Johnson #428544 v. Goodspeed et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
AARON XAVIER JOHNSON #428544,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Paul L. Maloney
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-760
ROBERT GOODSPEED, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before me on Defendant Jeffrey Clouse’s Motion for Summary Judgment
based on the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion. (ECF No. 18.) The motion is fully briefed and
ready for decision. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), I recommend that the Court GRANT the
motion and dismiss Plaintiff’s claim against Defendant Clouse without prejudice.
I. Background
Plaintiff, a prisoner currently incarcerated with the Michigan Department of Corrections
(MDOC) at the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 on July 10, 2025, against several MDOC employees based on events that occurred at the
Oaks Correctional Facility (ECF) in July, October, and December 2022. Following initial review
of Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c),
the Court allowed Plaintiff’s following claims to proceed: (1) First Amendment retaliation claims
against Defendants Clouse, Baker, and Ward; (2) Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against
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Defendant 	Goodspeed; 	and 	(3) 	Eighth 	Amendment 	deliberate 	indifference 	claim 	against
Defendant Bruskis.1 (ECF No. 4 at PageID.55–56.)
Plaintiff’s specific allegations against Defendant Clouse concern exchanges that occurred
on October 19 and 21, 2022 concerning two Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) grievances
Plaintiff had filed. Plaintiff alleges that on October 19, 2022, Defendant Clouse stopped by his
isolation cell in unit 4 and told him that one of the PREA grievances was being denied, and the
other grievance was being investigated. (ECF No. 1 at PageID.7.) Two days later, Clouse stopped
by Plaintiff’s cell again and told him “to stop putting in grievances on his staff and maybe staff
[would not] retaliate against [Plaintiff].” (Id.)
Defendant Clouse now seeks summary judgment on the basis that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies against him.
II. Motion Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Material facts
are facts that are defined by substantive law and are necessary to apply the law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could return
judgment for the non-moving party. Id.
The court must draw all inferences in a light most favorable to the non-moving party but
may grant summary judgment when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
fact to find for the non-moving party.” Agristor Fin. Corp. v. Van Sickle, 967 F.2d 233, 236 (6th
1 Defendant Bruskis was subsequently dismissed from the action without prejudice due to
Plaintiff’s failure to provide accurate service information. (ECF No. 43.)
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Cir. 1992) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
While a moving party without the burden of proof need only show that the opponent cannot
sustain his burden at trial, a moving party with the burden of proof faces a “substantially higher
hurdle.” Arnett v. Myers, 281 F.3d 552, 561 (6th Cir. 2002). Where the moving party has the
burden, “his showing must be sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could
find other than for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir.
1986). The Sixth Circuit has emphasized that the party with the burden of proof “must show that
the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that the evidence is so
powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.” Arnett, 281 F.3d at 561 (quoting
Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001)). Accordingly, summary
judgment in favor of the party with the burden of persuasion “is inappropriate when the evidence
is susceptible of different interpretations or inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner must exhaust all available administrative
remedies before filing a lawsuit with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Prisoners are no longer required to demonstrate
exhaustion in their complaints. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007). Instead, failure to
exhaust administrative remedies is “an affirmative defense under the PLRA,” which the defendant
bears the burden of establishing. Id. With respect to what constitutes proper exhaustion, the
Supreme Court has stated that “the PLRA exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion,”
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defined as “compliance with an agency’s deadlines and other critical procedural rules.” Woodford
v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-93 (2006). In Bock, the Court reiterated:
Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is required by
the PLRA to “properly exhaust.” The level of detail necessary in a grievance to
comply with the grievance procedures will vary from system to system and claim
to claim, but it is the prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the
boundaries of proper exhaustion.
Bock, 549 U.S. at 218.
MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 sets forth the applicable grievance procedure for
prisoners in MDOC custody. Prior to submitting a grievance, a prisoner is required to “attempt to
resolve the issue with the staff member involved within two business days after becoming aware
of a grievable issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond [their] control or if the issue is
believed to fall within the jurisdiction of Internal Affairs.” Mich. Dep’t of Corr. Policy Directive
03.02.130 ¶ Q (effective 03/18/2019). If this attempt is unsuccessful (or is inapplicable), the
prisoner may submit a Step I grievance. Id. The Step I grievance must be submitted within five
business days after attempting to resolve the matter with staff. Id. The issues asserted in a grievance
“should be stated briefly but concisely,” and the “[d]ates, times, places, and names of all those
involved in the issue being grieved are to be included.” Id. at ¶ S.
If the prisoner is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a timely response,
he may appeal to Step II within ten business days of the response, or if no response was received,
within ten business days after the response was due. Id. at ¶ DD. If the prisoner is dissatisfied with
the Step II response, or does not receive a timely Step II response, he may appeal the matter to
Step III. Id. at ¶ HH. The Step III grievance must be submitted within ten business days after
receiving the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days
after the date the Step II response was due. Id.
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Defendant Clouse supports his motion for summary judgment with a Step III Grievance
Report for Plaintiff dated August 18, 2025, which shows the grievances Plaintiff filed and pursued
through Step III that arose out of incidents occurring at ECF. (ECF No. 19-3.) The Step III report
shows that the only ECF-based grievances Plaintiff filed were ECF-21-11-1611-28e and ECF-21-
07-1067-19b, both of which were filed at Step I in 2021, prior to the alleged 2022 incidents forming
the basis of Plaintiff’s claims in this action. (Id. at PageID.144.) In addition, Clouse presents an
affidavit from MDOC Litigation Specialist Tracey Raquepaw of the Office of Legal Affairs in
Lansing. (ECF No. 19-5.) Raquepaw attests that she searched the Administrative Investigations
Management database, which tracks PREA grievances, and located two in which Plaintiff was the
victim: (1) AIM #41585 against Defendant Goodspeed; and (2) AIM #42642 against Defendants
Baker and Ward. (Id. at PageID.158–59.) Raquepaw states that Goodspeed, Baker, and Ward were
the only subjects of these PREA grievances. (Id. at PageID.159, 161, 163.)
Plaintiff does not address this evidence; nor does he present his own evidence showing that
he exhausted a grievance against Clouse or included Clouse in any PREA complaint. Instead,
Plaintiff’s response focuses upon his factual allegations in this action, and he attaches two
statements from other prisoners which concern his allegations against Defendants Goodspeed,
Baker, and Ward, but have nothing to do with Defendant Clouse or any efforts by Plaintiff to
exhaust his claim against Defendant Clouse.
Plaintiff’s sole reference to exhaustion is his discussion of the Sixth Circuit’s decision in
Richards v. Perttu, 96 F.4th 911 (6th Cir. 2024), which he claims supports his right to jury trial. It
does not. In reviewing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Richards, the Supreme Court held that “as a
matter of statutory interpretation . . . parties have a right to a jury trial on PLRA exhaustion when
that issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim that falls under the Seventh Amendment.” Perttu
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v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 468 (2025). Perttu has no application here because the issue whether
Plaintiff exhausted a claim against Defendant Clouse is not intertwined with Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim against Clouse. The only evidence in the record pertaining to exhaustion shows that Plaintiff
failed to exhaust his claim, and that evidence has no bearing on the merits of Plaintiff’s retaliation
claim against Defendant Clouse. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to create a genuine issue of material
fact as to exhaustion.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the Court grant Defendant Clouse’s motion
for summary judgment and dismiss without prejudice Plaintiff’s claim against Clouse.
Dated: March 2, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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