadafore v. Gardner, 330 F.3d 849, 854 (6th Cir. 2003);
Gutierrez 826 F.2d at 1538.
Here, Plaintiff does not facts that would suggest that any “agreement” or “plan” existed
between Defendants. Instead, Plaintiff’s allegations of conspiracy are wholly conclusory. As the
United States Supreme Court has held, even allegations hinting at a sheer “possibility” of
conspiracy, do not contain “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement was
made.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–57. Instead, the Supreme Court has recognized that although
parallel conduct may be consistent with an unlawful agreement, it is insufficient to state a claim
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where that conduct “was not only compatible with, but indeed was more likely explained by,
lawful, unchoreographed . . . behavior.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567).
Accordingly, because Plaintiff does not allege facts to show an agreement among Defendants,
Plaintiff fails to state a plausible § 1983 civil conspiracy claim
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court
determines that Defendants KCCF, Flanigan, Fennema, Knott, and Pavlovic will be dismissed for
failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court will also dismiss, for failure to state a claim, the following claims against the remaining
Defendant Curtis: First Amendment claims concerning the right to send and receive mail, access
to the courts, and free exercise of religion, Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims, claims
regarding Plaintiff’s use of the grievance process, and conspiracy claims. Plaintiff’s First
Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Curtis remains in the case.
An Order consistent with this Opinion will be entered.
Dated: 	April 28, 2026 	/s/ Jane M. Beckering
Jane M. Beckering
United States District Judge
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