Bitzer v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
ANDREW C. B.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________/
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:25-cv-850
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Title XVI of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that,
if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The
Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff seeks
review of the Commissioner’s decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to
submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of social security appeals,
I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and of the
record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is
limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether
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there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting the decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de
novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See
Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Factfinding is the Commissioner’s province,
and those findings are conclusive provided substantial evidence supports them. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v.
Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In
applying this standard, a court must consider the evidence as a whole, while accounting for any
evidence that fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.,
735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The substantial evidence standard contemplates a zone within
which the decision maker can properly rule either way without judicial interference. See Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords the administrative decision maker
considerable latitude and precludes reversal simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff filed an application for SSI on February 23, 2023, alleging disability due to
depression, anxiety, bipolar disorder, Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, suicidal and self-harm,
impaired sleep, panic, unstable mood, inability to focus, paranoia, inability to get along with
others, heart condition, and leg spasm. (PageID.124, 279–85.) Plaintiff was 48 years old at the
time he filed his application. (PageID.124.) He had earned a high school diploma and had not
worked in the 15 years prior to the date he filed his application. (PageID.305.) Plaintiff’s
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application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and he requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
On July 1, 2024, ALJ Robert Tjapkes held a hearing and received testimony from Plaintiff
and impartial vocational expert (VE) Shannon Smith. (PageID.56–91.) On July 16, 2024, ALJ
Tjapkes issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled from the date he filed his
application through the date of decision. (PageID.36–50.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s
request for review on June 9, 2025. (PageID.23–25.) ALJ Tjapkes’s ruling thus became the
Commissioner’s final decision. See Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432,434 (6th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff timely initiated this civil action for judicial review on July 29, 2025.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
1 1. 	An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found
to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b));
2. 	An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c));
3. 	If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the
duration requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of
Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration
of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));
4. 	If an individual is capable of performing her past relevant work, a finding of “not disabled”
must be made (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));
5. 	If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other
factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity
must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
416.920(f)).
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404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that, if a claimant suffers from a
nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders, and
he can satisfy his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so severe that he is unable to
perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functional capacity (RFC)
is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant
bears the burden of proof).
After determining that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his
application date of February 23, 2023, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from severe
impairments 	of 	chronic 	bronchitis; 	generalized 	anxiety 	disorder; 	bipolar 	disorder; 	major
depressive disorder; and alcohol use disorder. (PageID.39.) At step three, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled
any impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 1. (PageID.40–42.) Regarding Plaintiff’s mental impairments, the ALJ considered
listings 12.04 (Depressive, Bipolar, and Related Disorders) and 12.06 (Anxiety and Obsessive-
Compulsive Disorders). In applying these listings, the ALJ considered the “paragraph B” criteria
that address four broad areas of mental functioning. See 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
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1. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had moderate limitations in all areas of functioning. (PageID.41–
42.)
The ALJ then found that Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20
C.F.R. § 416.967(b), except:
[H]e can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. He can never work around
hazards such as unprotected heights or unguarded, moving machinery. He can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs. He is limited to occasional exposure to
occupational extremes of atmospheric conditions as defined in the Selected
Characteristics of Occupations (“SCO”), cold, heat, and humidity. He is able to
understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions and tasks. He can tolerate
occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors but no interaction with the
public. He can perform no production rate work such as on an assembly line. He
can tolerate occasional changes in the workplace setting.
(PageID.42–43.) 2
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (PageID.48.) At
step five, the ALJ found that based on testimony from the VE, Plaintiff was able to perform three
different jobs existing in the national economy, including merchandise marker, housekeeper, and
assembler of small products, approximately 422,000 of which existed in the national economy.
(PageID.48–49.) This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably
within what this court and others have deemed ‘significant’”). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff was not disabled.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff raises a single issue in his appeal. That is, he argues that the ALJ erred in failing
to give appropriate weight to the opinions of the medical experts, specifically, Plaintiff’s therapist,
2 The ALJ acknowledged that his RFC finding was similar to that of another ALJ in an August
2021 decision finding Plaintiff not disabled in connection with his applications for disability
insurance benefits under Title II of the Act and SSI benefits, but he found that new and material
evidence supported a change in Plaintiff’s RFC. (PageID.43, 96–111.)
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Cathy Forrest, MA, LLP, and his treating psychiatrist, Katherine Jawor, D.O. (ECF No. 8 at
PageID.1036.)
The ALJ evaluated the medical opinions pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. Under that
regulation, the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling
weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),” even an opinion
from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ will articulate his or her
determination of the persuasiveness of a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors
listed 	in 	paragraphs 	(c)(1) 	through 	(c)(5) 	of 	this 	section, 	as 	appropriate.” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§
416.920c(b)(1). Those factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with the
claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or contradict the opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1)–(5). In general, the ALJ must explain his or her consideration of the
supportability and consistency factors, but is not required to explain how the remaining factors
were considered. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2) and (3). The regulations explain “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. 	The 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical 	evidence 	and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive
the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.
(2) Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(2) and 416.920c(c)(1)–2.
The ALJ evaluated Ms. Forrest’s and Dr. Jawor’s opinions as follows:
Ms. Forrest provided numerous opinions regarding the claimant’s ability to work,
but I do not find them persuasive as they are not well supported and are inconsistent
with the evidence of record. Specifically, in July 2023, Ms. Forrest completed a
medical source statement in which she opined that the claimant, among other
things, was unable to meet competitive standards or had no useful ability to function
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in mental abilities needed to do work, would be absent from work more than four
days per month due to his mental impairments, and had no limitations exacerbated
by alcohol use (Ex. C10F). Ms. Forrest indicated that such limitations applied as
early as 2014 (Id.). She completed another medical source statement in June 2024
that was similar, albeit less extreme in the claimant’s limitations (Ex. C19F).
Furthermore, Ms. Forrest wrote letters in which she provided additional context and
opined that the claimant is “unable to effectively communicate, take direction[,] or
get along with others” (Ex. C5F, 1) and is “not able to do work related activities
that include remembering or understanding, maintaining concentration, carrying
out instructions[,] or responding appropriately to other people” (Ex. C12F, 3).
Ms. Forrest’s extreme assessments are not well supported by her therapy records,
which document some anxiety, depression, self-harm, and reports of hallucinations
and paranoia, but show the claimant reported living alone and independently,
running errands for his mother, and engaging with friends. I also note regarding
supportability that the record does not contain records from Ms. Forrest going back
to 2014 and that her medical source statements were completed on check box forms
without sufficient explanation for the medical signs to support such extreme
opinions. Furthermore, her assessments are inconsistent with the other evidence of
record, which shows that the claimant’s only visits to the emergency room and
hospitalization for suicidal ideation occurred in the context of alcohol abuse and
that the claimant was able to engage in substantial gainful activity from 2014
through 2016 (Ex. C3D). Finally, I note that Ms. Forrest wrote undated letters or
letters pre-dating the alleged onset date in which she stated that the claimant is
unable to work and is eligible for Social Security disability (Exs. C1F, 1; C5F, 1,
4; C12F, 3). Such statements are inherently neither valuable nor persuasive (20
CFR 416.920b(c)(3)).
Katherine Jawor, D.O., also provided multiple opinions regarding the claimant’s
ability to work, but I do not find them persuasive as they are not well supported and
are inconsistent with the evidence of record. Specifically, in June 2024, Dr. Jawor
wrote a letter in which she “concur[red]” with Ms. Forrest’s findings in her July
2023 opinion (Ex. C17F). Later that same month, Dr. Jawor completed her own
medical source statement in which she opined that the claimant, among other
things, was unable to meet competitive standards or had no useful ability to function
in mental abilities needed to do work, was seriously limited in his ability to interact
with others, would be absent from work more than four days per month due to his
mental impairments, and had no limitations exacerbated by alcohol use (Ex. C18F).
Like Ms. Forrest’s opinions, Dr. Jawor’s opinions are not supported by her own
treatment notes, which show that the claimant’s mental status examinations have
been relatively unremarkable and that the claimant reported medications were
immensely helpful less than twelve months after the alleged onset date. Dr. Jawor’s
treatment notes reveal the claimant reported significant levels of functioning,
including regularly cooking out with a friend, independently living alone, and
walking his mother’s dog, that are simply inconsistent with such extreme opinions.
Dr. Jawor’s opinions, like Ms. Forrest’s opinions, are also inconsistent with the
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other evidence of record, which shows that the claimant’s only visits to the
emergency room and hospitalization for suicidal ideation occurred in the context of
alcohol abuse.
(PageID.47–48.)
Plaintiff does not argue that the ALJ failed to comply with the regulation by articulating
his consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, nor does he attempt to show that
the ALJ’s analysis of those factors is not supported by substantial evidence. Rather, he contends
that the ALJ erred by relying on the prior administrative findings of the state agency medical and
psychological consultants, rather than the opinions of Ms. Forrest and Dr. Jawor, as Ms. Forrest
had counseled Plaintiff since 1988 and Dr. Jawor was highly qualified. Plaintiff further contends
that “[t]he fact that both Ms. Forrest and Dr. Jawor concur on the Claimant’s limitations would
require that their opinions be given controlling weight.” (ECF No. 8 at PageID.1049.)
These arguments lack merit because, as set forth above, the applicable regulation no longer
requires ALJs to assign specific evidentiary weight or assign controlling weight to a medical
opinion or prior administrative findings. See Gorman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:20-cv-514,
2022 WL 2284818, at *4 (E.D. Ky. June 23, 2022) (noting that ALJs no longer assign weight to
medical opinions or prior administrative findings); Normile v. Kijakazi, No. 3:20-CV-346, 2022
WL 619536, at *4 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 2, 2022) (“While Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to provide
‘good reasons’ for the weight he afforded the medical opinions, under the new regulations, the
ALJ is no longer required to assign ‘weight’ to the opinions or to give good reasons for the weight
ascribed to a treating-source opinion.”). Thus, “the treating physician rule no longer applies.” See
Takacs v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-02120, 2022 WL 447700, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 26, 2022), report
and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 445767 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 14, 2022) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In addition, Plaintiff mischaracterizes the ALJ’s assessment of the state agency
medical and psychological consultants findings as persuasive. In fact, he found the medical
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consultants’ findings “mostly persuasive” and the psychological consultants’ findings “partly
persuasive,” as they did not fully account for certain medical evidence regarding Plaintiff’s
impairments and functioning. (PageID.46–47.) But even if he had found the state agency
consultants’ findings persuasive, Plaintiff cites no authority precluding an ALJ from finding a
treating source’s opinion less persuasive than that of a state agency consultant.
Plaintiff also contends that Ms. Forrest’s and Dr. Jawor’s opinions “are supported by
objective medical evidence and detailed clinical observations,” (id. at PageID.1049), but this is not
an argument warranting remand. See McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th
Cir. 2006) (“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there
exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. . . . This is so because
there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Commissioner can act without the fear of court
interference.”) (citation omitted). As the quoted paragraphs of the ALJ’s decision show, the ALJ
fully explained and supported his analysis of the supportability and consistency factors. Plaintiff’s
argument that other evidence might support a different result is essentially an invitation to reweigh
the evidence, which the Court may not do. See Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x
411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the court “reviews the entire administrative record, but does
not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ”).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
Dated: January 30, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within that time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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