Blaylock #895020 v. Burgess et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
JAMES BLAYLOCK #895020, 	Case No. 1:25-cv-00757
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou
Chief U.S. District Judge
v.
MICHAEL BURGESS, et al.,
Defendants.
/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
This Report and Recommendation (R. & R.) addresses Defendant Boerema’s
motion for summary judgment due to Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. ECF No. 15.
State prisoner James Blaylock filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights during misconduct
proceedings. 	ECF No. 1. 	The remaining claims are against Oaks Correctional
Facility employees, Captain (Capt.) Boerema and Lieutenant (Lt.) Baker.
Lt. Baker held a misconduct hearing on November 12, 2023, and found
Plaintiff guilty of three misconduct tickets. Plaintiff appealed that decision asserting
that he was found guilty by Lt. Baker “as a result of retaliation.” Id., PageID.15. Lt.
Baker is not moving for dismissal of this action based upon lack of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. 	ECF No. 16, PageID.84. 	However, Capt. Boerema moves
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 1
of 9

2
for summary judgment by asserting that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies against him.
Capt. Boerema held a hearing on November 15, 2023, and found Plaintiff guilty
of two misconduct tickets. 	Plaintiff appealed by asserting that “the guilty findings
was done in retaliation.” 	Id., PageID.24, 27. 	Capt. Boerema argues that Plaintiff
failed to properly exhaust his administrative remedies against him because he did
not assert on appeal “that Capt. Boerema threatened to increase Blaylock’s sanctions
if he did not plead guilty.” ECF No. 16, PageID.85.
In the Court’s screening opinion, the Court summarized Plaintiff’s claim
against Capt. Boerema:
Similarly, Plaintiff goes on to allege that on the days he appeared before
Defendant Boerema for misconduct hearings, Plaintiff told Boerema
that his due process rights had been violated and that “civil action
[would] be taken.” (Id.) According to Plaintiff, Defendant Boerema called
Plaintiff a nuisance and said that he would not be dismissing the tickets.
(Id.) Plaintiff suggests that Defendant Boerema falsified the hearing
report by stating that the camera footage showed the sergeant sliding
the tickets under Plaintiff’s cell door even after Plaintiff told Defendant
Boerema that the tickets had been hung on the wall next to Plaintiff’s
cell door. (Id.) Plaintiff also suggests that Defendant Boerema retaliated
against Plaintiff by finding him guilty and giving him a total of 40 days’
loss of privileges. (Id.)
ECF No. 5, PageID.41. (emphasis added).
For the reasons discussed below, it is respectfully recommended that the Court
deny Defendant Boerema’s motion for summary judgment.
II. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record reveals that there are no
genuine issues as to any material fact in dispute and the moving party is entitled to
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 2
of 9

3
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56; Kocak v. Comty. Health Partners of
Ohio, Inc., 400 F.3d 466, 468 (6th Cir. 2005). The standard for determining whether
summary judgment is appropriate is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient
disagreement to require submission to a jury[1] or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. McGowan, 421
F.3d 433, 436 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
251-52 (1986)). The court must consider all pleadings, depositions, affidavits, and
admissions on file, and draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the party opposing
the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986).
III. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A prisoner’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is an affirmative
defense, which Defendants have the burden to plead and prove. 	Jones v. Bock, 549
U.S. 199, 212-16 (2007). “[W]here the moving party has the burden—the plaintiff on
a claim for relief or the defendant on an affirmative defense—his showing must be
sufficient for the court to hold that no reasonable trier of fact could find other than
for the moving party.” Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254, 259 (6th Cir. 1986).
The Sixth Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the party with the burden of proof
1 	The Seventh Amendment does not always require courts to submit factual
disputes about exhaustion to a jury. 	Lee v. Willey, 789 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.
2015). However, when the exhaustion issue is intertwined with the merits of a claim,
the Seventh Amendment requires a jury trial on the exhaustion issue. 	Richards v.
Perttu, 605 U.S. 460, 479, 145 S.Ct. 1793, 1807 (2025).
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 3
of 9

4
“must show the record contains evidence satisfying the burden of persuasion and that
the evidence is so powerful that no reasonable jury would be free to disbelieve it.”
Cockrel v. Shelby Cnty. Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036, 1056 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly,
summary 	judgment 	in 	favor 	of 	the 	party 	with 	the 	burden 	of 	persuasion 	“is
inappropriate 	when 	the 	evidence 	is 	susceptible 	of 	different 	interpretations 	or
inferences by the trier of fact.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 553 (1999).
Pursuant to the applicable portion of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA),
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust his available administrative remedies. Porter
v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 733 (2001). 	A
prisoner must first exhaust available administrative remedies, even if the prisoner
may not be able to obtain the specific type of relief he seeks in the state administrative
process. Porter, 534 U.S. at 520; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741; Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215
F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 1999).
To 	properly 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies, 	prisoners 	must 	complete 	the
administrative review process in accordance with the deadlines and other applicable
procedural rules. 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19; Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 90-91
(2006). 	“Compliance with prison grievance procedures, therefore, is all that is
required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’” 	Jones, 549 U.S. at 218-19. 	In rare
circumstances, the grievance process will be considered unavailable where officers
are 	unable 	or 	consistently 	unwilling 	to 	provide 	relief, 	where 	the 	exhaustion
procedures may provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can navigate it, or “where
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 4
of 9

5
prison administrators thwart inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process
through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation.” 	Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S.
632, 644 (2016).
“Beyond doubt, Congress enacted [Section] 1997e(a) to reduce the quantity and
improve the quality of prisoner suits.” Porter, 534 U.S. at 524. In the Court’s view,
this objective was achieved in three ways. 	First, the exhaustion requirement
“afforded corrections officials time and opportunity to address complaints internally
before allowing the initiation of a federal case.” 	Id. at 525. 	Second, “the internal
review might ‘filter out some frivolous claims.’” Id. (quoting Booth, 532 U.S. at
737). And third, “adjudication could be facilitated by an administrative record that
clarifies 	the 	contours 	of 	the 	controversy.” Id. 	When 	institutions 	are 	provided
adequate notice as required under the PLRA, the opportunity to address the claims
internally furthers the additional goals of limiting judicial interference with prison
administration. Baker v. Vanderark, 1:07-cv-004, 2007 WL 3244075, *5 (W.D. Mich.,
Nov. 1, 2007).
Michigan Dept. of Corrections (MDOC) Policy Directive 03.02.130 (effective
September 25, 2023) sets forth the applicable grievance procedures for prisoners in
MDOC custody at the time relevant to this complaint. Inmates must first attempt to
informally resolve a grievable issue within two business days of becoming aware of
the issue, unless prevented by circumstances beyond his or her control. 	Id. at ¶ W.
If informal resolution is unsuccessful, the inmate may proceed to Step I of the
grievance process and submit a completed grievance form within five business days
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 5
of 9

6
of the attempted informal resolution. 	Id. at ¶¶ W, CC. 	The inmate submits the
grievance to a designated Grievance Coordinator, who assigns it to a respondent. Id.
at ¶ CC. 	The Policy Directive also provides the following directions for completing
grievance forms: “The issues should be stated briefly but concisely. 	Information
provided is to be limited to the facts involving the issue being grieved (i.e., who, what,
when, where, why, how). Dates, times, places and names of all those involved in the
issue being grieved are to be included.” Id. at ¶ Y (emphasis in original).
If the inmate is dissatisfied with the Step I response, or does not receive a
timely response, he may appeal to Step II by obtaining an appeal form within ten
business days of the response, or if no response was received, within ten days after
the response was due. 	MDOC Policy Directive 03.02.130 at ¶¶ JJ. 	The respondent
at Step II is designated by the policy, e.g., the regional health administrator for
medical care grievances. Id. at ¶ LL.
If the inmate is still dissatisfied with the Step II response, or does not receive
a timely Step II response, he may appeal to Step III using the same appeal form. 	Id.
at ¶¶ NN. 	The Step III form shall be sent within ten business days after receiving
the Step II response, or if no Step II response was received, within ten business days
after the date the Step II response was due. 	Id. 	The Grievance Section is the
respondent for Step III grievances on behalf of the MDOC director. Id. at ¶ OO.
When the grievance procedures are not available because the issue presented
is non-grievable, exhausting those procedures is not required. It is well-established
that a prisoner “cannot be required to exhaust administrative remedies regarding
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 6
of 9

7
non-grievable issues.” Figel v. Bouchard, 89 F. App’x 970, 971 (6th Cir. 2004); Mays
v. Kentucky Dept. of Corrections, 2018 WL 4603153, at *3 (W.D. Ky. Sept. 25, 2018)
(“It is beyond debate that an inmate cannot be required to exhaust administrative
remedies regarding non-grievable issues.”); Reeves v. Hobbs, 2013 WL 5462147 (W.D.
Ark. Sept. 3, 2013) (“Defendants cannot treat a complaint as non-grievable, and
therefore not subject to the grievance procedure, and then turn around and maintain
the claim fails because [the plaintiff] failed to follow the grievance procedure. As the
well-known proverb states, they cannot have their cake and eat it too.”). 	However,
when other administrative remedies are available, the prisoner is required to exhaust
those remedies prior to filing a federal lawsuit.
When prison officials waive enforcement of these procedural rules and instead
consider a non-exhausted claim on its merits, a prisoner’s failure to comply with those
rules 	will 	not 	bar 	that 	prisoner’s 	subsequent 	federal 	lawsuit. 	Reed-Bey 	v.
Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322, 325 (6th Cir. 2010). 	The Sixth Circuit has explained:
[A] prisoner ordinarily does not comply with MDOCPD 130—and
therefore does not exhaust his administrative remedies under the
PLRA—when he does not specify the names of each person from
whom he seeks relief. 	See Reed-Bey v. Pramstaller, 603 F.3d 322,
324-25 	(6th 	Cir. 	2010) 	(“Requiring 	inmates 	to 	exhaust 	prison
remedies in the manner the State provides—by, say, identifying all
relevant defendants—not only furthers [the PLRA’s] objectives, but
it 	also 	prevents 	inmates 	from 	undermining 	these 	goals 	by
intentionally defaulting their claims at each step of the grievance
process, 	prompting 	unnecessary 	and 	wasteful 	federal 	litigation
process.”). An exception to this rule is that prison officials waive any
procedural 	irregularities 	in 	a grievance 	when 	they 	nonetheless
address the grievance on the merits. See id. at 325. 	We have also
explained that the purpose of the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement “is
to allow prison officials ‘a fair opportunity’ to address grievances on
the merits to correct prison errors that can and should be corrected
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 7
of 9

8
to create an administrative record for those disputes that eventually
end up in court.” Id. at 324.
Mattox v. Edelman, 851 F.3d 583, 590-91 (6th Cir. 2017).
IV. Analysis
Under MDOC policy, a prisoner is required to grieve his retaliatory misconduct
claims in a properly filed grievance. PD 03.02.130 ¶(P) 9, 11 (“If the prisoner wishes
to pursue a claim that retaliation is the basis for a . . . misconduct [ticket], they must
file a grievance on the sole issue of retaliation and it shall not be rejected”). However,
challenges to the decision made by the hearing officer are not grievable. Id. Instead,
a plaintiff “shall file a motion or application for rehearing in order to exhaust his or
her administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of the final decision or
order.” Ayotte v. Stemen, No. 15-13826, 2019 WL 2219739, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, No. 15-13826, 2019 WL 1349607 (E.D.
Mich. Mar. 26, 2019) (citing Bergey v. Tribley, No. 2:15-CV-43, 2015 WL 7731426, at
*3 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 20, 2015), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:15-CV-43,
2015 WL 7738093 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 30, 2015).)
Here, Blaylock appealed the November 15, 2023, misconduct hearing decision
made by Capt. Boerema. Plaintiff appealed by asserting that “the guilty findings was
done in retaliation.” 	ECF No. 1, PageID.24, 27 (MDOC Class II and Class III
Misconduct Appeal). Capt. Boerema argues that Plaintiff needed to “raise the issue
of retaliatory sanctions in his appeal of the tickets” to exhaust his retaliation claim.
ECF No. 16, PageID.90; ECF No. 21, PageID.135. As previously set forth, the Court
summarized Plaintiff’s protected conduct as: 	“Plaintiff told Boerema that his due
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 8
of 9

9
process rights had been violated and that “civil action [would] be taken.” ECF No. 5,
PageID.41. 	(emphasis added). 	The Court summarized the claim as: “Defendant
Boerema retaliated against Plaintiff by finding him guilty and giving him a total of
40 days’ loss of privileges.” 	Id. (emphasis added). 	Defendant’s argument is too
narrowly focused on just the sanctions that Capt. Boerema imposed and ignores the
allegation that the decisions were retaliatory. 	In the opinion of the undersigned,
Plaintiff broadly raised the issue that Defendant Boerema’s misconduct hearing
decisions were retaliatory in his appeals. That was enough to create a genuine issue
of material fact.
V. Recommendation
Accordingly, the undersigned respectfully recommends that this Court deny
Defendant Boerema’s motion for summary judgment.
Dated: 	April 24, 2026 	/s/ `ttÜàxÇ ixÜÅttà
MAARTEN VERMAAT
U. S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
NOTICE TO PARTIES: Objections to this Report and Recommendation must
be served on opposing parties and filed with the Clerk of the Court within fourteen
(14) days of receipt of this Report and Recommendation. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C);
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). 	Failure to file timely objections
constitutes a waiver of any further right to appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Case 1:25-cv-00757-HYJ-MV ECF No. 22, PageID.<pageID> Filed 04/24/26 Page 9
of 9