Ramsdell v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
BRIAN RAMSDELL,
Plaintiff, 	Hon. Robert J. Jonker
v. 	Case No. 1:25-cv-703
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security
denying Plaintiff’s claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the
Social Security Act. Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative
record and provides that if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it shall be conclusive. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned
recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited to a review of the Commissioner’s decision
and of the record made in the administrative hearing process. Tucker v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 775 Fed. Appx. 220, 225 (6th Cir., June 10, 2019).
The scope of judicial review in a social security case is limited to determining whether
the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards in making her decision and
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whether there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting that decision. Id.
at 224-25. Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a
preponderance, and constitutes such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 US 389, 401
(1971).
The Court may not conduct a de novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary
conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. Biestek v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 880 F.3d 778, 783 (6th Cir. 2017). The substantial-evidence standard
presupposes the existence of a zone within which the decision maker can properly
rule either way, without judicial interference. Moruzzi v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 759 Fed. Appx. 396, 402 (6th Cir., Dec. 21, 2018). This standard affords
the administrative decision maker considerable latitude and indicates that a decision
supported by substantial evidence will not be reversed simply because the evidence
would have supported a contrary decision. Luukkonen v. Commissioner of Social
Security, 653 Fed. Appx. 393, 398 (6th Cir., June 22, 2016).
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was 48 years of age on his alleged onset date. (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.43). He successfully completed high school and worked previously as an
automobile mechanic helper, a diecasting machine operator, a medical equipment
repairer, and a machine builder. (Id.) Plaintiff applied for DIB benefits on
November 29, 2022, alleging that he had been disabled since September 19, 2022, due
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to multiple sclerosis, memory issues, heat sensitivity, random muscle spasms, pain
and numbness in extremities, back and neck stiffness/pain, headaches, random mood
changes, an inability to focus, and spinal scoliosis. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.34; ECF
No. 5-7, PageID.240).
Plaintiff’s application was denied, after which time he requested a hearing
before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Following an administrative hearing,
ALJ Robert Tjapkes, in an opinion dated June 11, 2024, determined that Plaintiff did
not qualify for disability benefits. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.32-45). The Appeals
Council declined to review the ALJ’s determination, rendering it the Commissioner’s
final decision in the matter. Plaintiff subsequently initiated this action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of the ALJ’s decision.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for
evaluating disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f). If the
Commissioner can make a dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further
finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also
provide that if a claimant suffers from a non-exertional impairment as well as an
exertional impairment, both are considered in determining his residual functional
capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
Plaintiff bears the burden to demonstrate that he is entitled to disability
benefits, and he satisfies his burden by demonstrating that his impairments are so
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severe that he is unable to perform his previous work, and cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, perform any other substantial gainful
employment existing in significant numbers in the national economy. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(2)(A). While the burden of proof shifts to the Commissioner at step five of
the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of proof through step
four of the procedure, the point at which his residual functioning capacity (RFC) is
determined. O’Neal v. Commissioner of Social Security, 799 Fed. Appx. 313, 315 (6th
Cir., Jan. 7, 2020).
The ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffers from multiple sclerosis and cervical
degenerative disc disease, severe impairments that whether considered alone or in
combination with other impairments, failed to satisfy the requirements of any
impairment identified in the Listing of Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.34-36).
With respect to Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform light work subject to the following limitations: (1) he cannot climb
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds; (2) he cannot work around environmental hazards such
as unprotected heights or unguarded, moving machinery; (3) he can perform
occasional crouching, crawling, kneeling, balancing, stooping, and climbing of ramps
and stairs; and (4) he can have occasional exposure to occupational extremes of heat
and vibration. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.37).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform any of his past relevant
work, at which point the burden of proof shifted to the Commissioner to establish by
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substantial evidence that there exists in the national economy a significant number
of specific jobs which Plaintiff can perform, his limitations notwithstanding. O’Neal,
799 Fed. Appx. at 316. In satisfying this burden, the ALJ may rely on a vocational
expert’s testimony. Ibid.
In this case, a vocational expert testified that there are approximately 635,000
jobs in the national economy which an individual with Plaintiff’s RFC could perform.
(ECF No. 5-2, PageID.78). This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g.,
Taskila v. Commissioner of Social Security, 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix
thousand jobs in the United States fits comfortably within what this court and others
have deemed ‘significant’ ”). Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not
entitled to benefits.
I. 	Residual Functional Capacity
A claimant’s RFC represents the “most [a claimant] can still do despite [his]
limitations.” Sullivan v. Commissioner of Social Security, 595 Fed. Appx. 502, 505
(6th Cir., Dec. 12, 2014); see also, Social Security Ruling 96-8P, 1996 WL 374184 at
*1 (Social Security Administration, July 2, 1996) (a claimant’s RFC represents her
ability to perform “work-related physical and mental activities in a work setting on
a regular and continuing basis,” defined as “8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an
equivalent work schedule”).
Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ’s RFC assessment
is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
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did not properly assess the medical opinions, consider all Plaintiff’s impairments, or
properly address Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms.
In support of his RFC assessment, the ALJ noted the following, inter alia.
MRI scans show Plaintiff’s multiple sclerosis and cervical impairments with no new
lesions or changes. (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.315, 351-52, 354, 359, 363, 365). Plaintiff
receives infusions twice per year to manage his multiple sclerosis. (ECF No. 5-3,
PageID.85, 89, 95, 99-100; ECF No. 5-7, PageID.259, 277; ECF No. 5-8, PageID.329.)
During a consultive examination in March 2023, Plaintiff reported that he was not
on any medication and was following up with neurology. (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.394).
Examinations revealed that Plaintiff exhibited normal gait, strength, coordination,
sensation, reflexes, and mental status findings. (ECF No. 5-3, PageID.89, 95; ECF
No. 5-8, PageID.321-22, 324, 326, 334-35, 395-97; ECF No. 5-9, PageID.485-86).
The ALJ recognized that Plaintiff experienced certain physical limitations and,
accordingly, restricted Plaintiff to a limited range of light work. The ALJ examined
the evidence in detail, and his RFC assessment is supported by substantial evidence.
Plaintiff has not articulated any error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment, but instead,
merely urges this Court to re-weigh the evidence and reach a different conclusion.
The ALJ is tasked with determining a claimant’s RFC. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c),
416.946(c). While the ALJ may not “play doctor” and substitute her own opinion for
that of a medical professional, the ALJ is not required to tailor her RFC assessment
to any particular opinion or item of medical evidence. See, e.g., Poe v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 342 Fed. Appx. 149, 157 (6th Cir., Aug. 18, 2009). Instead, the
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ALJ is “charged with the responsibility of evaluating the medical evidence and the
claimant’s testimony to form an assessment of her residual functional capacity.”
Webb v. Commissioner of Social Security, 368 F.3d 629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004).
This is precisely what the ALJ did, and the ALJ’s RFC assessment is
supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ should have
weighed and evaluated the evidence differently is not grounds for relief.
Accordingly, this argument is rejected.
II. 	Medical Source Opinion
Following Plaintiff’s psychological consultative examination, Dr. Robert
Griffith, PsyD, ABAP,1 reported that Plaintiff experienced far greater functional
limitations regarding his mental health than the ALJ recognized. (ECF No. 5-8,
PageID.386-90). The ALJ, however, found that the doctor’s observations were “not
persuasive.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.42). Plaintiff argues that he is entitled to relief
because the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Griffith’s and Gray’s statements is not
supported by substantial evidence.
Because Plaintiff filed his application after March 27, 2017, the ALJ evaluated
the opinions in question pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. This regulation provides
that the ALJ “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary weight, including
1 Plaintiff notes in his brief that the ALJ titled Dr. Griffith “LP,” rendering it
“unclear” whether the ALJ credited him as “an acceptable medical source” in his
evaluation. (ECF No. 9, PageID.513). The record supports that that the ALJ was
aware that Dr. Griffith was a licensed psychologist as that title is listed underneath
Dr. Griffith’s name on his report that the ALJ cited to. (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.386).
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controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s),” even an opinion from a treating source. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a).
Instead, the ALJ is required to articulate his determination of the persuasiveness of
a medical opinion “in a single analysis using the factors listed in paragraphs (c)(1)
through (c)(5) of this section, as appropriate.” Id. § 416.920c(b)(1).
These factors include: (1) supportability; (2) consistency; (3) relationship with
the claimant; (4) specialization; and (5) other factors which tend to support or
contradict the opinion. Id. § 416.920c(1)-(5). The ALJ must explain his
consideration of the supportability and consistency factors, but absent circumstances
not present here, he is not required to explain how the remaining factors were
considered. Id. § 416.920c(b)(2), (3). The regulations define “supportability” and
“consistency” as follows:
(1) 	Supportability. The more relevant the objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support
his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s),
the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative
medical finding(s) will be.
(2) 	Consistency. The more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more
persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical
finding(s) will be.
Id. § 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
With respect to Plaintiff’s functional mental limitations, Dr. Griffith reported
the following. Plaintiff “will have mild difficulties with short instructions and
marked difficulties dealing with detailed instructions.” (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.390).
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Plaintiff “will likely be better with routine” and “will have marked or extreme
difficulties maintaining attention and concentration throughout the day.” (Ibid.).
He found that Plaintiff’s “reliability and dependability will be markedly limited.”
(Ibid.). He noted that Plaintiff’s “pace and endurance seem to be quite low” and
that “[h]e will have marked difficulties tolerating social stressors.” (Ibid.).
Regarding Plaintiff’s general mental health, Plaintiff did not report to Dr.
Griffith any previous mental health care, including medication, outside of cognitive
and neurological care (ECF No. 5-3, PageID.96; ECF No. 5-8, PageID.389-90). The
record largely contains benign mental status findings. (ECF No. 5-8, PageID.326,
334; ECF No. 5-9, PageID.485). In his application for benefits, Plaintiff reported
that his daily activities include the following: dishes, laundry, mowing, shoveling
snow, grocery shopping, making meals, driving, handling finances, working on cars,
and summer camping. (ECF No. 5-7, PageID.248-50).
In support of his assessment of Dr. Griffith’s statements, the ALJ cited the
above evidence, which simply fails to support Dr. Griffith’s statements regarding
Plaintiff’s functional mental limitations. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.39-40). The ALJ
also noted that the doctor’s statements were inconsistent with those of other opinions
in the record. (ECF No. 5-3, Page ID.86-89, 96). As noted above, the ALJ, in his
RFC assessment, restricted Plaintiff to a limited range of light work. These
limitations are supported by the record. To the extent Dr. Griffith’s statements are
interpreted as articulating even greater mental limitations, the ALJ reasonably
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discounted such and his rationale for doing so is supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, this argument is rejected.2
III. Plaintiff’s Subjective Allegations
Plaintiff asserts that, at the administrative hearing, he had “difficulty
expressing himself, could not recall words[,] or provided piecemeal responses” (ECF
No. 5-2, PageID.66-69), demonstrating that his depressive symptoms “are more than
de minimus” (ECF No. 9, PageID.516). The ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “depressive
disorder” was “nonsevere” because it “does not cause more than minimal limitation
in the claimant’s ability to perform basic mental work activities.” (ECF No. 5-2,
PageID.35). At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff also reported that he could not
complete a flight of stairs without stopping and that he had to sit after fifteen
minutes of standing while washing the dishes. (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.71-73). As
noted above, the ALJ restricted Plaintiff to a limited range of light work. Plaintiff
argues that he is entitled to relief because the ALJ improperly discounted his
subjective allegations.
While “pain alone, if the result of a medical impairment, may be severe enough
to constitute disability,” King v. Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984), a
claimant’s “statements about [her] pain or other symptoms will not alone establish
2 Plaintiff also states that his symptoms increased although Natalie Gray, M.D., a
non-examining consultant, noted that Plaintiff’s fatigue and dizziness would
“likely. . . improve with ongoing treatment.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.71-72; ECF
No. 5-3, PageID.100). Plaintiff additionally contests the ALJ’s characterization of
his twice-a-year infusion treatment as “conservative.” (ECF No. 5-2, PageID.41).
The Court is unpersuaded by these bare assertions.
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that [she is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(a); see also, Hash v. Commissioner of
Social Security, 309 Fed. Appx. 981, 989 (6th Cir., Feb. 10, 2009).
Instead, a claimant’s assertions of disabling pain and limitation are evaluated
pursuant to the following standard. First, it must be determined whether the
claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably be
expected to produce the claimant’s alleged symptoms. See Titles II and XVI:
Evaluation of Symptoms in Disability Claims, Social Security Ruling 16-3p, 2016
WL 1119029 at *3-4 (S.S.A., Mar. 16, 2016). Next, the intensity and persistence of
the claimant’s symptoms are evaluated to determine the extent to which such limit
her ability to perform work-related activities. Id. at *4-9.3
As is also well recognized, “subjective complaints may support a finding of
disability only where objective medical evidence confirms the severity of the alleged
symptoms.” Workman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 105 Fed. Appx. 794, 801
(6th Cir., July 29, 2004). Where the objective medical evidence fails to confirm the
severity of a claimant’s subjective allegations, however, the ALJ “has the power and
discretion to weigh all of the evidence and to resolve the significant conflicts in the
3 Social Security Ruling 16-3p rescinded Social Security Ruling 96-7p. Id. at *1.
However, the adoption of this new Social Security Ruling did not alter the analysis
for evaluating a claimant’s subjective statements. Instead, as the Social Security
Administration stated, it was simply “eliminating the use of the term ‘credibility’ [so
as to] clarify that that subjective symptom evaluation is not an examination of an
individual’s character.” Ibid. As courts recognize, aside from this linguistic
clarification, “[t]he analysis under SSR 16-3p otherwise is identical to that
performed under SSR 96-7p.” Young v. Berryhill, 3:17-cv-395 DW, 2018 WL
1914732 at *6 (W.D. Ky., Apr. 23, 2018).
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administrative record.” In this respect, it is recognized that the ALJ’s credibility
assessment “must be accorded great weight and deference.” Ibid. It is not for this
Court to reevaluate such evidence anew, and so long as the ALJ’s determination is
supported by substantial evidence, it must stand. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Commissioner
of Social Security, 540 Fed. Appx. 508, 511 (6th Cir., Oct. 4, 2013) (“[w]e have held
that an administrative law judge’s credibility findings are virtually
unchallengeable”).
There is no dispute that Plaintiff experiences significant limitations resulting
from his various impairments. As discussed above, however, the evidence does not
support Plaintiff’s testimony that he is limited to the extent alleged. The Court is
not permitted to re-weigh the evidence. The ALJ articulated a clear rationale in
support of his decision to discount Plaintiff’s subjective allegations and the ALJ’s
conclusions and rationale are supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, this
argument is rejected.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, the undersigned recommends that the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
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OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk
of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within such time waives the right to appeal
the District Court’s order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v.
Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Respectfully submitted,
Date: January 26, 2026 	/s/ Phillip J. Green
PHILLIP J. GREEN
United States Magistrate Judge
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