Robinson #707841 v. Reed et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
______
JELONI DJUAN ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
v.
RICHARD REED, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________/
Case No. 1:25-cv-987
Honorable Phillip J. Green
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate
order. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Plaintiff consented to proceed in all matters in this action under the
jurisdiction of a United States Magistrate Judge. (ECF No. 1, PageID.4.)
This case is presently before the Court for preliminary review under the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (PLRA), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court is
required to conduct this initial review prior to the service of the complaint. See In re
Prison Litig. Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1131, 1134 (6th Cir. 1997); McGore v.
Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604–05 (6th Cir. 1997). Service of the complaint on the
named defendants is of particular significance in defining a putative defendant’s
relationship to the proceedings.
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“An individual or entity named as a defendant is not obliged to engage in
litigation unless notified of the action, and brought under a court’s authority, by
formal process.” Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344,
347 (1999). “Service of process, under longstanding tradition in our system of justice,
is fundamental to any procedural imposition on a named defendant.” Id. at 350.
“[O]ne becomes a party officially, and is required to take action in that capacity, only
upon service of a summons or other authority-asserting measure stating the time
within which the party served must appear and defend.” Id. (citations omitted). That
is, “[u]nless a named defendant agrees to waive service, the summons continues to
function as the sine qua non directing an individual or entity to participate in a civil
action or forgo procedural or substantive rights.” Id. at 351. Therefore, the PLRA,
by requiring courts to review and even resolve a plaintiff’s claims before service,
creates a circumstance where there may only be one party to the proceeding—the
plaintiff—at the district court level and on appeal. See, e.g., Conway v. Fayette Cnty.
Gov’t, 212 F. App’x 418 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district
court screened the complaint and dismissed it without prejudice before service was
made upon any of the defendants . . . [such that] . . . only [the plaintiff] [wa]s a party
to this appeal.”).
Here, Plaintiff has consented to a United States Magistrate Judge conducting
all proceedings in this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). That statute provides that
“[u]pon the consent of the parties, a full-time United States magistrate judge . . . may
conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment in the case . . . .”
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28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Because the named Defendants have not yet been served, the
undersigned concludes that they are not presently parties whose consent is required
to permit the undersigned to conduct a preliminary review under the PLRA, in the
same way they are not parties who will be served with or given notice of this opinion.
See Neals v. Norwood, 59 F.3d 530, 532 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The record does not contain
a consent from the defendants[; h]owever, because they had not been served, they
were not parties to this action at the time the magistrate entered judgment.”).1
Under the PLRA, the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought
under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from
such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must
read Plaintiff’s pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972), and accept Plaintiff’s allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or
wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these
standards, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to state a claim.
1 But see Coleman v. Lab. & Indus. Rev. Comm’n of Wis., 860 F.3d 461, 471 (7th Cir.
2017) (concluding that, when determining which parties are required to consent to
proceed before a United States Magistrate Judge under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), “context
matters” and the context the United States Supreme Court considered in Murphy
Bros. was nothing like the context of a screening dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)); Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500,
503–04 (9th Cir. 2017) (relying on Black’s Law Dictionary for the definition of
“parties” and not addressing Murphy Bros.); Burton v. Schamp, 25 F.4th 198, 207
n.26 (3d Cir. 2022) (premising its discussion of “the term ‘parties’ solely in relation to
its meaning in Section 636(c)(1), and . . . not tak[ing] an opinion on the meaning of
‘parties’ in other contexts”).
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Discussion
Factual Allegations
Plaintiff is presently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of
Corrections (MDOC) at the St. Louis Correctional Facility (SLF) in St. Louis, Gratiot
County, Michigan. The events about which he complains, however, occurred at the
Earnest C. Brooks Correctional Facility, (LRF) in Muskegon Heights, Muskegon
County, Michigan. Plaintiff sues LRF employees Corrections Officers Richard Reed
and Matthew Oppermann, as well as the MDOC. (ECF No. 1, PageID.1–2.)
Plaintiff alleges that due to “staff negligence,” he was seriously assaulted at
around 1:48 p.m. on October 5, 2024. (Id., PageID.3.) At the time, Plaintiff was facing
the officer’s desk waiting for a health care kite from Defendant Oppermann and was
stabbed twice from behind. (Id.) Plaintiff suffered stab wounds to his shoulder and
to the left side of his face close to his temple. (Id.) Plaintiff’s assailant, Inmate
Sutton, locked on B-wing and did not have a callout to be out of his cell without staff
authorization, nor any reason to be out of his cell. Nonetheless, Defendant Reed
released Sutton from his cell. Sutton then proceeded down the stairs to the area
where Plaintiff was stabbed. (Id.) Plaintiff states that his injuries were caused by
“staff negligence” and could have resulted in the loss of his life.
Plaintiff does not specify what relief he is seeking.
Failure to State a Claim
A complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it fails “to give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
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U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). While a complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations,
a plaintiff’s allegations must include more than labels and conclusions. Id.; Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). The court must
determine whether the complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678. Although the plausibility standard is not equivalent to a “‘probability
requirement,’ . . . it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted
unlawfully.” Id. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[W]here the well-
pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—that the pleader is
entitled to relief.” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)); see also Hill v. Lappin,
630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
standard applies to dismissals of prisoner cases on initial review under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of
a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the
deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins,
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996).
Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive
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rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific
constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
A. 	Defendant MDOC
Initially, the Court notes that the State of Michigan (acting through the
MDOC) is not a “person” who may be sued under § 1983 for money damages. See
Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613, 617 (2002) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State
Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989)); Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir.
2013). Therefore, Plaintiff’s claim against the MDOC is properly dismissed for failure
to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e(c).
B. 	Eighth Amendment
To the extent that Plaintiff is attempting to assert a violation of the Eighth
Amendment, Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Inmates have a constitutionally protected right to personal safety grounded in the
Eighth Amendment. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). Thus, prison staff
are obliged “to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates” in
their care. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984). In particular, because
officials have “stripped [prisoners] of virtually every means of self-protection[,]”
“officials have a duty to protect prisoners from violence at the hands of other
prisoners.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 833. To establish a violation of this right, a plaintiff
must show that prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his or her risk of
injury. Walker v. Norris, 917 F.2d 1449, 1453 (6th Cir. 1990); McGhee v. Foltz, 852
F.2d 876, 880–81 (6th Cir. 1988). While a prisoner does not need to prove that he has
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been the victim of an actual attack to bring a personal safety claim, he must at least
establish that he reasonably fears such an attack. Thompson v. Cnty. of Medina, 29
F.3d 238, 242–43 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that plaintiff has the minimal burden of
“showing a sufficient inferential connection” between the alleged violation and
inmate violence to “justify a reasonable fear for personal safety.”).
To establish liability under the Eighth Amendment for a claim based on a
failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, a plaintiff must show that the prison official
acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial risk of serious harm facing the
plaintiff. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834; Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993);
Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 766–67 (6th Cir. 2011); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493,
506 (6th Cir. 2001); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Street,
102 F.3d at 814; Taylor v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr. 69 F.3d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1995).
Deliberate indifference is a higher standard than negligence and requires that “the
official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the
official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.”
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837; see also Bishop, 636 F.3d at 766–67.
In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts showing that either Defendant
Reed or Defendant Oppermann acted with “deliberate indifference” to a substantial
risk of serious harm to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege that Inmate Sutton had
made prior threats to him, or that Defendants Reed and Oppermann were aware of
any such threats. Nor does Plaintiff allege that he and Inmate Sutton had any history
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of violence whatsoever. Plaintiff merely states that Defendants were negligent, and
that such negligence was the cause of his injuries. However, allegations of negligence
fall short of the deliberate indifference required to state an Eighth Amendment claim.
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (holding that an Eighth Amendment violation requires
a “state of mind more blameworthy than negligence”). Therefore, Plaintiff fails to
state an Eighth Amendment claim against either Defendant Reed or Defendant
Oppermann.
C. 	State Law Negligence Claim
To the extent that Plaintiff is asserting a state law negligence claim, the Court
notes that claims under § 1983 can only be brought for “deprivations of rights secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457
U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Section 1983 does not provide redress for a violation of a state
law. Pyles v. Raisor, 60 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995); Sweeton v. Brown, 27 F.3d
1162, 1166 (6th Cir. 1994). Plaintiff’s mention of the word “negligence” in his
complaint, therefore, fails to state a claim under § 1983.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff seeks to invoke this Court’s supplemental
jurisdiction over a state-law claim, Plaintiff has failed to state facts to support such
a claim. In Michigan, “[a] cause of action for negligence must include allegations to
support each of four elements: ‘(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2)
the defendant breached the legal duty, (3) the plaintiff suffered damages, and (4) the
defendant’s breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages.’” Kiem v. Sallie
Mae Home Loans, Inc., 859 N.W.2d 238, 243–44 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2014)
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(quoting Loweke v. Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co., LLC, 809 N.W.2d 553, 556
(Mich. 2011)).
Plaintiff alleges only that Defendant Reed let Inmate Sutton out of his cell.
Plaintiff offers no facts that would permit the Court to infer that the innocuous act of
letting Sutton out of his cell—an act that undoubtedly occurred every day—was a
breach of duty, or that such a breach was a proximate cause of Plaintiff’s injuries.
Plaintiff alleges only that one event—letting Sutton out of his cell—preceded the
other. Moreover, Plaintiff makes no allegations that Defendant Opperman had any
duty to Plaintiff or that Defendant Opperman acted or failed to act in any way that
breached that duty or caused damages. Accordingly, the Court concludes that
Plaintiff has failed to state a common law negligence claim upon which relief may be
granted.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review required by the PLRA, the Court determines that
Plaintiff’s claims will be dismissed for failure to state a claim, under 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good
faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore, 114 F.3d at 611. For
the same reasons the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s claims are properly dismissed,
the Court also concludes that any issue Plaintiff might raise on appeal would be
frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the
Court certifies that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.
A judgment consistent with this opinion will be entered.
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Dated: November 13, 2025 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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