Tapia v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
SOUTHERN DIVISION
MISTY T.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_________________________________/
Hon. Paul L. Maloney
Case No. 1:25-cv-641
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is an action pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
to review a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff’s claim for
Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) under Title II of the Social Security Act.
Section 405(g) limits the Court to a review of the administrative record and provides that
if the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, it shall be conclusive. The
Commissioner has found that Plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the Act. Plaintiff seeks
review of the Commissioner’s decision.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), authorizing United States Magistrate Judges to
submit proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition of social security appeals,
I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court’s jurisdiction is confined to a review of the Commissioner’s decision and of the
record made in the administrative hearing process. See Willbanks v. Sec’y of Health and Human
Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th Cir. 1988). The scope of judicial review in a social security case is
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limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards and whether
there exists in the record substantial evidence supporting the decision. See Brainard v. Sec’y of
Health and Human Servs., 889 F.2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court may not conduct a de
novo review of the case, resolve evidentiary conflicts, or decide questions of credibility. See
Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984). Factfinding is the Commissioner’s province,
and those findings are conclusive provided substantial evidence supports them. See 42 U.S.C. §
405(g).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance. See Cohen v.
Sec’y of Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992). It is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. See Richardson
v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Bogle v. Sullivan, 998 F.2d 342, 347 (6th Cir. 1993). In
applying this standard, a court must consider the evidence as a whole, while accounting for any
evidence that fairly detracts from its weight. See Richardson v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
735 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1984). The substantial evidence standard contemplates a zone within
which the decision maker can properly rule either way without judicial interference. See Mullen v.
Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). This standard affords the administrative decision maker
considerable latitude and precludes reversal simply because the evidence would have supported a
contrary decision. See Bogle, 998 F.2d at 347; Mullen, 800 F.2d at 545.
PROCEDURAL POSTURE
Plaintiff filed an application for DIB on August 3, 2022, alleging that she had been
disabled since April 15, 2016, due to bursitis of the hip, gastric bypass sleeve, asthma, anemia,
degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, seizures, anxiety, depression, and post-traumatic stress
disorder. (PageID.88; 201–05.) Plaintiff was 43 years old at the time she filed her application.
(PageID.88.) Plaintiff had completed two years of college and had previous work as a receptionist
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and a retail sales clerk. (PageID.34, 2228.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on
reconsideration, after which she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ).
On April 9, 2024, ALJ Cynthia Harmon held a video hearing and received testimony from
Plaintiff and Susan Rowe, an impartial vocational expert (VE). (PageID.49–85.) Prior to the
hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to March 25, 2020. (PageID.224.) On June 14,
2024, the ALJ issued a written decision finding that Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits because
she was not disabled from her amended alleged onset date through the date of the decision.
(PageID.18–36.) The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on April 11, 2025.
(PageID.9–11.) Therefore, the ALJ’s ruling became the Commissioner’s final decision. See Cook
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 480 F.3d 432, 434 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff timely initiated this civil action
for judicial review on June 9, 2025.
ANALYSIS OF THE ALJ’S DECISION
The social security regulations articulate a five-step sequential process for evaluating
disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a-f), 416.920(a-f).1 If the Commissioner can make a
1 1. 	An individual who is working and engaging in substantial gainful activity will not be found
to be “disabled” regardless of medical findings (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(b), 416.920(b));
2. 	An individual who does not have a “severe impairment” will not be found “disabled” (20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c));
3. 	If an individual is not working and is suffering from a severe impairment which meets the
duration requirement and which “meets or equals” a listed impairment in Appendix 1 of
Subpart P of Regulations No. 4, a finding of “disabled” will be made without consideration
of vocational factors (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 416.920(d));
4. 	If an individual is capable of performing her past relevant work, a finding of “not disabled”
must be made (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(e), 416.920(e));
5. 	If an individual’s impairment is so severe as to preclude the performance of past work, other
factors including age, education, past work experience, and residual functional capacity
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dispositive finding at any point in the review, no further finding is required. See 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The regulations also provide that, if a claimant suffers from a
nonexertional impairment as well as an exertional impairment, both are considered in determining
residual functional capacity. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The burden of establishing the right to benefits rests squarely on Plaintiff’s shoulders, and
she can satisfy her burden by demonstrating that her impairments are so severe that she is unable
to perform her previous work, and cannot, considering her age, education, and work experience,
perform any other substantial gainful employment existing in significant numbers in the national
economy. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); Cohen, 964 F.2d at 528. While the burden of proof shifts
to the Commissioner at step five of the sequential evaluation process, Plaintiff bears the burden of
proof through step four of the procedure, the point at which her residual functional capacity (RFC)
is determined. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987); Walters v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997) (ALJ determines RFC at step four, at which point claimant
bears the burden of proof).
After determining that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Act through
September 30, 2021, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her amended alleged
onset date of March 25, 2020, through September 30, 2021, the ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered
from severe impairments of degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine status-post fusion;
history of gastric bypass surgery; gastroesophageal reflux disease; esophagus dysmotility disorder;
episodic pancreatitis; migraine headaches; obesity; generalized anxiety disorder; and major
depressive disorder. (PageID.20–21.)
must be considered to determine if other work can be performed (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f),
416.920(f)).
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At step three, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination
of impairments that met or medically equaled any impairment identified in the Listing of
Impairments detailed in 20 C.F.R., Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (PageID.22–25.) The ALJ
then found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work within the meaning of 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1567(a), subject to the following limitations:
[T]he claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but never climb ladders,
ropes, and scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl.
The claimant must avoid dangerous workplace hazards such as unprotected heights
or dangerous moving machinery. The claimant cannot be exposed to more than
moderate noise levels as defined by the DOT. The claimant can carry out simple
instructions that do not involve detailed or complex decision making or judgment.
The claimant can tolerate occasional changes in a routine work setting. The
claimant cannot be required to work at a production rate pace or have hourly quota
requirements, but is able to complete flexible daily quotas by the end of the day.
(PageID.24.)
At step four, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as
a receptionist and a retail sales clerk. (PageID.34.) At step 5, however, based on the VE’s
testimony, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was able to perform the jobs of order clerk, document
preparer, and table worker, approximately 117,000 of which existed in the national economy.
(PageID.35–36, 82.) This represents a significant number of jobs. See, e.g., Taskila v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902, 905 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[s]ix thousand jobs in the United States fits
comfortably within what this court and others have deemed ‘significant’”). Therefore, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled.
DISCUSSION
In her appeal, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s RFC finding as contrary to law for failing to
describe the “total limiting effects” of her impairments. More specifically, Plaintiff contends that
the ALJ erred in not adopting time-off-task and workplace absence limitations due to her failure
properly to evaluate Plaintiff’s treating physician’s opinion and Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms.
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A claimant’s RFC represents the “most [a claimant] can still do despite [his or her]
limitations.” Sullivan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 595 F. App’x 502, 505 (6th Cir. 2014); see also SSR
96-8P, 1996 WL 374184, at *1 (a claimant’s RFC represents her ability to perform “work-related
physical and mental activities in a work setting on a regular and continuing basis,” defined as “8
hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule”). In determining a claimant’s
RFC, the ALJ considers medical source statements and all other evidence of record. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1545(a)(3); see also Reynolds v. Saul, No. 4:20-CV-83, 2021 WL 2169091, at *4 (W.D. Ky.
May 27, 2021) (“The RFC finding is based on a consideration of medical opinions and all other
evidence in the case record, including a claimant’s subjective statements about his impairments.”).
The ALJ’s RFC determination must be supported by substantial evidence. Torres v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 490 F. App’x 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2012). However, an RFC finding “need not correspond
to, or even be based on any specific medical opinion.” Simon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-
CV-259, 2017 WL 1017733, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2017), report and recommendation
adopted, 2017 WL 3172717 (S.D. Ohio July 25, 2017) (citing Brown v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 602
F. App’x 328, 331 (6th Cir. 2015)).
As an initial matter, Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ’s RFC discussion was “highly
conclusory” and thus deficient because she simply discussed the evidence and provided
conclusions without connecting specific evidence to her conclusions—in other words, she failed
to provide the required “logical bridge”— is unpersuasive. (ECF No. 7 at PageID.3220–21.) Over
several pages of her decision, the ALJ discussed the evidence of record, including Plaintiff’s
hearing testimony regarding her impairments’ impacts on her functioning, the medical evidence
reflecting gastric bypass surgery and follow-up examinations, various other examination findings
and diagnostic and imaging studies, back surgery in August 2021 and post-surgical findings,
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Plaintiff’s subjective reports of symptoms, and Plaintiff’s mental health treatment with medication
management and therapy. (PageID.26–30.) The ALJ then evaluated the medical opinions and prior
administrative findings in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, finding Plaintiff’s treating
doctor’s opinions unpersuasive in most, but not all, respects and finding the State agency medical
and psychological consultants’ opinions unpersuasive. (PageID.31–32.) The ALJ then evaluated
Plaintiff’s subjective symptoms in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3) and SSR 16-3p,
2016 WL 1119029, discussing in separate paragraphs degenerative changes in her lumbar spine
requiring surgical intervention, her esophagus dysmotility disorder, nausea, emesis, abdominal
pain, gastroesophageal reflexes disease, and pancreatitis, her migraine symptoms, and her mental
health and its effects on her functioning. (PageID.33.) Last, the ALJ tied it all up in a paragraph
discussing each RFC limitation and explaining how the evidence supported those findings.2
(PageID.33–34.) The ALJ’s decision comported with the “narrative discussion” requirement of
SSR 96-8p as it “provide[d] an “accurate and logical bridge between the evidence and the result.”
Meyer v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 10-cv-12963, 2011 WL 3440152, at *9 (E.D. Mich. June 9,
2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 3471411 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Turning to the opinion evidence, B. Davidson, M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician, opined
on Plaintiff’s physical limitations, including her capacities to sit, stand, and walk in an eight-hour
workday and lift and carry weight, which were generally consistent with a reduced range of light
work. (PageID.31, 3081–82.) Dr. Davidson also opined that Plaintiff would be absent more than
2 The ALJ’s “in sum” paragraph included the sentence, “It [the RFC] is not supported by or
consistent with the record.” (PageID.33–34.) This appears to be a misstatement, as the introductory
sentence confirmed that “the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the
record.” (PageID.33.)
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five days a month and need more than 45-minute unscheduled breaks during an eight-hour
workday. (PageID.3081.) The ALJ found this portion of the opinion unpersuasive because Plaintiff
was more limited in some respects and less limited in others:
The undersigned finds this opinion to be unpersuasive. Dr. Davidson supports this
opinion by citing to the claimant’s low back pain, alleged failed surgical repair, and
post-surgical complications. These conditions support a finding of limits to the
claimant’s functioning. (12F). However, the degree of limitations described are
inconsistent 	with 	the 	overall 	record. 	The 	claimant 	provided 	imaging 	of
degenerative changes to her lumbar spine that caused foraminal and disc space
narrowing at L5-S1. Even after surgical intervention of the claimant’s L5-S1
condition an osteophyte remained that caused moderate narrowing of the neural
foramina 	bilaterally 	at 	L5-S1. 	(5F/150; 	6F/240, 	242, 	244-245, 	248-252).
Examinations found that the claimant’s lumbar spine condition could cause the
claimant to experience muscle weakness, limited reflexes and sensation, impaired
coordination, and an antalgic gait. These combined symptoms supported limiting
the claimant to less than four hours of standing. They also supported limiting the
claimant to lifting no more than ten pounds. Therefore, they supported limiting the
claimant to no more than sedentary activity. (5F/66, 72, 87, 133, 137, 148, 162,
170; 6F/20). As for the claimant’s ability to use her hands, Dr. Davidson cites to
the claimant’s degenerative cervical disc disease in support of these limitations.
The claimant’s degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine is a non-severe
impairment. Therefore, it does not support any limitations to functioning. This
portion of the opinion is inconsistent with the record. (5F/166).
(PageID.31.) Regarding the doctor’s opined time-off-task and workplace absence limitations, the
ALJ wrote:
As for the claimant’s time of [sic] task and workplace absences, the undersigned
finds this to be unpersuasive. While the claimant exhibited periods of pain with
limited functioning, (5F/66, 72, 87, 133, 137, 148, 162, 170; 6F/20), the claimant
generally retained grossly intact functioning despite her pain symptoms. The
claimant’s strength was 5/5. (5F/72, 95, 98, 137, 147, 162; 6F/20, 55, 63, 95, 106,
131, 144). Her reflexes were 2+. (5F/72, 87, 137, 147; 6F/20, 51, 112, 132). The
claimant’s extremities had full range of motion. (5F/42, 51, 67, 98, 137; 6F/55, 79).
Her sensation (5F/87, 95, 137; 6F/55, 63, 106, 131, 144), and coordination were
intact. (6F/87, 106, 133). She walked with a normal, unaided gait. (5F/87, 98, 137).
(PageID.32.)
Plaintiff contends that because the ALJ cited abnormal findings to support the RFC’s
limitation to sedentary work, she should have found that these same findings supported Dr.
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Davidson’s time-off-task and workplace limitations. (ECF No. 7 at PageID.3221–22.) But nothing
prevented the ALJ from citing the same or similar evidence for different purposes: on the one hand,
to impose greater exertional limitations than Dr. Davidson and the State agency consultants opined,
and on the other, to conclude that Plaintiff’s pain symptoms did not limit her functioning to an
extent requiring work-preclusive limitations. The ALJ was tasked with evaluating and weighing
the medical evidence, and her decision reflects that she acted within her “zone of choice.” See
Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (observing that “[t]he
substantial-evidence standard . . . presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which the
decisionmakers can go either way” and that as long as substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
finding, the fact that the record contains evidence which could support an opposite conclusion is
irrelevant) (quotation marks omitted). Moreover, the ALJ did not exceed her adjudicative role by
interpreting “raw medical data” and playing doctor, as Plaintiff argues, after rejecting the medical
opinions. (ECF No. 7 at PageID.3222.) As noted above, the ALJ’s RFC finding was not required
to correspond to, or be supported by, a specific medical opinion. Instead, the ALJ’s decision
reflects that she properly “considered and weighed the evidence in the entire record, and drew
appropriate conclusions from that evidence.” O’Donnell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-CV-
436, 2015 WL 5749485, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2015).
Regarding Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, the ALJ concluded, in relevant part:
As for the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting
effects of his or her symptoms, they are inconsistent with the record. The claimant
provided imaging of degenerative changes to her lumbar spine that caused
foraminal and disc space narrowing at L5-S1. Even after surgical intervention of
the claimant’s L5-S1 condition an osteophyte remained that caused moderate
narrowing of the neural foramina bilaterally at L5-S1. (5F/150; 6F/240, 242, 244-
245, 248-252). Examinations found that the claimant’s lumbar spine condition
could cause the claimant to experience muscle weakness, limited reflexes and
sensation, impaired coordination, and an antalgic gait. (5F/66, 72, 87, 133, 137,
148, 162, 170; 6F/20). However, these limitations were not chronic. They were
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periodic. Numerous examinations found that the claimant’s strength was 5/5.
(5F/72, 95, 98, 137, 147, 162; 6F/20, 55, 63, 95, 106, 131, 144). Her reflexes were
2+. (5F/72, 87, 137, 147; 6F/20, 51, 112, 132). The claimant’s extremities had full
range of motion. (5F/42, 51, 67, 98, 137; 6F/55, 79). Her sensation (5F/87, 95, 137;
6F/55, 63, 106, 131, 144), and coordination were intact. (6F/87, 106, 133). She
walked with a normal, unaided gait. (5F/87, 98, 137).
(PageID.33.)
Here, the ALJ properly considered the record as a whole and found that Plaintiff was not
as limited as she claimed. While the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s back impairments caused her pain,
she also found that Plaintiff’s limitations were “periodic” rather than “chronic” and that Plaintiff’s
symptoms generally did not affect her functioning. Plaintiff contends that having found her pain
symptoms to be variable, the ALJ was required to account for them in her RFC finding. (ECF No.
7 at PageID.3224.) But the ALJ did account for these periodic symptoms by limiting Plaintiff to
sedentary work. (PageID.33–34.) While Plaintiff argues for a different result, her alternative
interpretation of the evidence is, in effect, a request to reweigh it. If the Commissioner’s decision
denying benefits is supported by substantial evidence, as it is here, the decision must be affirmed.
Longworth v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005).
Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate error warranting remand.3
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, I recommend that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
Dated: February 9, 2026 	/s/ Sally J. Berens
SALLY J. BERENS
U.S. Magistrate Judge
3 Given the foregoing conclusions, I find no need to address Plaintiff’s argument that the VE’s
testimony regarding absenteeism was vague. (ECF No. 7 at PageID.3222–23.)
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NOTICE
OBJECTIONS to this report and recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court
within 14 days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file
objections within that time waives the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See Thomas v.
Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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